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ABSTRACT 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility evidences the recognition by 
the international community that crimes against international law are committed by 
individuals, not abstract entities and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced. 
This principle which was first propagated by the Nuremberg tribunal has now 
been confirmed and codified by the international community in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute established a sui generis permanent 
international criminal court and unequivocally provides that a person who commits a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be held individually responsible and liable 
for punishment. 
This study explores this undertaking by the international community to replace 
the culture of impunity with the culture of accountability. The study celebrates the 
historic establishment of the Court but suggests that it is not yet time for hurrah. The 
international community must demonstrate its support for the Court by mustering the 
political will to cooperate fully with the Court and free the Court from inherent 
bottlenecks in the Statute that may restrict the effectiveness of the Court. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
=============================================================== 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
___________________________ 
 
 
The genre of law referred to as international criminal law deals with the 
proscription and the prosecution of individuals who commit egregious crimes that 
threaten the peace and security of the international community.1  The rationale for the 
prosecution of individuals who violate international crimes is to ensure an international 
criminal justice system that does not allow any safe heaven for an accused person.2  
Therefore, the goal of international criminal justice is to establish a system that ensures 
the prosecution of an accused regardless of his or her country of nationality or position.3   
The agitation of international criminal justice was originally staunchly resisted by 
States which oppose the notion that international law should regulate behavior of 
governments over their nationals.  Such notion of direct international regulation of 
nationals was considered a heresy, let alone the suggestion that international law should 
proscribe accountability for individuals accused of criminal infractions.4  This is because 
the body of laws generally referred to as international law was conceptually designed to 
                                                 
1The term “international community” is used to refer to the group of countries as represented in the United 
Nations. 
2 United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan echoed that the goal of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) is to “ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta, and no army anywhere can abuse human rights 
with impunity.”  See, United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview, 
available at: http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.html (last visited March 6, 2006) [hereinafter ICC 
Overview]. 
3 Id. (indicating that we need international criminal court inter alia, “to achieve justice for all”, “to end 
impunity”, “to help end conflicts”, “to remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals”, “to take over when 
national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act”, and “to deter future war criminals”). 
4 Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 4 (Oxford, 2nd Ed. 2001). 
 3 
provide rights and obligations primarily to States.  Individuals were not regarded as 
subjects of international law but third party beneficiaries.5   
The notion that States are the primary subjects of international law was 
entrenched by the Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 16486 which led to the disintegration of 
western Christendom and inspired a universalization of international relations and, 
therefore, of international law.7  The Peace Treaty of Westphalia reflected the emergent 
political philosophy of statehood premised on the theory of political sovereignty as the 
cornerstone of the rights and duties of the various States that came into existence.8  
International law was therefore developed along statehood.  Thus, according to the 
positive school9 which overshadowed the field of international law from late eighteenth 
century, international law is concerned primarily with relations between States and 
between their sovereigns. 10  Under the positive school of thought, State sovereignty was 
absolute and inviolable.11  
Accordingly, many States legislative practice recognizes that the first and best 
established jurisdictional principle is “territoriality.” Territoriality is considered the 
                                                 
5 Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 4, at 4. 
6 The Peace Treaty of Westphalia is a peace settlement enacted in 1648.  This treaty ended the war between 
Spain, the Dutch, and Germany and introduced international legal doctrine that is premised on non-
interventionist concepts including sovereignty, self-determination, territorial integrity, and consent. Leo 
Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 25 (Leo Gross ed., 1969) [hereinafter The Peace of Westphalia]. 
7 After the Peace Treaty of Westphalia, the French, the German, and the Swedish princes to form a slack 
confederation of independent states.  See Benjamin B. Ferencz, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 8 (Oceana Publications, Inc., 1st ed. 1980). 
8 Taslim O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L. L. 285 (1980).   
9 The Positive school of thoughts displaced the Naturalist school of thoughts comprising legal 
commentators such as Hugo Grotius, Francisco de Vitoria, and Francisco Suraez in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.  According to the Naturalist school of thoughts, law was “found, not made” as it was 
derived from abstract and universal principles of justice.  Consequently, there was little distinction, if any, 
between national and international law because the same principles were supposed to bind all people in all 
places.  See Peter Malanczuk, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 15-16 (Routledge, 7th rev. ed. 1997). 
10Id., 118; Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 4, at 4. 
11 Id. 
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normal, and nationality the exceptional, basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.12  Under 
this scheme, States have the primary responsibility to prosecute those responsible for 
grave breach of human rights abuses such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes violations in their own courts.13   
While it is settled that States are the primary subject of international law, 
international law scholars have continued to query whether international law as a legal 
system recognizes other individuals and non-state actors as persons or subjects of 
international law.14  As noted above, during the early stages of the development of 
international law, States were generally regarded as the only entity capable of possessing 
international legal personality.  And international law was traditionally defined as the law 
that governs relations between States.15  International law commentators were unwilling 
to accept that a non-state actor can be a subject of the international legal system.16  On 
the other hand, where they acknowledge that non-state actors possess rights and 
obligations under international law, this was considered as emanating from their relation 
or dependence upon a State, that is, such rights and obligations are purely derivative.17 
                                                 
12 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States, § 402 cmt. (American Law Institute, 
1987).  Note however that some states’ legislative practice including the U.S. also recognize that a state 
may exercise universal jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses of universal concern which are 
recognized by the community of nations, such as piracy, the slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of an 
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated 
in section 402 are present. 
13 Jules Deschenes, Toward International Criminal Justice, in PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES, 29, 32 (Rogers Clark & Madeleine Sann, eds., Transnational Publishers, 1st ed. 1996). 
14 Hugh M. Kindred et al. eds., INTERNATIONAL LAW AS CHIEFLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
IN CANADA 4th ed. 271(1987).  
15 See L. Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 5 (7th ed. 1948); S.S. Lotus (France v. 
Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18. 
16 See D.P. O’Connell, INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (2nd ed. 1970) (observing that “a half century ago the 
international lawyers could content themselves with the proposition that States only are subjects of 
international law”).   
17 See Thomas Buergenthal & Harold G. Maier, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 
(1990). 
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States played a pivotal role towards the formation of the international legal order, 
and international society was organized as a matter of law around the existence of 
States.18 However, in the past 75 years, there have been increased opportunities for 
interaction between States and individuals mainly due to the improvement in technology 
especially in the area of computerized information; the end of World War II; and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union which led to the end of the Communist government.19 
As States became to take active interest in commercial activities, States began to 
gradually embrace the concept of restrictive sovereign immunity.20  Similarly, these 
period have witnessed increase in global problems in areas such as the environment, 
energy, migration, overpopulation, human rights and international crimes, natural 
resources, and trade.  Also, from the early twentieth century, the grip of the positive 
school of thoughts’ idea on the inviolability of State sovereignty began to dwindle.21  
Thus, the continued propagation of the view that public international law applies 
only to States and therefore only States could be persons or subjects of international legal 
system is misleading and erroneous.22  Equally mistaken is the argument that the rights 
and duties conferred on non-state entities under international law are solely derivative.23 
                                                 
18 Ian Brownlie, A Rebirth of Statehood, in Malcolm D. Evans, ed., ASPECTS OF STATEHOOD AND 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 5 (1996). 
19 James E. Hickey, Jr., The Source of International Legal Personality in the 21st Century, 2 HOFSTRA L 
POL’Y SYM 1, 2 (1997). 
20 Peter Malanczuk, supra note 9, at 119.  Restrictive sovereign immunity is generally referred to as 
qualified sovereign immunity under which a State retains immunity from lawsuits based on its official 
public acts, but may be subject to a foreign State’s jurisdiction regarding claims arising out of its private 
acts, such as commercial behavior.  See, Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head-of-State 
Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 173 (1986). 
21 Ratner & Abrams, supra note 4, at 4. 
22 See, Hans Kelsen, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 342 (Anders Wedberg Trans., 1949); 
Barry Carter & Philip R. Trimble, INTERNATIONAL LAW 411 (1991). 
23 See, Pasquale Fiore, INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFIED AND ITS LEGAL SANCTION OR THE 
LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF STATES 36, 51, 109 (5th ed. 1918) (noting  as early as 
1890 that the rights of the individual at international law are not solely those rights the individual enjoys as 
a citizen of a State.  Fiore referred with approval Article 40 of the Act of Berlin of July 13, 1878 (which 
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As aptly observed by Oliver W. Holmes in 1881, “the life of the law has not been 
logic; it has been experience.”24  And as noted by one of the leading authority on 
international criminal law: 
the history of international criminal law is one derived by 
facts, characterized by practical experiences, dominated by 
pragmatism, and constantly gripped by the conflicting 
demands of realpolitic on the one hand, and those of justice on 
the other.25   
 
The facts are that “more than 250 conflicts have occurred since the end of World 
War II, causing anywhere between 70 and 170 million casualties.”26  It is also a fact that 
States have largely failed since the end of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials to fulfill the 
responsibility to prosecute the perpetrators of these heinous crimes.27  As a result, history 
is illustrative of the fact that those individuals responsible for committing crimes against 
mankind are rarely held accountable for their actions.28 
On the other hand, experience has shown that the act of an individual in one 
country especially with respect to atrocious crimes has the capacity to resonate beyond 
the boundaries of his or her State of nationality.  Also, experience has shown that some of 
the atrocious crimes are committed by individuals with the authority of the State.29 
Experience has equally shown that with exception of few examples, States have been 
reluctant to hold such individuals accountable for their actions.30  Hence: 
                                                                                                                                                 
extended rights to subjects of Serbia and argued that some rights at international law ran directly to the 
individual human being) Id.  See also, Hans Kelsen, supra note 21 at 345-48. 
24 Oliver W. Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 1(Little, Brown & Co.1881).  
25 M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 18 (2003). 
26 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Need for International Accountability, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).   
27 Jules Deschenes, supra note 13, at 32. 
28 Id. 
29 Ratner & Abrams, supra note 4, at 1.  
30 Id. 
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for centuries, in tyrannical states, governmental officials could 
act with impunity; and while the rise of liberal government 
over the past some 300 years has led to an overall 
improvement in the human rights records of some states, it has 
not, until very recently, opened the door to punishment of 
those officials who might continue to violate fundamental 
individual rights.31   
 
Therefore, there have been persistent and concerted agitation for international 
criminal justice founded on the principle of individual accountability for egregious 
conducts considered crimes under international law.  This agitation for international 
criminal justice propels the development of international criminal law.  The movement 
for international criminal justice is comprised of individuals from all walks of life, 
nongovernmental organizations with varied interests, and governments from different 
systems and parts of the world.  The champions for this movement varied from time to 
time but at any time, there were always sufficient groups to keep the movement alive.  At 
some point, champions of the movement include but are not limited to victims of 
atrocious crimes, survivors of genocidal wars, victor super powers, human rights non-
governmental organizations, and international governmental organizations. 
Thus, notwithstanding States’ initial rejection of international criminal law and 
creation of international criminal institution, nongovernmental organizations, 
international organizations, and other like minded institutions have continued to demand 
that justice be done to those responsible for egregious international crimes.  As a result, 
the last decade has witnessed unprecedented determination to create norms and establish 
institutions of international criminal law of accountability for individuals responsible for 
violations of the most egregious crimes recognized by international law.  As has been 
aptly stated by a commentator: 
                                                 
31 Ratner & Abrams, supra note 4, at 1-2. 
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in these fields, the individual state is powerless, or at least 
limited, in its capacity to preserve peace and human rights 
effectively.  Interstate cooperation in the form of international 
governmental organization has increased rapidly since the end 
of World War II.  This international cooperation is reflected 
by the progressive formulation of an international public 
interest and by states acting “in the public interest.”32  
 
The growing concerns of the international community resulted in a demand for 
international criminal prosecution in an international criminal tribunal for crimes 
recognized under customary international law as a threat to international peace and 
security. Due to the unending quest for justice, individual accountability for certain 
crimes, which is the catalyst for international criminal law, became established as general 
principle of international law.  One area where the efforts to hold non-state actors 
accountable for violations of international law has been persistent and is now becoming 
successful is individual accountability to certain egregious crimes recognized under 
international law such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  
Evidently, the influence of non-state actors in the last five decades towards the 
shaping of international law has resulted in a reconsideration of the view that under 
international law, States enjoy monopoly of international legal personality to the 
complete exclusion of all other entities operating on the international plane.33   Many 
international law scholars are now willing to concede that non-state entities such as 
intergovernmental organizations,34 non-governmental organizations,35 human begins,36 
                                                 
32 Stephan Hobb, Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental 
Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 191, 192 (1997). 
33 As separately observed by Justice Titunov and Dr. Okeke, early Soviet international law scholars held 
tenaciously to this view.  See Oleg I. Titunov, The International Legal Personality of States: Problems and 
Solutions, 37 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 323, 326-327 (1993); Christian N. Okeke, International Law in the 
Nigerian Legal System, 27 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 311, 318-319 (1997). 
34 Intergovernmental organizations refer to organizations whose membership is reserved exclusively to 
States. This will include intergovernmental organizations of international character such as the United 
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and corporations37 may be endowed with varying degrees of international legal 
personality.38  Also, States have recognized the concept of individual criminal 
responsibility39 even while rejecting that of State criminal responsibility.40 
Modern definition of international law now recognizes the fact that it is no longer 
a legal system that concerns itself solely with affairs of States.  But that it is a law that 
deals “with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their 
relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or 
juridical.”41  Therefore, as noted by one of the commentators on subjects of international 
law, “to continue to maintain that international law regulates the affairs and relations of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nations and its specialized agencies.  It also includes regional organizations such as the European Union, 
Organization of African Unity, Organization of American States, etc.  
35 Nongovernmental Organizations (more commonly referred to as NGOs) is an association of like minded 
individuals directed towards pursuing a common objective. Examples of NGOs will include the 
International Red Cross Society; The International Olympic Committee; Amnesty International, and 
Greenpeace International.  See generally, Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The 
Status of Non-Governmental Organizations under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD.  
579 (1999); Stephan Hobb, supra note 32; David J. Ettinger, The Legal Status of the International Olympic 
Committee, 4 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 97 (1992). 
36 Myres S. Mcdougal et al., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC 
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 96 (1980), P.K. Menon, The 
International Personality of Individuals in International Law: A Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine, 1 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 151 (1992) 
37 Corporations here will refer to multinational and/or transnational private business companies operating in 
more than two or more countries.  It has been observed that these kinds of corporations exert great 
influence in shaping international law and policies.  Thus, it is been argued that such corporations should 
enjoy international personality under international law and that they should be registered by the United 
Nations.  See, Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing International Law, 1983 
Duke L.J. 748 (1983).  For a contrary opinion, see Francois Rigaux, Transnational Corporations, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 121, 129. 
38 Louis Henkin, et al., INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (1993), Christian N. Okeke, CONTROVERSIAL 
SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEW 
ENTITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR TREATY-MAKING CAPACITY 18 (1974); 
James E. Hickey, supra note 19, at 2-3. 
39 Prakash Sinha, The Position of the Individual in an International Criminal Law in, A TREATISE ON 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 122-34 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973). 
40 Fritz Munch, Criminal Responsibility of States, in M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 25, at 122-29; Farhad 
Malekian, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES (1985). 
41 See ALI, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Third), s. 101 (1987). 
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states alone, that states are therefore the sole subjects of international law ... ignores both 
reason and reality.”42  
Consequently, the notion that international law should regulate only the behavior 
of States is no longer tenable.  Rather, the realities of the global nature of the new world 
order favors the suggestion that international law should proscribe accountability for 
individuals accused of criminal infractions.43  No where is this trend more pronounced 
and entrenched than in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
which was signed on July 17, 1998, by 120 countries44 and entered into force on June 20, 
2002.45   
The ICC Statute established a permanent international criminal court to prosecute 
individuals accused of committing the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity which occurred after July 01, 2002.46  The idea behind the establishment of 
ICC is to bring an end to the culture of impunity by holding individuals criminally 
accountable for committing crimes prohibited under international law. Thus, this study 
focuses on the 1998 Rome Statute of the international criminal court with respect to its 
ability to ferment the principle of individual criminal accountability under international 
criminal law.  The objective of this study is to critically examine the personal 
jurisdictional scope of the ICC with a view to determine whether the ICC is capable of 
achieving the objective behind its establishment. 
                                                 
42 Christian N. Okeke, supra note 38, at 18. 
43 Ratner & Abrams, supra note 4, at 4-5.  
44 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
45 Id., art. 126, provides that the Statute shall come into force when ratified by 60 countries. 
46Id., art. 1.   
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This study is divided into four major parts.  Part I examines the evolution of the 
principle of individual criminal accountability in international criminal law.  It traces the 
historical development of the principle of individual criminal accountability through the 
examination of the jurisdictional frameworks within which ad hoc tribunals were 
established up to World War II.  In this wise, part one will include an examination of 
early attempts to try war criminals.  Also, Part II includes a discussion on World War II 
trials by ad hoc tribunals such as the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg,47 the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East,48 and trials before the Military Tribunals 
in Germany and the Far East Countries.49  Part II also discusses the development that 
followed the aftermath of World War II trials such as the conclusion of international 
criminal law conventions that include the Genocide Convention50 and the four Geneva 
Conventions51 and its additional protocols.52   
                                                 
47 See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals 
(Nuremberg, September 30 - October 1, 1946), 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg 
Judgment]. 
48 Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, approved Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 
1589, at 11, 4 Bevans 27 [hereinafter IMTFE Charter]. 
49 Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Peace and against Humanity, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No. 
3, Berlin, January 31, 1946, reprinted in Benjamin B. Ferencz, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 488 (1980) [hereinafter CCL No. 10]. 
50 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force on January 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
51 The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 970 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; The Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked members of the 
Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 971 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II)’; The 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 972 
(entered into force on October 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; The Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
52 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 16 ILM 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions]; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 16 ILM 
1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions]. 
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Part II will briefly discuss the establishment and the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)53 and Rwanda 
(ICTR)54 respectively.  Furthermore, it will examine the establishment and jurisdiction of 
the Special and Mixed International Tribunals in Sierra-Leone,55 Timor-Leste,56 and 
Cambodia.57   
Part III examines the history, the enabling environments, and the dynamics that 
lead to the creation of the international criminal court.  It focuses on the subject matter 
and personal jurisdiction of the ICC.  It examines the procedures for triggering the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  Also, the study will discuss the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction 
and the grounds for challenging the admissibility of a case and ICC’s personal 
jurisdiction.   
Part IV highlights the inherent bottlenecks to the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction.  
In particular, this part of the study will analyze the principle of complementarity between 
the ICC and States Parties to the ICC Statute.  Inevitable issues to be examined under the 
complementarity discussion will include the rationale for the primacy of a State’s first 
                                                 
53 See The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. The ICTY Statute was 
unanimously adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, May 25, 1993, for the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia. See also S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993). 
54 See Security Council Resolution Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 
(1194) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. The ICTR was set up to prosecute those responsible for the genocidal 
war in Rwanda. 
55 The Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of 
a Special Court for Sierra Leone [hereinafter Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement], annexed to the 
Secretary-General’s Sierra Leone Report, available at:  http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf 
56 Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious 
Criminal Offences, UNTAET, 1.1, 1.3, 2.3, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000) [hereinafter 
Regulation 2000/15]. 
57 Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 109(b) U.N. Doc. A/57/806 (2003) [hereinafter 
March Agreement]. 
 13 
option to exercise jurisdiction; the bases for holding that a State is unable and/or 
unwilling to prosecute.  Additionally, the legality of the so called article 98 immunity 
agreement will be discussed.   
In conclusion, this study will argue that while the establishment of the ICC is one 
of the remarkable events of the twentieth century, the highlighted obstacles are capable of 
restricting the reach and effectiveness of the ICC as an institution designed to bring an 
end to the culture of impunity.  Consequentially, this study will advocate the elimination 
of the said bottlenecks.  Also, this study takes the position that while the idea behind the 
establishment of the ICC is laudable, a pursuit of retributive justice alone through the 
ICC may not bring about sustainable justice and political stability to the affected States or 
regions.   The study takes the position that in deserving situations, military action may be 
necessary to end the killing of innocent civilians cut up in armed conflicts. 
Lastly, this study argues that article 98 immunity agreement runs contrary to the 
spirit and purpose of the ICC Statute.  Additionally, this study without equivocation 
contends that the conclusion of article 98 immunity agreement by ICC States Parties is a 
clear violation of their obligation to cooperate with the Court and to arrest and surrender 
suspects to the Court. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
=============================================================== 
 
2.0.     EARLY ATTEMPTS AT INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
________________________________________ 
 
crimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit 
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.1  
 
 
2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
The development of international criminal law first emanated from customs which 
were later transformed and elaborated into international legal frameworks. As would be 
discussed shortly, certain acts were considered abhorrent to mankind that individuals 
accused of committing such acts were prosecuted without a prior legal instrument 
detailing such acts as crimes.  However, shortly after the early recorded trials, efforts 
were made to conclude legal instruments which detailed that certain acts are considered 
crimes against mankind and that individuals who commit these acts would be prosecuted.  
While the concept of individual criminal accountability was included in early 
international legal instruments, the contours of the principle of individual criminal 
accountability have been delineated and expanded by the decisions of ad hoc 
international tribunals, the agitation for the protection of human rights, and recent 
international legal frameworks.  
During the early development of international law, States were initially the only 
subjects of international law.  As such, only States were possessors of rights and 
obligations under international law.  One major obligation of a State under international 
law is to prosecute individuals accused of committing crimes within its territory before its 
                                                 
1 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L. L. 172, 220-21 
(1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].  
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national courts.  However, even under this prevailing arrangement, allied States or States 
acting under the umbrella of the United Nations, had sometimes, set up an ad hoc tribunal 
comprised of nationals of two or more countries to prosecute individuals from other 
States who were accused of committing crimes that shock the conscience of the 
international community at the material time.     
This part of the study analyzes the development of the principle of individual 
criminal accountability for acts which are considered as crimes within the international 
legal community.  It is largely a discussion of the legal history of the establishment of ad 
hoc criminal tribunals.  The analysis will be discussed in three major sections.  The most 
doubtful precedents are discussed in section one.  In section two, the discussion will 
concentrate primarily on the establishment and the trials of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
International Military Tribunals.  The circumstances and the judgments of these Tribunals 
marked the commencement of an important legal evolution of individual criminal 
accountability.2  Section three discusses post Nuremberg and Tokyo era, and how the 
principles enunciated in those tribunals influenced the development of international 
criminal law, particularly, the principle of individual criminal accountability.  In this 
respect, the discussion will examine how the principle of individual criminal 
accountability contributed to establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia.   
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Edoardo Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, No. 835, pp. 531-553 (1999) available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList106/911763EAA63170C0C1256B66005D85D0. 
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2.2. The Trial of Peter Von Hagenbach  
Commentators refer to the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474 for war crimes 
before a tribunal of judges consisting of the 26 representatives of States compromising 
the Holy Roman Empire as the forerunner of individual criminal accountability on the 
international plane.3  Von Hagenbach served as the governor of the fortified city of 
Breisach, on the Upper Rhine, under Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy (1433-1477), 
known to his enemies as Charles the Terrible.4  Hagenbach ruled the occupied territory 
with brutal force in attempt to force the submission of the Breisach population to 
Burgundian rule.5  In the process, murder, rape, illegal taxation and the wanton 
confiscation of private property became generalized practices.6   
The revolt of Hagenbach German mercenaries and local citizens as well as the 
siege of the city of Breisach by a large coalition made up of Austria, France, Bern and the 
towns and knights of the Upper Rhine lead to the defeat of Hagenbach.7  Upon 
Hagenbach defeat, the Archduke of Austria, under whose authority von Hagenbach was 
captured, ordered the trial of Hagenbach by an ad hoc tribunal consisting of 28 judges of 
                                                 
3 See Georg Schwarzenberger, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS, Volume II: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 462 (Stevens, London, 1968); M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 1 (1991); M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 
(1992).  It has however been noted that von Hagenbach atrocities cannot be labeled “war crimes” since the 
war did not start until 1476.  See, Jordan J. Paust, Selective History of International Tribunals and Efforts 
Prior to Nuremberg, 10 ILSA J INT’L & COMP. L. 207 (2003); Timothy L.H. McCormack, 
Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in International Law: Panel II: Adjudication 
Violence: Problems Confronting International Law and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity: Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International Criminal 
Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 690-91 (1997).   
4 Edoardo Greppi, supra note 2 (citation omitted).   
5 William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1973) (discussing 
the Hagenbach trial and the historical background of military tribunals). 
6 See, Georg Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 462-66 (noting that Hagenbach was so cruel that both the 
local population and his own mercenaries revolted and took him into custody). 
7 Edoardo Greppi, supra note 2 (citation omitted). 
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the allied coalition of States and towns.8  In his capacity as sovereign of the city of 
Breisach, the Archduke of Austria appointed the presiding judge.  Given the composition 
of the ad hoc court, it can be argued that it was a real international tribunal.9 
The prosecution charged Hagenbach for actions against the “laws of God and 
man,” including responsibility for murder, rape, perjury, and pillage arguing that he had 
“trampled under foot the laws of God and man”.10  Hagenbach argued that he was 
complying with superior orders from the Duke and that he did not recognize any other 
judge and master but the Duke of Burgundy, whose orders he could not dispute.  
Hagenbach further argued that it is settled fact that “soldiers owe absolute obedience to 
their superiors?” and requested for an adjournment to ask for confirmation from the 
Duke.11  
At the time of Hagenbach trial, punishment of the accused hinged on the question 
of compliance with superior orders.  There was no question that a successful defense of 
superior order would have exonerated Hagenbach because the Duke himself had 
personally confirmed and ratified ex post factum “all that had been done in his name”.12  
The tribunal rejected von Hagenbach defense and request for an adjournment to ask for 
confirmation from the Duke because this request was considered contrary to the laws of 
God.13  The tribunal noted that Hagenbach had committed crimes which he had the duty 
                                                 
8 See Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 462-66; M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 1-2. 
9 The tribunal included judges from Alsace, Switzerland, and other States within the Holy Roman Empire. 
See, M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing that “it can be said that the first international criminal 
court was established in 1474 in Breisach, Germany, where 27 judges of the Holy Roman Empire judged 
and condemned Peter von Hagenbach for his violations of the “laws of God and man” because he allowed 
his troops to rape and kill innocent civilians and pillage their property”); Jordan J. Paust, M. Cherif 
Bassiouni et al., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 622 (2d ed. 2000). 
10 Georg Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 465. 
11 Jordan J. Paust, supra note 3, at 207. 
12 Edoardo Greppi, supra note 2 (citation omitted). 
13 Jordan J. Paust, supra note 3, at 207. 
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to prevent.  Therefore, the tribunal found him guilty and sentenced him to death and also 
stripped him of his rank of knighthood and related privileges.14  Von Hagenbach was 
executed following the Marshal’s order: “Let justice be done”.15 
 
2.3.    The Leipzig Trials 
The first real international but unsuccessful attempt to prosecute individuals 
accused of war crimes occurred after the end of the World War I.  In November 1918, 
after Germany had lost the war, Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated and fled to Netherlands, 
which had remained neutral to the war and whose monarch then was the Kaiser’s 
cousin.16  After World War I, there was an enormous public outcry among the victims 
that those responsible for the war and commission of atrocities that violates the Hague 
Conventions and customs of war should be held to criminal account.  As such, a 
Preliminary Peace Conference was convened in Paris in 1919 by the victorious “Great 
Powers”, the Allied and the Associated Powers.17  Germany was considered the principal 
perpetrator of the war and the objective of the Peace conference was to negotiate the 
terms of a peace treaty which will include the terms of Germany’s surrender.18  Also, the 
Allies saw the Peace Conference as an opportunity to prosecute German war criminals 
and particularly, Kaiser Wilhelm II, for war crimes and for starting the war.19  
                                                 
14 Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 465.  
15 Id. 
16 M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 18 (1997).  
17 The five great powers were the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan. 
The additional states composing the Allied and Associated Powers were Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, 
Cuba, Czecho-Slovakia, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, and Uruguay. See, THE 
TREATIES OF PEACE 1919-1923, Vol. I, at 3 (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, New York, 
1924 ). 
18 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 15. 
19 Id. See also, James F. Willis, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY 
OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 37, (1982).  
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The Allied powers appointed a committee of legal experts known as the 
Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties.20  The Commission was charged with the task of investigating and gathering 
information concerning those responsible for initiating the war and for committing war 
crimes to aid their criminal prosecution.21  For about two months, the Commission 
investigated various acts of war crimes and in 1920 submitted its report which 
recommended 895 alleged war criminals to the Allied powers to be tried by the Allied 
tribunal.22  
Meanwhile, on June 28, 1919, in Versailles, representatives of the Allied Powers 
concluded the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and 
Germany.23  The treaty mandated German disarmament and war reparations, and 
established the League of Nations.24 Articles 228 and 229 of the treaty established the 
right of the Allied Powers to try and punish individuals responsible for “violations of the 
laws and customs of war” before Allied Military Tribunals or before the Military Courts 
of any of the Allies.25  Specifically, Article 228 contains clear acceptance of the German 
                                                 
20 The Commission was comprised of two members from each of the five Great Powers and one member 
from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Serbia to represent the states having a special interest in the 
matter.  See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 
Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 96 (1920) 
[hereinafter 1919 Commission Report]. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. But see, M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 16, n. 12 (wherein he noted that there was conflict as 
to the number of alleged war criminals listed for prosecution); Telford Taylor, THE ANATOMY OF THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS 17 (1992) (stating that the Allies presented a list of 854 individuals, including 
political and military figures); M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 200 (stating that the Allies submitted a 
list of 895 named war criminals); Remigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition, in 3 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 29, 36 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3 vols., 1987) [hereinafter ICL] 
(stating that 901 names appeared on the list). 
23 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 23, 1919, 2 BEVANS 43, 
13 AM. J.I.L. (Supp) 151 (1919) (although the treaty was signed in Versailles, initial groundwork for the 
treaty was established at the Preliminary Peace Conference in Paris earlier that year) [hereinafter Treaty of 
Versailles].   
24 Id. 
25 Id., art. 228 & 229. 
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government’s recognition of the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring 
before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the 
laws and customs of war.26  Furthermore, it stated that the German government had the 
duty to hand over “all persons accused”, in order to permit them to be brought before an 
allied military tribunal.27  
Where a person is accused of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the 
Allied and Associated Powers, the individual will be brought before the military tribunals 
of that Power concerned.28  On the other hand, persons accused of criminal acts against 
the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought 
before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers 
concerned.29  Thus, by implication, Article 229 provided for the possibility of setting up 
an ad hoc international tribunal to prosecute persons who are accused of criminal acts 
against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers.   
Also, article 227 of the Treaty provided for the creation of an ad hoc international 
criminal tribunal solely to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II for waging a war of aggression 
over Belgium.30  Realizing its inability to prosecute the Kaiser for aggression,31 the 
                                                 
26 Treaty of Versailles, supra note 23, art. 228. 
27 Id. 
28 Id., art. 229. 
29 Id. 
30 Id., art. 227. 
31 The Allies diplomatically requested that the Netherlands “make the Kaiser available for trial.”  Noting 
that there was no international court competent to try a sovereign Head of State and no one had ever been 
convicted for the crime of aggression before, the Dutch refused to extradite Kaiser.  See Benjamin A. 
Ferencz, The Evolution of International Criminal Law, at http://www.benferencz.org/hamburg.htm (last 
visited August 31, 2005).   Also, it has been suggested that the Netherlands reportedly denied that request, 
allegedly speculating that it was made as a political formality and that the Allies would not exert effort to 
secure his surrender.  See, Telford Taylor, supra note 22, at 16.  The legal grounds for denying the request 
were that the “offense charged against the Kaiser was unknown to Dutch law, was not mentioned in any 
treaties to which Holland was a party, and appeared to be of a political rather than a criminal character.” Id. 
See also, Quincy Wright, The Legality of the Kaiser, 13 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 121 (1919). The 
Netherlands discouraged formal extradition requests because extradition treaties applied only to cases in 
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Allied Nations agreed to a face saving nebulous provision in article 227 of the Treaty of 
Versailles requiring Germany to hand the Kaiser over to stand trial for “a supreme 
offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”32   
The Allied Powers agreed to constitute a special tribunal composed of judges 
appointed by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to try the 
accused.33  In arriving at its decision, the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives 
of international policy, with a view of vindicating the solemn obligations of international 
undertakings and the validity of international morality.34  The Powers agreed to submit a 
formal request to the government of the Netherlands for the ex-Emperor’s surrender for 
trial.35  Perhaps because the Allied Powers knew that the Dutch government would not 
oblige a request to surrender the ex-Emperor, no such request was ever made and he lived 
famously as “the woodchopper of Doorn.” 36  
Similarly, the prosecution of the individuals envisioned in Article 228 did not 
materialize.  By 1921, the goal of setting up joint or separate military tribunals was 
overtaken by the concerns for regional stability and political interest.37  As a result, the 
Allied Powers decided not to undertake the prosecution of Germans accused of war 
crimes, rather, they transferred jurisdiction to the German Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                                 
which a criminal act occurred.  The Netherlands viewed the charge against the Kaiser as a “political 
offence” because a Head of State’s decision to go to war is within the prerogative of national sovereignty 
and, therefore, not a crime under Dutch Law.  See, James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the 
Laws and Customs of War, 14 AM. J. INT’L. L. 70, 91 (1920).  For a discussion of the political offense 
exception to extradition, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNITED 
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE Ch. VIII (3d ed. 1996); Christine Van Den Wingaert, THE POLITICAL 
OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION: THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE 
RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER (1980). 
32 Treaty of Versailles, supra note 23, art. 227. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Benjamin A. Ferencz, supra note 31 (citation omitted). 
37 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 19. 
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(Reichsgericht).38  This meant that the war criminals would be tried under German law.  
Thus, my implication, the Prosecutor General of the Court had the discretion to decide 
which cases would be tried.39  Therefore, the Allied Powers had to turn over the cases 
and the evidence to the Prosecutor General.40   
As a result of the concerns expressed by the German government regarding the 
difficulty of trying its citizens for war crimes, the Allied Powers agreed to submit only 
forty-five cases to the Prosecutor General out of the original list of 895 submitted by the 
Commission established in 1919 by the Allied Powers.41  Out of the 48 cases submitted, 
the Prosecutor General tried only twelve.  Those convicted received lenient sentences 
ranging from six months to four years, and only few actually served those sentences in 
prison.42 
Although the Allied Powers had argued that while they deferred to the German 
Supreme Court the trials of the accused war criminals, that they reserved the right to set 
aside the German judgments and carry out the provisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of 
Versailles, they never exercised this option.43  Thus, while World War I claimed the lives 
of hundreds of thousands individuals, only twelve were ostensibly held accountable for 
such degree of atrocity.  The conduct of the Leipzig trials therefore “exemplified the 
sacrifice of justice on the altars of international and domestic politics of the Allies”,44 and 
                                                 
38 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 19. 
39 Id., at 21. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id, at 21, n.24. 
44 Id., at 20. 
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a missed opportunity to establish an international system of justice that would have 
functioned independently of political considerations to ensure uncompromised justice.”45 
 
 
2.4.  The Trials of World War II Criminals  
With the apparent failure of the Allied Powers to hold World War I criminals 
accountable for their criminal acts, and their complete abandonment of the objective of 
the League of Nations as a forum that would bring about a new world order that would 
prevent future wars, it was not entirely surprising that the world was soon engulfed in a 
World War II.46  The Covenant of the League of Nations envisaged the use of economic 
sanctions to deter nations from war.47  However, enforcement of the economic sanctions 
required consent of all the member States to the League.48  It soon became clear that 
nations were still not ready to yield their sovereign prerogatives and thus remained 
unwilling to give up their right to go to war and to decide for themselves when sanctions 
against aggressors should be applied.49  Thus, when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 
and Italy brazenly attacked Ethiopia in 1935 in clear violation of the League’s covenant, 
member States to the League failed to take collective economic or military measures to 
halt the aggression.50  
Similarly, the international community signaled its unwillingness to act when in 
1931 Hitler defied the Peace Treaty of Versailles and marched his troops into the 
Rhineland and Japan launched another aggression against China in 1937.51  The next 
                                                 
45 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 21. 
46 Benjamin A. Ferencz, supra note 31. 
47 Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted December 1924, art. 16., available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm (last visited August 31, 2005). 
48 Id., art. 5. 
49 Benjamin A. Ferencz, supra note 31. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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year, Germany continued its defiance of the Treaty of Versailles when it annexed Austria 
and moved against Czechoslovakia.  World political leaders were still reluctant to act 
until September 1, 1939, when German planes launched a massive bombardment against 
Poland before Polish allies, France and the United Kingdom reluctantly declared that they 
were at war with Germany.  The world soon became engulfed in World War II.52 
The horrible crimes committed during World War II led to a swift conclusion of 
agreements among the Allied Powers to provide a forum to hold the individuals involved 
in committing such atrocities to account.  Towards this objective, on January 13, 1942, 
representatives of the Allied Powers comprising nine European nations met at St. James 
Palace wherein they formulated the St. James Declaration.53 A highlight of the 
declaration is the statement of the represented States that “international solidarity [is] 
necessary in order to avoid the repression of these acts of violence simply by acts of 
vengeance on the part of the general public, and in order to satisfy the sense of justice of 
the civilized world.”54   
In furtherance of this commitment, on October 7, 1942, the four Major Allies 
announced that a United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) would be set up 
for the investigation of war crimes.  However, the Commission was not established until 
October 20, 1943.55  The UNWCC was saddled with the responsibility of investigating 
                                                 
52 Benjamin A. Ferencz, supra note 18. 
53 The Inter-Allied Declaration, Jan. 13, 1942, reprinted in PUNISHMENT FOR WAR CRIMES: THE 
INTER-ALLIED DECLARATION, signed at St. James’ Palace, London, on January 13, 1942, (Inter-
Allied Information Committee, London, undated). See also, UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 89-92 (1948) [hereinafter History of the UNWCC].  
54 See the Resolution by the Allied Governments Condemning German terror and Demanding Retribution 
(January 13, 1942), reprinted in 144 Brit. & Foreign Papers, 1940-1942, at 1072 (Her Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, 1952).  
55 Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cessation: 
From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 289, 301 (1994). Even though 
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and collating evidence of war crimes.56  Notwithstanding the obstacles faced by the 
UNWCC such as limited financing and inadequate staff,57 it managed to compile a decent 
record of war criminals, evidence, witnesses, and became a reference center among 
governments that later conducted their own investigation.58  
 At a meeting of the three Major Allied Powers (United Kingdom, United States, 
and USSR.) in Moscow, the Allied Powers reached an agreement to prosecute and punish 
war criminals, particularly the leaders of the Nazi regime.  The agreement was contained 
in the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, signed by President Roosevelt of United 
States, Prime Minister Churchill of Britain, and Premier Stalin of Soviet Union.59  In 
signing the Moscow Declaration, the aforesaid three Allied powers, noting that they were 
speaking in the interest of the thirty-two member State of the United Nations, solemnly 
declared and gave full warning of their declaration as follows:  
At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which 
may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and 
members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have 
taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and 
executions will be sent back to the countries in which their 
abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged 
and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries 
and of free governments which will be erected therein …. for 
most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the 
uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusors 
in order that justice may be done…without prejudice to the case 
                                                                                                                                                 
this Commission’s name was preceded by “United Nations,” it was unrelated to the world body founded in 
San Francisco in 1945. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at n. 33. 
56 Since the UNWCC was limited to investigating war crimes only, it could not investigate the allegations 
of atrocities committed against the Jews, because such acts constituted “crimes against humanity” and not 
war crimes. M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 22 (citing Ann Tusa & John Tusa, THE NUREMBERG 
TRIAL 22 (1984). 
57 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 22  (citing UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE LAWS OF WAR 89-92 (1948) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE UNWCC]. 
58 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 22-23. 
59 Declaration of German Atrocities, Nov. 1, 1943, 3 BEVANS 816, 834; 9 DEP’T ST. BULL. 308 (1943), 
reprinted in 38 AM. J. INT’L L. 5 (1944) [hereinafter “Declaration of German Atrocities”]. 
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of German criminals whose offenses have no particular 
geographical localization and who will be punished by joint 
decision of the government of the Allies.60  
 
Although the Allied Powers agreed that “the major criminals, whose offences 
have no particular geographical localization,” would be punished “by the joint decision of 
the Governments of the Allies”, they disagreed on the method by which the prosecution 
should be carried out.61  The proposal by Britain that major war criminals should simply 
be taken out and shot because their guilt was taken for granted and “beyond the scope of 
any judicial process”62 was rejected by the United States and France which insisted upon 
fair trials for the war criminals before an international tribunal.63  But Britain was afraid 
that the war criminals may hijack the prosecution as a forum for propaganda and self-
justification.64  On the other hand, the United States and France were mindful of the 
historical implication of the proposal by Britain and wanted to set a precedent of judicial 
fairness.65  In the end, Allies agreed to try the war criminals before an international 
criminal tribunal.   
 
 
2.4.1. Trials of World War II Criminals by the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (IMT)  
The agreement to establish an international criminal tribunal was drafted at a 
conference held in London from June 26 to August 8, 1945.  At the end of the 
conference, the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, was signed by the representatives 
                                                 
60 See Declaration of German Atrocities, supra note 59. 
61 See John F. Murphy, NORMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (Ginsburgs & 
Kudriavstev eds., 1990). 
62 Id., referring to the brief of Sir Malkin of the British Foreign Office entitled “Against the Establishment 
of an international Court”).  
63 Telford Taylor, supra note 22, at 32. 
64 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 24. 
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of the four Allied Powers.66   The London Agreement provided for the establishment of 
an international military tribunal “for the trial of war criminals whose offences have no 
particular geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their capacity 
as members of organizations or groups or in both capacities.”67  The Charter creating the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) was annexed to the London Agreement.68 
 
2.4.1.a. The Ratione Materiae of the International Military Tribunal 
Article 6 of the IMT Charter conferred jurisdiction on the IMT to try individuals 
accused of (i) crimes against peace, (ii) war crimes, and (iii) crimes against humanity.  
(i) Crimes Against Peace:   
This is defined as the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing.69   Perhaps, other than the article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles which 
provided for the failed prosecution of the Kaiser, there was no other legal precedent in 
international law for the prosecution of individuals for crimes against peace, which meant 
the preparation and waging of a war of aggression.70   
However, in contrast to the ambiguity inherent in article 227 of the Treaty of 
Versailles reference to “international morality and the sanctity of treaties”, Article 6(a) of 
                                                 
66 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, August 8, 
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter the London Agreement].   The London Agreement was 
signed by Robert H. Jackson, U.S.A.; Robert Falco, French Republic;  Jowitt C., United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and  I. T. NIKITCHENKO, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics   
67 Id., art. 1. 
68 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, August 8, 
1945, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546 
[hereinafter the IMT Charter].  Nineteen other nations adhered to the Nuremberg Charter. 
69 Id., art. 6(a). 
70 Benjamin B. Ferencz, supra note 31. 
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the IMT Charter referred to the waging of war in violation of “international treaties.”71  
This was a remarkable clarification in that it explained the basis of the crime against 
peace.  Also, by prohibiting the waging of war in violation of international treaty, article 
6(a) made the crime of aggression a universal crime which can be applied against any 
nation.72   
It is however noteworthy that no international convention has explicitly made 
aggression an international crime.73  The main reason for this development has been 
attributed to the inability of States to agree definitively on what constitutes aggression,74 
as States continue to shift positions based on political expediency.75  The last attempt at 
defining aggression was made during the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court.76  The effort proved unsuccessful resulting in the 
exclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.77  
 
 
 
                                                 
71 IMT Charter, supra note 68, art. 6(a). 
72 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 29 (citing the REPORT OF Robert H. Jackson, United States 
Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials at vii-viii (U.S. Gov’t Prtg. Off. 1949) 
[hereinafter Jackson Report]. 
73 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at n. 69 (observing that while the U.N. Charter prohibits aggression, 
and the Security Council has the power under Chapter VII to take measures, including sanctions, to 
preserve and maintain peace in accordance with the Charter’s articles 2(3), 2(4), 39-51, there has never 
been an international convention explicitly making aggression an international crime. 
74 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at n. 69 (noting that other than the General Assembly’s 1974 
Resolution, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), 
defining aggression which was adopted by consensus, there is no definition of that crime). 
75 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that the United States has held different positions on 
the matter between World War I, World War II, and the Cold War era). 
76 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at n. 69 (citing the Report of the Prepatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Vol. I, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, paras. 212-
93, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996)) [hereinafter Preparatory Committee Report]. 
77 Id. 
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(ii) War crimes:   
War crimes are defined as violations of the laws and customs of war.78  Article 
6(b) of the IMT Charter lists war crimes to include, murder, ill-treatment or deportation 
into slave labor or for any other purpose of the civilian population of or in occupied 
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, the killing of 
hostages, the plunder of public or private property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns 
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.79  
From the list of crimes, it is evident that the IMT Charter set out to prohibit acts 
which violate the traditional laws and customs of war.  In compiling the list of war 
crimes, the drafters of the IMT Charter looked to The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907 on the Laws and Customs of War80 and the Geneva Convention of 1929 Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.81 However, it should be noted that the referenced 
Hague Conventions and the Geneva Convention had no provisions on the punishment of 
individuals who violated their rules.  Originally, prisoners of war were considered as war 
booty, treated as slaves, and oftentimes slaughtered.   The 1899 Hague Peace Conference 
which was widened by the 1907 Hague Convention was directed at ensuring a humane 
treatment of prisoners of war.  These rules proved insufficient in World War I, and were 
elaborated in the 1929 Geneva Convention.  
(iii) Crimes Against Humanity:   
This is defined as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
                                                 
78 IMT Charter, supra note 68, art. 6(b). 
79 Id., art. 6(b). 
80 The 1899 Hague Convention II and The 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, July 29, 1899 and October 18, 1907 respectively which entered into force on September 4, 
1900 and January 26, 1910, respectively, 36 Stat. 2277, I Bevans 631. 
81The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, entered into 
force on June 19, 1931, 118 L.N.T.S. 343, 47 Stat. 2021, 2 Bevans 932. 
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persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.82   
The objective of the crimes against humanity was to protect the civilian 
population from extermination and enslavement.  Until the IMT Charter, crime against 
humanity was not a treaty law and it is doubtful whether they originated from 
international conventions, custom, and/or general principles of law.83  Thus, while article 
6(c) of the IMT Charter conferred the IMT with jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity committed “before or during the war” the fact that crimes against humanity has 
not been proscribed before the war led the drafters of the Charter to circumscribe the 
application of Article 6(c) only in situations where it could be linked to war crimes.84 
The connection of crimes against humanity to war crimes was necessary to 
obviate the possibility of a successful attack of crimes against humanity committed 
before the war as ex post facto law.85   However, this requirement eviscerated the scope 
of Article 6(c) because it effectively excluded the prosecution of individuals for crimes 
committed before the outbreak of the war in 1939.86  Also, in some instances, the IMT 
was not able to differentiate between the crimes against humanity and war crimes.87   
 
2.4.1.b. The Ratione Personae of the International Military Tribunal 
The International Military Tribunal exercised personal jurisdiction over the 
“leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices” who participated in the formulation or 
                                                 
82 IMT Charter, supra note 68, art. 6(c). 
83 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 26. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Leila Sadat Wexler, supra note 55, at 307-08. 
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execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of crimes under the IMT’s 
Charter.88  The IMT Charter stated that all of them are responsible for all acts performed 
by any persons in execution of such plan.89   
Article 7 of the IMT Charter stripped the accused of any immunity they may 
enjoy as a result of their official position, whether as Heads of State or responsible 
officials in government departments.90  In addition, the IMT Charter for the first time 
abrogated the defense of “obedience to superior” order as an absolute defense from 
liability.91  Rather, the IMT Charter provided that it may be considered in mitigation of 
punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.92   
Although the IMT Charter limited “obedience to superior order” as a mitigating 
factor, it should be noted that in some instances, the IMT did not follow the proscription 
of the defense of obedience to superior order to the letter of article 8.  In those instances, 
the IMT allowed the defense as a complete bar to responsibility in situations where the 
junior officer had no alternative moral choice in refusing to carry out the superior order.93  
This approach may be rationalized on the basis that the abrogation of the defense of 
obedience to superior order was contrary to what most military laws provided for at the 
time World War II started.94 
                                                 
88 IMT Charter, supra note 68, art. 6.  
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90 Id., art. 7. 
91 Id., art. 8.  
92 Id.  
93 See generally, Nico Keijzer, MILITARY OBEDIENCE (1978); Leslie C. Green, SUPERIOR ORDERS 
IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1976); Yoram Dinstein, THE DEFENCE OF 
OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS’ IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965). 
94 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 28 (citing Lassa Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW 264-65 
(1st ed. 1906)). The BRITISH MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, No. 443 (1914) relied upon Oppenheim 
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Army, Field Manual 27-10 (1940) reflected the same position in § 345(1). On November 15, 1944, a 
revision of § 345(1) limited, but retained, a qualified defense.  But see, U.S. DEPT OF THE ARMY, 
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As a result of the agreement between the Allies that the IMT will only prosecute 
the major war criminals and that the German municipal and military courts would try the 
minor war criminals in the jurisdiction where the crime took place, only twenty-four war 
criminals were brought before the IMT.95  Eventually, only twenty-two of the twenty-
four war criminals stood trial before the IMT.96  The Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, 
Germany commenced trial on November 20, 1945, and completed on October 1, 1946.97  
Twelve of the war criminals were convicted and sentence to death by hanging,98 three 
were sentenced to life imprisonment,99 four were sentenced to serve between ten to 
twenty years in prison,100 and the other three were acquitted.101  However, there freedom 
                                                                                                                                                 
FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956). For a historical evolution of the 
question, see Leslie C. Green, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, 27 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 167 
(1989); Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973). 
95 Leila Sadat Wexler, supra note 42, at 306. 
96 Two of the defendants who were not brought to trial are Robert Ley (who committed suicide on October 
25, 1945, before the trial began) and Gustav Krupp von Bohlen un Halbach (who was unable to stand trial 
because of mental illness).  See the International Military Tribunal Judgment and Sentence, October 1, 
1946, 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 172, 252 (1947) [hereinafter IMT Judgment].  
97 Id. 
98 Those sentenced to death and hung on October 16, 1946 include: Hans Frank, Governor-general of Nazi-
occupied Poland, called the “Jew butcher of Cracow” was hanged wearing a beatificsmile, Alfred Jodl,  
Chief of Operations for the German High Command, Ernest Kaltenbrunner, Chief of RSHA (an 
organization which includes offices of the Gestapo, the SD, and the Criminal Police) and Chief of Security 
Police, Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the German High Command, Wilhelm Frick, Minister of the 
Interior, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister, Alfred Rosenberg, Chief Nazi Philosopher and Reich-
minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories, Fritz Sauckel, Chief of Slave Labor Recruitment, Arthur 
Seyss-Inquart, Austrian Chancellor, then Reich, Commissioner for the Netherlands, Julius Streicher, Anti-
Semitic Editor of Der Sturmer, Martin Bormann, and Hermann Goering, Richsmarschall and Luftwaffe 
(Air Force) Chief; President of Reichstag; Director of “Four Year Plan” who committed suicide on the day 
before his scheduled hanging by taking a cyanide pill that was smuggled into his cell.  Goering wrote in his 
suicide note, “I would have no objection to getting shot,” but he thought hanging was inappropriate for a 
man of his position. IMT Judgment, supra note 84.  Also see available at: 
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/meetthedefendants.html, (visited on February 
4, 2005). 
99Id. The three individuals sentenced to life imprisonment are Walther Funk, Minister of Economic, (he was 
released in 1957 because of poor health and died in 1959), Rudolf Hess, Deputy to the Fuhrer and Nazi 
Party Leader (he remained lost in his own mental fog in Spandau prison for many years as its only prisoner 
until he committed suicide in 1987 at age 93), and Erich Raeder, Commander in Chief of the German Navy 
(he served nine years before his release in 1955 and he died in 1960 at age 84). 
100Id. The war criminals sentenced to various prison sentences are Karl Doenitz, German admiral 
(sentenced to 10 years, and died 1981), Konstantin von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1938, 
then Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia Neurath (sentenced to 10 years in prison, was released 
because of poor health in 1954, and died two years later) Baldur von Schirach, Hitler Youth Leader 
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was short-lived as each of them were subsequently tried and convicted to various prison 
terms by the German court.102  
The IMT judgment was not subject to appeals and at trial some defendants were 
frequently denied the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses that were relied upon 
by the prosecution.103  Also, IMT has been criticized for its failure to indict or prosecute 
non German war criminals, especially Allied Military personnel, an omission which has 
dogged the IMT proceedings as a “victor’s justice.”104  Notwithstanding these 
deficiencies, “that four great nations flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the 
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the 
law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason”.105   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(sentenced to 20 years in prison, was released from Spandau Prison in 1966 and died in 1974 at age 67), 
and Albert Speer, Reichminister of Armaments and Munitions (sentenced and served his 20-year sentence, 
he wrote two books about his life and died in 1981 at age 76). 
101Id. Those acquitted by the IMT are Franz von Papen, Ambassador to Turkey was acquitted, Hjalmar 
Schacht, Reich bank President and Minister of Economics before the War (was found not guilty by the IMT 
was later convicted by a German court and sentenced to eight years, freed in 1950 and died in 1970 at age 
93) and, Hans Fritzsche, Head of the Radio Division, (was acquitted by the IMT and was later tried and 
convicted by a German court, then freed in 1950 and died in 1953). 
102 Howard S. Levie, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 56-57 (1993). 
103 There was no appeal, a right now guaranteed in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Even Justice Jackson noted these mistakes in his report to the President, wherein he admits to 
mistakes in the “proceedings of this novelty.” Id. at 440.  Since World War II, however, the impact of 
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procedures in most countries of the world. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM OF 
UNITED NATIONS NORMS AND STANDARDS (1994); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the 
Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in 
National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235 (1993). 
104 For a critical perspective of the IMT, see, August Von Knierem, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1959); 
Hans Ehard, The Nuremberg Trial against the Major War Criminals and International Law, 43 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 223 (1949); A. Frederick Mignone, After Nuremberg, Tokyo, 25 TEX. L. REV. 475 (1947); 
Gordon Ireland, Ex Post Facto from Rome to Tokyo, 21 TEMPLE L.Q. 27 (1947); Georg 
Schwarzenberger, The Judgment of Nuremberg, 21 TUL. L. REV. 329 (1947); Hans Kelsen, Will the 
Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law, 1 INT’L L.Q. 153 (1947); 
Gordon W. Forbes, Some Legal Aspects of the Nuremberg Trial, 24 CAN. B. REV. 584 (1946).  
105 Justice Robert H. Jackson, Prosecutor’s Address of Nov. 21, 1945 to the International Military Tribunal, 
in 2 Trial of the Major War Criminals 99 (1947). 
 35 
2.4.2. Trials of World War II criminals by the International Military Tribunal For 
The Far East, 1946-1948 (IMTFE) 
Pursuant to the request of the U.S.S.R. which was acceded to by the other three 
Allied Powers, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) was established in Moscow in 
December 1945.106  The FEC was comprised of representatives of the eleven Allied 
States including the four Major Allies having veto powers.107  The FEC was based in 
Washington and was responsible for the formulation and coordination of Allied 
occupational policies for Japan.108  General Douglas MacArthur who was the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was in charge of occupational matters and 
therefore controlled the activities of the FEC.109  The Allied Council for Japan located in 
Tokyo which was comprised by the four Major Allies was responsible for carrying out 
the directives of the FEC.110   
Although the FEC was a political body without any investigative powers, it 
however, was instrumental to the prosecution of suspected Japanese war criminals.111  It 
was evident that the U.S.S.R. interest in Japan went beyond a say in occupational control, 
but included a desire to prosecute suspected Japanese war criminals.112  Thus, in 
furtherance of this objective, on January 19, 1946, General McArthur promulgated the 
Charter establishing the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE).113  The 
                                                 
106 See Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, Report by the Secretary General, February 26 – July 10, 
1947, 16 DEP’T ST. BULL. 804-6 (1947) (hereinafter FEC Report). 
107 Id. The eleven Allied nations are: Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, India, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. 
108 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 31. 
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113 Id., at 32 (citing the Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 3, 4 Bevans 20 [hereinafter IMTFE Proclamation]. On the 
same day General MacArthur issued his proclamation, the Charter for the IMTFE was adopted. Pursuant to 
a policy decision by the FEC, the Charter was later amended by General’s Order No. 20, issued by 
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Tribunal was comprised of the representatives of the Allied powers that defeated Japan 
and members of the FEC.114 
With few exceptions, the IMTFE Charter like the IMT Charter conferred on the 
IMTFE jurisdiction over individuals accused of committing (a) crimes against peace, (b) 
war crimes, and (c) crimes against humanity.  Some of the exceptions are found in article 
5(c) of the IMTFE Charter which limited “crimes against humanity” to persecution on 
political and racial grounds, thereby omitting persecution on religious ground which is 
included in Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter.  Such an inclusion was factually necessary in 
the IMT Charter because of the Holocaust.115 Also while the IMT Charter provided that 
inhumane acts committed “against any civilian population” constitute “crimes against 
humanity,” that phrase was deleted from Article 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter, thereby 
expanding the class of persons beyond civilians only.  The expansion was influenced by 
the desire “to make punishment possible for large-scale killing of military personnel in an 
unlawful war.”116 
The IMTFE trials lasted two and a half years, from May 3, 1946, to November 11, 
1948.  In all, 28 Japanese officials who had overseen Japanese military aggression 
throughout Asia in World War II were arraigned before the Tribunal on 55 counts of 
                                                                                                                                                 
MacArthur. See Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, approved Apr. 26, 1946, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 11, 4 Bevans 27 [hereinafter IMTFE Amended Charter].  
114 The IMTFE consisted of 11 members. Nine were representatives from countries which had signed 
Japan’s surrender agreement: Australia, Canada, China, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Instrument of Surrender by Japan, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1733, 1735, 3 Bevans 1251, 1252. India and the Philippines were subsequently added as members due 
to their status as members of the FEC. See IMTFE Amended Charter, supra note 113. 
115 See, M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 202 (1979). 
116 Bernard V.A. Roling and Antonio Cassese, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND 3 (Oxford, 1993). 
See also, Bernard V.A. Roling, The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in A TREATISE ON 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 590 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973). 
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‘Class A’ crimes.117  Seven of the 28 defendants were sentenced to death while the 
remaining defendants received prison sentences. The defendants include individuals 
accused of crimes stemming from their political positions in Japan during the Second 
World War.  They also include foreign ministers, chiefs of staff, prime ministers, etc.  
The one notable exemption was the Emperor of Japan, who was excluded because he was 
regarded as a kind constitutional monarch whose only intention was to establish peace 
and prosperity for his people.  
 
2.4.3. Trials of World War II Criminals Before Military Tribunals in Germany 
and the Far East Countries (Control Council Law No. 10 Tribunals) 
Other war criminals were tried in the respective victim countries.  Pursuant to the 
Allied Control Council Law No. 10 which was promulgated by the Allies as the 
sovereign powers in Germany, each of the Allies had jurisdiction to try German nationals 
in the territory under their control.118  Each of the four Major Allies proceeded separately 
to try the German war criminals as they deem fit.119  The Tribunals set up under the CCL 
                                                 
117 For a complete historical record of the IMTFE, see generally, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: 
THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST IN TWENTY-TWO VOLUMES (R. John Pritchard & Sonia 
Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981); THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE COMPREHENSIVE INDEX 
AND GUIDE TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE FAR EAST IN FIVE VOLUMES (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981); YUK 
TANAKA, HIDDEN HORRORS: JAPANESE WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR II (1996). 
118 Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against 
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while the British, French, and Russian trials were before military courts.  See M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra 
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No. 10 like the IMT and IMTFE had jurisdiction to try individuals accused of “crimes 
against peace,” “war crimes,” and “crimes against humanity.”120   
However, the category, requirement, and scope of the “crimes against humanity” 
in Article II(c) of the CCL No. 10 differed from the IMT and IMTFE Charters.121  The 
categories of “crimes against humanity” under Article II(c) were expanded to include 
imprisonment, torture, and rape.  Also, article II(c) removed the requirement that “crimes 
against humanity” be connected to war by omitting the words “before or during the war” 
contained in Article 6(c) of the IMT’s Charter.122  Finally, by eliminating the requirement 
that “persecution,” as a crime against humanity should be in the “execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,” article II(c) ostensibly 
extended the scope of the Tribunals to cover persecutions not executed or connected with 
any crime within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.  Be that as it may, there is no evidence that 
the Tribunal utilized this provision to extend its jurisdiction but it has been suggested that 
such extension of the Tribunals’ jurisdiction “strained the principles of legality.”123 
Lastly, war criminals were tried throughout the Far East before separate military 
tribunals which were sanctioned by the FEC.  Each Allied Power which include 
Australia, China, France, the Netherlands, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and the U.S.S.R. set up its own military tribunal and invested it with the 
powers of prosecuting its prisoners of war who were Japanese and persons of other 
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nationalities.124  The field military tribunals dispensed justice to the war criminals in 
accordance with the military laws and/or practice of the constituting States.  
Although these trials were supposed to be controlled by the individual Allied 
Powers, the FEC still exerted some form of control on the activities of the Military 
Tribunals.  Thus, in 1949, the FEC issued a formal advisory to all nineteen Allied powers 
in the Far East that Japanese war crimes trials should be concluded by September 30, 
1949.125  Thereafter, on September 8, 1951, forty-eight States signed the Treaty of Peace 
with Japan at San Francisco.  Article II of the Treaty of Peace provided that all convicted 
war criminals should be repatriated to Japan to serve the remainder of their sentences 
under the SCAP’s control.126  In consonance with Article II of the Treaty of Peace, Japan 
passed Law No. 103 of 1952 which established a commission to supervise the 
repatriation and release of Japanese convicted war criminals.127  Like the IMTFE 
convicted war criminals, all the convicted war criminals by the Allied military tribunals 
in the Far East had their sentences commuted or were released between 1951 and 1957 
before they could complete their sentence.128  
 
2.5. Observations and Commentary 
By way of comparison, the IMT was a treaty creation while the IMTFE was 
promulgated by General MacArthur.  While no official reason was supplied for this 
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difference in approach, it has been suggested that it was borne out of the United States 
desire to checkmate the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East and the prosecution 
of Japanese war criminals.129  In addition, it was also suggested that the United States 
was equally concerned about Japan’s post-World War II course of conduct.130  It is also 
plausible to suggest that the United States considered it politically expedient to maintain 
control of post World War II Japan.  In order to achieve these objectives, General 
MacArthur exerted undue influence and control over the activities of the FEC and the 
IMTFE.131  General MacArthur’s influence was also visible in the “United States 
Military Commissions that tried Japanese Military personnel in the Philippines and other 
areas of the Far East Military Theater of Operations that he subsequently established 
pursuant to his authority as the SCAP in that Pacific Japan Theater.”132 
The end result of General MacArthur’s overbearing control was that the 
proceedings of the IMTFE were a mockery of the IMT.  First, the IMTFE lasted three 
times longer than the IMT trial of the Major German War Criminals. Secondly, the 
objectivity of the FEC and the IMTFE members was compromised by the fact that they 
were not chosen in there individual capacity but as representative of their country’s 
                                                 
129 The political and military tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the IMTFE 
proceedings affected the proceedings in many ways.  For instance, all information related to the existence 
of a bacteriological weapons research lab located in Manchuria during World War II was purposely kept 
from the IMTFE. Professor Bernard Roling believed that this information was withheld by American 
military authorities who wanted to reap the benefits of the research and keep the information from the 
Soviets. Professor Howard Levie has a differing view, however, believing that the information was 
withheld by both the Americans and the Soviets because both countries had access to the information and 
wanted to prevent the other from obtaining research results. See Howard Levie, supra note 103, at 141. 
Professor Levie highlights Soviet criticisms of the IMTFE, including accusations that the IMTFE displayed 
anti-Soviet tendencies and was influenced by the overwhelming American presence in its administration. 
Id., at 145. 
130 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 32. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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government.133  As political representatives of their respective country’s government, it 
was impossible for them to act as impartial arbiters of justice.  Consequently, there were 
glaring abuses of procedural due process in the proceedings of the FEC and the 
IMTFE.134  For instance, on April 3, 1946, the FEC issued a policy decision on the 
“Apprehension, Trial and Punishment of War Criminals in the Far East.”  Article 6(a) of 
the FEC’s policy decision empowered General MacArthur, to establish an agency, acting 
under his command, to investigate reports of war crimes, collect and analyze evidence, 
and arrange for the apprehension of suspects.  Pursuant to the authority conferred on 
General MacArthur by Article 6(a), he created the International Prosecution Section 
charged with the responsibility of preparing documents for the indictment of the War 
Criminals.  Also, by virtue of Article 6(a), General MacArthur had the sole discretion to 
decide what individuals or organizations would be prosecuted and before which court 
they would appear.135   
It was apparent that this arrangement would create room for subjective decision as 
to which of the war criminals should be selected for prosecution.136  In the end, no Allied 
                                                 
133 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 32 (noting that while the choice of judges at the IMT was made 
by the respective of the Four Major Powers, the U.S., British, and French judges and their alternates were 
highly qualified and known for their personal integrity and independence.  The judges from the USSR, who 
were military officers, were believed to be less knowledgeable than their western counterparts and subject 
to their government’s directives, though their performance on the bench paralleled that of their western 
counterparts.  Professor Bassiouni notes that this was not the case at the IMTFE. With the exception of 
Roling (Netherlands), Pol (India), and Bernard (France), many of the judges appeared politically motivated, 
especially the president, and General MacArthur’s influence seemed rampant.  See, John A. Appleman, 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, 239-44 (1954) (referring to page numbers 
in the transcript evidencing prejudice and unfairness, particularly by Presiding Judge Sir William Webb of 
Australia)). 
134 Id. 
135 Accused war criminals were divided into Class A, B, and C. The first IMTFE proceedings were against 
28 senior Japanese officials considered Class A suspected war criminals, though clearly some of them did 
not deserve being placed in that category, according to most experts on the subject. For an early appraisal, 
see Solis Horwitz, The Tokyo Trial, 465 INT’L RECONCILIATION 473 (1950); Howard Levie, supra 
note 102, at 141. 
136 See, M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 3, at 211-12. 
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military personnel were prosecuted for war crimes. Also conspicuously absent from 
prosecution is Emperor Hirohito of Japan which was effectuated by the FEC policy 
decision on February 3, 1950, not to prosecute him for war criminal.137  The FEC sought 
to rationalize the decision not to prosecute Emperor Hirohito on the basis that it was 
necessary to preserve his image as Japan’s Emperor and as a reward for his unconditional 
surrender of Japan.  It was believed that the decision not to prosecute the Emperor would 
ensure better political cooperation by the post-World War II Japanese ruling elite and 
obtain their support for the administration of the occupied Japanese territories.138  This 
“exemplifies how political considerations resulted in the release of convicted war 
criminals and in condemnation of those whose role in the atrocities was negligible or 
non-existent.”139   
Similarly, the IMTFE arbitrarily set its own rules and standards by deciding what 
evidence may or may not be entered as exhibits.  The trials were generally marred by 
procedural irregularities and abuse of judicial discretion.140  An example of such travesty 
of justice that permeated the IMTFE proceedings is the fact that while it was mandatory 
for the accused to make a written application in advance before seeking to produce any 
evidence in the form of documents or witnesses, the prosecution was not required to 
make similar prior disclosure.  Also, the application of the law to some of the defendants 
was at least dubious, if not erroneous.141 For instance, the execution of sentences was 
                                                 
137 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 36 (citing 22 DEP’T ST. BULL. 244 (1950) (suggesting that 
MacArthur reportedly instigated the decision because he felt that prosecuting the Emperor would make 
pacification of Japan a difficult task, costing the United States many casualties at the hands of Japanese 
guerrillas). 
138 William Manchester, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 1880-1964, 484-91 (1978). 
139 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 36. 
140 John Appleman, See, John A. Appleman, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES, 239-58 (1954).  
141 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 34 (Citing Bernard V.A. Roling, supra note 116, at 605-07. 
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inconsistent, and could be unilaterally reduced or competently discharged by General 
MacArthur.142  
Thus, unlike the IMT convicts, none of the twenty-five convicted war criminals 
by the IMTFE served their full prison term as they were all released by the end of the 
1950s.143 Just as some critics regard the IMT trials as victor’s justice, the Japanese 
considered the IMTFE and the Military tribunals’ trials in the Far East as victors’ 
vengeance couched in terms of victors’ justice.144  On the other hand, while the convicted 
German war criminals “were for the most, pariahs in their society, the Japanese did not 
view such persons as criminals but as victims.”145    
On the other hand, a remarkable difference between the Allied Military 
prosecutions in the Far East and the trials by the IMT, IMTFE, and the Tribunals under 
CCL No. 10, was that the Military Tribunals proceedings in the Far East had jurisdiction 
only for war crimes.146  Also, the IMT and IMTFE are considered international in nature 
due to their composition.  However, the CCL No. 10 Tribunal and the Allied Military 
                                                 
142 Howard Levie, supra note 102, at 142. 
143 See John Mendelsohn, supra note 128, at 226. 
144 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 34 (Citing A.C. Brockman, THE OTHER NUREMBERG, THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1987); THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES 
TRIAL (C. Hosoya et al. eds., 1986); Philip R. Piccigallo, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR 
CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST 1945-1951 (1979); Saburo Shiroyama, WAR CRIMINAL: THE 
LIFE AND DEATH OF HIROTA KOKI (1977); Richard H. Minear, VICTOR’S VENGEANCE: THE 
TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971). 
145 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 34-5 (citing a letter from Dr. R. John Pritchard to him dated Jan. 
30, 1996, noted that Class A war criminals convicted by the IMTFE became members of Cabinet, and one 
became Prime Minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, a career diplomat, who was Foreign Minister in Tojo 
Midelki’s Wartime Cabinet and who signed on behalf of Japan the Instrument of Surrender on September 
2, 1945, on board the USS Missouri, was sentenced by the IMTFE to seven years imprisonment. He was 
released on parole 21 November 1950, and in November 1951 he was given clemency. Shigemitsu became 
Foreign Minister in December 1954. During his two years as Minister, he was instrumental in obtaining the 
Allies’ clemency and ultimately, in 1957, the release of all Japanese held in captivity. On 7 April 1957, the 
Japanese Government announced that with the concurrence of a majority of the Allied Powers represented 
on the IMTFE, all major Japanese war criminals were granted clemency and unconditionally released 
forthwith. Kishi Nobusake, another Class A criminal suspect, was tried and convicted in further 
proceedings after the first Tokyo Trial, but later became Prime Minister in January 1956 and served until 
July 1960. He also held the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for some time in 1956). 
146 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 36. 
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Tribunals for the Far East are domestic in nature because the Tribunals were individually 
constituted by the Allied Powers in exercise of sovereign rights over the territory that 
they control following the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.147  
Regardless of the shortcomings highlighted above, the Nuremberg and subsequent 
war crimes trials were the foundation stones on which a new world order of international 
justice was to be built.  The prosecutions were positive revolutionary steps because they 
represented the first organized attempt to apply principles of international law to punish 
people accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Before the Nuremberg trials, 
jurisdiction over such offenses was limited to individual countries’ military courts.  The 
Nuremberg trials therefore, confirmed that when cruelties, such as genocide, reached a 
magnitude that shocked the conscience of humankind, it should and could be punished as 
a crime against all of humankind.  According to Justice Jackson, “crimes against 
International law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the promise of international law be 
enforced.”148   
The Nuremberg trials (and, with a minor impact, the Tokyo trials) produced a 
large number of judgments, which have greatly contributed to the forming of case law 
regarding individual criminal responsibility under international law.149   
                                                 
147 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 36. 
148 IMT Judgment, supra note 1, at 447. 
149 See, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 
November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Official Documents and Proceedings, Nuremberg, 1947. See also, 
Telford Taylor, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 22; R.H. Jackson, THE 
NUREMBERG CASE, (New York, 1948), R.H. Jackson, THE CASE AGAINST THE NAZI WAR 
CRIMINALS (New York, 1945); Bernard V.A. Roling and Antonio Cassese, THE TOKYO TRIAL, supra 
note 116. 
CHAPTER THREE 
=============================================================== 
 
3.0. THE FOUNDATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR MODERN 
                                           INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the visible aftermaths of World War II experiences and trials was the rapid 
development of international criminal law.  The Nuremberg trials helped to expose the 
degree of atrocities committed by the Germans during World War II.  It also exposed the 
lack of and/or inadequate legal instruments proscribing such conducts as crimes under 
international law.  These revelations galvanized the development of the legal frameworks 
for modern international criminal law.  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
and the newly formed United Nations1 became the vanguard for codification of rules of 
armed conflict and prohibition of certain conducts as crimes against humanity into 
treaties and other legal instruments.2  
 
3.2. The United Nations Adoption of the Nuremberg Principles 
Shortly after the completion of the Nuremberg trials, the UN General Assembly 
on December 11, 1946, adopted by unanimous vote Resolution 95(I), entitled 
                                                 
1 See Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, arts. 51, 59, Stat. 1031, 1044, 3 Bevans 1153, 1165. 
With the demise of the League of Nations for its failure to prevent the World War II, the United Nations 
was established on October 24, 1945, as an international organization to maintain peace and security.  On 
April 25, 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco to draft the United Nations Charter 
which established the UN.  The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 by the representatives of the 50 
countries that took part in the San Francisco Conference.  Poland which was not represented at the 
Conference later signed the Charter and became one of the original 51 Member States of the United 
Nations.  The United Nations officially came into existence on October 24, 1945, and has currently 199 
Member States.  See http://www.un.org [visited on February 9, 2005) [hereinafter the  
2 For a detailed discussion of international criminal law conventions see M. Cherrif Bassiouni, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR PENAL PROVISIONS (1997). 
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“Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal.”3  Through Resolution 95(1), the UN affirmed the principles of 
international law recognized by both the IMT Charter4 and espoused in the Judgment of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal.5  This meant that in the General Assembly’s view, the IMT had 
taken into account already existing principles of international law, which the tribunal had 
only to “recognize”.  Thus, by Resolution 95, the UN confirmed the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law.  Also, through 
Resolution 95, the UN General Assembly mandated the International Law Commission 
(ILC), a subsidiary organ of the United Nations to codify the Nuremberg Principles into a 
criminal code and to create an international criminal jurisdiction where such offenses, 
including the crime of genocide, could be punished.6   
By adopting Resolution 95, the United Nations confirmed that there were a 
number of general principles, belonging to customary law, which the Nuremberg Charter 
and Judgment had “recognized”.  Also, the United Nations expressed the need to 
incorporate the principles into a major instrument of codification either by way of a 
“general codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind” or as an 
                                                 
3Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add Sess. 1, pt. 2, 55th Plen. Mtg. at 188 (1946) [hereinafter 
UN Resolution 95].  For a discussion of the legislative history of this resolution, see The Charter and 
Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal: History and Analysis, U.N. Doc. A/CN 4/5, at 11-33. 
4Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, August 8, 
1945, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546 
[hereinafter the IMT Charter]. 
5 The Nuremberg Tribunal noted that “crimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract 
entities and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced.” See  Trial  of  Major War  Criminals  before  the  International  Military  Tribunal,  
Judgement,  Nuremberg, 14.11.1945 – 1.10.1946, Official Documents, 1947, Vol. I, s. 223. 
6 UN Resolution 95, supra note 3, at 188. 
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“international criminal code”.  By the same token the resolution recognized the 
customary law nature of the provisions contained in the London Agreement.7 
In 1950, the ILC followed up the U.N. affirmation with its report entitled the 
“Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal 
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal.”8  Principle I which expressly recognizes the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility, states that “any person who commits an 
act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to 
punishment”.9  In essence, Principle 1 constitutes official recognition of the fact that an 
individual in the broadest sense (“any person”) may be held responsible for having 
committed a crime.  And this may be the case even if the act is not considered a crime 
under domestic law.10   
Principles III and IV provide that a person who acts in his capacity as Head of 
State or as a government official and one who acts on the orders of the government or of 
a superior are not thereby relieved of responsibility.11  These two principles affirm what 
was established in Articles 7 and 8 of the Nuremberg Charter regarding the prohibition of 
the defense of superior order as absolute defense.12  However, while article 8 of IMT 
Charter on superior orders, accepted the possibility of mitigation of punishment “if the 
Tribunal determines that justice so requires”, Principle IV of the ILC text modifies the 
                                                 
7“Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter has since come to represent general international law.” See Ian 
Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (Oxford, 1991); M. Shaw, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 471 (Cambridge, 1998).  
8 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), 
reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 364, 374-78, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1 (reporting 
the Commission’s findings for The Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles]. 
9 Id., Principle I. 
10 Id., Principle II. 
11 Id., Principles III & IV. 
12 IMT Charter, supra note 4, arts. 7 & 8. 
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approach by stating that the individual is not relieved of responsibility “provided a moral 
choice was in fact possible to him”.13  Thus, unlike article 8 of the IMT Charter, Principle 
IV leaves a great discretionary power to the tribunals that are called upon to decide 
whether or not the individual had a “moral choice” to refuse to comply with an order 
given by a superior.   
Principle VI codifies the three categories of crime established by article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Charter. What was defined in the London Agreement as “crimes coming 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” has now been formulated as “crimes under 
international law”, using the same wording found in article 6 of the IMT Charter.14  To 
this extent, Principle VI represents the core of a possible international criminal code.   
The affirmation of the Nuremberg principles by the 1946 General Assembly 
resolution and their formulation by the ILC were important steps toward the 
establishment of a code of international crimes entailing individual responsibility.15  
Thus, individual criminal responsibility for violations of the international crimes is now 
                                                 
13 Nuremberg Principles, supra note 8, Principle IV. 
14 See discussions and accompanying text on IMT subject matter jurisdiction in Chapter two.  
15 See article 2 of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind which 
provides: 
 
Individual responsibility 
1.    A crime against the peace and security of mankind entails individual responsibility. 
2.    An individual shall be responsible for the crime of aggression in accordance with article 16. 
3.    An individual shall be responsible for a crime set out in article 17, 18, 19 or 20 if that individual: 
     (a) Intentionally commits such a crime; 
     (b) Orders the commission of such a crime, which in fact occurs or is attempted; 
     (c) Fails to prevent or repress the commission of such a crime in the circumstances set out in article 6; 
     (d)  Knowingly  aids,  abets  or  otherwise  assists,  directly  and  substantially,  in  the commission of 
such a crime, including providing the means for its commission; 
     (e) Directly participates in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime which in fact occurs; 
     (f) Directly and publicly incites another individual to commit such a crime which in fact occurs; 
     (g) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action commencing the execution of a crime  which  
does  not  in  fact  occur  because  of  circumstances  independent  of  his intentions.  
 
See, International  Law  Commission Draft  Code  of  Crimes  Against  the  Peace  and  Security  of 
Mankind, 1996, art. 2, available at: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm.  
 49 
undisputed part of contemporary customary international law.16  Criminal responsibility 
now extends to individual combatants, government officials, and Heads of State.17 
Furthermore, it is now a recognized principle of international law that “leaders, 
organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit … [crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity] are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of 
such plan.”18   
 
3.3. The Genocide Convention of 1948 
On December 9, 1948, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.19  The 
Genocide Convention was an agreement which condemned genocide as an international 
crime, regardless of where it took place.  It sought to prevent and punish genocides and 
actions leading to genocide.  Importantly, the Genocide convention severed the 
connection of genocide with war by declaring that genocide is a crime under international 
law “whether committed in time of peace or in time of war”.20  
The convention defined genocide by listing prohibited genocidal acts which if 
committed with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group” is punishable as genocide under international law.21  The criminal acts of 
                                                 
16 See Nuremberg Principles, supra note 8, Principle I. 
17 Id., Principles III-IV. 
18 Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Sept. 30, 1946, 22 T.M.W.C. 
411. 
19 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force on January 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
20 Genocide Convention, art. 1. 
21 Id., art. 2.  Such acts are: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
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genocide which are punishable under the Genocide Convention include the act of 
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.22  
Thus, it is a crime to plan or incite genocide, even before killing starts, and to aid 
or abet genocide.23  It follows that genocidal acts need not kill or cause the death of 
members of a group.  Causing serious bodily or mental harm, prevention of births and 
transfer of children are acts of genocide when committed as part of a policy to destroy a 
group’s existence.24  Similarly, perpetrators need not intend to destroy the entire group, 
an intention to destroy only part of a group will suffice as genocide.  It is disputable 
whether there is a requirement of intent to destroy a substantial number of group 
members or whether an individual may be guilty of genocide even if he or she kills only 
one person.  It would appear that the individual is guilty of genocide so long as the person 
knew that he or she was participating in a larger plan to destroy the group.25 
The protected groups under the genocide Convention are national, ethnical, racial 
or religious groups.26  A national group means a set of individuals whose identity is 
defined by a common country of nationality or national origin.  On the other hand, an 
ethnical group is a set of individuals whose identity is defined by common cultural 
traditions, language or heritage.  A racial group means a set of individuals whose identity 
is defined by physical characteristics.  And a religious group is a set of individuals whose 
identity is defined by common religious creeds, beliefs, doctrines, practices, or rituals. 
                                                                                                                                                 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; and (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
22 Genocide Convention, supra note 19, art. 3. 
23 Id. 
24 Id., art. 2. 
25 For further discussion on genocide, see part II, chapter six, infra.  
26 Genocide Convention, supra note 19, art. 2. 
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Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention undertake to enact, in accordance 
with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the 
provisions of the present Convention.27  Also, because the Convention did not provide 
the penalties for persons convicted of genocide, Contracting Parties are free to enact 
domestic legislation which should provide effective penalties for persons guilty of 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 3.28  It follows that the punishment 
of genocide in one Contracting Party may be more or less severe than is provided in 
another Contracting Party.   
The Genocide Convention applies equally to “rulers”, “public officials” and 
“private individuals”,29 thereby reinforcing the principle of individual criminal liability.  
The jurisdiction to try individuals charged with genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in article 3 is placed on the State in the territory of which the act was 
committed, or on such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect 
to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.30  However, the 
International Court of Justice has jurisdiction between Contracting Parties with respect to 
the interpretation or application or responsibilities of Contracting Parties under the 
Convention.31  
 The Genocide Convention which was adopted on the eve of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly was an important 
                                                 
27 Genocide Convention, supra note 19, art. 5. 
28 Id. 
29 Id., art. 4. 
30 Id., art. 6. 
31 Id., art. 9. 
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development in the proscription of acts against humanity.32  The customary nature of the 
principles which form the basis of the Convention has been recognized by the 
International Court of Justice.33  The Convention introduced genocide as a new crime 
under international law distinct from its classification as crimes against humanity under 
article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter.34   However, in the case of Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic,35 the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia held that “genocide [is] itself a specific form of crime against humanity”.36  
This has led to the suggestion that in future cases it may be necessary only to charge 
perpetrators with crimes against humanity with genocide as part of the res gestae.37  This 
suggestion is inappropriate because elements of the crime against humanity and genocide 
are not the same at least as contained under the Elements of Crimes for the International 
Criminal Court.38  
 
 
3.4. The Geneva Conventions on Laws and Customs of War, 1949 
Shortly after the Genocide Convention, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross conscious of the atrocities of World War II initiated the drafting of four 
Conventions in Geneva on August 12, 1949, aimed at strengthening the rights of civilians 
and prisoners of war during armed conflict.  The Conventions were adopted on August 
12, 1949, by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International 
                                                 
32 Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J.I.L., 145 (1947); Josef L. 
Kunz, The United Nations Convention on Genocide, 43 AM. J.I.L., 738 (1949); Nehemiah Robinson, THE 
GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (New York, 1960). 
33 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion of 18 May 1951, I.C.J. Reports, 23 (1951).  
34 See discussions on the subject matter jurisdiction of the IMT, supra chapter two, at pp 15-18.  
35 Prosecutor v. Tadic (Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-94-1-T, July 14, 1997. 
36 Id., at para. 8. 
37 Leslie C. Green, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 2nd Ed., 43 (2000). 
38 See discussions on the International Criminal Court, infra at Part III. 
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Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, held in Geneva from April 12, to 
August 12, 1949.  The four Geneva Conventions are: the Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field39; 
the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick, 
and Shipwrecked members of the Armed Forces at Sea40; the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War41; and the Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.42  
World War II highlighted the lack of clarity and inadequacy of the existing laws 
of armed conflict that protected victims of war and the need for more specific provisions 
on punishing violations of the law.43  Thus, Geneva Conventions I, II, and III revised the 
ffirst Geneva Convention of 1864 on the treatment of battlefield casualties, the Second 
Geneva Convention of 1906 which extended the principles from the first convention to 
apply also to war at sea, and the third Geneva Convention of 1929 on the treatment of 
prisoners of war respectively.  On the other hand, Geneva Convention IV of 1949 for the 
first time, provided for the protection of civilians in enemy territory during armed 
conflict.  Convention IV was as a result of the treatment suffered by civilian populations 
of occupied territories during World War II.44  Together, the Geneva Conventions 
reshaped the entire treaty-based system dealing with the protection of war victims and a 
                                                 
39 The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 970 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]. 
40 The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 
members of the Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 971 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
II). 
41 The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
972 (entered into force on October 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 
42 The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
43 See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 169 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989). 
44 Leslie C. Green, supra note 37, at 43. 
 54 
significant development in the law of armed conflict since 1907 and have been adhered to 
by more States than any other agreement on the laws of armed conflict.45 
The extensive provisions of the Geneva Conventions are linked by certain general 
principles and “common articles” which are applicable to all four Conventions. Under 
Common article 1 applicable to all four Conventions, the High Contracting Parties (used 
to refer to member States to the Geneva Conventions), to these Conventions undertake 
the basic general treaty obligation “to respect and to ensure respect for the present 
Conventions in all circumstances”.46  Common Article 1 is reflective of the principles of 
good faith and pacta sunt servanda,47 which have deep historical and jurisprudential 
roots in international law.  The principle imposes on a State party to a convention not 
only a duty to perform its own obligations as a party to the convention but also a duty not 
to encourage others to violate the convention.48  Hence, in the merits phase of Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,49 the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) concluded that: 
[T]here is an obligation on the United States Government, in the 
terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to “respect” the 
Conventions and even “to ensure respect” for them “in all 
circumstances”, …. the United States is thus under an obligation 
not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in 
Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of Article 3 
common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions . . . . 50 
 
                                                 
45 Currently, there are 191 States Parties to the Conventions.  See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and 
Successions, at < http://www.icrc.org/eng/party_gc> (documenting 191 ratifications as of October 2004). 
46 Geneva Conventions, common Article 3. 
47 See Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
UNTS Regis. No. 18,232, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679 
(1969). 
48 Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. I. L. 348, 354-5 (1987). 
49 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14 
(Judgment of June 27). 
50 Id., at 114, para. 220. 
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The Geneva Conventions created two types of armed conflicts: international and 
non-international. The bulk of the Conventions apply to international armed conflicts 
whether declared or not.51  International armed conflict exists between two States even if 
one of the parties does not recognize the existence of a state of war.52  Also, international 
armed conflict exists whenever there is a partial or total occupation of another State’s 
territory and even when the occupation has met with no armed resistance.53  Furthermore, 
the Geneva Conventions are applicable as between Contracting Parties in all international 
armed conflicts even where one of the States to the conflict is not a party to the 
Conventions. In addition, the Contracting Parties shall be bound to observe the 
Convention in their relation to the said State if the latter subsequently accepts and applies 
the Convention.54  Thus, under common article 2, the Geneva Conventions apply to 
almost every armed conflict between States.55 
On the other hand, common article 3 applies to “armed conflict not of an 
international character”.56  Non-international armed conflict refers to conflicts that are 
                                                 
51 See the Geneva Conventions, common Article 2.  
52 The Geneva Conventions, common Article 2. 
53 The Geneva Conventions, common Article 2.  
54 Geneva Conventions, common Article 2. 
55 David D. Caron & David L. Sloss, Availability of U.S. Courts to Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base - Reach of Habeas Corpus - Executive Power in War on Terror 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 788, 789 (2004).  
56 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, provides that: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following 
provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or 
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
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not between States and includes conflicts between a State and a non-state entity.57  
Article 3 marks a new step in the development of humanitarian law as it was without 
antecedent because international law and prior conventions relating to armed conflict 
generally did not regulate the conduct of internal armed conflict.58   However, in 1949, 
the ICRC considered it necessary to adopt minimum rules of protection for the parties 
involved in a non-international conflict.59  In the merits phase of the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,60 the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) noted that common Article 3 defines: 
certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a non-
international character. . . . [I]n the event of international armed 
conflicts, these rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in 
addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to 
international conflicts; . . . they . . . reflect what the Court in 1949 
called “elementary considerations of humanity” (Corfu 
Channel..).61 
 
The ICRC Commentary on Geneva Convention No. I states that common article 3 
demands respect for rules “already recognized as essential in all civilized countries, and 
enacted in the municipal law of the States in question, long before the Convention was 
signed.”62  The ICRC’s position has received judicial support from the ICJ which noted 
that the Geneva Conventions are part of “the general principles of humanitarian law to 
                                                                                                                                                 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for . . . 
57 Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 38-41 (2003). 
58 Leslie C. Green, supra note 37, at 44.  
59 COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA 
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK 
IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 26 (J. Picted ed. 1952)   
60 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 49, at 14. 
61 Id., at 114, paras. 218-19. 
62 Id. at 50. 
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which the Conventions merely give specific expression”.63  In Prosecutor v. Tadic,64 the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia upheld 
the decision of the Trial Chamber 165 which held that common article 3 applies to both 
international and internal armed conflicts.66  The Appeals Chamber further observed that 
common article 3 covered “all violations of international humanitarian law other than the 
grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions.”67 
Another remarkable novation of the Geneva Conventions is the introduction of a 
clear obligation on Contracting Parties to prosecute those who commit “greave 
breaches”68 of the Convention.69  Common articles 49, 50,129, and 146 provide that: 
                                                 
63 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 49, at 114, para. 220 
64 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, (May 7, 1997) reprinted in I.H.R.R. vol. 4, No. 3 (1997). 
65 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-
94-1-T (August 10, 1995).  
66 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-AR72 (October 2, 1995) reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996) [hereinafter 
Decision of the Appeals Chamber].  
67 Id, 87. 
68  See Geoffrey Best, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, 166 (1994); Leslie Green, supra note 37, at 43. Each 
of the four Conventions lists what constitutes grave breaches which are identical and only differs in context 
of the specific subject matter addressed by each convention. 
 
Art. 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I and Art. 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention II contain identical 
provisions that define grave breaches with respect to the wounded and sick in the field and at sea. These 
two articles provide as follows: 
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if 
committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman 
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly. 
 
Geneva Convention I, supra note 39, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 40, art. 51.  
 
Art. 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III defines grave breaches with respect to the protection of 
prisoners of war as follows: 
 
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if 
committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman 
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a 
prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention. 
Id. art. 130.  
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Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to 
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered 
to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It 
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of 
its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another 
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High 
Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.70    
   
The Commentary to the Geneva Convention IV, Article 146 elaborates on the 
obligation imposed on Contracting States to prosecute persons accused of grave breaches 
of the Conventions.  The Commentary provides as follows: 
The obligation on the High Contracting Parties to search for 
persons accused to have committed grave breaches imposes an 
active duty on them.  As soon as a Contracting Party realizes that 
there is on its territory a person who has committed such a 
breach, its duty is to ensure that the person concerned is arrested 
and prosecuted with all speed.  The necessary police action 
should be taken spontaneously, therefore, not merely in 
pursuance of a request from another State.71 
 
The text of common articles 49, 50, 129, & 146 did not place any jurisdictional 
limit on the obligation of States to apprehend and prosecute individuals who commit 
                                                                                                                                                 
Art. 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV defines grave breaches with respect to the protection of 
civilians as follows: 
 
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if 
committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman 
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a 
protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the 
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly. 
Id. art. 147. 
69 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 39, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 40, art. 50, Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 41, art. 129, and Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, art. 146. 
70 Id. 
71 See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION of 12 August, 1949: GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 593 
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention IV Commentary].  
 59 
great breaches of the Conventions.72  On the contrary, the Geneva Conventions clearly 
obligate States to search for and prosecute any person accused of violating common 
articles 49, 50, 129, & 146 without regard to the person’s nationality.73  However, a State 
may in accordance with its laws, differ jurisdiction to another Contracting State that has 
made out a prima facie case against the accused.74  While the Geneva Conventions did 
not expressly provide that a Contracting State may demand from another Contracting 
State to fulfill its obligation to prosecute or surrender the accused to a willing State, the 
Commentary to common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions appears to support this 
proposition.75  Furthermore, the 1958 Commentary on the Geneva Convention IV added 
that: 
[t]he proper working of the system of protection provided by the 
Convention demands in fact that the Contracting Parties should 
not be content merely to apply its provisions themselves, but 
should do everything in their power to ensure that the 
humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied 
universally.76 
 
In view of the above, it has been suggested that since war crimes are universal 
crimes, suspected war criminals may be prosecuted by any State.77  Thus, by implication, 
Contracting States’ obligation to prosecute is absolute for grave breaches of the Geneva 
                                                 
72 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 39, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 40, art. 50, Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 41, art. 129, and Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, art. 146. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA 
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK 
IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 26 (J. Picted ed. 1952) (emphasis added). The Commentary adds 
that “in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, the other Contracting Parties . . . may, and 
should, endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention.” 
76 COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 16 
(O. Uhler & H. Coursier eds. 1958). 
77 See Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (3d ed. 1979). 
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Conventions.78  Furthermore, it has also been advocated by commentators that the 
Geneva Conventions introduced the concept of universal jurisdiction through common 
articles 49, 50, 129, & 146.79  According to one commentator: 
… under the 1949 Geneva Conventions ... all States Parties to the 
Conventions ... are currently obligated to search out persons who 
have committed “grave breaches” of the Conventions and to 
either try them or extradite them for trial pursuant to the 
Conventions. This obligation is a major procedural mechanism 
under the Conventions for enforcement of their important 
humanitarian principles. The obligation applies to all States 
Parties whether or not they were parties to the conflict or the 
“grave breaches” took place in their jurisdiction, and it applies 
now with no need for further legal predicates.80  
 
However, the obligation to search for and arrest persons suspected of committing 
grave breaches should not be construed to bestow on a State the universal obligation or 
carte blanche to search for alleged war criminals in the sovereign territory of foreign 
countries.81  Rather, the obligation to prosecute persons accused of grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions must be exercised within the limits of international law.82   
 
3.5. Additional Protocols I & II to the Geneva Conventions 
While the Geneva Conventions were considered a major legal framework for the 
development of rules of war, with time, it was noted that the Conventions did not provide 
adequate protection in certain areas such as the conduct of combatants and protection of 
                                                 
78 See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International 
Crimes in Haiti? 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 20 (1996). 
79 Leslie Green, supra note 37, at 43; Geoffrey Best, supra note 68, at 165 (1994); John Norton Moore, 
CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW 302-03, 310 (1992); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 503-26 (1992); See Ian 
Brownlie, supra note 77, at 563; Denise Plattner, The Penal Repression of Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 278 INT’L REV. of the RED CROSS 
409, 413 (1990). 
80 John Norton Moore, supra note 79, at 299.  
81 See Paul S. Stevens, An Interview with Defense Department General Counsel Judith A. Miller, (Standing 
Comm. on Law and Nat. Security, Washington D.C.), 18 A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP. 1 (1996).  
82 See Ian Brownlie, supra note 77, at 243-57 
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civilians from the effects of hostilities. In other to address the deficiency, the 
International Conference on Human Rights after its meeting in Tehran in 1968 invited the 
ICRC to study the possibility of updating the Conventions.83  Accepting the invitation, 
the ICRC organized and chaired the consultations between experts drawn from 
governments and from National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.84  The ICRC used 
the reports of these conferences to prepare the draft of the Additional Protocols.85 The 
ICRC presented the reports of the conferences on Additional Protocols to the Twenty-
Second International Conference of the Red Cross.86   
Thereafter the draft Protocols were considered by the Diplomatic Conference on 
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977.87  The Conference was convened by the Swiss 
government in February, 1974 and was attended by 115 States that signed the Geneva 
                                                 
83 International Conference on Human Rights (Tehran, Apr 22-May 13, 1968), Resolution XXIII, in Final 
Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Doc A/CONF 32/41 at 18 (UN 1968). 
84 Conference of Red Cross Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian 
Law applicable in Armed Conflicts (The Hague, Mar 1-6, 1971), Report on the Work of the Conference, 
Doc D-O-1195b (ICRC 1971) (cyclostyled document); Conference of Government Experts on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 
(Geneva, May 24-June 12, 1971), Report on the Work of the Conference (ICRC 1971); Conference of Red 
Cross Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts, 2d Sess (Vienna, Mar 20-24, 1972), Report on the Work of the Conference, Doc D-1254b 
(ICRC 1972) (cyclostyled document); Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 2d Sess (Geneva, May 3-
June 3, 1972), Report on the Work of the Conference (ICRC 1972) (two volumes). 
85 International Committee of the Red Cross, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 
August 12, 1949 (1973); International Committee of the Red Cross, Draft Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949: Commentary (1973). 
86 Resolution XIII, in Resolutions Adopted by the XXIInd International Conference of the Red Cross, 14 
Intl Rev Red Cross 19, 30 (1974); International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Study by the 
XXIInd International Conference of the Red Cross of the Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, Doc CDDH/6 (1974) (cyclostyled document). 
87 See Resolutions of The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977, available at: ICRC, 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/cff3695d633af7d5c125641e0052bb7
8?OpenDocument.  
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Conventions and/or are member States of United Nations Organization.88  The 
Conference was also observed by national liberation organizations as well as 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.89 The Diplomatic Conference 
ended on June 8, 1977 with the adoption of two additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions.90   
Protocol I extends the Geneva Conventions’ definition of international armed 
conflict to include wars of national liberation.91  By clearly prohibiting what constitutes 
indiscriminate attacks, Protocol I specifies what constitutes a legitimate target of military 
attack.92  Attacks or other acts carried out in violation of the prohibition against 
indiscriminate attacks and attacks or reprisals directed against the civilian population and 
individual civilians or civilian objects or objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population are, subject to certain provisos, considered grave breaches of 
humanitarian law and classified as war crimes.93  Article 90 of Protocol I provides for the 
                                                 
88 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva, 1974-1977) (Federal Political Department, 
Bern 1978) (seventeen volumes). 
89 Id.   
90 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 16 ILM 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions]; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 16 ILM 
1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions]. 
91 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 1(4). 
92 Specifically, Protocol I: 
a) prohibits indiscriminate attacks and attacks or reprisals directed against: the civilian population and 
individual civilians (art. 48 and 51); civilian objects (art. 48 and 52); objects indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population (art. 54);cultural objects and places of worship (art. 53); works and installations 
containing dangerous forces (art. 56); and the natural environment (art. 55); 
b) extends the protection accorded under the Geneva Conventions to all medical personnel, units and 
means of transport, both civilian and military (art. 8-31); 
c) lays down an obligation to search for missing persons (art. 33); 
d) strengthens the provisions concerning relief for the civilian population (art. 68-71); 
e) protects the activities of civil defence organizations (art. 61-67); 
f) specifies measures that must be taken by the States to facilitate the implementation of humanitarian law 
(art 80-91). 
93 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 85. 
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establishment of an International Fact-Finding Commission to investigate alleged grave 
breaches or other serious violations of the Conventions and of Protocol I.94  All States 
Parties to Protocol I may accept the competence of this Commission.95    
Protocol I was necessary to strengthen the Geneva Conventions because new 
methods of combat had been developed and the rules applicable to the conduct of 
hostilities had become outdated.  Protocol I provides a reminder that the right of the 
parties to a conflict to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited and that it is 
prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles, material or tactics of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.96  
Protocol II seeks to extend the application of the main rules of the law of war to 
internal conflicts.97  This was in recognition of the fact that most conflicts since World 
War II have been non-international.98  Prior to Protocol II, the only provision in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 which is applicable to non-international armed conflict is 
article 3 common to all four Conventions.  Although common article 3 sets out basic 
principles for protecting people in wartime, it was not enough to solve the serious 
problems of humanitarian concern that arise in internal conflicts.  Thus, while common 
article 3 planted the seed of humanitarian considerations in law relating to civil war, 
Protocol II expanded the scope of prohibitions and protections.99 
                                                 
94 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 90.  
95 Id. 
96 Id., art. 35. 
97 See, Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 3. 
98 Lindsay Moir, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2002). The Red Cross estimates that 
eighty percent of victims of violence are victims of “non-international armed conflicts.” available at 
www.icrc.org. 
99 For example, Protocol II: 
(a) strengthens the fundamental guarantees enjoyed by all persons not, or no longer, taking part in the 
hostilities (Art. 4); 
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Also, unlike common article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, which fails to set 
criteria for the definition of internal conflict to which it applies, Protocol II describes its 
own field of application in considerable detail, excluding situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other 
acts of a similar nature.100  Thus, the kind of internal armed conflict covered by Protocol 
II are non-international conflicts that take place on the territory of a State between the 
armed forces of that state and rebel armed forces that are under responsible command and 
control part of the national territory.101  However, Protocol II unlike Protocol I failed to 
expressly provide for individual criminal responsibility for persons in a position of 
authority during an armed conflict and do not criminalize omissions by persons in 
authority to prevent crimes being committed under their command.102  
 
3.6. Observations and Commentary 
The Genocide Convention and the Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocol 
I & II laid the foundation for international criminal law.  These legal instruments 
pioneered the codification of international prohibition of acts which are repugnant to a 
civilized society and inimical to the survival of humankind.  As discussed in chapters 
                                                                                                                                                 
b) lays down rights for persons deprived of their freedom and provides judicial guarantees for those 
prosecuted in connection with an armed conflict (art. 5-6); 
c) prohibits attacks on the civilian population and individual civilians (art. 13);  
d) prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (art. 14);  
e) prohibits attacks on works and installations containing dangerous forces (art. 15); 
f) prohibits attacks on cultural objects and places of worship (art. 16); 
g) regulates the forced movement of civilians (art. 17); 
h) protects the wounded, sick and shipwrecked (art. 7); 
i) protects religious personnel and all medical personnel, units and means of transport (art. 9-11); 
j) limits the use of the red cross and red crescent emblems to those persons and objects duly authorized to 
display it (art. 12). 
100 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 1. 
101 Id., art. 1(1). 
102 See, Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 86 applicable to international 
conflicts criminalizes omissions and provide for individual criminal responsibility.  
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four and six of this study, the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions have 
been incorporated wholly or with modifications in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals in 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively, the Statutes of the special or mixed 
tribunals for Sierra-Leone, Timore-Leste, and Cambodia as well as the ICC Statute.   
The two Additional Protocols were intended to supplement, but do not replace, 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949.  The Protocols have strengthened the rules governing 
the conduct of hostilities by the addition of more precise rules aimed at limiting the use of 
violence and protecting the civilian population.103  However, these instruments are not 
without limitations, prominent of which is the failure to provide an effective enforcement 
mechanism and in some situations, limited protection.  Therefore, in spite of these rules, 
States rarely fulfilled their duty to provide for or exercise their jurisdiction.  While 
concerned organizations such as the ICRC and others have appealed to States to comply 
with their obligations under the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I & II, the 
situation remained static.  Thus, until the mid-1990s, the vast majority of war crimes 
trials were limited to crimes committed during the World War II.104  
Apart from the legal instruments discussed above, there are other conventions 
which have been adopted over the years that contribute directly or indirectly to the 
development of international criminal law.  The Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954,105 which was adopted 
                                                 
103 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski & B. Zimmermann, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff, 
Geneva, 1987). 
104 Knut Dormann and Louis Maresca, The Role of the Red Cross in the Development of International 
Humanitarian Law: The International Committee of the Red Cross and Its Contribution to the Development 
of International Humanitarian Law in Specialized Instruments, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 217, 225 (2004). 
105 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 
14, 1954, (entered into force on August 7, 1956).  The Convention has been ratified or acceded to by 114 
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in the wake of massive destruction of the cultural heritage in World War II, commits the 
contracting parties to protect the “cultural heritage of all mankind” in the event of armed 
conflict.106  The Convention obligates contracting parties “to take, within the framework 
of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal 
or disciplinary sanctions” upon those persons “who commit or order to be committed a 
breach” of the Convention.107  
Also, the the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of December 10, 
1948, 108 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in response to World War II,  
outlined United Nations’ view on the human rights guaranteed to all mankind.109  The 
formation of the United Nations (“U.N.”) and the passing of the UDHR were important 
milestones in the contemporary history of human rights.110  The UDHR was conceived as 
a statement of objectives to be followed by governments, and therefore not legally 
binding.111  The UDHR however, served as the foundation for the adoption of two 
                                                                                                                                                 
States.  See http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E#1 (last visited March 9, 
2006). 
106 The Hague Convention, supra note 105, preamble, art. 4.   
107 Id., art. 28.  Note also that Article . 85(4)(d) of the 1977 Protocol I makes also attacks against historic 
monuments, works of art or places of worship under certain conditions a war crime.   See, Additional 
Protocol I, supra note 90, art. 85(4)(d).  See also, J. Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict (Paris, 1996). 
108 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].  
109 See, Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 290 (1996) (suggesting that the UDHR remains the 
primary source of global human rights standards and is the basis for most human rights instruments). 
110 See, Henry Steiner & Philip Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 705 
(Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 2000) (reviewing the formation of international human rights); Anne Gallagher, 
Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working with New Actors and Partners, in THE 
FUTURE OF U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 201 (Philip Alston & James Crawford, 
eds., 2000) (expressing that the effectiveness of the U.N. human rights treaty system rests on “its ability to 
encourage and cultivate national implementation of, and compliance with, international human rights 
standards”). 
111 Note however that in 1968 United Nations International Conference on Human Rights decided it 
“constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community” to all persons.  See also, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 262, (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 3rd ed. 1999) (noting scholars’ 
recognition of the UDHR as “binding, customary international law”); and at 848 (observing that “One oft-
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legally-binding UN human rights Covenants;112 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,113 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights.114  The UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ISESCR which are jointly referred to as the 
International Bill of Human Rights provides for and sets forth general standard for 
fundamental human rights protection.115  
The ICCPR offers in more detail the civil and political rights enumerated earlier 
in the UDHR and is legally binding on those countries that have ratified it.116 The ICCPR 
includes inter alia, the right to life,117 to be free from torture and slavery,118 to liberty and 
security, to freedoms of movement and association, thought, religion and expression, to 
                                                                                                                                                 
stated argument is that at least some standards set by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although 
initially only recommendatory and nonbinding, have now become legally binding as customary law 
through their wide acceptance by nations as having normative effect.”).  Thus, some scholars have argued 
that the UDHR has a legally binding effect on all United Nations members since it is “an authoritative 
interpretation of the general human rights commitments contained in the [United Nations] Charter.”  Id., at 
848. 
112The Universal Declaration of Human Rights could not garner the international consensus necessary to 
become a binding treaty because it contained both first-generation civil and political rights and second-
generation economic, social, and cultural rights.  This led to a divide between developed capitalist nations 
such as the USA, which favored civil and political rights, and communist nations which favored economic, 
social and cultural rights.  To solve this problem, two binding Covenants were created instead of one: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights. 
113 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) (entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].  As at January 26, 2006, about 155 members of the 
international community are States Parties to the ICCPR, making it one of the most fundamental 
expressions of human rights at the international level. See Office of the United Nations Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm (visited March 10, 2006).  
114 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966), 
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].  As at January 26, 2006, the ICESCR has been 
ratified by 152 States.  http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/3.htm (visited March 10, 2006). 
115 See Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1153, 1164 N.53 (1998) (explaining how the UDHR formed the foundations of human rights law).  
116 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 111 cmt. h (2002). 
117 ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 6 
118 Id., art. 7 
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equality before the law,119 to privacy, to equality within marriage, to the enjoyment of 
culture, the right to a fair trial120 and provides for principle of nullum crimen sine lege.121  
States Parties to the ICCPR are obligated to adopt legislative, administrative, and 
other measures necessary for ensuring that individuals within their jurisdiction enjoy the 
rights and freedoms contained in the ICCPR without discrimination.122 The Covenant 
establishes the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC)123 to monitor its implementation 
by considering periodic reports from States Parties.124  Should a State Party violate an 
individual’s rights and fails to provide an effective remedy, that person may 
communicate a complaint to the United Nations Human Rights Committee pursuant to 
the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.125  In certain circumstances, the HRC may consider 
                                                 
119 Id., art. 26 (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law.”). 
120 Id., art. 14 
121 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor 
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence 
was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the 
imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.  ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 15. 
122 ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 2(1). 
123 Id., art. 28 (providing for the establishing the Human Rights Committee). 
124 The Human Rights Committee is comprised of 18 experts who meet three times a year to consider 
periodic reports submitted by member States on their compliance with the treaty. Members of the Human 
Rights Committee are elected by member states, but do not represent any State.  Id., art. 28.  See Louis 
Henkin et al., HUMAN RIGHTS 491-92 (1999) observing that the Human Rights Committee: 
 
may be described as the guardian of the [ICCPR], with responsibility for monitoring its implementation. Its 
two main functions ... are to consider reports from, and complaints against, the State Parties. The former is 
obligatory for all State Parties, while the latter is optional and exists in two forms: interstate 
“communications’ under the Covenant, as well as individual “communications’ under the Optional 
Protocol. The basic obligation of States Parties is to implement the rights provided for in Parts I and III of 
the [ICCPR]. 
  
Id. 
125 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in 999 
U.N.T.S. 302 (1966) [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (establishing a committee with authority to review 
alleged human rights violations).  As at January 26, 2006, the Protocol has been ratified by 105 States 
Parties.  See Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, 
available at: http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/5.htm (visited March 10, 2006).  Article 1 
of the Protocol provides that:   
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complaints from other countries that have ratified the Covenant and from individuals who 
believe their rights under the Convention have been violated.  The HRC also formulates 
General Comments (GC) that may help to clarify what countries must do to comply with 
the ICCPR.126  
The ICESCR is a legally binding treaty that protects in more detail, a range of 
economic, social, and cultural rights without discrimination based on creed, political 
affiliation, gender, or race enumerated earlier in the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights.127  The ICESCR obligates States Parties to work toward the granting of 
economic, social, and cultural rights to individuals.128  In 1987, the U.N. Economic and 
Social Council established the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) to monitor the progress of countries towards fully implementing their 
obligations under the ICESCR.129 The Committee also formulates General Comments 
(GC) that clarifies what countries must do to comply with the ICESCR. 
                                                                                                                                                 
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of 
the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who 
claim to be victims of a violation by the State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No 
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not 
a Party to the present Protocol. 
  
Id.  
 
126 See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudications, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 338-40 (1997) (explaining how the UNHCR monitors States’ 
adherence to the ICCPR). 
127 The ICESCR includes the right to work, to just and favorable conditions of work, to form and join trade 
unions, to family life, to an adequate standard of living, to the highest attainable standard of health, to 
education, and to take part in cultural life.  It prohibits all forms of discrimination in the enjoyment of these 
rights, including on the basis of sex, and requires that countries ensure the equal rights of women and men.  
See ICESCR, supra note 114. 
128 Id., art. 2. 
129 The Committee is composed of eighteen independent experts, chosen with regard to equitable 
geographical distribution, who serve in their personal capacities. See E.S.C. Res. 1985/17, U.N. ESCOR, 
para. B, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85 (1985). See Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First Session of the U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 (1987).  
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In addition to the above international legal frameworks is the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.130  The 
Torture Convention establishes a complete ban on any form of torture or other inhuman 
or degrading treatment.131 The Torture Convention defines torture as: 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him 
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.132  
 
The Committee Against Torture (Committee) acts as an oversight of the 
Convention.133  The Committee is authorized to receive complaints from individuals 
against States for alleged violations of the Convention.134  Also, the Committee reviews 
communications submitted by a State Party alleging that another State Party is not 
fulfilling its obligations under the Torture Convention.135  On receipt of reliable 
information that torture is being practiced within the territory of a State Party, the 
Committee may initiate an investigation to determine whether the Convention has or is 
                                                 
130 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force on June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention].  The 
Torture Convention has been ratified by 141 States Parties as at January 26, 2006, see Office of the United 
Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm (visited March 10, 2006). 
131 Torture Convention, supra note 130, art. 2.    
132 Id., art. 1(1). 
133 Id., art. 17 (creating a Committee Against Torture and establishing selection procedures). See generally 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee Against Torture, Fact Sheet No. 17 
(providing committee materials, including sessions, notes, complaints, and press releases), at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs17.htm (last visited May 20, 2004).  
134 See id. at art. 22 (explaining the individual complaint process); see also Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee Against Torture: Overview and Procedure, at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/overcat.htm (last visited May 20, 2004). 
135 See id. at art. 21 (delineating the requirements for State Party complaints regarding another State Party's 
failure to abide by CAT provisions). 
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being violated.136  A dispute between the States Parties concerning the interpretation of 
the Convention which cannot be resolved through arbitration may be referred to the 
International Court of Justice by either party.137 
Furthermore, there are other legal instruments that have been adopted at the 
regional level that reflects the spirit of the International Bill of Rights.  These legal 
frameworks include the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”),138 the American Convention on Human Rights 
(“ACHR”),139 together with the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (“Inter-American Convention 
on Violence Against Women”),140 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (“African Charter”).141  The following is a summary of applicable provisions from 
the aforementioned documents as well as a brief explanation of how the various human 
rights bodies operate. 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”) guarantees and seeks to provide the same protection contained in 
the international bill of rights to all persons within the its jurisdiction.142  The 
enforcement and oversight of the ECHR is carried out by the European Court of Human 
                                                 
136 See Torture Convention, supra note 130, art. 20 (outlining investigatory procedures comprised of 
confidential inquiries, reports, and visits).  The Committee’s decision is not binding on States Parties to the 
Convention.  However, the Committee’s decision serves as important points of reference for State Parties 
as they enforce the Torture Convention domestically.   
137 Id., art. 30(1). 
138 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].  
139 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].  
140 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against 
Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534, [hereinafter Inter-American Convention on Violence Against 
Women]. 
141 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1981) (entered into force 
on October 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter]. 
142 ECHR, supra note 138, art 1 (requiring all States Parties to secure the rights and freedoms delineated 
within the ECHR “to everyone within their jurisdiction”). 
 72 
Rights (“ECtHR”) European Commission of Human Rights (“European 
Commission”),143 respectively. 
Similarly, the American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) and Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
Against Women (“Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women”) recognize 
and extend the rights guaranteed under the international bill of rights to persons within its 
jurisdiction.144  Both the ACHR and the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against 
Women are interpreted and enforced by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (“IACHR”)145 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”)146 
with respect to members of the Organization of American States147 who are States Parties 
to the two instruments.  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”)148 is 
another regional instrument which implements the rights guaranteed under the 
international bill of rights and imposes a general duty upon its States Parties to 
“recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in [the] Charter and ... to adopt 
                                                 
143 See The European Court of Human Rights, Historical Background, Organization and Procedure (2003) 
[hereinafter ECtHR Background] (explaining how the European Commission of Human Rights (“European 
Commission”) and the original European Court of Human Rights were replaced by a full-time court on 
Nov. 1, 1998), at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/HistoricalBackground.htm (last visited May 18, 
2004). 
144 ACHR imposes upon its State Parties the obligation to respect and ensure the rights and freedoms 
included in the convention, for “all persons subject to their jurisdiction ... without any discrimination for 
reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic 
status, birth, or any other social condition.” Furthermore, the ACHR guarantees that “all persons are equal 
before the law”.  See ACHR, supra note 139, arts. 1, 24. 
145 See generally Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), at http://www.oas.org/ (last 
visited March 10, 2006). See Louis Henkin et al., HUMAN RIGHTS 319 (1999) 
146 See generally Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”), at http://www.oas.org/ (last visited 
March 10, 2006).  
147 See ACHR, supra note 139, at pmbl. 
148 See African Charter, supra note 141.   
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legislative or other measures to give effect to them.”149  The African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights (“African Commission”)150 and the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights151 were established in order to protect the rights delineated in the 
African Charter (as well as in other pertinent documents).152   
Although the international bill of rights and the regional human rights treaties 
essentially address and belong to international human rights law, they however impact 
international criminal law.153  The Human Rights Commission established by the above 
named regional human rights treaties are assisted in their works by National Human 
Rights Institutions (NHRIs).154  While it is the primary reasonability of States to observe 
                                                 
149 See African Charter, supra note 141, art 1.  Article 2 of the ACH which provides that “every individual 
shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present 
Charter,” while Article 3 declares that “every individual shall be equal before the law” and “every 
individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.” The AFC guarantees the right to life and 
integrity of the person in Article 4 of the Charter.  Article 5 guarantees the right to be free from torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  
150 Id., art. 30 (providing for the establishment of the Commission.).  The Commission’s three central 
functions include the promotion and protection of human rights, and the interpretation of the provisions of 
the African Charter. Id., art. 45.  Also, the Commission is charged with overseeing inter-State complaints 
and “other communications,” which include individual petitions.  Id., arts. 47-58. 
151 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III). 
available at:  http://www.africa-union.org/organs/orgCourt_of_Justice.htm  (visited March 10, 2006). The 
protocol received the requisite number of ratifications and came into force on January 25, 2004.  See, Press 
Release, African Union, The Protocol on the African Court on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights to Come 
Into Force Soon (Dec. 30, 2003), at http://www.pict-pcti.org/pdf/APHRC%20coming%20into%20force.pdf 
(last visited March 10, 2006).  
152 See, Louis Henkin et al., Human Rights 319 (1999) (stating that customary human rights law is slightly 
different from customary international law); see also infra Part II.E (discussing the incorporation of 
domestic violence norms within customary international law). 
153 See, Louis Henkin et al., Human Rights 319 (1999) (stating that customary human rights law is slightly 
different from customary international law); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1977-78 (2002) (observing that countries that have ratified human rights 
treaties have better human rights ratings then those countries that have not). 
154 See generally, Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 10 (2000) 
(explaining the role of NHRIs  suggested that the “human rights commission has as its express mandate the 
protection and promotion of human rights.”). 
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and enforce human rights, non-governmental organizations, and individuals should also 
ensure that these rights are observed.155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155 See Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1408-
16 (1999) (noting how States, non-governmental organizations, and individuals all play a role in enforcing 
international human rights). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
=============================================================== 
 
4.0. ESTABLISHMENT OF AD HOC INTERNATIONAL AND       
                                          SPECIAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
_____________________________________________ 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 As noted in Chapter three, the horrific experiences of World War I & II and the 
trials that followed lead to the adoption of international conventions proscribing rules of 
armed conflict and prohibiting certain conducts.  The expectation therefore was that 
States and the international community at large are now poised to ensure that such 
atrocious conducts reminiscent of World War I & II should never be repeated.  
Conversely, where such atrocity is committed, that States and the international 
community will move swiftly to checkmate the situation and promptly hold the 
perpetrators criminally responsible.  Unfortunately, when it came time for States and the 
international community to make good on this expectation, they neglected to do so.  
Rather, States and the international community showed a preference for self preservation 
and a lack of political will to prosecute individuals accused of committing egregious 
crimes.  In the same vein, attempts to create a permanent international court to hold war 
criminals individually accountable were sometimes truncated and at other times 
proceeded at a snail speed. 1   
Thus, while international human rights law did develop quickly, its monitoring 
mechanisms at the international level remained primarily political or quasi-judicial at 
best.  Consequently, armed conflicts and genocidal acts in violations of international law 
particularly, the Geneva and the Genocide conventions progressed openly with impunity 
                                                 
1 See Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 1-31 August 1951, UN Doc. A/2136 
(1952); Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 July 27- August 20, 1953, 
UN Doc. A/2645 (1954). 
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in Europe, Asia, and Africa.2  However, with the unrelenting activities of the print and 
electronic media that brought the genocide in the former Republic Yugoslavia into our 
homes,3 the international community realized that it can no longer bury its ostrich head in 
the sand and decided to respond to public outcry against the despicable acts of ignoble 
conducts.4   
Thus, after several decades of hardly any progress, the UN Security Council in 
1993 and 1994 respectively, established two ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) to punish those responsible for the situations in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  In essence, it took about four decades after the end of the 
prosecutions of World War II to set up another international criminal tribunal in the 
former Yugoslavia.  However, once the jinx of inaction was broken,5 it took only 10 
years to establish one more ad hoc tribunal and three special tribunals as well as a 
permanent criminal court.  The ad hoc tribunals and the special tribunals are briefly 
                                                 
2 See Gideon A. Moor, The Republic of Bosnia-Herzogovia and Article 51: Inherent Rights and Unmet 
Responsibilities, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 870, 897-98 (1995) (“Taking note of the continued reports of 
human rights atrocities within Bosnia ... the Security Council expressed alarm at continuing reports of 
human rights violations.”); Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former 
Yugoslavia, 22 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 235 (1994), and Human Rights Watch, Rwanda -  Human 
Rights Developments (observing that the international community was shamefully absent at the moment 
of the killings in Rwanda and is moving slowly to bring those guilty to justice]; available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/AFRICA-08.htm; (last visited September 1, 2005).  
3 See Roy Gutman, Prisoners of Serbia’s War: Tales of Hunger, Torture at Camp in North Bosnia, 
Newsday (N.Y.), July 19, 1992, at 7.  Gutman’s report helped to expose the horrible treatment of Croat and 
Muslim detainees in Serb camps in the Bosnian cities of Banja Luka and Trnopolje and in the Manjaca and 
Omarska camps. Id.; Physicians for Human Rights, MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE IN THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA: 1991-1995 24 (1996) [hereinafter Medicine Under Siege] (noting that television cameras 
showed pictures of “hundreds of emaciated men behind barbed wire, their eyes hollow from hunger and 
despair”). 
4 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
xxi (Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf eds., 1995) [hereinafter Insider’s Guide Volume One]. See also 
David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 401 
(1994). 
5 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity For International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 420 
(2000). 
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examined in this part of the study while the creation of the permanent international 
criminal court will be discussed in Part II.    
 
4.2.  THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA 
 
4.2.1. History of the Conflict in former Yugoslavia    
 The former Republic of Yugoslavia was comprised of three major 
ethnic/political/religious groups; the Croats, Bosnian, and Serbs, who harbored historical 
hatreds among themselves.6  This deep rooted ethnic animosity was a potential threat to 
peace in the Balkans which became apparent with collapse of the Soviet threat7and the 
death of Croatian Marshal Tito (who had ruled the Republic since 1945 and had managed 
to suppress opposition from the Serbs and Bosnians) in 1980.8  In 1989, Slobodan 
Milosevic became president of Serbia and Montenegro, the truncated Yugoslavia.9  His 
nationalist quest for a greater Serbia incited anti-Serb sentiments and support for the 
secession of Serbians in Croatia and Bosnia which eventually led to the dissolution of the 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991.10 
Fighting in Yugoslavia broke out in June 1991 when the predominantly Serb 
forces of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) invaded Slovenia and Croatia after both 
                                                 
6 Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL 14 (The Continuum International 
Publishing Group, Inc., 2002). 
7 Id., at 18. 
8 Roger Thurow, Tito’s Legacy: Political Drifting, An Economy in Chaos Prevail in Yugoslavia; Question 
is Whether Nation Will Turn More to Soviets Out of Economic Need; Sharpening Ethnic Rivalries, Wall 
St. J., May 8, 1986, available in 1986 WL-WSJ 258991. 
9 Makau Mutua, Open Forum: Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 167, 173 (1997). 
10 Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 11-19 (noting that Franjo Tudjman and Milian 
Kucan, leaders of Croatia and Slovenia respectively, sought to weaken Serbian influence in Yugoslavia by 
pursing for the creation of a loose federation of States, leading to the dissolution of Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1991), see also MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 3, at 15-17. 
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Republics declared independence on June 25, 1991.11  The fighting ended temporarily on 
July 7, 1991, but resumed into a “full-scale warfare in August 1991 and continued until 2 
January 1992, when a ceasefire was signed in Sarajevo under the auspices of the United 
Nations.”12  Meanwhile, the UN Security Council had invited all States to impose a 
“general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to 
Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise.”13 Subsequently, after the 
ceasefire of January 2, 1992, the Security Council on February 21, 1992, adopted 
Resolution 743 which authorized the deployment of United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) to carry out peacekeeping operations in the region.14   
The UNPROFOR was established on March 13, 1992, but was largely ineffective 
as it was unable to stop Serbian forces from attacking the Croats and Bosnian Muslims in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) in April 1992 following the recognition of their independence 
by the European Community and the United States of America on April 6 & 7, 1992, 
respectively.15  On May 10, 1992, the JNA reluctantly withdrew from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina but continued to provide military, financial, logistic, and other kinds of 
support to Serbian forces (BSA) made up largely of Bosnian Serbs who reside in the Serb 
dominated area of BiH which the Serbs referred to as the “Republika Srpska.”16   
                                                 
11 Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 19; MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 3, 
at 16.  See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, at para. 10., 
Gen. Ass. 54 Sess. November 15, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/549, at www.un.org/peace/srebrenica/pdf. (visited 
March 2, 2005) [hereinafter The Fall of Srebrenica]. 
12 See the Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 11, at para. 11. 
13 See Security Council Resolution 713 adopted in September 1991, S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/713 (1991). 
14 See S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/743 (1992). 
15 Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 22; MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 3, 
at 16-17; The Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 11, at para.15. 
16 See The Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 11, at para.18; Norman Cigar & Paul Williams, INDICTMENT 
AT THE HAGUE: THE MILOSEVIC REGIME AND CRIMES OF THE BALKAN WAR 25 (New York 
University Press 2002); Steve Terret, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER 
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For the next three years, the BSA and the Serb paramilitary groups sporadically 
mounted pockets of attacks on the civilian population with the objective of terrorizing 
and forcing them to flee the self declared territory of the Republika Srpska.17  This 
deliberate arms attack on the civilian population was infamously referred to as “ethnic 
cleansing” wherein Bosnian Muslims and Croats are either forced into exile as refugees, 
held as hostages for use in prisoner exchanges, or placed in concentration camps and 
many summarily executed.18  An estimated 20,000 Muslim women and girls were thrown 
into rape camps. Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Croat political leaders were arrested, 
imprisoned and in many cases murdered.  It is estimated that the war in Bosnia led to the 
death of 200,000 or more lives, as many as three million people displaced, and tens of 
thousands missing.19 
Although it was apparent that the peacekeeping mission and embargo has failed to 
stop the war, the Security Council was hesitant to take decisive action to end JNA’s 
military action and the attendant human casualty.  Rather, the UN Security Council 
decided to continue the failed political action by voting to impose another round of 
sanctions on Serbia.20  However, when in July 1992 the scale of atrocities occurring in 
the former Yugoslavia was published in the print and television media all over the world, 
public opinion was stimulated and pressure was mounted on the international community 
to take decisive action to hold those responsible for the atrocities to account.21  
                                                                                                                                                 
ARBITRATION COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN THE 
POST COLD WAR WORLD 33 (Ashgate Publishing Co. 2000). 
17 See the Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 11, para. 19. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Paul Lewis, UN Votes 13-0 for Embargo on Trade with Yugoslavia; Air Travel and Oil Curbed, N.Y. 
Times, May 31, 1992, at 1. 
21 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 416-417. 
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Consequently, UN Security Council passed Resolution 771 which invited States 
to collect and present to the Security Council with information regarding the violations in 
the former Yugoslavia.22  On October 6, 1992, the UN Security Council established the 
Commission of Experts charged with the responsibility of investigating and collecting 
evidence of “grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of 
international humanitarian law” committed during the conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia.23  The Commission eventual chairman was Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
who at that time, directed the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI) of 
DePaul University in Chicago, U.S.A.24   The Commission submitted its First Interim 
Report on February 22, 1993.25   
While the process of establishing an international criminal tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia was ongoing and even after the tribunal was established, fighting continued 
                                                 
22 S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 3106th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992). 
23 See S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1476 
(1992) [hereinafter SC Resolution 780].  Resolution 780 provides as follows: 
[The Security Council r]equests the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial 
Commission of Experts, to examine and analyze the information submitted pursuant to resolution 771 
(1992) and the present resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts 
may obtain through its own investigations or efforts, of other persons or bodies pursuant to Resolution 771 
(1992), with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Id. at para. 2 
24 On October 25, 1992, the UN Secretary-General appointed five members to the Commission of Experts.  
Initial members of the Commission were: Professor Frits Kalshoven (Netherlands) as Chairman; Professor 
M. Cherif Bassiouni (Egypt); Commander William J. Fenrick (Canada); Judge Keba M’Baye (Senegal); 
and Professor Torkel Opsahl (Norway).  In August 1993 Professor Kalshoven resigned from the 
Commission due to medical reasons and Professor Opsahl who acted as Chairman from July-August died in 
September.  Thus, on October 19, 1993, the UN Secretary-General appointed Professor Bassiouni as 
Chairman and also appointed Professor Christine Cleiren (Netherlands) and Judge Hanne Sophie Greve 
(Norway) to replace Professors Kalshoven and Opsahl respectively.  See M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 5, 
at n. 128. 
25 See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 20, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993). 
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over the Serb dominated area in BiH and the United Nations designated “safe areas”.26  
In March 1994, Bosnia and Croatia reached an agreement to form a joint federation and 
end their hostilities.  Thereafter, in April 1994, the Croatian and Bosnian-Muslim forces 
joined in opposition to the Serbs, launching an offensive in April and May.  However, it 
was not until December 1994 that temporary relief came to Bosnia as a result of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces enforced a cease-fire and the 
withdrawal of the Serbian artillery.27  
The cease-fire lasted only until March 1995 because the Serb forces refused to 
comply with a UN ultimatum to remove all heavy weapons from a 12-mile exclusion 
zone around Sarajevo.  Bosnian-Serb militias led by Mladic and aided by Yugoslav Army 
troops took over the UN “safe areas” of Srebrenica and Zepa.  The Yugoslav Army 
expelled over 40,000 Bosnian-Muslims who had sought safety at Srebrenica.  Between 
5,000 and 8,000 were executed, allegedly on Mladic’s order.  Eventually, in May 1995, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the support of the United States 
launched air strikes against Serb targets in the area.  Simulatenously, a joint Croatian-
Bosnian forces operation against the Serbian forces was also on-going.28   
After several months of air strikes, the Serbian forces were ejected from large 
areas of western Bosnia.  This led to the Dayton Peace Accords which was signed on 
December 14, 1995, in Paris.29  The Accord established BiH as a sovereign State, 
consisting of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand, 
                                                 
26 Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 26-27.  The “safe areas” for Bosnian-Muslims 
are: Bihac, Tuzla, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, and Sarajevo. The UN peacekeeping soldiers were deployed 
to defend the areas. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 The Dayton Peace Accord was signed by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian president Alija 
Izetbegović, and Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. Id. 
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and on the other hand, the Republika Srpska (RS).30  It was expected that the Dayton 
Peace Accords would end the violence in the area but this hope was short lived when in 
1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) actuated with the desire for self-determination 
attacked Serbian positions.31  The Serbian government responded by killing and 
relocating ethnic Albanians from the territory of Kosovo.32  NATO responded with 
another round of air strikes against Serbia to end the forced evacuation of ethnic 
Albanians from Kosovo.33  The Serbian government under Slobodan Milosevic 
responded by ordering a program of ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo-Albanian, forcing 
hundreds of thousands to flee as refugees.34  In June 1999, Milosevic finally surrendered 
to the superior firing power of NATO and ended his attack on the Albanians.35   
 
4.2.2. Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)  
After the Commission of Experts submitted its first Interim Report, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 808 which authorized the creation of an international 
criminal tribunal to prosecute those individuals responsible for serious violations of 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.36 
                                                 
30 See Steve Terrett, supra note 16, at 96. 
31 Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 33. 
32 See Todd A Salzman, Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural and Ethical 
Responses to Rape Victim in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348, 363 (1998). 
33 Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 34. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1163-
1205 (1993) [hereinafter Resolution 808].  Resolution 808 states that the UN Security Council: 
 
Decided that an international criminal tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991. 
Resolution 808 further mandated the UN Secretary-General to within 60 days submit a report on the 
establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal to the Security Council.  
Id, at preamble. 
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Pursuant to Resolution 808, UN Secretary-General on May 3, 1993, submitted his report 
on the establishment of the ad hoc tribunal and a draft Statute for the tribunal to the 
Security Council.37   
Following the submission of the Secretary-General’s report, the Security Council 
pursuant to article 39 of the United Nations Charter unanimously adoption Resolution 
827 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
on May 25, 1993.38  Also, the Security Council approved the draft Statute of the Tribunal 
as presented by the Secretary-General.39  According to Resolution 827, the Security 
Council determined that the “situation [in Yugoslavia] continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security” and in order to put an end to the crimes, is convinced 
that the “establishment of an … international tribunal and the prosecution of persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law would enable this aim 
to be achieved and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”40 
 
 
                                                 
37 See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General]. 
38 See Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law and Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former 
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 
1192 [hereinafter Resolution 827]. See also Peter Burns, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL: THE DIFFICULT UNION OF PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS, 125 (for insights into the 
establishment of the ICTFY and the politics surrounding it); David P. Forsythe, POLITICS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 185; Roman A. Kolodkin, An Ad 
Hoc International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in 
the Former Yugoslavia, in THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, 165, 165-66 (Roger S. 
Clark & Madeleine Sann eds., 1996) (analyzing the legal aspects of prosecution in the ICTY); Patricia M. 
Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations 
on Day-To-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 87 (2001) (discussing the 
ICTY from a firsthand perspective).  
39 Resolution 827, at paras 1-2.  See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, appended to the Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 
48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTFY Statute]. 
40 Resolution 827, supra note 38, at preamble. 
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4.2.3. Scope of the ICTY Jurisdiction and Composition  
Recognizing that conflict in the former Yugoslavia was on-going at the time of 
establishing the ICTY, the Tribunal was granted temporal jurisdiction “to prosecute 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Statute.”41  The Tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction covers grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions,42 violations of the laws or customs of war,43 genocide,44 and 
crimes against humanity.45   
The Statute established individual criminal responsibility, including that of a 
Head of State for violations of any of the tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction during the 
existence of the tribunal.46  The ICTY Statute also grants the Tribunal primacy 
jurisdiction over national courts with respect to the prosecution of individuals concerning 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunal.47  Where a national court has begun 
prosecution, the tribunal may request the national court to defer jurisdiction to the 
tribunal.48   However, unlike the Nuremberg trials, the ICTY cannot try accused persons 
in absentia and recognizes that defendants may choose not to testify.49 
 The ICTY is structured to ensure its independence and impartiality.  The tribunal 
consists of three branches: (1) the judicial chambers; (2) the office of the prosecutor and; 
                                                 
41 ICTFY Statute, supra note 39, arts. 1, 8. 
42 Id., art. 2. 
43 Id., art. 3. 
44 Id., art. 4. 
45 Id., art.5. 
46 Id., art. 7.  See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to 
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 43 (1997). 
47 ICTFY Statute, supra note 39, art. 9. 
48 Id., art. 9(2).. 
49 Id., art. 20 which requires that an accused should be in custody before the commencement of a trial. Id. 
See also Ruth Wedgewood, War Crimes: Bosnia and Beyond, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 267 (1994); Patricia 
Wald, supra note 38, at 98 
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(3) the Registry.50  The judicial chamber composed of sixteen permanent judges is 
divided into two trial chambers and one appeals chamber.  The trial chambers are 
composed of three judges each while the appeals chamber is composed of 5 judges at 
each sitting.51  The judges are elected by the UN General Assembly, with no more than 
one judge from any single country.52  The Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY is appointed by 
the Security Council for a four year term.  Remarkably, the ICTY Statute clearly provides 
that the Prosecutor shall be independent of the Security Council and the General 
Assembly.53  Thus, the Prosecutor has absolute discretion to bring charges against any 
person provided that the Prosecutor has “reasonable grounds for believing that a subject 
has committed a crime.”54 However, while the tribunal is independent of the Security 
Council, the tribunal’s Registry is subject to the U.N.’s administrative rules.55  
 
4.2.4. Assessment of the ICTY 
The ICTY through its judgments has contributed to the development of the 
jurisprudence of international criminal law system.  The tribunal has helped to clarify 
certain legal principles and is spearheading the shift from impunity to accountability by 
holding individuals accountable regardless of their position.  On May 24, 1999, the ICTY 
made history as the first international criminal tribunal to indict a serving Head of State, 
former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, for violations of the laws and customs of 
                                                 
50 ICTFY Statute, supra note 39, art.11. 
51 Id., art. 12. 
52 Id., art. 12(1) and 13(bis).  
53 Id., arts. 16 - 20. 
54 Id., art. 18; Patricia Wald, supra note 38, at 100 (quoting ICTY Rule of Procedure and Evidence 47, U.N. 
Doc. IT/32 (1994)). 
55 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 46, at 43; Patricia Wald, supra note 38, at 88.   
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war and crimes against humanity committed against the Kosovo Albanian population in 
1998-99.56   
The tribunal’s high point has been the arrest and well-publicized transfer of 
Milosevic to the Detention Unit at The Hague on June 29, 2001, for prosecution by the 
ICTY for his role in the atrocities committed by Serbian forces during the Kosovo 
conflict.  Milosevic is charged with the murder of 900 Kosovo-Albanians and the 
deportation of 740,000 more.   Since then he has also been separately indicted for grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war and crimes 
against humanity committed against the Croatian and other non-Serb populations in the 
Republic of Croatia.  In addition, Milosevic is also charged with genocide and complicity 
in genocide during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.57    
As at March 3, 2006, of about 161 persons were indicted by the tribunal for 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, 133 have appeared in proceedings before the ICTFY.58  Of this number, 40 
have been found guilty, 44 accused persons are at pre-trial stage, 9 accused persons are 
currently at trial, and 48 of the accused are currently in custody at the Tribunal’s 
detention unit.59 
Despite the achievements recorded by the ICTY, the tribunal has been criticized 
for its slow progress and for the fact that some of the highest ranking government 
                                                 
56 See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, et al., Case No. IT-99-37, May 24, 1999, available at: 
http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm.  
57 See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, April 21 and July 28, 2004; Prosecutor v. 
Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, May 24, 1999, available at: http://www.un.org/icty/cases-
e/index-e.htm. 
58 See ICTY at a Glance, Key Figures, available at: http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm. (visited 
March 10, 2006) [hereinafter ICTY at a Glance].  
59 Id. 
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officials indicted by the tribunal have yet to be taken into custody.60  The ICTY judges 
were all elected by November 1993 with Antonio Cassese, an Italian professor of 
international law, as its first President.61  However, it was not until July 1994 that Judge 
Richard Goldstone of South African was elected the first Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY.62  
While the appointment of the officers of the tribunal was completed in July 1994, the 
ICTFY did not start sitting until November 1994 when it held its first public hearing.63  
Apart from structural shortcomings, the delay may not be unconnected with the 
tribunal’s financial reliance on the United Nations.64  Also, as noted by the former ICTY 
Prosecutor Louise Arbour, the ICTY’s limitations are based, in part, on the uncertain and 
developing nature of international criminal law.65    
                                                 
60 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights News, Progress on War Crimes Accountability, the Rule of Law, 
and Minority Rights in Serbia and Montenegro, HRW Statement to the U.S. Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (June 4, 2003), at 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/serbiatestimony060403.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (stating: 
“The past year has seen continued stutter-step progress toward cooperation with the ICTY and 
accountability for war-time atrocities. Still missing is the clear political leadership to ensure that all those 
responsible for war crimes are held accountable”).  
61 Id. at 148.  The current president is Fausto Pocar of Italy.  See ICTY at a Glance, supra note 58, at 
Organs of the Tribunal.  
62 See INSIDER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 161-63 (suggesting that the embarrassing delay was occasioned 
by the interest shown by different states to have their nationals appointed for the job).  Even though the 
ICTY Statute provided that the Prosecutor shall serve for a four year term, there has been two change of 
guards within five years.  On October 1, 1996, Judge Louise Arbour of Canada succeeded Judge Goldstone.  
On September 15, 1999, Carla Del Ponte, former Switzerland’s attorney general and chief federal 
prosecutor, who was unanimously approved by the U.N Security Council in the summer of 1999 succeeded 
Judge Arbour. 
63 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA - THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, NATIONAL COURTS AND CONCURRENT 
JURISDICTION: A GUIDE TO APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
AND ITS RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS iii (May 1995) 
[hereinafter Prosecuting War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia]. 
64 ICTY Statute, supra note 39, art. 32 which provides that the UN is obligated to fund the tribunal. Id. See 
also Craig Topper, And Justice for All? An Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 8 N. Y. INT’L L. 
REV. 48 (1995); See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 33 (April 1995) [hereinafter “Criminal Tribunal in 
Yugoslavia] (noting the inability of the UN to appropriate funds for the tribunal thereby compelling the UN 
Secretary General to allocate money without the proper appropriations processes). Id. 
65 Jordan J. Paust, Book Review, 96 AM J. INT’L L. 1006 (2002) (reviewing SUBSTANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman 
eds., 2000)).  
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Furthermore, the difficulties in surrendering indictees and other forms of non-
cooperation of national authorities remain one of the major obstacles to the fulfillment of 
the Tribunal’s mandate of trying key figures in the conflict in former Yugoslavia.66  As at 
March 3, 2006, 6 arrest warrants have been issued against accused persons that are 
currently at large including former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and former 
Bosnian Serb army commander General Ratko Mladic.67 
However, it should be noted that the ICTY depends on the cooperation of UN 
member States to arrest indictees and gain access to evidence.68  UN member States have 
not shown demonstrable enthusiasm in tracking down suspects.  In some cases, States 
have explicitly refused to cooperate.69  Unfortunately, there is no established independent 
enforcement mechanism by which the ICTY Prosecutor can rely to bring apprehend 
indictees.  Short of imposing economic or other sanctions, a course of action that is 
unlikely, the United Nations cannot force compliance by a recalcitrant State.  Thus, the 
tribunal’s greatest failure has been its inability to apprehend major suspects and bring 
them to trial. Given the fact that the tribunal cannot try a suspect in absentia,70 some 
commentators have suggested that shaming through identification could turn indicted war 
                                                 
66 See Address to the United Nations Security Council by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Ms. Carla Del Ponte, 27 November 2001, 
http://www.ictr.org/ ENGLISH/speeches/delponte271101sc.htm.     
67 Others include Stojan Zupljanin, Vlastimir Djordjevic, Goran Hadzic, and Zdravko Tolimir.  See ICTY 
at a Glance, supra note 58, at Key Figures.  
68 ICTY Statute, supra note 39, art. 29. 
69 Croatia Defies Tribunal, Independent (London), Feb. 20, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
CURNWS File (stating that Croatia recently refused to turn over information on suspects). See also 
Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening Enforcement of Humanitarian Law: Reflections on the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79 (1995); Jeri Laber & 
Ivana Nizich, The War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Problems and Prospects, 18 
FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 7 (1994). 
70 ICTY Statute, supra note 39, art. 20.  Article 20 require an accused person to be in custody before the 
commencement of a trial. Id. See also Ruth Wedgewood, War Crimes: Bosnia and Beyond, 
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criminals into pariahs and deprive them of the freedom of movement.71   On the other 
hand, the better approach is for the international community to take the step from having 
established international accountability mechanisms to endowing them with enforcement 
capacity. 
Another recent development that threatens the credibility of the Tribunal is the 
deaths of Milan Babic and Slobodan Milosevic.  On 5 March, 2006, Milan Babic, the 
Serb nationalist war criminal who pleaded guilty on January 27, 2004, and testified 
against Slobodan Milosevic, was found dead in his prison cell at the United Nations 
Detention Unit in Scheveningen.  After conducting an investigation, Mr. Babic was 
presumed to have committed suicide.72  On, March 11, 2006, Slobodan Milosevic was 
found dead in his cell at the U.N. Detention Unit in Scheveningen.  The circumstances 
surrounding his death are still uncertain.73   
The death of Mr. Milosevic before the completion of his trial is a profound 
disappointment which calls to question the credibility of the Tribunal.74  Mr. Milosevic’s 
                                                 
71 Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 229, 243-44 (1995).  See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 
(1993) (Madeleine Albright, then US ambassador to the UN, declaring that war crimes suspects will 
become international pariahs and prisoners in their own lands - Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia - even if their 
own states do not hand them over for trial). See also War Criminals to Become International Pariahs, 
Agence France Presse, May 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
72 Press Release, Milan Babic Found Dead in Detention Unit, The Hague, AM/MOW/1046e, March 6, 
2006, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/p1046-e.htm (visited March 12, 2006). 
73 Press Release, Slobodan Milosevic Found Dead in His Cell at the Detention Unit The Hague, 
CC/MOW/1050ef, March 11, 2006, available at: http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/p1050-e.htm 
74 See Jon Silverman, Worst Outcome for Milosevic Tribunal, 11 March 2006,  available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4797696.stm (visited March 12, 2006) (Mr. Silverman, BBC Legal 
Affairs Analyst, suggesting that Mr. Milosevic’s death raises questions which may tarnish the reputation of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and undermine confidence in war crimes justice 
generally). 
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death forecloses the opportunity for victims and their families to have a final answer in 
this case on his criminal responsibility.75   
The tribunal is expected to complete its sitting by 2008.76  The completion 
strategy is predicated on ICTY focusing on trials involving “the highest-ranking political, 
military, paramilitary and civilian leaders and . . . referring certain cases to national 
courts.”77  Pursuant to the strategy, the ICTY must complete its investigations by the end 
of 2004, and all trials and appeals must be completed by December 31, 2008.  Thus, 
ICTY need to focus its efforts towards the trial of senior perpetrators while strengthening 
the local courts so that they are in a position to assume responsibility for trying relatively 
minor offenders.78  However, the courts in the former Yugoslavia, including the war 
crimes chamber of the State Court of BiH are not yet in a position to assume 
responsibility for trying large numbers of cases.79   
The ICTY is expected to adhere to its completion strategy, notwithstanding any 
judicial and practical challenges that may arise in fulfilling them as it is unlikely that the 
Security Council will extend the deadline.  For the common strategy to work, it would be 
                                                 
75 See Statement of the President of the Tribunal, The Hague, March 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/speech/poc- 060312e.htm (visited March 12, 2006). 
76 ICTY President Claude Jorda submitted the ICTY completion strategy on June 10, 2002. Report on the 
Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Prospects for 
Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, UN Doc. S/2002/678 (2002) enclosure [hereinafter Jorda 
Report]. On February 23, 2003, Judge Theodor Meron was elected president of the ICTY.  Judge Theodor 
Meron and Judge Fausto Pocar Elected as President and Vice-President Respectively, ICTY Press Release 
CC/PIS/735-e (Feb. 27, 2003). See also the remarks delivered by ICTY president Meron and ICTY 
prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, respectively, to the Security Council on October 9, 2003. UN Doc. S/PV.4838, 
at 3-7, 9-13 (2003) [hereinafter Meron Speech and Del Ponte], also available as Statement of Judge 
Theodor Meron to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Press Release JL/P.I.S./788-e (Oct. 9, 2003), 
and Address by Ms. Carla Del Ponte to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Press Release 
FH/PIS/791-e (Oct. 10, 2003). ICTY press releases are available at the ICTY Website, 
<http://www.un.org/icty>. 
77 Judge Claude Jorda, Address to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Press Release JDH/PIS/690-
e, at 1 (July 23, 2002). 
78 Daryl A. Mundis, Note and Comment: The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L.L. 142, 158 (2005). 
79 Id. 
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necessary for the international community to ensure timely arrests of outstanding 
indictees and timely access to evidence if the indictees were to be prosecuted within time 
frame of the completion strategy.80   
 
4.3. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 
 
4.3.1. Background on the Rwandan Genocide 
Ethnic and political rivalry between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis of 
Rwanda was a product of Belgium colonial mal-administration.81  As at February 10, 
2005, Rwanda population which is estimated at about eight million people is made up of 
eighty-four percent Hutus, fourteen percent Tutsis, and one percent of Twas.82  Although 
the Hutus and the Tutsis have distinct physical characteristics which made them 
distinguishable, they did not exist as segregated tribes, commonly intermarried and spoke 
the same language (Kinyarwanda).83  However, the Belgium colonial government of 
Rwanda considered it necessary to introduce ethnic classifications for its administration 
                                                 
80 Jorda Report, supra note 76, para. 15 (the ICTY prosecutor noting that it would not be possible to 
complete the ICTY’s mandate by the anticipated date unless those indicted individuals at liberty were 
arrested); see also Del Ponte, Address to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Press Release 
JJJ/PIS/709-e, 3-4 (Oct. 30, 2002); Judge Claude Jorda, Address to the United Nations Security Council, 
ICTY Press Release JDH/PIS/708-e 1, 2 (Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Jorda, Oct. 2002 Speech]. 
81 For an in-depth history of the ethnic, social and political factors leading to Rwandan genocidal war of 
1994, see generally Gerard Prunier, THE RWANDA CRISIS 1959-1994: HISTORY OF GENOCIDE 
(1995); Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm (visited March 3, 2005) [hereinafter History of 
Genocide in Rwanda].   
82 See CIA: The World Factbook, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html 
(visited March 3, 2005) [hereinafter World Factbook].  The Hutus has always been the majority tribe and 
the population distribution in 2005 is the same as at 1994.  See Letter Dated 9 December 1994 from the 
Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, P 59, U.N. Doc. 
S/1994/1405 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report of the Commission of Experts]. 
83 Gerard Prunier, supra note 81, at 5; also see History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 2. 
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of Rwanda.84  Also, the Belgian colonial government preferred the Tutsis for political 
positions almost at the exclusion of the majority Hutus.85   
With these colonial policies, the seed of ethnic hatred was advertently or 
inadvertently planted in the physic of average Rwandan.86  Thus, even after the exit of 
the colonial government, succeeding Rwandan governments especially that of President 
Juvenal Habyarimana pursued policies that highlighted ethnic differences such as the 
classification of Rwandans according to their ethnicity87 and recordation of their ethnicity 
on their identity cards and in the census.88  As a result of the established ethnic 
categorization, violent ethnic rivalry manifested itself in 1959, three years before 
independence from Belgium when the Hutus attacked the Tutsis in retaliation of Tutsis 
attack on a Hutu sub-chief.89  Over the next several years, thousands of Tutsis were either 
killed or driven into exile in neighboring countries.90  
For the next 30 years or so, the exiled Tutsis were unable to return to Rwanda. In 
the meantime, the Hutus have taken control of the governance of Rwanda.  General 
Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, who came to power in 1973 through a coup d’etat, 
transformed himself into a civilian president.91  President Habyarimana resorted to a one 
party system and abhorred any opposition effectively precluding the integration of Tutsis 
                                                 
84 See History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 2 
85 Gerard Prunier, supra note 81, at 26-27. 
86 See Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 35 (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana] (developing a historical background on the conflict prior to the 
proceedings). 
87 Rwandans are considered to have the ethnicity of their father, despite the heritage of their mother.  See 
Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, at 59. 
88 See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, at 61. 
89 See World Factbook supra 82; Gerard Prunier, supra note 81, at 48-54; United States Institute for Peace, 
Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide (1995), available at 
http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/rwanda1.hmtl (visited March 4, 2005) [hereinafter Accountability for War 
Crimes and Genocide].  
90 See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, at 55; Gerard Prunier, supra note 78, at 
61-64.  
91 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 86, at 41. 
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in Rwandan politics.92  While in exile, the Tutsis formed a rebel group, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), to champion their cause with a military wing, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA).  On October 1, 1990, the RPF launched an attacked on Rwanda 
from Uganda in an attempt to invade Rwanda by force.93   
The invasion started a three year civil war between the Hutus and the Tutsis.  
President Habyarimana who was becoming increasingly unpopular took advantage of the 
situation to arrest or exterminate his political opponents.94  Also, by early 1992, 
Habyarimana and the extremist elements in Rwanda who rejected the Arusha Accords, 
allowed the creation of a militia groups known as the “Interahamwe” (those who stand 
together or those who attack together) 95 and the “Impuzamugambi” (“those with a single 
purpose”).  The Rwandan army and the Interahamwe were instrumental to the several 
attacks and massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus opposed to Habyarimana’s 
government or sympathetic to the cause of RPF.96  On the other hand, ordinary Hutus 
whose patriotic zeal was famed by the propaganda of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille 
Collines (RTLM) quickly identified with the mass movement called the “Hutu Power.”97   
The message of the Hutu power was built on the platform of a possible renewed 
Tutsi political dominance and attendant consequences to the Hutus.98  This message 
resonated with rigor following the October 21, 1993, assassination of Burundian 
                                                 
92 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 86, at 44. 
93 Gerard Prunier, supra note 81, at 93.  
94 Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide, supra note 89, at 2. 
95 History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 2; also see William A. Shabas, Justice, Democracy, 
and Impunity in Post-genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 
523, 524 (1996);  Human Rights Watch/Africa, GENOCIDE IN RWANDA APRIL-MAY 1994, vol. 6, no 
4, at 2 (May 1994), available at http://hrw.org/reports/world/rwanda-pubs.php [hereinafter Genocide in 
Rwanda].  
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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president Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, by Tutsi soldiers in Burundi.99  President 
Ndadaye’s assassination sparked off another round of massive killings of both Hutu and 
Tutsi.100  In the face of all these massacres, none of those implicated in the killings were 
prosecuted.  On the contrary, they continued to exercise power as they had before.101   
In a last attempt at a peaceful resolution of the civil war, the Rwandan 
government and the RPF agreed to a negotiated political settlement, the Arusha Peace 
Accords, which they signed on August 4, 1993.102  The Accords includes a cease-fire 
agreement and six detailed Protocols which provided for power-sharing, repatriation of 
refugees and resettlement of displaced persons, integration of armed forces, establishment 
of demilitarized zone, and miscellaneous issues were painstakingly negotiated between 
1990 and 1993 under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and 
United Nations.103  In the spirit of the Accords, on October 5, 1993, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 872 which established the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda (“UNAMIR”) to supervise the implementation of the Accords.104 
Within months of the signing of the Accords and the establishment of UNAMIR, 
there were obvious signs that Hutu extremists were less enthusiastic about honoring the 
terms of the Accords.105  On the other hand, the RPF anticipating that the Rwandan 
government may renege on the Accords increased the number of their soldiers and 
                                                 
99 See Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 95. 
100 Id. 
101 Id; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Segui, Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of Commission Resolution 
E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12, P 
25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/71 (1995) [hereinafter Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda]. 
102 Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 349, 351 (1997); 
103 Id. 
104 See S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (1993). 
105 Madeline H. Morris, supra note 102, at 351. 
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firearms in Kigali in violation of the Arusha Peace Accords.106  All hopes for a peaceful 
resolution of the civil war ended on April 6, 1994, when the plane carrying presidents 
Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, a Hutu, was shot down in mysterious 
circumstances as it was about to land in Rwanda, killing both presidents and others on 
board.107  Both presidents were returning from a meeting of African Heads of States in 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania where president Habyarimana had allegedly agreed to form a 
broad-based transitional government in compliance with the Accords.108  
The death of president Habyarimana provided the “spark” for the Rwandan army, 
presidential guards, the Interahamwe, and those Hutus who identified with the message of 
“Hutu power” to renew the killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.109  On the other hand, 
the RPF continued its advancement to Kigali and in the process the RPF permitted its 
soldiers to kill persons whom they took to be Interahamwe, “genocidaires”, or other 
supposed participants in the genocide and persons close to Habyarimana’s political 
party.110 RPF soldiers also “massacred unarmed civilians, many of them women and 
children, who had assembled for a meeting on their orders.”111   
                                                 
106 History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 3. 
107 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1995, 41 (1994) [hereinafter World Report]. 
108 Id. 
109 History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 78. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. Human Watch notes that: 
The RPF was commonly acknowledged by military experts to be a highly disciplined force, with clear lines 
of command and adequate communication. Although it may have become less disciplined during the 
months of the genocide due to the incorporation of new recruits, RPF commanding officers like General 
Paul Kagame maintained the authority necessary to ensure compliance with their orders. The crimes 
committed by RPF soldiers were so systematic and widespread and took place over so long a period of time 
that commanding officers must have been aware of them. Even if they did not specifically order these 
practices, in most cases they did not halt them and punish those responsible. 
Id. 
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Amidst the skirmish, the international community failed to take decisive measure 
to end the atrocity.112  On the contrary, 2,500 soldiers attached to the UNAMIR forces 
began to pull out and within weeks were left with only about 450 troops, with no mandate 
to stop the violence or protect the civilians.113  The killings finally ended on July 17, 
1994, after the RPF defeated the Rwandan army and took control of the government.  
However, by the time the killings stopped, between half a million and a million men, 
women and children were killed on both sides, the Tutsis accounting for majority of the 
dead.114  Also, about two million Hutu refugees many fearing Tutsi retribution fled to 
neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the former Zaire (now Democratic Republic 
of the Congo).115  The Rwandan prison facilities were also filled three times beyond 
normal capacity.116   
On July 19, 1994, RPF established a transitional government of National Unity 
together with seven other political parties.  The transitional government named Pasteur 
                                                 
112 Madeline H. Morris, supra note 102, at 351. 
113 See S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 336th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/912 (1994); World Report, 
supra note 107, at 46.  See also History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 2. United Nations 
inactivity and acquiescence to genocide was equally damning. There were credible reports that the United 
Nations peace-keeping force in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which had been present to facilitate the peace 
negotiations between the Hutu government and the RPF, apparently knew that a genocide might take place 
but the UN took no preventive action.  See World Report, supra note 107, at 41. See generally Joint 
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: 
Lessons From the Rwanda Experience, Vols. I-V (March 1996). 
114 Sources differ on estimates of the number of people killed in 1994. The independent Commission of 
Experts established by the U.N. Security Council reported that on the conservative side, 500,000 people 
were killed. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, at 57. The Special Rapporteur 
of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights stated that some reliable sources estimate that close to one 
million people were killed. See Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, supra note 101, at 24; History of 
Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 2; World Report, supra note 107, at 39-48. 
115 See Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, supra note 101, at 38; John Prendergast & David Smock, 
Postgenocidal Reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi (1999), available at 
http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990915/ sr990915.html (visited March 5, 2005).  See Comm. on Int’l Relations 
U.S. House of Representatives and the Comm. on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 
Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1995, at 211 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Country Reports on 
Human Rights]. 
116 See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, The 
Administration of Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda 3, para. 18, U.N. Doc. HRFOR/JUSTICE/June 1996/E 
(1996) [hereinafter Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda]. 
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Bizimungu, a moderate Hutu and RPF member, the President while General Paul 
Kagame, a Tutsi and RPF leader, was appointed Vice-President and Minister of 
Defense.117  
 
4.3.2. The Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) 
The groundwork for the creation of an international criminal court for Rwanda 
started with the Security Council Resolution 935 which established a Commission of 
Experts to investigate grave violations of international humanitarian law committed 
during the Rwandan genocidal civil war.118  While the Commission was conducting its 
investigation, the Rwandese government on September 28, 1994, formally requested for 
the establishment of an international criminal tribunal to try those responsible for the 
atrocities in Rwanda.119  The Commission’s preliminary report was submitted to the 
Security Council on October 4, 1994,120 and the final report on December 9, 1994.121  
 Meanwhile, on October 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda while addressing the 
U.N. General Assembly reiterated its government request to the Security Council to 
                                                 
117 Gerard Prunier, supra note 81, at 300.  On March 23, 2000, Mr. Bizimungu resigned as president of 
Rwanda following a disagreement with General Kagame.  In April 2000, General Kagame was appointed 
the new president.  In June 2000, Bizimungu formed his own political Party for Democracy and Renewal 
(PDR).  The Rwandan government banned the party and arrested Bizimungu.  On June 7, 2004, he was 
found guilty of embezzlement, inciting violence and associating with criminals but cleared on charges of 
threatening state security. See, From President to Prison, BBC News World Edition, Monday, 7 June, 2004, 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3728807.stm., (visited March 14, 2005).   Meanwhile, on August 26, 
2003, General Kagame won the first presidential election since the 1994 genocide.  See Rwandan President 
Claims Landslide, BBC News World Edition, 26 August, 2003, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3178611.stm., (visited March 14, 2005). 
118 See S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994).   
119 See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council (Sept. 28, 1994), UN Doc. S/1994/1115.  
120 See Letter dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994). 
121 See Letter dated 9 December 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994). 
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establish an international criminal tribunal for Rwanda as a matter of urgency.122  The 
Rwandan government considered an international criminal tribunal a necessary tool for 
justice, in view of the fact that most of the criminals had sought refuge in other 
countries.123  In that statement, the President stated that: 
Rwanda requests the Security Council to adopt a resolution to 
facilitate the arrest and trial of the murderers who were hiding in 
the refugee camps outside the country.  The resolution will grant 
authority to hold persons who are suspected in the genocide. 
Six months after the crimes were committed, there must be 
action.124 
 
Both the Commission’s preliminary and final reports as well as the October 13, 
1994, report of Rene Degni-Sequi (special rapporteur appointed on recommendation of 
the Commission of Human Rights) concerning human rights situation in Rwanda, 
recommended the establishment of an international criminal tribunal.125  Thus, in 
November 1994, the Security Council by thirteen votes to two (China abstained, while 
Rwanda voted against) adopted Resolution 955 establishing the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).126  The ICTR was created to prosecute serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, to establish law and order, and thereby to contribute to 
the restoration and maintenance of peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda.127   
 
                                                 
122 See Underlying Problems in Caribbean Continue To Be ‘Unnoticed and Unattended,’ Prime Minister of 
Antigua and Barbados Tells General Assembly, Fed. News Serv., Oct. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World 
Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Underlying Problems Continue] (indicating that Rwandan President 
Pasteur Bizimungo expressed to the General Assembly the “urgency” of prosecuting through an 
international tribunal those responsible for genocide). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 See, Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 81, at 177-80; Situation of Human Rights in 
Rwanda, supra note 101, at 75; Christina M. Cerna, A Small Step Forward for Human Rights: The Creation 
of the Post of United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
1265, 1270 (1995). 
126 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 
3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
127 ICTR Statute, supra note 123.  
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4.3.3.  Jurisdiction and Composition of the ICTR 
The ICTR has the jurisdictional competence to prosecute “persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of 
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”128  The ICTR 
subject matter jurisdiction covers the crimes of genocide,129 crimes against humanity,130 
and violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II131 
committed during the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal.132  Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR 
has no jurisdiction over violations of the laws and customs of war and the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 regarding international conflicts because the Rwandan civil war was 
considered an internal conflict.133 
Following the precedents of the IMT Charter and the Statute of the ICTY, article 
6 of the Statute of the ICTR provided for the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility.134  The ICTR jurisdiction is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
128 ICTR Statute, supra note 126, art. 1. 
129 Id., art. 2. 
130 Id., art. 3. 
131 Id., art. 4. 
132 Id., art. 7 provides that “the temporal jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall extend 
to a period beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994.” 
133 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 431-32 
(Transnational Publishers, 2003). 
134 See ICTR Statute, supra note 126, art. 6 which provides as follows: 
(1).  A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually 
responsible for the crime.  
(2). The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
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(3). The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a 
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know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.  
(4). The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not 
relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that justice so requires.  
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Rwandan national courts.135  However, ICTR has primacy over Rwandan national 
courts.136 Consequently, at any stage before judgment is rendered, the ICTR may 
formally request Rwandan national courts to defer its jurisdiction to the ICTR.137 
The ICTR is composed of the Tribunal Chambers, the office of the Prosecutor and 
the Registry.  The Chambers is comprised of three Trial Chambers with three judges each 
and a five member Appeals Chamber.138  The ICTR share the same Appeals Chamber 
and Prosecutor with the ICTY which are based in The Hague.139  The ICTR however has 
its own Registry located at Arusha, Tanzania.140  The decision by the Security Council 
that the ICTR and ICTY should share some common personnel and infrastructure was 
based on the Secretary-General’s report that such institutional links would “ensure a unity 
of legal approach, as well as economy and efficiency of resources.”141   The decision to 
link the two tribunals has however been criticized as lacking legal reasoning and that it 
was based mainly on political convenience and cost saving consideration.142  On August 
28, 2003, the UN Security Council citing the need to ensure adherence to the completion 
                                                 
135 ICTR Statute, supra note 126, art. 8(1). 
136 Id., art. 8(2). 
137 Id. 
138 Id., arts. 10 & 11. The statute provides for two trial chambers, but an additional one was later created to 
accommodate the large caseload. See S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
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141 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 
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strategies as a primary reason, passed Resolution 1503 which bifurcated the Office of the 
Prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR.143   
 
4.3.4. Rwandan Government Opposition to the ICTR 
Although the Rwandan government supported the creation of the ICTR, it voted 
against Security Council Resolution 955 which established the ICTR.144  At the time of 
negotiation of the ICTR Statute, Rwanda was a non permanent member of the Security 
Council and was therefore fortunate to participate in the deliberation of the Security 
Council regarding the creation of the ICTR. 145   In the course of the negotiations over the 
provisions of the ICTR, the Rwandan government disagreed with a number of the 
provisions of the ICTR Statute.146  
 The Rwandan government opposed the ICTR because it considered the dates set 
for the ratione temporis competence of the tribunal from January 1994 to December 1994 
inadequate as it leaves out those individuals who had for a long time planed the 
extermination that finally began on April 1994.147  Also, the Rwandese government was 
not in support of the idea that the ICTR and the ICTY should have a common Appeals 
                                                 
143 See, S.C Res. 1503, U.N. SCOR, 4817th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503, para. 8 (Aug. 28, 2003). But see 
UN Doc. S/2003/794, in which Rwanda indicated that it preferred that the ICTR be given a separate 
prosecutor, citing what it considered to be problems at the Tribunal and about which Rwanda had 
previously complained.  As a result of Resolution 1503, Article 15 of the ICTR Statute was amended to 
delete the provision that the ICTY prosecutor also serves as prosecutor of the ICTR. See SC Res. 1503, 
supra, Annex 1 
144 See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 126. 
145 See Raymond Bonner, Shattered Nation: A Special Report; Rwanda Now Faces Painful Ordeal of 
Rebirth, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29 1994, at A1.  
146 For a detail discussion on the grounds for the Rwandan government objection to the ICTR, see Payam 
Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 
AM. J. INT’L L. 501 (1996); see also, Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa, Why the Government of Rwanda 
Called for an International Tribunal and Yet Opposed the United Nations Security Council Resolution, 12 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 631, 640 (1995) (paper delivered by Ambassador Bakuramutsa to the Fifth 
Annual Ernst C. Steifel Symposium: 1945-1995: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and State 
Accountability: Panel III: Identifying and Prosecuting War Crimes: Two Case Studies - The Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda). 
147 Manzi Bakuramutsa, supra note 146, at 640. 
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Chamber and Prosecutor because in its view, this arrangement will not facilitate quick 
dispensation of justice.148  
Furthermore, the Rwandese government wanted the Security Council to prohibit 
some States that allegedly took a very active part in the civil war in Rwanda from 
participating in the nomination and election of ICTR judges.149  The location of ICTR 
outside of Rwanda was also not acceptable to the Rwanda government.150  In addition, 
the Rwandese government objected to the ICTR Statute because of its inability to impose 
the death sentence.151  Under Article 23 of the ICTR Statute, the tribunal is only 
authorized to impose imprisonment.152 The Rwandese government stressed that the 
absence of the death penalty against those guilty of genocide was the main reason for its 
opposition to the ICTR.153   
None of the above stated objection of the Rwandan government was acceded to 
by the Security Council.154  In some situations, such as the issue of death penalty, the 
Security Council has its hands tied because having previously decided that the ICTY 
cannot impose death penalty, it found itself in a difficult position acceding to the 
Rwandan government’s request that the ICTR should be allowed to impose the death 
                                                 
148 Manzi Bakuramutsa, supra note 146, at 640. 
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150 Id. 
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153 Philippe Naughton, Rwandan Minister Defends “No” Vote on Tribunal, Reuters World Service, Nov. 9, 
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. Alphonse Nkubito, the Rwandan Minister of 
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154 However, on the issue of the trial chamber, the Security Council has increased the trial chambers to 
three.  See S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1165 (1998). 
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penalty.155  Notwithstanding the decision of the Rwandan government to vote against the 
ICTR Statute, the government pledged its willingness to cooperate with the United 
Nations on the matter and assist the ICTR with its work.156  
 
4.3.5. Assessment of the ICTR 
The tribunal was established in November 1994 but it was not until June 1995 that 
its judges were sworn in at The Hague.157 An administrator for the tribunal was not 
appointed until September 1995.158  Six months after the judges were sworn in and just 
one year after the tribunal was established, the ICTR on December 12, 1995, issued its 
first indictments.159  The indictments accused eight Rwandans of genocide and 
conspiracy to commit genocide in the mass killing of several thousand men, women and 
children in the Kibuye Prefecture of western Rwanda.160  Unlike ICTY, the Rwandan 
tribunal, through the assistance of the Rwandan government and neighboring States, has 
many of its indictees including several high-ranking officials of the former regime in 
custody.161  However, nine of the accused remain at large.162   
                                                 
155 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 133, at 433. 
156 See Richard D. Lyons, U.N. Approves Tribunal on Rwandan Atrocities, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1994, at 
A12.(noting that the Rwandan government has stated it will cooperate with the tribunal and quoting 
Representative Bakuramutsa as saying “Rwanda fully supports the tribunal, although we might not yet be 
satisfied with the resolution”). 
157 Julian Bedford, Judges to Set Rules for Rwanda Genocide Tribunal, Reuters, Jun. 26, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. Judge Laity Kama of Senegal and Judge Yakov Ostrovsky of 
Russia were elected president and vice-president of the tribunal respectively. Id.  See UN Panel Opens 
Inquiry on Rwanda, N.Y. Times, Jun. 28, 1995, at A5. 
158 Kenyan Appointed to Top Job on War Crimes Tribunal, Reuters, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
CURNWS File. Andronico Adede, a Kenyan UN bureaucrat was appointed the tribunal’s register on 
September 12, 1995. Id. 
159 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, et al, Case No. ICTR-95-1-I (1995). 
160 Payam Akhavan, supra note 146 at 509. See also Melissa Gordon, Justice on Trial: the Efficacy of the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217 (1995). 
161 Payam Akhavan, supra note 146, at 509.  As at March 1997, it was estimated that about 90,000 
genocide suspects were held in Rwandan jails.  See Corinne Dufka, Irish Leader Expresses Concern at 
Rwanda Justice, Reuters, Mar. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
162 They include: BIZIMANA, Augustin (ICTR-98-44) ;KABUGA, Félicien (ICTR-98-44) ;MPIRANYA, 
Protais (ICTR-2000-56); NDIMBATI, Aloys (ICTR-95-1); NIZEYIMANA, Idelphonse (ICTR-2000-55); 
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The ICTR does not have the resources to try even a substantial number of the 
reported ninety-thousand suspects in Rwandan jails.  Thus, as at March 9, 2006, the ICTR 
assumed jurisdiction for only 81 detainees.163  Of these detainees, 28 are on trial while 15 
are awaiting trial.164  The trial chamber has concluded 23 cases, 8 of which are currently 
on appeals.165  Of the 15 convicted, 6 have been sent to Mali to serve their prison 
sentences and 9 are awaiting transfer.166  The trial chamber handed out 14 life sentences 
and between 6 to 35 years prison sentences.167 One of the detainees was acquitted, two 
has their charges dropped and were released, one died in detention, and the other two 
were conditionally released.168  With the Prosecutor v. Akayesu169 decision, the ICTR 
became the first international war crimes tribunal to convict an official for genocide and 
to declare that rape could constitute genocide.170  
Thus, from a practical standpoint, many of the suspects will have to be tried by 
the national courts of Rwanda, although those trials raise serious questions of due process 
protections.171  On February 23, 2005, Hassan Bubacar Jallow, the Prosecutor of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
NTAGANZWA Ladislas (ICTR-96-9); NZABONIMANA, Callixte (ICTR-98-44); RYANDIKAYO 
(ICTR-95-1); and SIKUBWABO Charles (ICTR-95-1).  See Accused at Large, available at: 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/inprogress.htm 
163 See Status of Detainees, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/factsheets/detainee.htm (visited 
March 11, 2005). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-I, Amended Indictment (June 1997), paras. 12A-12B, 
available at: www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/indictment/actamond.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). 
170 See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International, Rwanda: Amnesty International Welcomes Historic 
Rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Sept. 4, 1998, available at: 
www.amnestyusa.org/news/1998/14703098.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004) (explaining that Akayesu’s 
conviction was the first time an international court had applied the Genocide Convention of 1948). 
171 As of March 1997, Rwanda was reported to hold in its jails over 90,000 genocide-related suspects. 
Many of the suspects have not been accorded due process protections by the RPF Rwandan government. 
Rwandan courts have started their own war crimes trials and had handed down ten death sentences by 
February 1997.  See Corinne Dufka, supra note 161; Despite UN Tribunal, Rwanda Plans to Try Suspects 
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ICTR during a visit to the Rwandan capital handed 15 of its cases under investigation to 
the Rwandan state prosecutor in a first such move since the establishment of the 
tribunal.172    
In order to speedy the prosecution of other accused persons who took less 
significant role in the civil war, the Rwandan government has turn to community courts, 
known as the gacaca.173   So far 118 of such courts have been established and by the time 
the gacaca system is up and running, there will be 12,000 of the courts.174  Each gacaca 
court is comprised of nine judge panel elected among the local people and the court can 
imposed prison sentences up to life imprisonment.175  Suspects who confess and seek 
forgiveness from surviving victims receive lighter sentences.  On March 10, 2005, the 
first gacaca judgment of 30 years imprisonment was handed to Saddam Nshimiyimana 
who was accused of killing people stopped at a roadblock during the genocide and others 
who sought refuge from the slaughter in a Roman Catholic Church in central Kigali.176 
Some survivors have expressed concerned about the slow pace of gacaca trials 
and what they say are lenient sentences for those who confess.177  On the other hand, 
human rights groups are worried that the proceedings do not meet international standards 
for criminal courts.178  However, the Rwandan officials have argued that if the national 
courts are going to handle all the people accused of taking part in the genocide, about 
                                                                                                                                                 
for War Crimes, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 10, 1994, at A6. A Rwandan official estimated in 1994 that 
national courts could try as many as 30,000 suspects. Id. 
172 See UN War Crimes Court Hands over 15 Cases to Rwanda, available at 
http://www.rwanda.net/english/News/2005/022005/news02232005d.htm, (visited March 11, 2005). 
173 See Edward Rwema, Rwanda Launches New Phase of Genocide Trials at Traditional Courts, available 
at: http://www.rwanda.net/english/News/2005/032005/news03102005c.htm, (visited March 11, 2005). 
174 Id. (quoting Johnston Busingye, secretary general in Rwanda Justice Ministry).  
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
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63,000 of them, it could take decades before their cases would be heard.179  The Rwandan 
officials also suggest that gacaca courts, by bringing together survivors and perpetrators, 
will promote reconciliation.180  
The ICTR has come under serious criticism for its failure to charge Tutsis 
suspected of killing Hutus in the 1994 genocide.181  Thus, Filip Reyntjens, a Belgian 
historian and expert witness on genocide has said he would stop cooperating with the 
tribunal because no Tutsis from the RPF rebel army had been indicted.182  Professor 
Reyntjens stated that prosecuting only Hutus amounted to victor’s justice, because the 
Tutsi force which ended the genocide by overthrowing the extremist Hutu regime also 
committed atrocities.  He noted that the tribunal was supposed to foster reconciliation but 
was doing the opposite because its one-sided approach alienated ordinary Hutus.183  
Before Carla del Ponte was removed as the prosecutor of the ICTR, she had promised to 
charge members of the RPF.184  Unfortunately, Ms. Del Ponte’s successor, Hassan 
Bubacar Jallow has not shown any zeal in going after members of the RPF.185   
The ICTR is expected to complete its sitting by 2010.186  Pursuant to the strategy, 
the ICTR must complete its investigations by the end of 2004, and all trials and appeals 
                                                 
179 Edward Rwema, supra note 173 (reporting that government officials suggest that the gacaca courts will 
speed up the huge number of trials allowing the national courts to concerned itself with the cases of only 
the leaders of the genocidal war).  
180 Id. 
181 See, Rory Carroll, Genocide Tribunal ‘Ignoring Tutsi Crimes’, The Guardian, January 13, 2005, 
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/rwanda/story/0,14451,1389194,00.html, (last visited March 15, 
2005). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id.  See also, Steven Edwards, Del Ponte Says UN Caved to Rwandan Pressure National Post, 
September 17, 2003, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/rwanda/2003/0918ponte.htm 
185 Rory Carroll, supra note 181. 
186 See ICTR Completion Strategy dated 19 November, 2004, available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/completionstrat/191104.pdf, (visited March 11, 2005). The first version of 
the ICTR completion strategy was submitted to the UN on July 14, 2003.  See ICTR, for the Biennium 
2004-2005, annex, UN Doc. A/58/269 (2003). That document was prepared notably within the context of 
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must be completed by December 31, 2010.  In order to achieve the completion date, the 
ICTR on March 1, 2005, inaugurated its fourth courtroom which is expected to boast its 
judicial output and ensure that the Tribunal will meet its projected completion date.187 
With this move, the ICTR hopes to complete the remainder of the cases before the 
Tribunal within the estimated completion date.188    
 
 
  
4.4. SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT 
4.4.1. History of the Sierra Leonean Conflict 
The Sierra Leone conflict was triggered by decades of misrule and corruption on 
the part of the government of President Joseph Momoh and the desire by the rebel forces 
to control the Sierra Leonean diamond market.  The conflict which quickly degenerated 
into a civil war began in March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) headed 
by Foday Sankoh (a former Corporal in the Sierra Leone Army), aided by President 
Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) attacked Sierra Leone from 
                                                                                                                                                 
General Assembly resolution 57/289 (2003) para. 15 (a), which provided that the proposed budget of the 
ICTR for 2004-2005 should include “detailed information as to how the resources requested for the 
biennium would support the development of a sound and realistic completion strategy”.  A second version 
of the ICTR Completion Strategy was submitted to UN September 29, 2003, the ICTR president Erik 
Mose.  See Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, enclosure, in Letter 
Dated 29 September 2003 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed 
to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2003/946 (2003) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy]. This 
document formed the basis of the request to increase the number of ad litem judges sitting “at any one 
time” from four to nine. By resolution 1512 (2003), the Security Council granted the request.  See also 
remarks made by President Mose and ICTR prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow, respectively, before the 
Security Council on October 9, 2003. UN Doc. S/PV.4838, supra note 5, at 7-9, 13-16.  Following his 
address to the Security Council, Prosecutor Jallow undertook to review all cases and investigations pursued 
by his office and compiled a document on February 28, 2004, entitled, Completion Strategy of the Office of 
the Prosecutor, UN Doc. S/2004/341, at 1 n.2.  The third version of the document was submitted to the 
President of the Security Council on 30 April 2004 and formed the basis of the assessments provided by the 
ICTR President and Prosecutor during the Council’s meeting on 29 June 2004. 
187 See Fourth ICTR Courtroom Inaugurated, available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2005/421.htm, (visited March 11, 2005). 
188 See ICTR Completion Strategy dated 19 November, 2004, available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/completionstrat/191104.pdf, (visited March 11, 2005). 
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Liberia.189  The Sierra Leonean government responded by drafting young men and 
children to counter the RUF offensive.  The highly unmotivated Sierra Leonean army in 
April 1992 staged a successful coup against the government of President Joseph Momoh 
and named a young army captain, Valentine Strasser as the new Head of State of Sierra 
Leone.190  
After the coup, RUF continued to attack the government of Captain Strasser and 
other successive Sierra Leonean governments as well as regional and international forces.  
Child soldiers, mass killings, signature mutilations, and sex crimes were symbolic of the 
civil war which went on sporadically between 1991 and 2002.191  In 1994, Nigeria led a 
peacekeeping force of West African States known as the Economic Community of West 
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to repel the RUF forces from overrunning 
the Sierra Leonean government.  In February 1995, the United Nations appointed 
Berhanu Dinka as its Special envoy to work with the then Organization of African Unity 
(“OAU”) and the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) to return 
Sierra Leone to a democratic government.192  
A multi party election was held in 1996 and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former U.N. 
official was elected president under the Sierra Leone People’s Party.  In order to appease 
the RUF which did not participate in the election and refused to recognize the election 
result, president Kabbah entered into negotiations with RUF which resulted in the 
                                                 
189 The RUF is a loosely organized guerrilla group that started the war in 1991, seeking to topple the 
government of Sierra Leone and to retain control of the lucrative diamond-producing regions of the 
country. It was headed by a former Corporal in the Sierra Leone Army, Foday Sankoh. 
190 See Karen Gallagher, No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149, 156, (2000). 
191 Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 391, 393 (2001). 
192 See United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Background, available at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html), (last visited March 15, 2005).  
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November 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord.193  The Abidjan Accord offered amnesty to RUF 
members in return to RUF agreement to an immediate cease-fire, disarmament, and 
demobilization.194  Before the parties’ commitment to the Abidjan Accord could be 
tested, president Kabbah’s government was overthrown in May 1997 by the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).195  Major Johnny Paul Koroma became the next 
Head of State of Sierra Leone and invited the RUF to share power with his ARFC.  Thus, 
rather than establish peace, the hallmark of the coalition government of the AFRC/RUF 
was the breakdown of the rule of law evidenced by killings and looting of public and 
private properties.196   
The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1132 which imposed an 
oil and arms embargo as well as travel restrictions against the military government of 
Major Koroma.197 In February 1998, ECOMOG responded to an attack by the AFRC 
forces and in the process depose the military junta and restored president Kabbah to 
office. However, president Kabbah’s government and the ECOMOG only controlled 
Freetown while the RUF by the end of 1998, controlled well over half the country, 
particularly in the major diamond mining areas.   
In 1999, RUF and members of the AFRC launched an offensive towards 
Freetown code-named “Operation No Living Thing.”198  Although ECOMOG was able to 
                                                 
193 See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of 
Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), November 30, 1996 (hereinafter Abidjan Accord), available at: http://www.sierra-
leone.org/abidjanaccord.html.(lasted visited March 15, 2005).  
194 Karen Gallagher, supra note 190, at 157. 
195 The AFRC is a group of senior military officers lead by Major Johnny Paul Koroma.  
196 Abdul Tejan-Cole, Note From the Field: The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship Between the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 
139, 141 (2003). 
197 See S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997). 
198 See Steve Coll, The Other War: The Gratuitous Cruelties Against Civilians in Sierra Leone Last Year 
Rivaled Those Committed in Kosovo at the Same Time, Washington Post Magazine, January 9, 2000, at 
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push the rebel forces out of Freetown, the resulting human rights violations and casualties 
lived up to the code name of the offensive.  It was estimated that about six thousand 
civilians were killed, thousands more were displaced, mutilated and limbless, raped, and 
much of Freetown was destroyed.199  Also, about 3,000 children were taken captive by 
RUF during its retreat from Freetown.200   
After the retreat, ECOMOG facilitated a peace negotiation between the Sierra 
Leonean government and the RUF which resulted in the Lome Peace Accord signed in 
Lome, Togo on July 7, 1999.201  The Lome Accord offered complete amnesty to RUF 
members including its leader Foday Sankoh, who had been convicted and sentenced to 
death for treason.202   Mr. Sankoh was appointed vice-president of Sierra Leone and 
Chairman of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, 
National Reconstruction and Development which oversee the diamond mines.203   
However, the U.N. added a reservation to the amnesty provision which precluded the 
amnesty from applying to “international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”204  The Lome 
Accord also provided for immediate cessation of all hostilities and disarmament as well 
                                                                                                                                                 
W8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/photo/galleries/sierraleone; Abdul Tejan-Cole, 
supra note 196, at 141. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of 
Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999 [hereinafter Lome Accord], available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Lomeaccord.html. 
202 Abdul Tejan-Cole, supra note 196, at 141. 
203 Id., at 142. 
204 See Human Rights Watch, The Sierra Leone Amnesty Under International Law (August 3 1999), 
available at: http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sierra/int-law2.htm.    
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as the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to facilitate the healing 
process for all Sierra Leoneans.205  
In October 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1270 which established 
the United Nation’s Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to monitor the implementation 
of the Lome Accord.206  The RUF refused to abate all hostilities as required by the Lome 
Accord, responded to the disarmament with less enthusiasm and took about 500 
UNAMSIL peacekeeping troops hostage when they attempted to take control of the 
diamond-rich areas of the country in accordance with the Lome Accord.207  Also, the 
                                                 
205 Abdul Tejan-Cole, supra note 196, at 142.  Pursuant to On February 22, 2000, Article XXVI of the 
Lome Peace Agreement, the President and Members of Parliament of Sierra Leone established the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission.   See The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, section 2(1) (2000), 
(Sierra Leone) [hereinafter TRC Act], at: http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html (last visited March 
24, 2005).  The object of the TRC is to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of 
human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the 
beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to 1999 (the date of signing the Lome Peace Agreement) and to address 
impunity, respond to the needs of the victims, promote healing and reconciliation, and to prevent a 
repetition of the violations and abuses. Id., sec. 6(1).  It is expected that the TRC will create an opportunity 
for victims to give an account of the violations and abuses suffered and for perpetrators to relate their 
experiences in a climate which fosters constructive interchange between victims and perpetrators with the 
aim that such arrangement will help restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation. Id., 
sec. (6)(2)(b).  On April 14, 2003, President Kabbah launched the commencement of the public hearings of 
TRC.  See President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah Kabbah - Speech on Launch of TRC Public Hearings Phase, 
available at: http://www.sierra-leone.org/trc-documents.html, (last visited March 24, 2005).   In the course 
of discharging its functions, the TRC has engaged in statement taking, public hearings, and research and 
investigations, and presented its final report to President Kabbah on October 5, 2004, and to the United 
Nations Security Council October 27, 2004.  See Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final 
Report, available at: http://www.ictj.org, (last visited March 24, 2005); Marian Samu, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Presents Report, available at: http://www.statehouse-sl.org/trc-fin-rep-
oct5.html., (last visited March 24, 2005); Final Report on ten-year Sierra Leone conflict published; seeks to 
set out historical record, offer guidance for future, Press Release ECOSOC/6140 GA/10287 SC/8227, 
available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/ecosoc6140.doc.htm, (last visited March 24, 2005). 
206 See S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. SCOR, 4054th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (1999). 
207 See Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Getting Away With Murder, Mutilation, Rape-New testimony 
from Sierra Leone, in World Report 1999 (July 1999), at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/sierra; 
Christopher S. Wren, U.N. Says Leone Rebels Now Hold 92 Peacekeepers, N.Y. Times, May 5, 2000, at 
A14; James Rupert and Douglas Farah, Liberian Leader Urges Sierra Leone Rebels to Free Hostages, 
Wash. Post, May 20, 2000, at A20; see also Sierra Leone Web News Archives, May 5, 2000, available at 
http://sierra-leone.org/slnews0500.html. 
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RUF renewed its offensive against the government and Sankoh’s security guards did not 
hesitate to kill several civilians during a demonstration in front of Sankoh’ residence.208  
As a result of RUF breach of the Lome Accord, the Sierra Leonean government 
authorized the arrest of several RUF leaders including the arrest of Mr. Sankoh on May 
17, 2000.209  Also, in June 2000, President Kabbah wrote to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, requesting the assistance of the United Nations to establish a court to try 
people who have committed atrocities in Sierra Leone.210  
 
 
4.4.2. Establishment of the Sierra Leonean Special Court 
Following President Kabbah’s request, the Security Council in August 2000 
passed Resolution 1315 which recognized “that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region” and therefore 
mandated the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the government of Sierra 
Leone to create an independent Special Court.211  Also, the Security Council requested 
the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation the recommendations of 
the Resolution.212  Pursuant to Resolution 1315, the Secretary-General on October 4, 
2000, forwarded his report to the Security Council on October 4, 2000,213 with the draft 
                                                 
208 See Norimitsu Onishi, Gunmen Fire on Protesters in Sierra Leone, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2000, at A6. The 
Sierra Leone Web cited Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) estimate of approximately 40 
civilian casualties. Sierra Leone Web News Archives, May 10, 2000, available at: http://sierra-
leone.org/slnews0500-B.html.  
209 Karen Gallagher, supra note 191, at 167. 
210 See Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2000/786, 10 August 2000.  
211 S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4168th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1315 (2000) [hereinafter Security Council 
Resolution 1315].  
212 Id. 
213 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 
55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone 
Special Court], available at:  http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf. 
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agreement between the U.N. and the government of Sierra Leone214 and the draft statute 
for the court annexed thereto.215  The Secretary-General’s report recommended a treaty-
based sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition would have the power to 
prosecute persons “most responsible” for serious violations of “international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory” of that country 
since November 1996.216 
From December 2000 to July 2001, the Security Council and the Secretary-
General exchanged correspondence which contained suggested amendments and 
revisions to the draft statute of the court submitted by the Secretary-General.217  By letter 
dated February 9, 2001, the Sierra Leonean government conveyed its acceptance of the 
amendments to the Secretary-General who in-turn, communicated this acceptance to the 
Security Council.218  Thus, by July 2001, the final text of the Sierra Leone Court statute 
was accepted by all parties and on January 16, 2002, the government of Sierra Leone and 
the United Nations signed the Agreement establishing the Special Court and officially 
                                                 
214 The Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment 
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone [hereinafter Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement], annexed to the 
Secretary-General’s Sierra Leone Report, available at:  http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf 
215 The draft Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, as amended [hereinafter Sierra Leone Special 
Court Statute], annexed to the Secretary-General’s Sierra Leone Report, available at:  
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf, also available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html.  
216 Secretary-General’s Sierra Leone Report, supra note 213, at para. 9. 
217 See Annex to the Letter Dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council Addressed 
to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/1234 [hereinafter Sierra Leone Statute Amendment]. By letter 
dated January 12, 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/40, the Secretary-General responded to the Security Counsel 
concerning the suggested amendment.  The Security Council responded to the Secretary-General’s letter on 
January 31, 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/95. These documents and other letters dated 2000 and 2001 are 
available online at:http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2000/ and http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2001/, 
respectively. 
218 This agreement was communicated to the Secretary-General in a letter dated February 9, 2001. See 
Letter Dated 13 July 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/2001/693. available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/455/50/PDF/N0145550.pdf?OpenElement. 
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ending the civil war.219   The agreement was ratified in March 2002 by the Parliament of 
Sierra Leone. 
Thus, unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, which were established under Security 
Council resolutions pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter  and have jurisdiction only 
over international offenses, the Sierra Leone Special Court (Special Court) is a “treaty-
based sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition having jurisdiction over 
violations of international humanitarian law and cognate Sierra Leonean law.”220 
 
4.4.3. Jurisdiction and Composition of the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
Although the Sierra Leonean civil war started in 1991, the Special Court has 
jurisdiction to prosecute only “persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the 
territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.”221  Financial consideration and the 
desire not to overburden the Special Court’s Prosecutor were instrumental for the 
decision not to extend the Court’s temporal jurisdiction to March 23, 1991, which was the 
date the civil war started.222  On the other hand, May 25, 1997, the date of the AFRC 
coup was rejected to avoid the impression that the Special Court was created to target the 
coupsits.223  Similarly, January 6, 1999, the date of RUF last incursion into Freetown was 
                                                 
219 See “Sierra Leone: UN Government Sign Historic Accord to Set up Special War Crimes Court”, UN 
NewsCenter, 16 January 2002, available at: 
http://www.un.org./apps/news/story.asp?NewsID2639&CrSierra&Crlcourt (last visited March 16, 2005). 
220 Secretary-General’s Sierra Leone Report, supra note 213, para. 9. 
221 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 1. 
222 See generally, Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone Special Court, supra note 213, paras. 
26-27. 
223 Id. 
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rejected because it would exclude the period within which serious crimes were committed 
in the rural and provincial areas.224  
In the end, the Secretary-General recommended November 30, 1996, the date 
which corresponds with the first failure of the Abidjan Peace Accord between the 
government of Sierra Leone and the RUF.  According to the Secretary-General, the 
November 30, 1996 date “would have the benefit of putting the Sierra Leone conflict in 
perspective without unnecessarily extending the temporal jurisdiction of the Special 
Court.”225  Also, while the Court’s temporal jurisdiction is based on the fact that all 
hostilities has not ceased at the time of drafting the Statute of the Court, it may be argued 
that the Court’s jurisdiction covers only November 30, 1996 to January 12, 2002, which 
is the date hostilities was officially declared over.   
In view of the fact that child soldiers played a significant part in the Sierra 
Leonean civil war, the question whether the Court should exercise jurisdiction over 
children was considered during the drafting stages of the Court’s Statute.226  In the end, it 
was agreed that the “Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was 
under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.”227  With respect 
to any person who was at the time of the alleged commission of the crime between 15 
and 18 years of age, the Special Court’s objective should be to rehabilitate and reintegrate 
the juvenile offender back to the society.228  Also, article 19 of the Statute precludes the 
                                                 
224 Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone Special Court, supra note 213, paras. 26-27. 
225 Id. 
226 See Letter dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/ 1234, 22 December 2000; see also Letter dated 12 January 2001 from 
the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2001/40, 12 January 
2001. 
227 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 7(1). 
228 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 7(1).  See also, Article 15(5) requiring the 
Prosecutor to “ensure that the child-rehabilitation programme is not placed at risk and that, where 
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Special Court from imposing any prison term on a juvenile offender.229  Thus, under this 
arrangement, the prosecution of child soldiers is highly unlikely.230  They would also 
probably not qualify under the express personal jurisdiction of the Special Court to 
prosecute only those “persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law.”231  Thus, the Prosecutor has 
declared that he does not intend to indict anyone for crimes committed while under the 
age of 18.232 
The Special Court subject matter jurisdiction covers crimes against humanity;233 
violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II;234 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian laws.235  Also, in consideration 
                                                                                                                                                 
appropriate, resort should be had to alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms, to the extent of their 
availability.” 
229 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 19(1). 
230 Daryl A. Mundis, Current Development: New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of International 
Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 934, 937 (2001). 
231 See, Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 1. 
232 See Thierry Cruvellier and Marieke Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The First Eighteen 
Months, March 2004, 5 available at: www.ictj.org/downloads/SC_SL_Case_Study_designed.pdf, 
233 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 2.  The following crimes are crimes against 
humanity if committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population: 
(a) Murder; (b)Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) 
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual 
violence; (h) Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds; and (i) Other inhumane 
acts. Id. 
234 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 3.  These violations shall include: 
a. Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well 
as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) Collective 
punishments; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of terrorism; (e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of 
indecent assault; (f) Pillage; (g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples; and (h) Threats to commit 
any of the foregoing acts. Id. 
235 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 4.  The following crimes are considered serious 
violations of international humanitarian law: 
a. Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians 
not taking direct part in hostilities; (b) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, 
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict; and 
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of the nature of the conflict, and giving the hybrid character236 of the Special Court’s 
applicable law, the Special Court has jurisdiction to prosecute persons who have 
committed crimes relating to the abuse of girls under 14 years of age as provided under 
the Sierra Leonean Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926 (Cap. 31).237  In addition, 
teh Court has jurisdiction to try those accused of committing crimes relating to the 
wanton destruction of property under the Sierra Leonean Malicious Damage Act, 
1861.238  Significantly, the Special Court unlike the ICTY and ICTR does not have 
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide because there was no evidence that the killings in 
Sierra Leone targeted individuals based on national, ethnic, racial or religious group nor 
was there any intent to annihilate persons belonging to any of the above groups. 
In consonance with the IMT, ICTY, and ICTR, the Statute of the Special Court 
provides for the principle of individual criminal responsibility.239  However, the Statute 
                                                                                                                                                 
(c) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or 
using them to participate actively in hostilities.  Id. 
236 The Special Court is often referred to as a “hybrid tribunal” because of its mixed jurisdiction and 
composition.  UN administrations in Kosovo and East Timor have established other hybrid tribunals, but 
the Court is the first example of this particular model.  See discussion on Cambodia Court, infra. 
237 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 5(a).  Offences relating to the abuse of girls 
under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926 (Cap. 31) for which the Special Court may prosecute 
are:  
(i) Abusing a girl under 13 years of age, contrary to section 6; (ii) Abusing a girl between 13 and 
14 years of age, contrary to section 7; and (iii) Abduction of a girl for immoral purposes, contrary to section 
12. 
 
238 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 5(b). Offences relating to the wanton destruction 
of property under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861 for which the Special Court may prosecute are:  
(i) Setting fire to dwelling - houses, any person being therein, contrary to section 2; (ii) Setting fire to 
public buildings, contrary to sections 5 and 6; and (iii) Setting fire to other buildings, contrary to 
section 6. Id. 
239 See Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 6 which provides as follows: 
(1).  A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually 
responsible for the crime. 
(2). The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
punishment. 
(3). The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a 
subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to 
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notes that the “individual criminal responsibility for the crimes under the Sierra Leonean 
law shall be determined in accordance with the respective laws of Sierra Leone.”240  
Also, the Special Court Statute invalidated “an amnesty granted to any person falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 
2 to 4 of the present Statute...”241  On the other hand, the Statute did not indicate whether 
the blanket amnesty given to all parties by the 1999 Lomé Accord should be recognized 
by the Court for crimes under the Sierra Leonean law.  In view of the limitation of article 
10 to international crimes under articles 2-4 and in accordance with statutory 
construction, it seems that the application of the amnesty to crimes under the Sierra 
Leonean law should be determined also by resort to the respective laws of Sierra Leone. 
Also, like the ICTY and the ICTR, the Special Court has concurrent jurisdiction 
with the domestic courts of Sierra Leone.242  However, the Special Court has primacy 
over Sierra Leonean national courts243 and by implication, the Sierra Leonean Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  Consequently, at any stage before judgment is 
rendered, the Special Court may request Sierra Leonean national courts and the TRC to 
defer their jurisdiction to the Special Court.244   
By contrast, the Special Court primacy over the Sierra Leonean national courts 
and the TRC is not over reaching like the power of the ICTY and ICTR which can assert 
primacy over national courts of third States or order the surrender of an accused located 
                                                                                                                                                 
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take 
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
(4). The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not 
relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
Special Court determines that justice so requires. 
240 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 6(5). 
241 Id., art. 10. 
242 Id., art. 8(1). 
243 Id., art. 8(2). 
244 Id. 
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in any third State.  This is because unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court was not 
established by the Security Council pursuant to its Chapter VII powers but by an 
agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone.245  However, the implication of 
this on the Court’s jurisdiction is negligible since most of the accused are already in 
custody in Sierra Leone.  Besides, the mere effect of an indictment by the Court will put 
pressure on third States harboring the indicted person(s) to surrender him or her to the 
Court even without the inherent power of the Security Council.246 
The Special Court is comprised of two Trial Chambers, one Appeals Chamber, 
the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry.247  Each trial chamber shall be composed of 
two judges appointed by the Secretary-General and one judge appointed by the 
government of Sierra Leone.248  The five-member Appeals Chamber shall be composed 
of three judges appointed by the Secretary-General and two judges appointed by the 
government of Sierra Leone.249  The Secretary-General appoints the Prosecutor and the 
Registrar, while the Deputy Prosecutor who should be Sierra Leonean is appointed by the 
government of Sierra Leone in consultation with the United Nations.250  
Thus, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which are composed exclusively of third State 
nationals elected by the U.N. General Assembly, and a Prosecutor selected by the 
Security Council, the Special Court is to be composed of both international and Sierra 
                                                 
245 See Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement, supra note 214. 
246 One notable exception is Nigeria’s continued refusal to extradite the former president of Liberia, Charles 
Taylor to Sierra Leone for trial despite pressure from the international committee.  Charles Taylor was 
indicted by the Court for war crimes and is presently in exile in Nigeria.  See Nigeria: Surrender Charles 
Taylor to Special Court for Sierra Leone, Amnesty International Press Release 8/11/2005 available at: 
http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGAFR440182005 (visited September 8, 2005). 
247 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 11. 
248 Id., art. 12. 
249 Id.  As at March 12, 2006, the President of the Court is Justice A. Raja N. Fernando, a Sri Lankan 
national. 
250 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, arts. 15 & 16(3).  Although the Statute provides that 
the Deputy Prosecutor should be a Sierra Leonean, the current Deputy Prosecutor Desmond da Silva 
appointed by the government of Sierra Leone is from the UK. 
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Leonean judges, prosecutors and staff.251  Also, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special 
Court will be seated at the headquarters of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone’s capital city.  However, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court is 
funded by voluntary contributions from a group of interested States,252 and a 
Management Committee comprising a small number of States oversees all non-judicial 
activities of the Court.253  Matters of cooperation with the government of Sierra Leone 
are regulated by the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act, 2002.254 
 
4.4.4. Assessment of the Sierra Leonean Special Court 
In April 2002, three months after the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN 
signed the agreement establishing the Special Court, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
appointed the Registrar and the Chief Prosecutor. The Registrar and the Prosecutor 
arrived in Freetown in late July and early August 2002, respectively.  They began 
operations in difficult conditions.  The Special Court had to build its own staff offices, 
courtrooms, and prison facilities because there were no convenient pre-existing offices 
for the Court to use.255  
                                                 
251 The decision to create a mixed tribunal of national and international judges was due primarily to 
practical considerations and fears about the neutrality of national trials. The Sierra Leonean judicial system 
has been largely decimated as a result of the war. It is only functional in Freetown and lacks the enormous 
human and financial resources required to undertake post-conflict trials.  For the effect of the war on the 
Sierra Leone judiciary see, The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, In Pursuit of Justice: A Report on 
the Judiciary in Sierra Leone Report, (2002) at: 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/Sierra%20Leone%20Report.pdf.  
252 This model of funding was opted for in the wake of the ICTY and ICTR, each of which costs the 
international community in excess of $100 million in assessed contributions yearly. 
253 The management committee comprises representatives from Canada (chair), the United States, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Lesotho, Nigeria, the UN Office of Legal Affairs, and the Government 
of Sierra Leone. 
254 See The Special Court Agreement 2002 (RATIFICATION) ACT, (2002) (Sierra Leone) [hereinafter 
Special Court Agreement], available at: www.specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtAct.html (last 
visited March 24, 2005).   
255 Thierry Cruvellier and Marieke Wierda, supra note 232, at 2 (noting that until January 2003, the 
Registry had to work in provisional offices owned by the Bank of Sierra Leone, while the Office of the 
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On March 10, 2003, the Court issued its first set of indictments and arrests known 
by the Office of the Prosecutor as “Operation Justice,” and by November 2003, 13 
individuals had been indicted.256  From its outset, the jurisdiction of the Special Court 
was restricted to “those who bear the greatest responsibility.”257  Thus, the indictments 
targeted individuals on the highest level command positions in the three main armed 
groups - the AFRC, the RUF, and the CDF involved in the Sierra Leone civil war.258  By 
virtue of their leadership positions, the indictees allegedly knew or should had reason to 
know about the commission of the crimes and may have also participated in directly 
committing atrocities.  With Sankoh and Bockarie dead, Koroma allegedly dead or 
missing, and Taylor presently out of reach, the Court may be unable to try its four most 
prominent suspects.  Unlike the other ad hoc tribunals, it has no procedure for hearing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Prosecutor operated from a private residence a few kilometers away until August 2003 when it was 
transferred to the permanent site). 
256 The individuals indicted include 10 of those in the Special Court’s custody:  Foday Sankoh, the RUF 
founder and former leader (Sankoh died on July 29, 2003); Issa Sesay, who succeeded Foday Sankoh as 
leader of the RUF; Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, senior RUF commanders; Alex Tamba Brima, 
Ibrahim “Bazzy” Kamara, and Santigie Kanu, senior members of the AFRC; Sam Hinga Norman, national 
coordinator of the CDF and Minister of Internal Affairs and National Security at the time of this arrest; 
Moinina Fofanah, Director of War for the CDF; and Allieu Kondewa, Chief Initiator and High Priest of the 
Kamajors.  The other three accused who were at large, dead, or allegedly dead are: Sam “Mosquito” 
Bockarie, former Battlefield commander of the RUF (On June 1, 2003, Bockarie’s body was flown to 
Freetown by the government of Liberia and given to the Special Court for final identification and he was 
positively identified); Johnny Paul Koroma, head of the AFRC; and Charles Taylor, former President of 
Liberia (who was granted asylum in Nigeria).  Thierry Cruvellier and Marieke Wierda, supra note 484, at 
4-5.  The CDF is largely composed of traditional hunters, some of whom are known as Kamajors. President 
Kabbah called on the CDF to assist in fighting the RUF. 
257 Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 1. Also see, War Crimes Court Loses Steam, 
The Analyst (Monrovia) March 2, 2005, available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200503020699.html 
(noting that “It was always recognized by the UN and the Sierra Leone government - and, indeed, by 
Amnesty International - that the court proposed by the UN Security Council in August 2000 would not be 
able to try all those who had committed crimes under international law). 
258 See Bringing Justice: the Special Court for Sierra Leone Accomplishments, Shortcomings, and Needed 
Support, at Limited Interpretation of “Those Who Bear the Greatest Responsibility”, Human Rights 
Publication available at: http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sierraleone0904/ (last visited March 29, 2005) 
[hereinafter Brining Justice]. 
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evidence in cases where the accused is not in custody.259  Thus, the prosecutorial strategy 
to narrowly construe the Court’s jurisdiction has come under attack.260  
Although the Special Court is supposed to be staffed by a mixture of domestic and 
international personnel, all key personnel of the Court are internationals.  Judge Geoffrey 
Robertson who serves as the first President of the Court is an Australian national.  The 
current president Justice A. Raja N. Fernando is from Sri Lanka.261  The Office of the 
Prosecutor262 was initially headed by an American, David Crane and from May 2005, by 
Desmond de Silva, from the United Kingdom who was Mr. Crane’s deputy.263  Until 
October 3, 2005, the Registry264 was led by Robin Vincent, a British national who was 
succeeded by Lovemore G. Munlo.265  During the Court’s start-up period, most of the 
key posts in the Office of the Prosecutor were filled by U.S. nationals, which attracted 
some criticism.  Although the Prosecutor explained that his key motivation in selecting 
his staff was to get to work quickly, critics perceived the Special Court as under undue 
American influence.   
The Special Court limited temporal jurisdiction has also been criticized because it 
will not be able to try the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law that 
                                                 
259 Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 17(4)(d). 
260 For instance, Human Rights Watch has expressed the believe that the mandate should be interpreted to 
include other perpetrators who, while not at the top of the chain of command, were regional or mid-level 
commanders who stood out above similarly ranking colleagues for the exceedingly brutal nature of the 
crimes they committed that terrorized civilians.  See Bringing Justice, supra note 512. 
261 See The Chambers, available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/chambers.html (visited March 12, 2006). 
262 The Office of the Prosecutor has about 40 staff members, including investigators and trial and appeals 
counsel. 
263 See Office of the Prosecutor, available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/prosecution.html (visited March 12, 
2006). 
264 The Registry performs the following functions: management of detention; witness protection; court 
management; legal support to the Chambers; filing of court records and exhibits; public information and 
outreach; security; financial and procurement matters; support to the Defence Office; and witness support 
and protection. 
265 See The Registry, avialble at: http://www.sc-sl.org/registry.html (visited March 12, 2006). 
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were committed by all the parties to the conflict between March 23, 1991 and November 
30, 1996.266   
 
 
4.5. TIMOR-LESTE HYBRID SPECIAL PANEL  
 
4.5.1. Background of the Conflict  
  East Timor was a Portuguese colony for more than four centuries.  After the 
overthrow of Portuguese dictator Marecello Caetano by a group of Portuguese army 
officers in 1974, the military junta began to divest Portugal of its colonies including East 
Timor.267   In readiness for self rule, the Portuguese Colonial government in East Timor 
authorized the formation of political parties and the conduct of some local government 
elections.   The neighboring Indonesian government considered the possibility of self rule 
in East Timor as a threat to its influence in the region and decided to pursue the 
integration of East Timor with Indonesia.268  The integration of East Timor with 
Indonesia was resisted by some of the political parties resulting in Indonesia invasion of 
East Timor in December 1975.269  By July 1976, Indonesia completed its annexure of 
East Timor by declaring it as Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province.270  Between 1975 and 
1980, about 200,000 East Timorese were killed as a result of the invasion of East Timor 
by the Indonesian military.271  
                                                 
266 For a critique of the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, see Abdul Tejan-Cole, supra note 196. 
267 Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, DELIVERANCE: THE INSIDE STORY OF EAST TIMOR’S FIGHT 
FOR FREEDOM 4 (2002). 
268 Jose Ramos-Horta, FUNU: THE UNFINISHED SAGA OF EAST TIMOR 64-71 (1987). 
269 Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, supra note 267, at 10-15. 
270 Id., at 15. See generally Australian National Command Element, Department of Defence, “A Short 
History of East Timor,” available at: http://www.defence.gov.au/army/asnce/history.htm. 
271 Damien Kingsbury, East Timor to 1999, in GUNS AND BALLOT BOXES: EAST TIMOR’S VOTE 
FOR INDEPENDENCE, 17, 20 (Damien Kingsbury ed., 2000); Richard Tanter et al., East Timor Faces the 
Future, in BITTER FLOWERS, SWEET FLOWERS: EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA, AND THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY 243, 260 (Richard Tanter et al. eds., 2001). See JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING 
PROGRAMME, THE GENERAL PROSECUTOR v. JONI MARQUES AND 9 OTHERS (THE LOS 
PALOS CASE) 4 (Mar. 2002), available at: http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources.htm [hereinafter 
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   The Indonesian government continued to govern East Timor as a province of 
Indonesia until the fall of Haji Mohammad Soeharto (Suharto) regime in 1998.  On 
January 27, 1999, the new government of Indonesia headed by President B. J. Habibie 
announced its intention to hold a referendum which would allow the East Timorese to 
choose between broad autonomy within Indonesia and transition to independence.272  On 
May 5, 1999, the UN, Indonesia and Portugal entered into a Tripartite Agreement which 
detailed the conditions for the referendum.273  In furtherance of the Tripartite Agreement, 
the United Nations Mission in East Timor (“UNAMET”) arrived in East Timor in May 
1999 to prepare for the referendum.  Meanwhile, the Indonesian military and the civilian 
leadership that were opposed to the referendum began a campaign of intimidation and 
violence aimed at disruption of the referendum.274  Notwithstanding the intimidation and 
violence by the Indonesian military and the East Timorese militias that it commanded, on 
September 5, 1999, the East Timorese turned out in a record 98.5% for the referendum.275  
By an overwhelming majority of 78.5%, the East Timorese choose self independence in 
place of special autonomy under the Indonesian government.276   
Within hours of the announcement of the referendum results, the Indonesian 
military and the militias responded by launching a systematic destruction of East 
Timorese infrastructure, killing of civilians and forcing hundreds of thousands to flee to 
                                                                                                                                                 
JSMP, LOS PALOS]. See also, East Timor Action Network, “Backgrounder for East Timor’s May 20 
Independence Day” (May 2002), available at: http://etan.org/news/2002a/05back.htm (noting that scarce 
food and medical supplies led to thousands of deaths in forced resettlement camps). 
272 See Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, supra note 267, at 101.  
273 Id. at 147.  
274 Damien Kingsbury, supra note 271, at 189-90.  
275 Geoffrey Robinson, With UNAMET in East Timor - An Historian’s Personal View, in BITTER 
FLOWERS, SWEET FLOWERS: EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA, AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY, 
supra note 271, at 55, 58. 
276 Id. 
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the hills and across the Indonesian.277  On September 20, 1999, the United Nations 
dispatched a peacekeeping force called the International Force in East Timor 
(“INTERFET”), which was led by Australian soldiers to maintain law and order in East 
Timor.278  After East Timor came under the effective control of INTERFET,279 on 
October 25, 1999, the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Chapter 
passed Resolution 1272, which established the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (“UNTAET”).280   
UNTAET was charged with the responsibility of administering East Timor for 
three years within which time East Timor will transition to self-rule.281   East Timor 
transition to a sovereign State was completed on April 14, 2002, when it conducted its 
presidential elections and was formally declared an independent Sate on May 20, 2002.  
Following Timor-Leste’s independence,282 UNTAET’s mandate was terminated and 
replaced by the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (“UNMISET”).283  The 
UNMISET is responsible for transitioning United Nations gradual withdrawal from East 
Timor and provide support to the East Timorese authorities in the areas of stability, 
                                                 
277 “This was no spontaneous outburst or flare-up of civil war but a one-sided campaign of terror and 
destruction aimed at those who voted for succession from Indonesia.” Human Rights Watch, 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: JUSTICE FOR EAST TIMOR 5 (August 2000), at 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/timor/etimor-back0829.htm. See Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, 
supra note 267 at 202. 
278 U.N. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (1999), at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs/UntaetDrs.htm (authorizing the creation of a multinational force for 
East Timor).  Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, supra note 267, at 270. 
279 See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration In East Timor, 
U.N. S.C., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/53 (2000) (reporting on the restoration of law and order following 
the arrival of INTERFET). Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, supra note 267, at 270. 
280 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, U.N. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th 
Sess., 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1272]. 
281 Id.  
282 On May 20, 2002, East Timor swore in its first government and held an inaugural session of Parliament 
which changed the name of the country to Timor-Leste. 
283 See United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, U.N. S.C. Res. 1410, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 
4534th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 (2002) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1410]. 
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democracy, justice, internal and external security, law enforcement and border control.284  
Also, the UNMISET took over UNTAET’s mandate for prosecuting serious crimes and 
assisting the judicial sector.285   
UNMISET mandate which was for an initial period of one year was extended by 
the Security Council successively for another two years to permit Timor-Leste, to attain 
self-sufficiency.286  On May 20, 2005, UNMISET completed its mandate in Timor-Leste.  
The Security Council replaced UNMISET with a small follow-on political mission – the 
United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) which was established to ensure that 
the foundations of a viable State are firmly in place in Timor-Leste.287     
 
4.5.2. Establishment, Jurisdiction and Composition of Timor-Leste  
Hybrid Special Panel 
In June 2000, the UNTAET passed Regulation 2000/15 which established the 
Special Panels for Serious Crimes, a hybrid tribunal comprised of two international and 
one Timor-Leste panels of judges.288  Regulation 2000/15 conferred exclusive 
jurisdiction on the Special Panels to try anyone accused of committing serious crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, including torture, murder, and sexual 
offenses between January 1 and October 25, 1999.289   
                                                 
284 S.C. Res. 1410, supra note 283. 
285 Id. 
286 On May 19, 2003, the Security Council by Resolution 1480 extended UNMISET mandate for another 
year until May 20, 2004.  On May 14, 2004, the Security Council in its Resolution 1543 again extended 
UNMISET mandate to six months with a view to subsequently extending it for a further and final six 
months.  The final extension was made through Security Council Resolution 1573 on November 16, 2004, 
which extended UNMISET mandate to May 20, 2005. 
287 See United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor – Mandate, at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/mandate.html (visited September 10, 2005). 
288 Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious 
Criminal Offences, UNTAET, 1.1, 1.3, 2.3, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000) [hereinafter 
Regulation 2000/15]. 
289 Regulation No. 2000/15, para 2.3.  See also, Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 298 (2003). 
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There are presently two Special Panels; one panel is English speaking, the other 
Portuguese, both operating from the Dili District Court.  Each of the Special Panel is 
composed of three judges made up of two international judges and one Timor-Leste 
judge.290  Also, there is an Appeals Chamber which is similarly composed of two 
international judges and one Timor-Leste judge.  The Appeals Chamber sits at the Dili 
Court of Appeals to hear appeals to decisions rendered by the Special Panels. 
International law norms, customs, and treaties control with respect to these international 
crimes and jurisdiction of the tribunal.291   Timor-Leste law, to the extent that it is not 
inconsistent with customary international law, applies to all other legal matters of the 
tribunal.292   
In addition to the Special Panels, UNTAET by Regulation 2000/16 established the 
Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) to investigate and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Special Panels.293  Although Regulation 2000/16 called for the creation of SCU that is 
staffed by Timor-Leste nationals and international experts “as necessary”,294 the SCU 
was in fact staffed mostly by international prosecutors, investigators, case managers, 
forensic personnel and translators.  The other arm of the hybrid tribunal, the legal aid 
service was not created until September 2001 when the UNTAET passed Regulation 
                                                 
290 Regulation No. 2000/15, supra note 288, paras. 1.1, 1.2, 22.1, 22.2. 
291 See Daryl Mundis, supra note 230, at 943. 
292 Id. 
293 Regulation No. 2000/16 on the Organization of the Public Prosecution Service in East Timor, UNTAET, 
U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/16 (June 6, 2000), available at: 
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources.htm. 
294 Id. 14.6. 
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2001/24.295  The legal aid service provides legal assistance to those accused of 
committing human rights offenses.296   
 
4.5.3. Assessment of the Timor-Leste Special Panel 
The Timor-Leste internationalized domestic tribunal presents a model that could 
potentially be of benefit in other situations.  However, researchers have pointed out that 
the tribunal’s main failings have been its link to a very weak domestic criminal justice 
system and lack of adequate resources and funding for the Special Panels.297  Also, the 
tribunal has been criticized for failing to observe minimal standards of due process.298  
There were also concerns regarding the impartiality of the Special Panels, the 
competence of the defense counsels, trial delays and interruptions, and questionable 
interpretation and translation.299  
The Special Panel began operating in June 2000 at a slow pace.  On December 11, 
the Special Panel rendered its first judgment against ten militiamen accused of crimes 
against humanity, including torture, murder, and forced expulsion.300  By October 2003, 
the Prosecutor has issued seventy-eight indictments against both former East Timorese 
                                                 
295 See Regulation No. 2001/24 on the Establishment of a Legal Aid Service in East Timor, UNTAET, 1-3, 
6, U.N.Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/24 (2001), at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/2001-24.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Regulation 2001/24].  
296 Id. 
297 For a detailed assessment of the achievements and failings of the tribunal, see David Cohen, Seeking 
Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, 63 ASIA PACIFIC 
ISSUES, Aug. 2002, at 3-4, available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api061.pdf; Suzannah 
Linton, Prosecuting Atrocities at the District Court of Dili, 2 Melb. J. INT’L L. 414 (2001); Suzanne 
Katzenstein, NOTE: Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245 
(2003); Press Release, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Court of Appeal Decision Raises National 
and International Concern (July 17, 2003), at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/News/17nb-7_03nb.htm (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2004) and Human Rights Watch World Report 2003, EAST TIMOR, available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/asia5.html (last visited April 27, 2005). 
298 Case No. 9/2000. For the Los Palos Case indictment, judgments and JSMP Commentary, available at: 
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Trialsnew.htm. [hereinafter “JSMP Commentary”]. 
299 David Cohen, supra note 297, at 6; Suzanne Katzenstein, supra note 297, at 260. 
300 JSMP Commentary, supra note 298. 
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militiamen and Indonesian military officers, accusing 350 individuals of serious crimes 
committed in 1999 and secured thirty-five convictions.301  The low rate of conviction is 
attributed to the fact that out of the 350 individuals indicted by the SCU, 263 remain at 
large, possibly enjoying safe heaven in Indonesia because the Indonesian government has 
refused to recognize the court and refuses to extradite the accused.302  Thus, with 
Indonesia reluctance to extradite or cooperate with the tribunal, the possibility that those 
most responsible for the violence in 1999 will ever stand before the Special Panels is very 
bleak.303  
The fear that many of the indictees may not face justice is strengthened by the 
early termination of the activities of the Special Panel and the SCU by the Security 
Council without any arrangement to ensure the completion of the outstanding trials and 
appeals.304  Consequently, over 300 people indicted for serious crimes before the Special 
Panels have not yet been tried because they could not be brought within the jurisdiction 
of the Special Panels before the UN prematurely closed the tribunal and the SCU.305  
There are reports that indictees have begun returning to Timor-Leste.306  Amnesty 
                                                 
301 See East Timor, Asia-Pacific Daily Rep. (Ctr. of Excellence in Disaster Mgmt. and Humanitarian 
Assistance, Tripler AMC, Hawaii), Sept. 30, 2003, at 2, at http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/10959.pdf  
[hereinafter Asia-Pacific Rep.].  
302 Id., at 2. 
303 Herbert D. Bowman, Letting The Big Fish Get Away: The United Nations Justice Effort In East Timor 
18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 371, 389 (2004). 
304 Pursuant to Resolutions 1543 (2004) and 1573 (2004), the Security Council directed that with the 
termination of UNMISET on May 20, 2005, the activities of the Serious Crimes Unit and Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste should cease.  The follow-on mission to UNMISET, UNOTIL, does not 
have a mandate to continue or to support the serious crimes process. 
305 See Amnesty International, Security Council Inaction on Justice for Timor-Leste Leaves Fight Against 
Impunity in Limbo, August 19, 2005, available at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/timor/2005/0819AItimor.htm [hereinafter Fight Against 
Impunity in Limbo].  
306 Id. 
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International has stated that the result of this development “is legal uncertainty, potential 
instability and continuing impunity”.307   
Thus, human rights groups and victims have continued to call on the U.N. 
Security Council to establish an international tribunal to try the masterminds of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Timor-Leste from 1975 to 1999.308   
On the other hand, Timor-Leste and Indonesian political leaders oppose the establishment 
of such tribunal and instead support the pursuit of “justice” through the Truth and 
Friendship Commission (TFC).309  Critics argue that the Truth and Friendship 
Commission is a means of preventing the establishment of an International Tribunal in 
Timor-Leste.310 
 
4.6.      THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR CAMBODIA  
 
4.6.1. Background  
At Cambodia’s independence in 1954, France handed over the governance of 
Cambodia to King Norodom Sihanouk who ruled until March 18, 1970, when he was 
                                                 
307 Fight Against Impunity in Limbo, supra note 305. 
308 East Timor National Alliance for International Tribunal Dili, Timor Leste, Press Release, August 7, 
2005, and Victims and Militia Demand Justice but Not Commission of Truth and Friendship at 
http://www.etan.org/news/2005/08all.htm; International Federation for East Timor urges UN Security 
Council to create International Tribunal for East Timor, Media Release, 05/20/2003, at 
http://home.snafu.de/watchin/IFET_Release4.htm; Amnesty International, Indonesia/Timor-Leste: 
International Responsibility For Justice, Press Release, 14 April 2003, AI Index: ASA 21/013/2003, at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA210132003?open&of=ENG-IDN 
309 The Agreement for the Truth and Friendship Commission was signed on March 9, 2005, by President of 
Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Timor-Leste President Xanana Gusmao.  The TFC’s mandate is 
to investigate crimes committed during and after the 1999 referendum.  The commission is comprised of 
five Indonesian and Timorese nationals and is expected to start its work in August 2005 and conclude 
within two years.  The objective of the TFC is only to expose the truth.  It has no prosecutorial powers and 
cannot impose punishment.  See, Xanana and SBY Sign Truth Commission Agreement, Timor Post, 
Thursday March 10, 2005, at http://www.unmiset.org/ . 
310 Seth Mydans, East Timor Atrocities will go Unpunished, International Herald Tribune WEDNESDAY, 
MAY 11, 2005, at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/10/news/timor.php; Truth and Friendship 
Commission: More Friendship, Less Truth, Impunity from the Law, JSMP Press Release,  January 14, 
2005, at http://www.asia-pacific-action.org/statements/jsmp_truthandfriendshipcommission_140105.htm  
 132 
overthrown by General Lon Nol.311  On April 17, 1975, General Nol’s fragile hold to 
power came to an end when the Khmer Rouge entered the city of Phnom Penh ousting 
General Nol.312  The Khmer Rogue and its leader Pol Pot vowing to “turn Cambodia back 
to the Year Zero”313 immediately emptied the capital of its residents and brought King 
Sihanouk back, only to hold him under house arrest.  Under the political and ideological 
leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge regime desired to “build a socially and ethnically 
homogeneous society.”314  Consequently, Pol Pot’s democratic Kampuchea abolished all 
preexisting economic, social, and cultural institutions with a view of transforming 
Cambodians into a collective workforce.  The manner of achieving this transformation 
resulted in a reign of terror anchored on a systematic and deliberate torture and murder of 
Cambodian citizens, which, along with the disease and starvation that accompanied the 
regime’s policies, led to the death of about 1.7 million Cambodians during the Khmer 
Rogue four years in power.315  
The Tuol Sleng prison which was a site of interrogation, torture, and execution, 
best exemplifies the brutal nature of the Khmer Rouge regime in the late 1970s.316  It has 
                                                 
311 Jamie Frederic Metzl, WESTERN RESPONSES TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CAMBODIA, 
1975-80, at 2-3 (1996); Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 
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312 See Howard Ball, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 100 (1999) (describing the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge). 
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(same); Francois Ponchaud, CAMBODIA: YEAR ZERO (Nancy Amphoux trans., 1978) (same); Michael 
Vickery, CAMBODIA: 1975-1982 (1984). 
314 See Brian D. Tittemore, Khmer Rouge Crimes: The Elusive Search for Justice, 7 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 3 
(Fall 1999).  
315 Id. Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 948 (1999). 
316 Locals in Phnom Penh referred to the prison as the “place of entering, no leaving.” David Chandler, A 
HISTORY OF CAMBODIA 218 (2d ed. 1996).  
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been suggested that of the 16,000-20,000 people “treated” there, only seven survivors are 
known to be alive.317  The Khmer Rouge guards at Tuol Sleng subjected the prisoners to 
various methods of torture, culminating in the forced written confessions of over 4,000 
Cambodians.318  Tuol Sleng prison was a microcosm for the Khmer Rouge atrocities.   
Methods of interrogation included, but were not limited to, electric shocks, severe 
beatings, removal of toenails and fingernails, submersion in water, cigarette burnings, 
needling, suffocation, suspension, and forced consumption of human waste.319  The 
accurate and meticulous records maintained by its guards will undoubtedly serve as 
significant evidence during any criminal adjudication.  
The U.N. Human Rights Commission’s Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities considered Cambodia’s human rights record 
in March 1979, describing the events between 1975 and 1979 as “the most serious 
[human rights violations] that had occurred anywhere in the world since nazism,” and 
concluded that they “constituted nothing less than autogenocide.”320  
The Khmer Rouge’s efforts to exercise complete control over the territory and 
population of Cambodia met severe opposition on December 25, 1978, when Vietnamese 
army invaded Cambodia and stormed Phnom Penh.  With the fall of the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime on January 7, 1979, the Vietnamese-backed People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea established complete control of the country, forcing the Khmer Rouge into 
the jungles of Cambodia and nearby Thailand where they continued to fight, supported 
                                                 
317 See Mann Bunyanunda, supra note 313, at 1594; see also Alan Sipress, For Torture Camp Survivor, 
Time is Scarce: Chance to Bear Witness Against Khmer Rouge Hinges on Stalled Tribunal, Wash. Post, 
Feb. 18, 2003, at A20 (detailing the survival of one of these remaining eyewitnesses). 
318 See Mann Bunyanunda, supra note 313, at 1594. 
319 Id., at 1593 n.45. 
320 U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 35th Sess., 1510th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1510 (1979). 
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mainly by China.321 A new Cambodian government was then installed by the 
Vietnamese. 
After the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime, the Vietnamese backed 
Cambodian government in 1979 carried out a farcical trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, the 
Standing Committee Member and Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs.  They were 
tried in absentia, found guilty of the commission of genocide, and sentenced to death by a 
domestic tribunal.322  Whilst the trial of members of the Khmer Rouge regime is 
necessary, the trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary by the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal was 
neither normatively fair nor in conformity with prevailing international law.  Thus, the 
international community refused to recognize these trials as legitimate for several 
reasons.  First, the two leaders were tried in absentia, a violation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).323 Second, the Decree Law which 
established the “People’s Revolutionary Tribunal” contained language denouncing the 
two defendants, functionally assuming their guilt, a violation of the international norm of 
the “presumption of innocence.”324  Third, the definition of genocide used at the trial did 
not comport with the internationally accepted definition, and it was crafted to virtually 
ensure the guilt of the defendants.325  
                                                 
321 Mann Bunyanunda, supra note 313, at 1582-83.  
322 See GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE TRIAL OF POL POT AND IENG 
SARY 549 (Howard J. De Nike et al. eds., 2000) (containing documents describing Khmer Rouge tactics) 
[hereinafter 1979 Trial Documents]; William A. Schabas, Problems of International Codification - Were 
the Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo Genocide?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 287, 289 (2001). 
323 Gregory H. Stanton, The Cambodian Genocide and International Law, in Genocide and Democracy in 
Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community 141, 142 (Ben Kiernan 
ed., 1993). 
324 For a definition of “presumption of innocence,” see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
325 The Decree defined genocide as “planned massacres of groups of innocent people; expulsion of 
inhabitants of cities and villages in order to concentrate them and force them to do hard labor in conditions 
leading to their physical and mental destruction; wiping out religion; [and] destroying political, cultural and 
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 On the other hand, decades following the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge, the 
international community was apathetical to holding the Khmer Rouge regime accountable 
for their various international human rights violations. Rather, the international 
community limited its attention to the establishment of a non-communist government.326  
As such, the United States supported the Khmer Rouge exiles and assured their 
continuing seat in the United Nations.  United States support for the Khmer Rouge kept 
Cambodian politics in a turmoil and prevented the pursuit of justice for the mass 
killings.327  Thus, the international community was predominantly focused on ensuring 
Cambodian territorial sovereignty and stability, at the expense of a thorough and 
adequate investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the atrocities.  The U.N. 
was involved in the settlement agreements terminating the Khmer Rouge leadership and 
establishing transitional Vietnamese occupation.328   
In 1989 the Vietnamese withdrew the last of their troops and the government 
renamed the country State of Cambodia.  At this time, the international community began 
to play a prominent role in the restoration of full self rule to Cambodia.   Consequently, 
on October 23, 1991, a multilateral Paris Peace Accords was signed which restored 
independence to Cambodia and ended Vietnamese administration of Cambodia.329  The 
Paris peace Accords also created the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC). 
                                                                                                                                                 
social structures and family and social relations.” See 1979 Trial Documents, supra note 322, at 45; see 
William Schabas, supra note 322, at 289.  
326 For a comprehensive review of the international response during and following the Khmer Rouge 
regime, see generally Jamie Metzl, supra note 311.  
327 See Samantha Power, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 146-
49 (2003). 
328 For a detailed discussion of the U.N.’s involvement after the Vietnamese were ousted, see Steven 
Ratner, supra note 311, at 5-30.  
329 Steven R. Ratner, an Attorney-Adviser for the Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of 
State, served as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Conference on Cambodia. See Steven Ratner, 
supra note 311, at 1. 
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Although the 1989 mandate establishing the conference did not reference justice, 
human rights, or tribunals,330 the U.N. considered proposals for an international criminal 
tribunal or a case before the International Court of Justice, but rejected both options.331 
According to Professor Steven R. Ratner, who represented the United States during the 
negotiations at the Paris Conference, “although all the participants believed that human 
rights should be mentioned, it was harder to reach consensus on how to . . . punish Khmer 
Rouge officials responsible for the atrocities and to prevent the repetition of these acts. 
As a result, the human rights obligations at times appear opaque.”332  However, the 
international community attempted to find an indirect route by addressing the human 
rights concerns in Article 15 of the Paris Peace Accords, emphasizing the Cambodian 
government’s present-time obligations to human rights treaties and standards.333  In May 
1993, the UNTAC helped supervise Cambodia’s general elections.   
 
 
4.6.2. Establishment of the Special Tribunal for Cambodia – “Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal” 
On June 21, 1997, the government of Cambodia submitted a request to the U.N. 
Secretary-General requesting the United Nations to extend the kind of assistance it 
offered to the establishment of ICTY and ICTR to Cambodia towards “brining justice to 
                                                 
330 Steven Ratner, supra note 311, at 5. 
331 For a discussion of the proposals and their ultimate rejection, see Hurst Hannum, International Law and 
Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 82, 94-101 (1989); Jim Leach, Don’t 
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those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes against humanity during the rule of 
the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979.”334   The Cambodian government noted that: 
crimes of this magnitude are of concern to all persons in the 
world, as they greatly diminish respect for the most basic right, 
the right to life. We hope that the United Nations and the 
international community can assist the Cambodian people in 
establishing the truth about this period and bringing those 
responsible to justice. Only in this way can this tragedy be 
brought to a full and final conclusion.335  
 
Before the UN could respond to the Cambodian government request, Hun Sen, 
one of the author’s of the request, seized power through a bloody coup detat on July 5, 
1997, and in the process executed about forty of his perceived political opponents.336   
However, on December 12, 1997, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution 
directing the Secretary-General to examine the Cambodian government’s request and 
consider establishing an investigative commission.337 Consequently, U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan established a “Group of Experts” with three main goals: “(1) to 
evaluate the existing evidence and determine the nature of the crimes committed; (2) to 
assess the feasibility of bringing  Khmer Rouge leaders to justice; and (3) to explore 
options for trials before international or domestic courts.”338  
Between July 1998 and February 1999, the U.N. Group of Experts (“the Group”) 
traveled through Cambodia interviewing government officials, survivors of the Khmer 
Rouge regime, and current Cambodian citizens, hoping not only to obtain information 
                                                 
334 Brian Tittemore, supra note 314, at 3 (quoting Letter from Norodom Ranariddh, Cambodian First Prime 
Minister, and Hun Sen, Cambodian Second Prime Minister, to Secretary-General Annan (June 21, 1997)). 
335 Id. 
336 Seth Mydans, Cambodia Purge Said to Claim 40 Victims, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1997, at A8.  
337 Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, G.A. Res. 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 70th plen. mtg., 
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338 Steven Ratner, supra note 315, at 949.  
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regarding the atrocities, but also to assess the emotional climate of the country.339  On 
February 22, 1999, the Group submitted its report to both the Security Council and 
General Assembly.340  The report inter alia stated that there were sufficient evidence 
which support the prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders for international crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, forced labor, torture, and crimes against 
internationally protected persons.341 However, the Group recommended that prosecutions 
be limited to “those persons most responsible for the most serious violations of human 
rights [in Cambodia] . . . including senior leaders with responsibility over the abuses as 
well as those at lower levels who are directly implicated in the most serious atrocities.”342  
Furthermore, because of the precarious state of the Cambodian domestic judicial 
system, the risk of political influence on the domestic courts, and the contentious 
international law issues involved, the Group recommended the establishment of an ad hoc 
U.N. tribunal seated in an Asia-Pacific nation-State other than Cambodia to try the 
accused.343  In addition, the Group recommended the appointment of an independent 
prosecutor for the tribunal.344  The Group was also of the opinion that such tribunal 
would promote the goal of achieving retributive justice with the goal of rehabilitation of 
Cambodia, because the process would not be politically or socially destabilizing to the 
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country.345  U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan accepted the Groups recommendations 
and noted that “if the international standards of justice, fairness and the process of law are 
to be met . . . the tribunal in question must be international in character.”346  
The Cambodian government disagreed with the Group’s recommendation for an 
ad hoc international tribunal.347  A few days after the release of the Group’s report, the 
Cambodian government ordered the arrest of Khmer Rouge leader Ta Mok, and 
suggested that with Ta Mok’s arrest, there was no longer a need for any international 
assistance.348  In September 1999, the Cambodian government also rejected a second 
U.N. proposal for a “mixed tribunal” with a majority of international judges and an 
international prosecutor and limited number of Cambodian judges and prosecutors that 
would not allow the Cambodian government to control and manipulate the process.  The 
Cambodian government rejected the proposal because it did not conform to Hun Sen’s 
position that the international community should only provide legal expertise.349  Hun 
Sen maintained that U.N. intention “to create a special tribunal, to implement special 
laws in Cambodia, which in reality is outside the umbrella of the Cambodian constitution 
and laws, will not be applicable.”350  
Beginning with the Groups report, the “Khmer Rouge tribunal”, as it is 
colloquially called, became the object of lengthy and rather complicated negotiations 
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between the Cambodian authorities and the United Nations.351  Finally, on March 17, 
2003, the United Nations reached a draft agreement with the Cambodian government for 
an international criminal tribunal to try former Khmer Rouge leaders.352  On May 13, 
2003, the U.N. General Assembly approved the March Agreement.353  The approval 
authorized the UN to help Cambodia set up and run two Extraordinary Chambers in the 
new tribunal to “prosecute those most responsible for crimes and serious violations of 
Cambodian and international law between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979.”354 On 
October 4, 2004, Cambodian National Assembly voted by 107-0 to ratify the legislation 
setting-up the tribunal.355 The agreement came after five years of negotiations and 24 
years after the Khmer Rouge were driven from power.  
 
4.6.3. Composition and Jurisdiction of the “Khmer Rouge Tribunal”  
The March Agreement created a mixed tribunal with only two extraordinary 
chambers, the Trial Chamber and the Supreme Court Chamber which serves as the 
appellate chamber.356  The Trial Chamber will be comprised of three Cambodian judges 
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“UN Warns Cambodia  on War Crimes Tribunal”, The Washington Post, 3 February 2001, p. A22; see also 
Human Rights Watch Press Release, “Core Issues in the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Unresolved”, 21 January 
2001, available at: http://www. hrw.org/press/2000/01/cambo0121.htm, also see “Khmer Rouge Trial 
Stalled Over Language”, Reuters, Phnom Penh, 26 November 2001(on file with the author). 
352 Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 109(b) U.N. Doc. A/57/806 (2003) [hereinafter 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement]. 
353 Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Approves Draft Agreement Between UN, Cambodia 
on Khmer Rouge Trials, U.N. GAOR 57th. Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/10135 (May 13, 2003).  
354 Id. 
355 See, Khmer Rouge Tribunal Approved, BBC News World Edition, Monday 4 October, 2004, available 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3712482.stm (last visited August 11, 2005).  
356 Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, supra note 352, art. 3(2).   
 141 
and two international judges,357 while the Supreme Court Chamber will consist of four 
Cambodian judges and three international judges.358  Unlike previous ad hoc tribunals 
where the U.N. Secretary General appoints the international judges, the 
Cambodian Supreme Council of the Magistracy (CSCM) will select the international 
judges from a list generated by the U.N. Secretary-General.359  According to the March 
Agreement, decisions in the two Chambers would be taken by a “supermajority” of the 
judges.  Thus a decision in the Trial and Supreme Chambers must be supported by four 
judges and five judges respectively.360  This requirement ensures that decisions in both 
chambers must be supported by at least one international judge and is meant to address 
international concerns over Cambodian control over the tribunal.361  
The prosecutor and investigator’s offices include one Cambodian and one 
international prosecutor and co-prosecutor on the one hand, and one Cambodian and one 
international investigator and co-investigator on the other hand.362  Similar to the 
appointment of the international judges for the Chambers, the CSCM selects the 
international prosecutor and investigator from nominees of U.N. Secretary-General.363  In 
the event of a disagreement between the domestic and international personnel regarding 
whether to prosecute a case, the case advances.364  However, the dissenting prosecutor 
may appeal the decision to a Pre-Trial Chamber of five judges, whose decision is final.365 
                                                 
357 Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, supra note 352, art. 3(2). 
358 Id.   
359 Id., art. 3(1).  
360 Id. art. 4(1).  
361 Barbara Crossette, U.S. Offers Compromise for Cambodian War Crimes Trials: Washington Proposes a 
Judicial Tribunal Made up of Three Cambodians and Two Foreign Members, Portland Oregonian, Oct. 20, 
1999, at A12 (describing the U.S. proposal and chronicling Cambodian objections to the U.N. proposal). 
362 Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, supra note 352, arts. 5(1), & 6(1). 
363 Id., arts. 5(5) & 6(5). 
364 Id., art. 6(4). 
365 Id., arts. 6(4), 7, at 6-7. 
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The CSCM appoints three Cambodians as judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
remaining two judges from a list of nominations provided by the U.N. Secretary-
General.366  The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision requires a supermajority vote and in the 
absence of the required supermajority the investigation or prosecution proceeds.367  
The tribunal has personal jurisdiction over those most responsible for crimes and 
serious violations of Cambodian and international law between April 17, 1975 and 
January 6, 1979.   The tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction include the crime of genocide 
as defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention, crimes against humanity as defined in the 
1998 Rome Statute of the ICC, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and 
additional crimes defined in Chapter II of the Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.368  
The tribunal will be seated in Phnom Penh, Cambodia,369 with Khmer as the 
official language.370  The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia governs both the subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the 
agreed-upon tribunals.371  The tribunal procedures will be in accordance with Cambodian 
law.  Where Cambodian law does not deal with a particular matter, or where there is 
uncertainty regarding a relevant rule of Cambodian law, or where there is a question 
regarding the consistency of such a rule with international standards, the tribunal may 
seek guidance from international law.372  Consequently, domestic norms, rather than 
                                                 
366 Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, supra note 352, art. 7(2). 
367 Id., art. 7(4), at 7. 
368 Id., art. 9.  
369 Id. art. 14. 
370 Id. art. 26(1). 
371 Id. art. 2. 
372 Id. art. 12(1). 
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international precedents, shall govern the procedural law followed by both Cambodian 
and international judges. 
 
 
4.6.3. Assessment of the “Khmer Rouge Tribunal”  
Although the amount so far pledged by U.N. member States is enough for more 
than one year of the tribunal’s operations, at the time of this writing, the tribunal is yet to 
start sitting.373  However, the March Agreement under which the tribunal is to operate has 
been severally criticized by human rights NGOs who fear that trial under the Agreement 
may not take place in accordance with international law and standards for fair trial.374  
Although the Cambodian government finally agreed to the inclusion of foreign judges 
and prosecutors to work with their Cambodian counterparts, critics are skeptical that the 
holding of the tribunal within Cambodia’s present court system, which is weak, corrupt 
and susceptible to political influence, will undermine the objective of the tribunal.375  
Besides the inherent flaws of the March Agreement, the continued delay in the 
take off of the tribunal dims the possibility of brining the Khmer Rouge to trial.  In 1998, 
Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, died in a camp along the border with Thailand.  
                                                 
373 The budget for the tribunal was set at US$43 million for the UN and $13.3 million for Cambodia, over a 
three-year period the tribunal is expected to sit.  In early 2005, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
announced that pledges from member states now covered the UN’s share of the tribunal’s $56.3 million 
three-year budget.  While Japan pledged more than half of the U.N. contribution, its is instructive to note 
that the United States declined to contribute to the funding of the tribunal claiming that Legislative 
restraints made it impossible to pledge moneys towards the Tribunal.  On the other hand, the Cambodian 
government has expressed concerns that it may not be able to contribute its portion of the tribunal’s budget.  
International donors are reluctant to give again, and the Cambodian government has rejected suggestions of 
a national fund-raising campaign, even though some local business leaders have expressed interest in 
donating.  See Roger Cohen, For Cambodia’s Dead, Farce Heaped on Insult, International Herald Tribune, 
April 2, 2005, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/cambodia/2005/0402farce.htm.; Nathaniel 
Myers, Khmer Rouge Tribunal Needs More Than Money, Bangkok Post, July 19, 2005. 
374 For a detailed analysis of the various flaws of the March Agreement, see Amnesty Int’l, Kingdom of 
Cambodia: Amnesty International’s Position and Concerns Regarding the Proposed “Khmer Rouge” 
Tribunal, AI Index: ASA 23/005/2003,  http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA230052003; Human 
Rights Watch, Serious Flaws: Why the U.N. General Assembly Should Require Changes to the Draft 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper April 2003, 
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/cambodia040303-bck.htm#P91_17633 
375 Id. 
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Presently, only five or so of the former leaders of Khmer Rouge are expected to stand 
trial.  Of the five, only two are in jail, Ta Mok 78, known as “the Butcher” who was the 
commander of the south-western region of Cambodia during the time of the Khmer 
Rouge and Kang Kek Ieu 62, nicknamed “Duch” commander of the notorious Tuol Sleng 
prison where thousands of people were killed during the Khmer Rouge regime.  The 
other three are living freely in Cambodia following the grant of pardon to them by Prime 
Minister Hun Sen after they defected from Khmer Rouge between 1996 and 1998.  They 
include Iang Sary 74, Pol Pot’s brother-in-law who served as minister of foreign affairs 
during the Khmer Rouge regime and was referred to as “brother number three”; Khieu 
Samphan 73, the Khmer Rouge regime’s Head of State and public face, and Nuon Chea, 
Pol Pot’s second in command, often referred to as “brother number two”. 
While the United Nations takes the position that such a pardon cannot protect 
someone from prosecution, Prime Minister Hun Sen suggested that going after Ieng Sary 
could reignite civil unrest in Cambodia.  Unlike the law establishing other ad hoc 
tribunals, the March Agreement did not clearly state that such pardon would not be a bar 
to prosecution.  Rather, the March Agreement merely mandates that the Cambodian 
government will not grant any additional amnesties or pardons to the Khmer Rouge.376  
On the implication of the pardon, the Agreement suggested that the Extraordinary 
Chambers will have the exclusive authority to determine whether the scope of the pardon 
precludes potential prosecution.377    In light of the above, it is anybody’s guess whether 
at the end of the day, the Cambodian Criminal Tribunal would succeed in brining justice 
                                                 
376 Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, supra note 352, art 11(1). 
377 Id. art. 11(2). 
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to the victims of the Khmer Rouge government and bring an end to the culture of 
impunity. 
   
 
4.7. Observations and Commentary 
This part of the study has attempted an examination of the historical efforts at 
bringing an end to the culture of impunity through the establishment of ad hoc 
international and mixed criminal tribunals.  The enthusiastic development of normative 
rules of individual accountability which was prompted by the appalling legacy of the 
World War II died down soon thereafter when it came to establishing permanent 
international court that would prosecute individuals accused of crimes under international 
law.  After several decades of hardly any progress, the breakthrough came in 1993 and 
1994 respectively, with the establishment of the two ad hoc criminal tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). 
The establishment of the ICTY and ICTR ad hoc tribunals rekindled the 
negotiations on a permanent criminal court and made it possible to pursue work on the 
creation of three other ad hoc tribunals dealing with crimes committed in Sierra-Leone, 
Timor-Leste and Cambodia.  The setting-up of the ad hoc tribunals especially, the ad hoc 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and in Rwanda (ICTR) were no doubt 
important step in the lengthy process of developing rules on individual criminal 
responsibility under international law. 
However, a scathing analysis of the history of these tribunals reveal that the 
establishment of each tribunal followed a disturbing trend of a period of passivity by the 
international community while the atrocities were been carried out. The international 
community only responds towards the end or at the end of the atrocities and in some 
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cases many years after the perpetrators of the atrocities have completed their heinous 
crimes unchallenged.  This trend affects the quality of justice in the sense that justice 
delayed is justice denied.  Additionally, a timely intervention on the part of the 
international community may have gone a long way to reduce the number of casualties of 
such brutal regimes. 
Another disturbing trend that permeates in trials conducted by ad hoc criminal 
tribunals is the seemingly desire to prosecute only the vanquished.  This is prevalent in 
the refusal of the Nuremberg tribunal to try any national of the allied powers, the 
continued failure by the Rwandan tribunal to prosecute any member of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front.  The inability of the Sierra Leonean tribunal to prosecute any member of 
the government and the Timor-Leste Special court failure to prosecute members of the 
Indonesian army are yet another example.  
 Also, the inability of the international community to fully fund the tribunals made 
it impossible for the wheel of justice to turn full circle against all the perceived 
perpetrators of atrocious crimes.  The effect of this is that the success of the fight against 
impunity has been severely hamstringed by the unwillingness of the international 
community to put their money where their mouth is.  Be that as it may, the establishment 
of the ad hoc tribunals showed that international adjudicatory mechanisms were not only 
necessary but also possible, thus paving the way for the adoption, several years later, of a 
treaty for the world’s first permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).378   Hopefully, 
the international community and the ICC will both learn from the mistakes made by the 
ad hoc tribunals. 
                                                 
378 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, 
UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
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The next segment of this study discusses the establishment of the ICC.  Part II 
examines the jurisdictional scope of the ICC with a view to evaluating the provisions 
relating to the entrenchment of the principle of individual criminal responsibility.  A 
critical analysis of ICC jurisdictional provisions will expose some inherent bottlenecks to 
the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction.  This study takes the position that the highlighted 
obstacles are capable of restricting the reach and effectiveness of the ICC as an institution 
designed to bring an end to the culture of impunity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 149 
CHAPTER FIVE 
=============================================================== 
 
 
5.0.     THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
5.1. Historical Background to the Creation of the International Criminal Court  
Numerous suggestions for the creation of a permanent international criminal court 
to punish individuals responsible for committing crimes against mankind in violations of 
norms of international law have been made over the years, but, have generally failed 
because States lacked the political will to establish such institution.1   
 As Dr. Koffi Annan UN Secretary-General observed:  
 
For nearly half a Century … almost as long as the United Nations 
has been in existence… the General Assembly has recognized the 
need to establish such a court to prosecute and punish persons 
responsible for crimes such as genocide.  Many thought … that the 
horrors of the Second World War … the camps, the cruelty, the 
exterminations, the Holocaust … could never happen again.  And 
yet they have.  In Cambodia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 
Rwanda.  Our time … this decade even … has shown us that man’s 
capacity for evil knows no limits.  Genocide … is now a word of our 
time, too, a heinous reality that calls for a historic response.2 
 
Commentators however traced the history of an international criminal court to 
early nineteenth century, when in January 1872, Gustav Moynier, a Swiss and one of the 
founders of the International Committee of the Red Cross, proposed a permanent court in 
response to the crimes of the Franco-Prussian War.3  Mr. Moynier was shocked by the 
atrocities committed by parties to the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and dismayed that 
                                                 
1 See Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: Making the Right Choices – 
Part I, 5 (Amnesty International Index: IOR 40/001/1997) at http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/ 
engior400011997, (visited September 28, 2005) [hereinafter “Making the Right Choices’]. 
2 See, Establishment of an International Criminal Court – Overview, available at: 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm (visited on March 6, 2006) [hereinafter ICC Overview].  
3 Beth K. Lamont, The International Criminal Court, available at: www.corliss-lamont.org/hsmny/icc.htm 
(visited March 13 2002). 
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there was no mechanism to bring them to justice.  Thus, in January 1872, Mr. Moynier 
proposed the establishment of an international criminal court to deter violations of the 
Geneva Convention of 1864 and to bring to justice anyone responsible for such 
violations.4  Until Mr. Moynier suggested a permanent court, almost all trials for 
violations of the laws of war were by ad hoc tribunals constituted by one of the 
belligerents, usually the victor State, rather than by ordinary courts or by an international 
criminal court.5  Only one European government reportedly declared that it was ready to 
sign a convention establishing such a court.  There was little interest by other 
governments and many of the leading international experts on humanitarian law criticized 
the proposal as unrealistic.6  
In 1899, the first International Peace Conference was convened at the initiation of 
the Czar of Russia who found himself in a financially unbearable arms race with France.7 
The Conference was attended by delegates from 26 self styled “civilized states” for about 
10 weeks at The Hague.  At the end of the conference, they drew up three Conventions, 
three Declarations and six Voeux or wishes.  But these conventions, declarations and 
wishes were carefully laced with ambiguities and exceptions.   In the end, signatory 
States merely agreed to “use their best efforts”... “as far as possible” and to disregard the 
rules if national honor or “essential interests” might be endangered.8  To that extent, it 
                                                 
4 See Making the Right Choices, supra note 1, at 3.  
5 Christopher Keith Hall, The first proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court, 322 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 57 (1998) available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList320/ 
BFF1AE58DAA8E25AC1256B66005B8BB3 (visited September 28, 2005).   
6 Making the Right Choices, supra note 1, at 5 (citing Pierre Bossier, FROM SOLFERINO TO 
TSUSHIMA: HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 283-284 
(Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute 1985).  
7 See Benjamin A. Ferencz, The Evolution of International Criminal Law, at http://www.benferencz.org/ 
hamburg.htm (last visited September 28, 2005). 
8 Id. 
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was more a wish list than a binding accord.  The problem of enforcement was not even 
mentioned.9 
In 1907, about 50 participants attended a follow-up Second Hague Conference at 
The Hague.  The 1907 Hague Conference improved some of the earlier texts of the 1899 
Conference but was not significantly different. It reflected the fact that leading 
participants were not ready to accept major changes in the world legal order.10  Nations 
were still pretending to conclude an effective peace treaty and rules of war when in 1914 
they found themselves in the midst of the unparalleled tragedy that became known as 
World War I.11 
After the end of World War I, another Peace Conference of the “Great Powers” 
was held in Paris in 1919.12  The Paris Peace Conference established a commission of 
legal experts to determine the “responsibility of the author’s of the war.”  The 
Commission known as the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War 
and on the Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws and Customs of War 
proposed that an ad hoc tribunal be established to try nationals of the Central Powers for 
violations of the laws of war and the laws of humanity.13  This proposal for an ad hoc 
tribunal was rejected by the “Great Powers.”  Rather, they agreed to include provisions in 
the Versailles Treaty which will allow for the establishment of a special tribunal 
composed of five judges from the “Great Powers” to try the Kaiser for “a supreme 
                                                 
9 Benjamin A. Ferencz, supra note 7. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 The great powers included States that were triumphant during the war particularly, the United States 
of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. 
13 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Report 
Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (1919 Peace Conference Report), Versailles, March 1919, 
Conference of Paris 1919, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 
Pamphlet No. 32, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 123-124 (1920 Supp.); 
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offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties” and for Allied military 
tribunals to try other persons for war crimes.14   
Beyond the inclusion of the said provisions in the Versailles Treaty, the Allies 
were nonchalant about the prosecution of First World War criminals.15  Thus, amidst 
national opposition, the Allies lost interest in the prosecution of those responsible for 
violations of the laws of war and the laws of humanity in the Ottoman Empire.16  Another 
proposal made in 1920 to establish a permanent international criminal court as part of the 
League of Nations was rejected by the Assembly as premature.17  In 1934, France 
proposed that the League of Nations establish a permanent court to try terrorist offences.  
However, the treaties adopted in 1937 defining the crimes and including the statute of the 
court never entered into force.18   
After these failed attempts, there was little effort in this regard until the events of 
World War II and its aftermath reminded the international community that a permanent 
criminal court is a requirement of our society.  However, proposals made to set up a 
permanent international criminal court following the World War II were rejected in favor 
                                                 
14Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Versailles Treaty), Versailles, 
28 June 1919, Article 227, 11 Martens (3d) 323.  Article 229 of the Versailles Treaty also allow for the 
establishment of military tribunals by each Allied and Associated Powers to try persons accused of 
committing crimes against their nationals and were the accused person committed crimes against nationals 
of more than one Allied and Associated Powers, the affected states will constitute a joint military tribunal 
to try the accused persons. Versailles Treaty, Art. 229.  See generally James F. Willis, PROLOGUE TO 
NUREMBERG (1982).  
15 See discussions on the Leipzig trials in Chapter two, supra at pp 5-10.  Also see Claude Mullins, THE 
LEIPZIG TRIALS (1921).  
16 See Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I 
Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 221 (1989); David 
Matas, Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity: The Lessons of World War I, 13 FORD. INT’L L. J. 86 
(1989). 
17 Memorandum by the Secretary-General, Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal 
Jurisdiction (Historical Survey), UN Doc.A/CN.4/7/Rev. 8-12 (1949).  The Assembly only agreed to 
establish a Permanent Court of International Justice to hear and determine any dispute of an international 
character which the parties thereto submit to it.  See The Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 14 (1929). 
18 Historical Survey, supra, note 17, at 16-18. 
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of ad hoc international tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, followed by Allied national 
military tribunals, to try Axis defendants.19  
At the end of the Nuremberg Judgment in 1946 there was renewed interest to 
create a permanent international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity, serious violations of humanitarian law and crimes against peace.  This time, 
the proposal for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court was made 
May 13, 1947 by France representative on the UN Committee on the Progressive 
Development of International Law and its Codification, Judge Henri Donnedieu de 
Vabres, formerly a judge on the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.20   
Although the UN General Assembly considered the proposal in 1948 during the 
negotiations for a treaty prohibiting genocide, it abandoned efforts to establish a 
permanent international criminal court to try cases of genocide as part of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention).  
Instead, the UN General Assembly simply agreed to a provision in the Genocide 
Convention that cases of genocide to be tried “by such international penal tribunal as may 
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction”.21 
However, as a result of the proposal, the UN General Assembly established the 
International Law Commission (ILC).22  Through resolution 260 of December 9, 1948, 
                                                 
19 Making the Right Choices, supra note 1, at 5. 
20 He submitted the French proposal, which provided that certain matters would be tried by a special 
international criminal chamber of the International Court of Justice and others in a permanent international 
criminal court, two days later.  See Memorandum submitted to the Committee on the Progressive 
Development of International Law and its Codification by the representative of France, UN Doc. 
A/AC.10/21, 15 May 1947.  
21 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 78 UNTS 277, December 9, 
1948, art. VI. [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
22 U.N.G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 174 (1948). 
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the UN General Assembly invited the ILC “to study the desirability and possibility of 
establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with 
genocide.”23  The ILC studied this question at its 1949 and 1950 sessions and came to the 
conclusion that the establishment of an international court to try persons charged with 
genocide or other crimes of similar gravity was both “desirable” and “possible”.24  
Thereafter, the UN General Assembly established two successive committees to prepare 
proposals relating to the establishment of such court and its jurisdiction.   
In 1951, the first committee prepared a draft statute for an International Criminal 
Court which was revised in 1953 by the second committee.  In 1954, the ILC adopted a 
draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1954 draft Code of 
Offences) but no consensus could be reached on either Code or Court.  Notwithstanding 
these efforts, the UN General Assembly in 1954 decided to postpone consideration of the 
draft statute ostensibly pending the adoption of a definition of aggression and an 
international code of crimes.25  There was also the suggestion that the Cold War 
prevailing at that period stymied efforts at moving ahead with such a project.26   
In 1974, the General Assembly agreed on a definition of aggression.27  Also, 
between 1982 and 1991, the ILC has done considerable work on a draft code of crimes 
under international law based on the work of its Rapporteur, Doudou Thiam (Senegal).  
                                                 
23 U.N.G.A Res. 260(III), supra note 22.  
24 See Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Second Session 5 June-29 July 1950, 5 
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at para. 140, UN Doc. A/1316. 
25 Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction on its session held from 1 to 31 August 
1951, 7 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 11) at 21, UN Doc. A/2136 (1952); Report of the 1953 Committee on 
International Criminal Jurisdiction 27 July-20 August 1953, 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 12), UN Doc. A/2645 
(1954); Report of the International Law Commission, 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11, UN Doc. A/2693 
(1954).  
26 Philippe Kirsch, Q.C., The International Criminal Court: Current Issues and Perspectives, 64 L & CONT. 
PROBS. 3 (2001). 
27 See U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 
December 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) 
[hereinafter Res. 3314]. 
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However, the UN General Assembly neglected to resume the work on the creation of a 
permanent international criminal court.  The concept of an international criminal court 
was place back on the agenda of the UN General Assembly with the invitation in 1987 by 
President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR who called for an international criminal court 
to try cases of terrorism and a proposal in 1989 by Prime Minister A.N.R. Robinson of 
Trinidad and Tobago for the establishment of an international criminal court to try cases 
of drug trafficking.28 In response to these requests, the General Assembly in December 
1989, mandated the ILC to recommence its work on the proposed court with jurisdiction 
to include drug trafficking.29 
Meanwhile, gross acts of ethnic cleansing were taking place in the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia, while genocidal war continued unabated in Rwanda.  The 
several conflicts that took place within the last decade which are primarily internal, 
demonstrated tragically that there was a continuing need to take measures to put an end to 
these abominable crimes.30  These developments shocked the conscience of the 
international community and jolted them to action.  Thus, in an effort to bring an end to 
widespread disregard to the laws of war which lead to unprecedented war crimes, crimes 
                                                 
28 See John Quigley, “Perestroika and International Law”, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 788, 794 (1988). These 
government initiatives followed extensive work by non-governmental organizations, particularly the World 
Federalist Movement and the International Association for Penal Law (Association Internationale de Droit 
Pénal), and tireless efforts by independent experts to demonstrate the feasibility of an international criminal 
court, in particular, by Benjamin B. Ferencz, a member of the United States prosecution team at the 
Nuremberg trial, in his book, An International Criminal Court, A Step Toward Peace: A Documentary 
History (London: Oceana Publications 1980), and by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni. See, for example, 
among his extensive writings, A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Tribunal (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987). 
29 GA Res. 44/39 of 4 December 1989 (requesting the International Law Commission “to address the 
question of establishing an international criminal court” with jurisdiction over crimes under the draft Code 
of Crimes then being prepared, “including persons engaged in illicit narcotics drugs across national 
frontiers”). The General Assembly renewed the request to study the question of an international criminal 
court the following year. GA Res. 45/41 of 28 November 1990.  See also, Jelena Pejic, Creating a 
Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 297 (1998). 
30 Phillippe Kirsch, supra note 26, at 4. 
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against humanity, and genocide, the UN Security Council established ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and for Rwanda in 
1994, to hold individuals accountable for those atrocities and, deter similar crimes in the 
future.31   
On the other hand, the United Nations has to deal with agitations for the creation 
of criminal tribunals to prosecute those responsible for international crimes committed in 
Cambodia during the Pol Pot regime of 1975 – 79,32 during the factional and guerilla 
warfare for the ouster and the replacement of Samuel Doe in Sierra Leone from 1996,33 
and the killings that followed Timor-Leste referendum for independence in 1999.34   
These agitations resulted in what has been described as “tribunal fatigue” for the United 
                                                 
31 See Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law and Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former 
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 
1192 [hereinafter Resolution 827].  See also The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), appended to SC Resolution 827 (hereinafter 
ICTY Statute]. The ICTY Statute was unanimously adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, 
May 25, 1993, for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Also see, Security Council 
Resolution Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th 
Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1194) [hereinafter ICTR 
Statute]. The ICTR was set up to prosecute those responsible for the genocidal war in Rwanda.  See 
discussions on ICTY and ICTR in part I, supra at 61, 74.  
32 See G.A. Res. 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/52/644/Add.2 (1997), at 
http://www.un.org/ga/documents/gares52/res52135.htm.   The resolution requested the UN Secretary 
General and the Cambodian government work together in order to address past serious violations of 
Cambodian and international law.  See also Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established 
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135, at 21- 32 (1999) at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cambodia-1999.html .  The Report recommended that members of the Pol 
Pot regime could be held criminally responsible through domestic trials, a tribunal under Cambodian law, a 
United Nations tribunal, and a Cambodian tribunal under United Nations administration. 
33 See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).  The Resolution 
requested the UN Secretary General to issue a report concerning the establishment of a special court in 
order to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in Sierra Leone.  See also Report of the UN 
Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 
(2000) providing the legal framework and requisite administrative elements for the creation of a Sierra 
Leonean special court.  Also see Res. 1370, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1370 (2001).  
The Resolution encourages the UN Secretary General, the government of Sierra Leone and others involved 
“to expedite the establishment of … the Special Court envisaged by resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 
2000.   
34 See Reg. 2000/15, U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000) establishing a special panel of judges to address serious criminal offences 
committed in East Timor.  See http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg0015E.pdf.  
 157 
Nations.35  The difficulties that followed the creation of hybrid tribunal and Special 
Courts to prosecute the said crimes suggested that ad hoc tribunals may not always be 
available when needed.36  
These developments engendered a state of urgency on the part of the UN General 
Assembly which then directed the ILC to accelerate the completion of its work on the 
draft statute of a permanent international criminal court “as a matter of priority” by July 
1994.37  Thus, in 1994 the ILC presented a draft statute on an international criminal court 
(ICC) to the UN General Assembly and recommended that it be transmitted to a 
diplomatic conference.38   But the recommendation to forward the draft statute to a 
diplomatic conference was defeated in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.  As 
a result, the UN General Assembly set up an Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court to consider major substantive issues arising from the ILC 
draft, which met in two sessions in 1995.39   
During this time, the attempt to create an effective permanent international 
criminal court benefited from a new wave of widespread and growing support around the 
world for such a court.  In an address to the Commencement Class of 1996 of the 
Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, the UN High Commissioner for 
                                                 
35 Michael P. Scharf, Comment: The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court, 6 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 167, 169 (1995) (defining “tribunal fatigue” as “the process of reaching a consensus 
on the tribunal’s statute, electing judges, selecting a prosecutor, and appropriating funds [that] has turned 
out to be extremely time consuming and politically exhausting for the members of the Security Council.”). 
36 Various reasons were offered for the failure – financial burden to lack of cooperation from successive 
governments in these countries. 
37 U.N.G.A. Res. 48/31 of December 9, 1993.  
38 Jelena Pejic, supra note 29, at 298. 
39 GA Res. 49/53 of 9 December 1994. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 49 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 22), UN Doc. A/50/22 (1995); see also Christopher 
Keith Hall, The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 117 (1997); Jelena Pejic, supra note 29, at 298.  
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Human Rights has repeatedly endorsed the establishment of such a court.40  Similarly, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions endorsed it in 
his November 1996 report to the General Assembly.41  Also, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the independence of judges and lawyers endorsed it in his 1996 report to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.42   
Likewise, regional intergovernmental organizations also strongly supported the 
establishment of such a court, including the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe,43 the European Parliament,44 the ACP-EU Joint Assembly45 and the Third 
Conference of Ministers of Justice of Francophone Countries.46  Also, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated that it gives “its full support to the work of 
the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of an international criminal court”.47  It 
                                                 
40 Address by José Ayala-Lasso, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 
Commencement Class of 1996 of the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, 14 May 1996; 
Towards a Permanent International Criminal Court, Turin address, 12 October 1996 (available on the 
Amnesty International Italian section’s web site: http://www.amnesty.it/eventi/icc/confer/lasso.htm); 
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. A/51/36, 18 October 1996, para. 41. 
41 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN Doc. A/51/457 
(1996), para. 160. 
42 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Dato’Param 
Cumaraswamy, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/37 (1996), para. 79. 
43 Council of Europe, Parl. Ass. Rec. 1189 (1992), para. 9 (“The Assembly, therefore, recommends that the 
Committee of Ministers call upon member states to act through the United Nations to secure the convening 
of an international diplomatic conference to prepare a convention on the setting up of a criminal court, and 
support such action.”). 
44 European Parl., Resolution on the establishment of the Permanent International Criminal Court, B4- 
0992/96, 9 September 1996. 
45 ACP-EU Joint Assembly, Resolution ACP-EU 1866/96/fin. on the establishment of the Permanent 
International Criminal Court, adopted on 26 September 1996, para. 1 (“Formally invites the ACP-EU 
Council and its Member States to support the need to establish the Permanent International Criminal Court, 
and to act in concert at the 51st General Assembly of the UN to ensure that it renews the mandate of the 
Preparatory Committee and take the decision to convene a Plenipotentiary Diplomatic Conference to 
establish an International Criminal Court before the end of 1998[.]”). 
46 In the Conference Declaration on November 1, 1995, para. 4, the Ministers stated that “we undertake the 
following commitments . . . to participate actively in the continuing efforts concerning the establishment of 
a permanent international criminal court”). 
47 ICRC, Statement at the Sixth Committee, General Assembly, 28 October 1996, p. 2. 
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was endorsed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union48 and supported by the Non-Aligned 
Movement.49   
Further, the international legal community also endorsed the establishment of an 
international criminal court, including the International Bar Association,50 the 
International Association of Lawyers (Union Internationale des Avocats),51 the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Committee,52 local lawyers groups53 and former prosecutors 
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.54  These supporters added to the 
broad international coalition of over 180 nongovernmental organizations around the 
globe, which have consistently at one time or the other called for the creation of a 
permanent criminal court.55  Newspapers throughout the world also called for the prompt 
establishment of an international criminal court.56  
                                                 
48 Inter-Parliamentary Union, 86th sess., October 1991, Santiago, Chile. 
49 NAM, Final Document, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia (14 to 20 October 1995), para. 122 (“Further 
progress is necessary to achieve full respect for international law and . . . a system of international criminal 
justice with respect to crimes against humanity as well as other international offences.”). 
50 International Bar Association, Resolution on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal 
Court, June 1995. 
51 International Association of Lawyers, Resolution, Paris, 18 November 1995 (“The International 
Association of Lawyers . . . Urges State governments to favour the rapid and effective establishment of the 
Permanent International Criminal Court.”). 
52 Recommendation at meeting in October 1996. 
53 See, for example, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on the Proposed 
International Criminal Court, 20 December 1996. 
54 Nuremberg Prosecutors again Appeal for a Permanent International Criminal Court, Press Release, 1 
October 1996, and Resolution for a Permanent International Criminal Court, adopted at a reunion held in 
Washington, D.C., 23 March 1996; Lord Hartley Shawcross, Life Sentence (London: Constable 1995), p. 
137 (“International law will never gain its full impact until an international court is established. Nor would 
the establishment of such a court present any great difficulty whether financially or politically.”). 
55 Several non-governmental organizations, including the International Law Association, the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, the International Congress of 
Penal Law, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch urged the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court.  See Historical Survey, supra note 16, at 12-15.  Also see, International 
Federation of Human Rights Leagues, Justice for Humanity: Towards the Creation of a Permanent 
International Criminal Court, La lettre Hebdomadaire de la FIDH, No. 613-614/2 (November 1995) 
(Special Issue), p. 2. 
56 In the past two years, hundreds of articles in countries around the world have been written on the subject. 
For a comprehensive collection of such articles, contact the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal 
Court, 777 UN Plaza, New York, New York 10017.   
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After the ad hoc Committee’s report, the General Assembly set up a Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (PreCom) to study 
the issues further and to draft texts, based on the ILC draft statute, government comments 
and contributions of relevant organizations and prepare a generally accepted consolidated 
draft text for submission to a diplomatic conference.57  The PreCom met in two sessions 
in 1996.58  Meanwhile, in July 1996, the International Law Commission completed its 
second reading of the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
(draft Code of Crimes) and sent its report (1996 ILC Report) with the draft Code to the 
General Assembly.59  
In view of the completion of the ILC work on the draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind, the U.N. General Assembly on December 17, 1996, 
decided that the PreCom should meet in four sessions of up to nine weeks in 1997 and 
1998 “in order to complete the drafting of a widely acceptable consolidated text of a 
convention, to be submitted to the diplomatic conference” and that “a diplomatic 
conference of plenipotentiaries will be held in 1998, with a view to finalizing and 
                                                 
57 GA Res. 50/46 of 11 December 1995. The term “other relevant organizations” was intended to include 
non- governmental organizations. Among the many such contributions, in addition to those published by 
Amnesty International (see note 2, supra), are the following: Association Internationale de Droit Pénal et 
al., 1994 ILC Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court With Suggested Modifications (Updated 
Siracusa-Draft) (15 March 1996); Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Commentary for the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (August 1996); 
International Commission of Jurists, The International Criminal Court: Third ICJ Position Paper (August 
1995); International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, Justice for Humanity, supra, n. 10; Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, Establishing an International Criminal Court (August 1996) and Fairness to 
Defendants at the International Criminal Court (August 1996). Many other useful papers have been 
published by other non-governmental organizations.  
58 The report is in two volumes.  The first summarizes the discussion and the second includes the various 
proposals for amendment of the ILC draft statute.  Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 22), UN Doc. A/51/22 (1996).  
59 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session May 6 –July 26, 1996, p 9, U.N. GAOR. 51st Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. GA/51/10 (1996), [hereinafter 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes].  
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adopting a convention on the establishment of an international criminal court”.60  Thus, 
the PreCom organized several meetings from 1996 to 1998 which was attended by 
governments, international law experts, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  In 
its final session which was held in March and April of 1998, the Committee completed 
the drafting of the ICC text.   
Since Italy had in 1996 offered to host an international criminal court conference, 
the U.N. General Assembly, at its fifty-second session decided to convene the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to July 17 1998, “to finalize 
and adopt a convention on the establishment of an international criminal court”.61  In his 
opening speech to the Conference, the UN Secretary General, Dr. Kofi Annan, noted as 
follows: 
In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of 
universal justice.  That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision.  
We are close to its realization.  We will do our part to see it through 
till the end.  We ask you … to do yours in our struggle to ensure that 
no ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human 
rights with impunity.  Only then will the innocents of distant wars 
and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep under the cover of 
justice; that they, too, have rights, and that those who violate those 
rights will be punished.”62 
 
Unlike the previous ad hoc tribunals – the Nuremberg, Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
the groundwork for the ICC treaty was done by the UN General Assembly and the 
International Law Commission rather than individual States.  Their aim was to develop a 
                                                 
60 U.N.G.A. Res. 51/207, December 17, 1996. 
61 See U.N.G.A. Res. 51/207, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/207 (1997), reprinted in 36 
I.L.M. 510, 511 (1997) (resolution on the establishment of an international criminal court). 
62 See ICC Overview, supra note 2. 
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code of offences and to elaborate a statute for an independent international criminal 
jurisdiction.63   
About 160 countries and a wide representation of nongovernmental organizations 
converged at the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries (held in Rome, Italy, 
from June 15 to July 17, 1998) to finalize and adopt a statute to establish an international 
criminal court.64 At the end of the conference, on July 17, 1998, members of the 
diplomatic conference voted 120 to 7 in favor of adopting the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). 65  The U.S. was not in favor of signing the 
statute and therefore voted against it, along with six other states, including China, India, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya.66  There has been tremendous success in the signing and 
ratification of the ICC Statute.  To date, 139 countries have signed and 100 countries, 
encompassing countries from all regions of the globe, have ratified the statute,67 which 
came into effect on July 1, 2002, after being ratified by more than 66 countries.68  
                                                 
63 Jonathan Stanley, International Criminal Court: A Court that knows no Boundaries?: The International 
Criminal Court Treaty is a Big Achievement but can it deliver what it Promises? The Lawyer, Tuesday, 
August 11, 1998 (available at WL 9167987). 
64 For a complete list of states and organizations represented at the Conference, see Final Act of the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10, Annex II, III (1998) [hereinafter Diplomatic 
Conference]. 
65 See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
66 By the December 31, 2000, deadline for signing the ICC Statute, the U.S. and Israel signed the Statute.  
However, the U.S. on May 6, 2002, and Israel on August 28, 2002, respectively, informed the U.N. 
Secretary-General that they have no legal obligations arising from their signatures of the Rome Statute on 
December 31, 2000.   See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp (visited March 13, 
2006) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].  For analysis of the U.S. opposition to the Court, see Remigius 
Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of “Operation Enduring 
Freedom”, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19 (2003). 
67 As at October 31, 2005, the countries that have ratified the Statute are: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, 
Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina-Faso, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Central African 
Republic, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, 
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, 
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The tenuous but fruitful conference marks the end of more than 50 years of 
attenuated efforts by the United Nations to create a permanent international criminal 
court.69  On the other hand, the coming into effect of the ICC Statute signifies the 
beginning of a new era of individual criminal responsibility for those who commit 
egregious international crimes.  It is the hopeful expectation of supporters of the Court 
that it serve as “a deterrent to future international crimes, a contributor to stable 
international order, and a reaffirmation of international law.”70  This remarkable support 
for the ICC demonstrates the direction of a new world order and the recognition that 
international justice and the fight against impunity require the cooperation and consensus 
of nations.  The Court will seat permanently at The Hague, Netherlands, and may sit in 
other countries when necessary.71   
 
5.2.  The Objectives of the International Criminal Court 
According to the Statute of the ICC, the Court was established to ensure that “the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished”.72  Also, the ICC was created to realize the determination of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall 
Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Zambia. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 64. 
68 ICC Statute, supra note 65, Article 126, provides that the Statute shall come into force when ratified by 
60 countries. 
69 See Cherif Bassiouni, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (1998) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Documentary History], where he note that 
“since the end of World War 1 (1919), the world community has sought to establish a permanent 
international criminal court.” 
70 Alison McIntire, Be Careful What You Wish for Because You Just Might Get It: The United States and 
the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 249, 259 (2001). 
71 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 3. 
72 Id., preamble, para. 4. 
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international community “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes 
[of concern to the international community], and thus to contribute to the prevention of 
such crimes”.73  Similarly, the United Nations had suggested that the international 
criminal court is needed inter alia, “to achieve justice for all”,74 “to end impunity”,75 “to 
help end conflicts”,76 “to remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals”,77 “to take over 
when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act”,78 and “to deter 
future war criminals”.79  
In order to achieve the objectives of the ICC, effective prosecution of the 
perpetrators “must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international cooperation”.80  While the ICC is there to assist, it remains the primary 
“duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for the 
prevention of such crimes”.81   
                                                 
73 ICC Statute, supra note 65, preamble, para. 5. 
74 See, ICC Overview, supra note 2 (noting that the International Court of Justice at The Hague handles 
only cases between States, not individuals and that the ICC will provide an avenue for dealing with 
individual responsibility). 
75 Id., (quoting the Nuremberg judgment that “crimes against international law are committed by men, not 
by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced”). 
76 Id. (citing Benjamin B. Ferencz, a former Nürnberg prosecutor who observed that “there can be no peace 
without justice, no justice without law and no meaningful law without a Court to decide what is just and 
lawful under any given circumstance”). 
77 Id. (pointing out the deficiencies of the ad hoc tribunal to include allegations of “selective justice”, 
“tribunal fatigue”, and that the ad hoc tribunals are subject to limits of time or place, making it impossible 
to cover all crimes and prosecute all criminals).   
78 Id. (referring to situations where the State lack the political will to prosecute their own citizens, or even 
high-level officials, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia or where national institutions may have 
collapsed, as in the case of Rwanda). 
79 Id. (expressing the view that once it is clear that the international community will no longer tolerate 
violations of international crimes without assigning responsibility and meting out appropriate punishment 
to heads of State and commanding officers as well as to the lowliest soldiers in the field or militia recruits,  
it is hoped that those who would incite a genocide; embark on a campaign of ethnic cleansing; murder, rape 
and brutalize civilians caught in an armed conflict; or use children for barbarous medical experiments will 
no longer find willing helpers). 
80 ICC Statute, supra note 65, preamble, para. 4 
81 Id., para. 6. 
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While it may be too soon to judge the ICC’s ability to achieve its objective, it 
should be noted that in spite of the coming into force of the ICC Statute in June 2002, the 
possibility of a prosecution by the Court has not had the desired effect of deterring 
perpetrators of international crimes.  Thus, notwithstanding the United Nations’ Security 
Council referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC, the violence in Sudan 
remains unabated.82  Also, the war crimes and crimes against humanity in the territory of 
DR Congo, parts of Uganda, and the Central African Republic has not waned in spite of 
the fact that the Court is currently investigating the violations in these States.  Thus, the 
mere creation of the Court is not sufficient to stem the tide of the culture of impunity.  
There is the need for sustained effective prosecution of individuals directly or indirectly 
responsible for these atrocities especially those in positions of governmental authority or 
military command. 
 
5.3.   Overview of the Organizational Structure of the International Criminal 
Court 
The ICC is composed of four organs: the Presidency, the Judiciary (comprised of 
an Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division), the Office of the 
Prosecutor, and the Office of the Registrar.83  These organs will not be subject to the 
instruction of States Parties but will operate independently in their respective fields of 
action.  In addition to the above organs, the ICC Statute made provision for the 
establishment of an institution to be known as the Assembly of States Parties.84  Before 
                                                 
82 See, Reuters, Sudan Unable to Try Darfur Suspects - UN Official, March 6, 2006, available at: 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/MCD652175.htm (quoting Sima Samar, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Sudan, who noted after a 10-day visit to Sudan that intelligence services continue to carry 
out arbitrary arrests, detention and torture with impunity, and that “freedom of expression and association 
unfortunately continue to be abused by the national intelligence services or military intelligence”). 
83 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 34. 
84 Id., art. 112. 
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examining the organizational structure of the ICC, it is necessary to understand the legal 
nature of the ICC because legal personality is a conditio sine qua non for the participation 
of an entity in a legal system.85  Also, given the pivotal role assigned to the Assembly of 
States Parties in the composition of the Court’s personnel and its managerial oversight, 
examination of the Assembly of States Parties will precede the overview of the Court’s 
organizational structure.86 
 
 
5.3.1. The Legal Personality of the International Criminal Court 
  Unlike ad hoc tribunals which were established by the UN Security Council or 
the UN General Assembly independently and/or in collaboration with concerned State(s), 
the ICC is a creation of a multilateral treaty.  Also, unlike the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), which is an organ of the United Nations, the ICC is not an organ of the 
UN.87  Rather, the ICC Statute provides that the Court “shall be brought into relationship 
with the United Nations.88   
International legal personality is the ability to possess rights and obligations with 
the capacity to exercise those rights and duties at the international sphere.  Thus, the 
conferment of international legal personality must be based on international law.  While 
States are the primary possessors of international legal personality, international 
organizations and other entities have been accorded international legal personality.  
Generally, there are two prevailing views on international legal personality to non-state 
entities.  Under the State-oriented view of legal personality, the rights and duties that the 
                                                 
85 A.S. Muller, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES 75 (1995). 
86 See ICC Statute, supra note 65, arts. 9, 36, 42, 46, 51, 112 respectively.  
87 The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.  See Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, article 1.   
88 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 2. 
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founding States of an organization give to it in its constitution are the determining factor 
in deciding whether legal personality on the international level exists. The more 
acceptable view is the functional theory and the objective approach, otherwise known as 
the doctrine of implied powers which was advanced by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion 
on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.89  The ICJ 
noting that the United Nations possessed “a large measure of international personality,”90 
observed as follows: 
The organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in 
fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only 
be explained on the basis of the possession of large measure of 
international personality and the capacity to operate upon an 
international plane. It is at present the supreme type of 
international organization, and it could not carry out the 
intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international 
personality. It must be acknowledged that its members, by 
entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and 
responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to 
enable those functions to be effectively discharged.91 
 
Thus, the ICJ concluded that “under international law, the Organization must be deemed 
to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred 
upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.”92 
The Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Reparation case is applicable to other 
international organizations.93  It follows that the reasoning in the Reparation case can be 
applied to the ICC in the sense that the Court satisfies the criteria of an international 
                                                 
89 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 
174 (1949) [hereinafter Reparation for Injuries”]. 
90 Id., at 179.  See also Quincy Wright, The Jural Personality of the United Nations, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 
509 (1949).  
91 Reparations for Injuries, supra note 89, at 179. 
92 Id., at 182. 
93 Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 979 (1995) 
(where he rhetorically questioned “if organizations are empowered to conclude treaties to exchange 
diplomats, and to mobilize international forces, ... how can such powers be exercised without having the 
status of international legal person?”). 
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organization under general international law.94  Thus, applying the opinion of the ICJ in 
the Reparation case, the ICC will undoubtedly qualify as an international legal 
personality.95  However, the ICC Statute in a bid to clarify its legal personality expressly 
stated that: 
the Court shall have international legal personality.  It shall also 
have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of 
its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.96 
 
Also, the United Nations has recognized that the Court possess international legal 
personality and has such capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions 
and the fulfillment of its purposes.97 Similarly, the Agreement on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Court (APIC) also acknowledges the Court’s international legal 
personality.98 Furthermore, the APIC specifically recognizes that the Court has the 
                                                 
94 Under general international law, the criteria for an international organization include: (a) a lasting 
association of states, (b) an organic structure, (c) a sufficiently clear distinction between the organization 
and its member states, (d) the existence of legal powers exercisable on the international level, and (e) 
lawful purposes.  See Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ED., 678-
981 (Oxford University Press 1998).  See ICC Statute, supra note 65, arts. 1 & 34. 
95 Several provisions in the ICC Statute confer treaty making powers on the Court.  For instance, article 2 
of the ICC Statute requires the Court to conclude a relationship agreement with the UN.  Similarly, under 
article 3(2) of the ICC Statute, the Court is to enter into a headquarters agreement with the host state, the 
Netherlands.  And article 87(5)(a) empowers the Court to enter into agreement with non party States on 
international cooperation and legal assistance.  
96 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 4. 
97 See Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, Article 2, 
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/1/Add.1.   The Agreement was signed on October 4, 2004, by Judge Philippe 
Kirsch, President of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the 
United Nations (UN).  The Agreement which provides a framework for the relationship between the UN 
and the Court entered into force upon signature.  See Press Release, Agreement Between the International 
Criminal Court and the United Nations, October 4, 2004, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/47.html [hereinafter Relationship Agreement]. 
98 Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court (APIC), Article 2, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2001/1/Add.3 (January 2002) [hereinafter “Agreement on Privileges and Immunities”].  The 
Agreement was adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at its First Session, September 3-10, 2002.  See 
ICC-ASP/1/3.  As at January 31, 2005, 21 States are now party to the Agreement on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the ICC while 62 States have signed the Agreement. States who are party to the Agreement 
are, Austria, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Mali, Namibia, New Zealand, 
Norway, Panama, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Trinidad and Tobago have 
ratified the Agreement. Finland is party to the Agreement through acceptance, France through approval and 
Liechtenstein through accession.  See http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/90.html (visited October 4, 
2005). 
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“capacity to contract, to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property and to 
participate in legal proceedings.”99  Also, the APIC which extends and elaborates upon 
article 48 of the ICC Statute, confers on the Court the privileges and immunities usually 
accorded to an international legal personality necessary for the effective discharge of the 
Court’s purposes.100   
In addition, the Court which will be based permanently in The Hague, 
Netherlands is expected to conclude a headquarters agreement with the host State.101  
Under the basic principles governing such headquarters agreement, the host State is 
obliged to ensure that the Court “enjoy privileges, immunities and treatment that are no 
less favorable than those accorded to any international organization or tribunal located in 
the host country.”102 Also, the headquarters agreement should recognize the Court’s 
international legal personality and the legal capacity to exercise its functions and fulfill 
its purposes as stated in Article 4 of the ICC Statute.103 
                                                 
99 Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, supra note 98, art. 2. See also Phillipe Sands & Pierre Klein, 
BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 471 (2001) (concluding that the explicit 
attribution of international legal personality to the Court reflects the change in international society, which 
is increasingly open to the co-existence of various categories of subjects of international law).  
100 Article 48 of the ICC Statute provides that “the Court shall enjoy in the territory of each State Party such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.”  ICC Statute, supra note 65, 
art. 48.  For a discussion on the privileges and immunities of the Court see, Phakiso Mochochoko, 
Completing the Work of the Preparatory Commission: The Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the 
International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 638 (2002); Stuart Beresford, The Privileges and 
Immunities of the International Criminal Court: Are They Sufficient for the Proper Functioning of the 
Court or Is There Still Room for Improvement? 3 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 83  (2002) 
101 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 3.  Pending the entry into force of the permanent Headquarters 
Agreement, it has been agreed that the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement with the  
Yugoslavia Tribunal applies, mutatis mutandis to the Court.  The interim Headquarters Agreement was 
agreed to by an exchange of notes between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Court on 19 
November 2002.   See Press Release, Exchange of Notes between the Netherlands and the ICC, The Hague, 
November 19, 2002, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/4.html (visited October 4, 2005). 
102 See Draft Basic Principles Governing a Headquarters Agreement to be Negotiated Between the Court 
and the Host Country, Principle 1(j), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/1/Add.1 (hereinafter “Basic Principles 
Governing a Headquarters Agreement”). The said Agreement was drafted by the ICC Preparatory 
Commission and adopted by the Assembly in September 2002. 
103 Id., Principle 6. 
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It follows from the above summation that the Court is endowered with the 
capacity to conclude agreements with States and make claims in respect of the rights 
contained therein.  Consequentially, the Court can institute legal proceedings, and acquire 
and dispose of property under the national law of the States concerned.  Therefore, the 
above instruments will ensure that the Court has sufficient legal standing for the 
independent exercise of its functions.    
 
 
5.3.2. Assembly of States Parties 
The Rome Statute provides for the establishment of an Assembly of States Parties 
which will be open to States that have ratified the ICC Statute as members and to States 
that have signed but have not ratified the ICC Statute as observers.104  During its first 
session, the Assembly of States Parties adopted the work of the Preparatory Commission 
and elected the members of the Bureau, consisting of its President, H.R.H. Prince Zeid 
Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, of Jordan, two Vice Presidents and 18 members elected by the 
Assembly for a three-year term.105  In electing the members of the Bureau, the Assembly 
must take into consideration principles of equitable geographic distribution and adequate 
representation of the principal legal systems of the world.106  On its second session in 
September 2003, the Assembly of States Parties adopted Resolution ICC-ASP/2/Res.3 
                                                 
104 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 112. See generally, S. Rama Rao, Article 112: Assembly of State 
Parties, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1201-13 (Otto Trifferer ed., 1999) [hereinafter 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE]. 
105 For a summary of the work of the Assembly of States Parties, see Progress Report, on the Ratification 
and National Implementing Legislation of the Statute for the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, The International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law 13 (10th ed. 
2003) [hereinafter Progress Report]. 
106 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 112(2). 
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establishing the Permanent Secretariat of the Assembly.107  Each State Party is 
represented by a representative who is proposed to the Credential Committee by the Head 
of State of government or the Minister of Foreign Affairs108  
The Assembly of States Parties is the management oversight and legislative body 
of the Court. The Assembly’s duties include adopting recommendations of the 
Preparatory Commission; providing oversight to the Presidency, the Prosecutor, and the 
Registrar; taking action pursuant to reports; making decisions regarding the Court’s 
budget; and considering questions related to non-cooperation.109  This list is by no means 
exhaustive.110  Thus, the Assembly is also responsible for approving the budget of the 
Court and providing the necessary funds to operate the Court.111  The United Nations 
may also contribute funds,112 and voluntary contributions will be allowed.113  The 
Assembly is also responsible for the election and removal of the Judges, the Prosecutor 
and the Deputy Prosecutor(s).114   
According to Article 112 (7), each State Party has one vote, however, every effort 
has to be made to reach decisions by consensus both in the Assembly and the Bureau and 
where consensus cannot be reached, decisions are made on the basis of either a two-thirds 
                                                 
107 The Permanent Secretariat of the Assembly commenced its work in 2004 in The Hague and is headed by 
Dr. Medard Rwelamira (South Africa). See Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/asp.html (visited October 5, 2005).  
108 See Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of States Parties, chapter iv, ICC-Asp/1/3 (2002), adopted by 
the Assembly of States Parties at its First Session at The Hague, September 3-20, 2002, available at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/1stsession/report/first_report_contents.htm (visited October 11, 2005). 
109 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 112(2)(a-f). 
110 Id., art. 112(2)(g) (stating that in addition to the list included in Article 112 (a)-(f), the Assembly shall, 
“[p]erform any other function consistent with this Statute or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”).  
111 Id., art. 115(a). 
112 Id., art 115(b) provides that the Court shall receive “[f]unds provided by the United Nations, subject to 
the approval of the General Assembly, in particular in relation to the expenses incurred due to referrals by 
the Security Council.” 
113 Id., art 116. 
114 Id., arts. 36, 42(4), & 46(2). 
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or simple majority depending on the issues in question.115  To ensure that the Assembly 
of States carry out their duties independently without interference by either the host 
country or third parties, the APIC provides that the representatives of States participating 
in the proceedings of the Assembly and its subsidiary organs as well as representatives of 
observer States and intergovernmental organizations invited to attend such meetings 
enjoy privileges and immunities for their official acts.116   
Disputes between two or more States parties concerning the interpretation of the 
Statute that do not involve the “judicial functions of the Court” that cannot be resolved by 
negotiation or by the Assembly may be referred to the ICJ for resolution.117  Perhaps, 
resort to the ICJ instead of the Court is in recognition of the fact that the Court’s 
jurisdiction is limited to criminal acts committed by individuals.  Also, it is remarkable 
that ICJ jurisdiction to interpret the ICC Statute does not include the interpretations that 
border on the Court’s judicial functions as this may subject the Court to judicial review 
by the ICJ.  Be that as it may, it is suggested that ICJ Article 119 jurisdiction should be 
narrowly construed and every efforts should be made by States parties to discourage 
resort to the ICJ.  
 
 
5.3.3. The Presidency 
The Presidency is one of the four Organs of the Court and is composed of the 
President and First and Second Vice-Presidents, all of whom were first elected as Judges 
of the ICC on a full-time basis.118  The judges composing of the Presidency are then 
                                                 
115 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 112(7). 
116 See Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, supra note 98, art. 14. 
117 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 119. 
118 Id., art. 38. 
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elected by an absolute majority of the eighteen judges of the Court for a three year 
renewable term.119  On March 11, 2003, the ICC judges elected Judge Philippe Kirsch 
(Canada) as its first President, Judge Akua Kuenyehia (Ghana) as First Vice-President, 
and Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica) as Second Vice-President of the Court.120   
With the exception of the Office of the Prosecutor, the Presidency is responsible 
for the general administration of the Court, particularly, the judicial administration of the 
Court.121  However, the Presidency will coordinate and seek the concurrence of the 
Prosecutor on all matters of mutual concern.122 
 
5.3.4. The ICC Judiciary 
The judiciary of the Court is composed of three divisions: Appeals Division, Trial 
Division, and Pre-Trial Division.  Each division is responsible for carrying out the 
judicial functions of the Court.  The Court’s bench will comprise of 18 judges, sitting on 
the Pre-trial, Trial and Appeal benches.123  All the judges must be persons of “high moral 
character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their 
respective Sates for appointment to the highest judicial offices”124 and must be nationals 
of States parties to the ICC Statute.125   In addition, each candidate for the judgeship must 
possess cognate experience in criminal law and procedures as a judge, a prosecutor, an 
                                                 
119 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 38. 
120 See International Criminal Court: The Presidency, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/presidency.html 
(visited on October 7, 2005); Jeff Sallot, Canadian First to Lead War-Crimes Court ,  Globe and Mail, 
March 12, 2003, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2003/0312canuck.htm 
121 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 38(3). 
122 Id., art. 38(4). 
123 Id., art 36(1).  The Presidency, acting on behalf of the Court, can propose to increase the number of the 
judges, if it is considered necessary and appropriate.  On receipt of such proposal, the Registry then will 
circulate the proposal to all States Parties for final discussion by the Assembly of States Parties. Id., art. 
36(2). 
124 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 36(3). 
125 Id., art. 36(4). 
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advocate, or in other similar capacity.126  On the other hand, the candidate may establish 
“competence in relevant areas of international law, such as international humanitarian 
law and the law of human rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal 
capacity which is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court.”127  
 The judges are elected by the countries that have ratified the Statute of the ICC 
using secret ballots.128  Nominations for judges may be made by any State party.129  
Judges are elected by a two-thirds majority of States’ parties.130  In electing judges, the 
Assembly of States Parties are enjoined to take into consideration “[t]he representation of 
the principal legal systems of the world; [e]quitable geographical representation; and [a] 
fair representation of female and male judges.”131  The Assembly is also encouraged to 
consider the need to include “judges with legal expertise on specific issues, including, but 
not limited to, violence against women or children.”132  Furthermore, the Assembly of 
States Parties must elect at least nine judges from “List A” and at least five judges from 
“List B.”133  
During first session of the Assembly of States Parties held in New York from 3 to 
7 February 2003, the Assembly elected the eighteen judges of the Court for a term of 
office of three, six, and nine years.134  The judges constitute a forum of international 
                                                 
126 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 36(3)(b)(i).  Candidates who meet this qualification are grouped under 
“List A.” 
127 Id., art. 36(3)(b)(ii).  “List B” contains the names of candidates who meet this requirement. 
128 Id., art. 36(6). 
129 Id., art. 36(4). 
130 Id., arts. 35-36.  
131 Id., art. 36(8)(a). 
132 Id., art. 36(8)(b). 
133 Id., art. 36(5). 
134 These are, alphabetically by State of nationality: Rene Blattmann (Bolivia); Sylvia Steiner (Brazil); 
Philippe Kirsch (Canada);  Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica); Georghios M. Pikis (Cyprus); Erkki 
Kourula (Finland); Claude Jorda (France); Hans-Peter Kaul (Germany); Akua Kuenyehia (Ghana); 
Maureen Harding Clark (Ireland); Mauro Politi (Italy); Anita Usacka (Latvia); Fatoumata Dembele Diarra 
(Mali); Hyun Song (Republic of Korea); Tuiloma Neroni Slade (Samoa); Navanethem Pillay (South 
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experts that represents the world’s principal legal systems.135  Judges will hold their 
offices for a term of nine years and will not be eligible for re-election.136 However, 
judges selected for a term of three years are eligible for re-election for a full term of nine 
years.137  Also, a judge involved in an on-going trial or appeal may conclude the trial or 
appeal before his or her retirement.138  Article 36(10) will ensure that a trial or an appeal 
is not interrupted mid-way with the withdrawal of a judge before the completion of the 
trial or appeal.   
After the election of the judges, the Court organized itself into Appeals, Pre-Trial 
and Trial Divisions and Chambers in accordance with Article 39 of the ICC Statute.139  
The Appeals Division consists of one appeals chamber of five judges.  The Appeals 
Chamber is composed of judges primarily elected from List B including the President and 
four other judges.140  The judges assigned to the Appeals Division shall serve in this 
Division for the entire term of their office.141  The Trial Division is composed of six 
judges with predominantly criminal trial experience and consists of the Second Vice 
President and five other judges.142   
                                                                                                                                                 
Africa); Karl T. Hudson-Phillips (Trinidad and Tobago); and Sang- Adrian Fulford (United Kingdom). For 
a list of the judges and their biographies, See International Criminal Court: Judges – Biographical Notes at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/chambers.html (visited October 7, 2005). 
135 Seven were elected from the Western European and others Group of States (WEOG), four from the 
Latin American and the Caribbean Group of States (GRULAC), three from the Asian Group of States, three 
from the African Group of States , one from the Group of Eastern Europe.  Seven are female and eleven are 
male judges.   
136 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 36(9)(a). 
137 Id., art. 36(9)(c). 
138Id., art. 36(10). 
139Id., art. 39(1). 
140 Id.  The judges assigned to the Appeals Division are the President, Judge Philippe Kirsch, Judge Erkki 
Kourula, Judge Navanethem Pillay, Judge Georghios M. Pikis, and Judge Sang-hyun Song.  See 
International Criminal Court: Appeals Division at http://www.icc-cpi.int/chambers/appeals.html (visited 
October 7, 2005).  
141 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 39(3)(b). 
142 Id., art. 39(1).  The judges assigned to the Trial Division are the Second Vice-President, Judge Elizabeth 
Odio Benito, Judge René Blattmann, Judge Maureen Harding Clark, Judge Anita Ušacka, Judge Sir Adrian 
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The Trial Division is divided into two Trial Chambers of three judges each.  
Three judges of the Division form a quorum and can carry out the judicial functions of 
the Trial Chamber.143  The Trial Chamber judges shall serve in this Division for a period 
of three years, and thereafter until the completion of any case if the hearing has already 
started.144  The major role of the Trial Chamber, expressed in article 64 of the ICC 
Statute, is adopting all the necessary procedures to ensure that a trial is fair and 
expeditious, and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused with regard 
for the protection of victims and witnesses.145   
The Pre-Trial Division which is composed of judges with predominantly criminal 
trial experience consists of the First Vice President and six other judges.146  They shall 
serve in this Division for a period of three years, and thereafter until the completion of 
any case if the hearing has already started.147  The functions of the Pre-Trial Division 
may be carried out by Pre-Trial Chambers composed of either a single judge or of a 
bench of three judges.148  The Pre-Trial Chamber inter alia, confirms or rejects the 
authorization to commence an investigation by the Prosecutor and makes a preliminary 
determination on admissibility and jurisdiction of the Court, without prejudice to 
subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to challenge on the jurisdiction and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fulford, and Judge Karl Hudson-Phillips. See International Criminal Court: Trial Division at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/chambers/trial.html (visited October 7, 2005). 
143 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 39(2)(b)(ii). 
144 Id., art. 39((3)(a). 
145 Id., art. 64(2). 
146 Id., art. 39(1).  The judges assigned to the Pre-Trial Division are the First Vice-President, Judge Akua 
Kuenyehia, Judge Fatoumata Diarra, Judge Claude Jorda, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, Judge Mauro Politi, 
Judge Tuiloma Neroni Slade, and Judge Sylvia Steiner. See International Criminal Court: Pre-Trial 
Division at http://www.icc-cpi.int/chambers/pretrial.html (visited October 7, 2005). 
147 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 36(3)(a). 
148 Id., art. 39(2)(b)(iii). 
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admissibility of a case.149  Also, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirms the charge(s) against the 
accused person before commencement of trial.150   
Although all judges are to be elected on the basis of their nationality to one of the 
States Parties to the ICC Statute, once elected, a judge cannot be automatically 
disqualified from sitting on a case solely on the basis that he or she is of the same 
nationality with the accused.  Rather, a judge may recuse his or herself151 or may be 
disqualified from a particular case on the subjective ground that his or her “impartiality 
might reasonably be doubted” or on the objective ground that he or she was previously 
involved in that case before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level.152  
Contrast with the 1994 International Law Commission’s draft Statute which disqualifies a 
judge from sitting in a case if he or she is a national of a complainant State or of the 
accused person.153  Article 41 of the ICC Statute presents a better approach to 
disqualification of a judge as opposed to the 1994 ILC draft because it allows for 
disqualification only in circumstances that suggests judge impartiality.154    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
149 ICC Statute, supra note 65, arts. 53 & 57. 
150 Id., art. 61. 
151 Id., art. 41(1). 
152 Id., art. 41(2)(a). 
153 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, Draft Article 
9(7), U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft 
Statute].   
154 Note however that Article 41(2)(a) also provides that a judge may also be disqualified on other grounds 
as may be included in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  For instance see Rule 34 RPE which added 
additional bases for disqualification on grounds of conflict of interest or bias.   See Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at its first session in New York 3-10 September 2002, 
ICC-ASP/1/3 at www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/ Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf 
(visited October 7, 2005) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence].     
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 5.3.5. The Office of the Prosecutor 
The Office of the Prosecutor is headed by a Chief Prosecutor and assisted by two 
Deputy Prosecutors who must be of different nationalities.155  The Chief Prosecutor has 
full authority over the management and the administration of the Office, including the 
staff, facilities and other resources of the Office.156  The principal mandate of the Office 
of the Prosecutor is to receive referrals and substantiated information and conduct 
investigations and prosecutions of crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.157  
For efficient discharge of its mandate, the ICC Statute provides that the Office of the 
Prosecutor shall act independently.158  Consequently, a member of the Office of the 
Prosecutor must not seek or act on instructions from any external source, such as States, 
international organizations, NGOs or individuals.159   
The Chief Prosecutor and the two Deputy Prosecutors are elected by the 
Assembly of States Parties for a non renewable term of nine years unless a shorter term is 
decided at the time of their election.160  Like the judges, the Chief Prosecutor and the 
Deputy Prosecutors shall not participate in any matter in which their “impartiality may 
reasonably be doubted on any ground.”161  Also, they shall be disqualified from a case if 
they had previously been involved in any capacity in that case before the Court or in a 
related criminal case at the national level concerning the accused person.162   
Article 42(7) of the ICC Statute represents a departure from the 1994 ILC draft 
which recommended automatic disqualification of the Chief Prosecutor and Deputy 
                                                 
155 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 42(2). 
156 Id.. 
157 Id., arts. 42(1) & 54. 
158 Id., art. 41(1). 
159 Id. 
160 Id., art. 42(4). 
161 Id., art. 42(7). 
162 Id., art 42(7). 
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Prosecutors from participating in any case involving an accused person of their own 
nationality.163   
On April 21, 2003, the Assembly of States unanimously elected Luis Moreno 
Ocampo (Argentina)164 as the first Chief Prosecutor of the Court for a term of nine 
years.165  On June 16 2003, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo took office and pledged to solemnly 
undertake the duties of his Office as provided in the ICC Statute.166  Also, on September 
10, 2003, the Assembly of States Parties elected Serge Brammertz (Belgium) as Deputy 
Prosecutor (Investigations), for a term of six years and was sworn in on November 3, 
2003.167  On September 8, 2004, Fatou Bensouda (Gambia) was elected Deputy 
Prosecutor (Prosecutions), for a full term of nine years.168  Ms. Bensouda was sworn in 
on November 1, 2004, at The Hague.169   
                                                 
163 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 153, art. 12(5). 
164 Moreno Ocampo had established his reputation as a prosecutor during several high profile trials 
involving leading figures from Argentina’s military junta.  He is also a renowned academic in the field of 
human rights, and is the Robert F. Kennedy Visiting Professor at Harvard Law School.  See Curriculum 
vitae Luis Moreno Ocampo, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ otp/moreno ocampo cve revised.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2005).  
165 See Election of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (last modified Apr. 21, 2003), at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/elections/results/prosecutor<uscore>results.htm.  Also see, Media Alert, 
International Criminal Court, Election of the Prosecutor (Apr. 24, 2003), available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/php/news/details.php?id=3 (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).  In a move to usher confidence on the Chief 
Prosecutor, The ASP decided that the prosecutor should be elected “by consensus,” and encouraged States 
Parties to consult with each other before nominating a candidate for prosecutor.  On March 24, 2003, the 
President of the Assembly of States Parties announced that the States Parties to the Rome Statute had 
“informally, and on the basis of consensus” selected the Argentine Luis Moreno Ocampo to serve as the 
court’s first prosecutor.  See Press Release, Election of the Prosecutor - Statement by the President of the 
Assembly of States Parties Prince Zeid Raad Al Hussein (Mar. 25, 2003), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/news/details.php?id=2.  
166 International Criminal Court: Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor (June 16, 
2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_ceremony.html (visited October 7, 2005). 
167 ICC Press Release, Election of the Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 10, 
2003), at http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/aspfra.htm 
168 ICC Press Release, States Parties to International Criminal Court elect Ms. Fatou Bensouda of the 
Gambia Deputy Prosecutor (Prosecutions) [Sept. 10, 2003], at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/statesparties/third_session.html (visited October 7, 2005). 
169 ICC Press Release, Solemn Undertaking of Deputy Prosecutor (Prosecutions) (Nov. 1, 2004), at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=83.html . 
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In order to efficiently discharge the functions of the Office of the Prosecutor, the 
Office is subdivided into three operational divisions.170  The Investigation Division 
headed by Deputy Prosecutor Brammertz, is responsible for carrying out the actual 
investigations, such as collecting and examining evidence, questioning persons being 
investigated as well as victims and witnesses.  The Investigation Division is composed of 
several interdisciplinary investigative teams, including forensic, military, political, 
financial, and other analysts.171  The Investigation Division may carry out its work at the 
seat of the ICC and, if necessary on the territory of the State concerned.172  The ICC 
Statute requires the Office to extend the investigation to cover both incriminating and 
exonerating facts in order to establish the truth.173   
The Prosecution Division headed by Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has a 
role in the investigative process, but its principal responsibility is the litigation of cases 
before the various Chambers of the Court.  The Prosecution Division comprises the trial 
and appeals counsel who will present cases before the Court.174   
The Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division (JCCD) headed by 
Mrs. Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, analyses referrals and communications, with support 
from the Investigation Division and makes recommendations on issues of jurisdiction, 
complementarity, and cooperation related to the situations under analysis or 
                                                 
170 See International Criminal Court – Office of the Prosecutor: General Organization, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/organs/otp.html (visited October 10, 2005). 
171 Hans-Peter Kau Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction Site For More Justice: 
The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J.INT’L L. 370, 373 (2005). 
172 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 54(2). 
173 Id., art. 54(1)(a). 
174 It is noteworthy that while the U.S. continues its opposition to the ICC, one of the senior trial attorneys 
for the ICC is former New York federal prosecutor Christine Chung, a U.S. national.  See Jess Bravin, 
International Criminal Court Picks US Lawyer to Lead First Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2004. 
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investigation.175  The JCCD also helps to negotiate and secure cooperation agreements 
with relevant States, entities, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations 
needed for the activities of the Office of the Prosecutor.176   
  While the ICC Statute provides that the Office of the Prosecutor should act 
independently,177 the Statute nevertheless provided some checks on the investigation 
power of the Prosecutor in order to assuage the fears of some States on the implication of 
an independent Prosecutor with absolute power.  Thus, the ICC Statute contains a 
graduated procedure by which the Pre-Trial Chamber would have to approve the 
investigation of cases in situations where the Office of the Prosecutor wishes to exercise 
its prosecution powers proprio motu.178   
 
5.3.6. The Office of the Registrar 
The Office of the Registrar is one of the four organs of the Court and is 
responsible for the administration of non-judicial aspects of the Court.179  The Registry is 
headed by the Registrar who as the principal administrative officer of the Court shall 
exercise his or her functions under the authority of the President.180  The Registrar and 
Deputy Registrar are elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of judges meeting in 
plenary session.181  Following the recommendation from the Bureau of the Assembly of 
States Parties, on June 24, 2003, Mr. Bruno Cathala (France) was appointed first 
Registrar of the Court for a renewable term of five years.182  
                                                 
175 ICC Statute, supra note 65, arts. 15 & 53. 
176 Id., art. 54(3)(c) & (d). 
177 Id., art. 41(1). 
178 Id., art., 15. 
179 Id., art. 43(1). 
180 Id., art. 43(2). 
181 Id., art. 43(3). 
182 Id., art. 42(5). 
 182 
Apart from general administration of the Court, the Registry provides 
administrative support to the judges and the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties. 
Also, the Registry, through the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the Registry is responsible 
for providing protective measures to victims and witnesses who appear before the 
Court.183  The Registrar is also to serve as the channel of communication between the 
Court and States, Inter-governmental Organizations and Non-Governmental 
Organizations.184  
 
5.4. Observations and Commentary 
The twentieth century witnessed atrocities of a truly unprecedented nature.  It is 
estimated that 170 million died in 250 conflicts that have occurred since World War II 
evidencing a testament of the failure of the international community to create a viable 
mechanism to prevent aggression and enforce international humanitarian law.185 
Fortunately, the apathy that the international community showed to various proposals for 
a permanent international court gave way to a purposeful deliberation at the Rome 
Conference which established the ICC. The ICC Statute is an expression of the 
compromises that have to be made at the Rome Conference to ensure that the Court is 
created.     
The main objective of ICC is to end the impunity of perpetrators who commit 
crimes that are of concern to the international community as a whole.186  By holding 
individuals criminally responsible for the crime sunder the ICC Statute, the ICC will 
                                                 
183 ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 42(6). 
184 See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 154, Rule 13(1). 
185 Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 
88 GEO. L.J. 381, 384 (2000).  
186 ICC Statute, supra note 65, preamble. 
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deter other perpetrators from committing atrocities against their own people by sending a 
strong message that these crimes will not go unpunished.187  Further, the ICC serves as 
effective replacement of ad hoc tribunals and unlike ad hoc tribunals, the ICC will have a 
broader jurisdiction to prosecute persons accused of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.  Additionally, with the establishment of the ICC, the United Nations is 
relieved from the financial burden and international politics that the United Nations faces 
when requested to set up ad hoc tribunals for every conflict.   
The ICC Statute has already entered into force in 2002 having been ratified by 
more than the required sixty States Parties within a record time.  Also, with the election 
and appointment of the judicial and administrative officers of the ICC, the Court is ready 
to commence work.  The qualification and the professional competence of the judges and 
the Prosecutor signals desire of the Assembly of States Parties to properly equip the ICC 
to take off on a proper footing.  These first set of appointments have received the 
approval of majority of he international community.    
                                                 
187 U.N. Dep’t of Public Information, The Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court: Background 
Information (May 1998), at http:/www.un.org/icc/statute.htm. 
CHAPTER SIX 
=============================================================== 
 
 
6.0.  THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
___________________________________ 
 
6.1. Introduction   
The Court will exercise complementary jurisdiction1 with national courts over 
individuals accused of committing egregious “crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.”2  Such crimes include the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and the crime of aggression.3  The Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression is however deferred to a later day when “a provision is adopted in 
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions 
under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”4  Under this 
process, the earliest time aggression could be included in the Court’s jurisdiction as a 
crime is seven years after the statute entered into force.5 Terrorism and drug related 
crimes were adopted into the text in an annexed resolution and will become part of the 
                                                 
1 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble para.10, arts. 1, 17(1), & 19(2)(b).  U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].  The 
ICC Statute does not define the term complementarity, but a combined reading of the provisions of the ICC 
Statute indicated herein suggests that it means the Court should only exercise jurisdiction if state(s) that has 
jurisdiction over the individual(s) is “unable” or “unwilling” to initiate criminal prosecution.  See further 
discussion on the Principle of Complementarity, infra Chapter 8. 
2 ICC Statute, supra note 1, at Preamble para. 9 & arts. 1,5. 
3 Id., art. 5(1). arts. 6-8 (defining the terms genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes). 
4 Id., art. 5(2).     
5 Articles 121 and 123 of the ICC Statute detail the process of amending the Statute.  In particular, under 
articles 121(1) & 123(1), proposal to amend the Rome Statute may be made seven years after its entry into 
force. Id.  
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crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction once it is defined at a review conference in the 
future.6  
The above categories of crimes over which the Court will exercise jurisdiction 
were considered to be jus cogens norms7 by majority of States involved in the Rome 
Conference.8  Article 6 of the Rome Statute confirms, in the same words, the provisions 
of the 1948 Genocide Convention and represents a further step towards the codification 
of principles and rules of the crimes of genocide which appear to be generally accepted.  
On the other hand, articles 7 and 8 represent an evolution of the crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.  Here, detailed provisions have replaced those of article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Charter and of their successive formulations.  
During the drafting of the ICC Statute, there was the question whether the Court’s 
subject matter should be limited to those crimes which are beyond any doubt part of 
customary law or whether it should also include all crimes or offences codified in 
international instruments.9  As the discussion progressed, it became clear that the more 
                                                 
6 See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, Annex 1, Res. E, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998) {hereinafter Final 
Act]. 
7 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) defines jus cogens as “norms accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States from which no derogation is permitted and which 
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]. The ICJ made this clear when it considered the effect of reservations to the Genocide 
Convention and stated that “the prohibition of genocide is binding on states, even without any contractual 
obligation.” See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Adv. Op.), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 23 (1951) (discussing genocide as a jus cogens norm); 
Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 (5 Feb.) (Second Phase) (discussing 
genocide as an obligation erga omnes).  The term jus cogens norms refer to customary international laws 
which gives rise to obligations erga omnes, that is, obligations owing to the international community as a 
whole.  See Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique 
of the U.S. Position, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 80, n. 60 (2001). 
8 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and 
Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 201-202 (1998); Michael P. Scharf, supra 
note 7, at 80. 
9 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, Article 20, U.N. 
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft Statute]. While the 
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punishable conducts included in the jurisdiction, the fewer the States that are willing to 
accept the Court’s jurisdiction.  The Committee then suggested referring all crimes that 
are recognized by treaty to an ad hoc jurisdiction with the consequence that the parties to 
the statute can still decide whether they are willing to accept an ICC’s jurisdiction on a 
case by case basis, while the more important exclusive jurisdiction implying an automatic 
acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction upon becoming party to the statute should be limited 
to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.10   
At the end, a practical compromise was reached to establish a court with a modest 
jurisdictional scope which jurisdiction will be generally acceptable by the majority of the 
States Parties.  Thus, as noted by Judge Philippe Kirsch, President of the Court who was 
then, the Rome Diplomatic Conferences Chairman, “[i]t was understood that the [Rome] 
statute was not to create new substantive law, but only to include crimes already 
prohibited under international law.”11   
It has been argued that while the above approach limited the Court’s jurisdiction, 
it was desirable to achieve the more expedient goal of making the Court’s jurisdiction 
automatic and compulsory to States Parties instead of an optional or case by case 
                                                                                                                                                 
conferment of jurisdiction to the Court over all treaty crimes may expand the jurisdiction of the Court, it 
could also minimize the Court’s efficiency as it may be over burden with cases.  Besides, unlike the ILC 
Draft which merely lists the crimes, a decision had earlier been reached by the Committee to include the 
definition of the crimes in the Statute, the Committee therefore recognized that it may encounter problem of 
definition because there are no uniformity of definition to some of the treaty crimes. 
10 This was the position of the ILC and many of the States involved in the Conference.  See 1994 ILC 
Draft, supra note 9, at Preamble para. 2,: “Emphasizing that such a court is intended to exercise jurisdiction 
only over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”   Also see, 
Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The 
Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2, 5 (1999). 
11 Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, supra note 10, at 7 n.19 (citing 1 Report of the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, 
at 16, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996)).  
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jurisdiction envisioned by the ILC.12  Therefore, a State upon becoming a State Party to 
the ICC Statute automatically accepts the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to crimes 
referred to in Article 513 but subject to the deferred jurisdiction over the crimes of 
aggression.14  Articles 6-8 of the ICC Statute contains detailed definition of the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes respectively.  These crimes have been 
specifically addressed and carefully described in the Statute and will be examined below 
shortly. 
 
6.2. Guidelines for Interpreting and Applying the Definitions.  
Before examining the definition of the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, it is apposite to precede the examination with the guidelines 
underlying the interpretation and application of the definitions.  In interpreting the 
definition, it is important to bear in mind the caveat that the definition is supplied only for 
“the purpose of this Statute”.15  It appears that the basis for the express limitation of the 
application of the definition to the purpose of the Statute is to avoid the impression that 
the Statute purports to serve as an international codification of the said crimes and 
thereby preclude the further development of these crimes for other purposes, especially as 
crimes under customary international law. 
Article 10 of the ICC Statute offers another guideline to the effect that the 
definition of the crimes proffered in this Part of the Statute shall not be “interpreted as 
limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for 
                                                 
12 See Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 665, 669 (1995).  
13 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(1). 
14 Id. art. 5(2). 
15 Id., arts. 6(1), 7(1), & 8(1). 
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purposes other than this Statute.”16  Obviously, the purposes of the ICC Statute will be 
better served with the progressive advancement of rules of international law as the Court 
may apply these rules in the interpretation of the Statute.17   
Further, other than the definition of the crimes, the Court may look to the 
Elements of Crimes18 and the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence19 for assistance 
in “the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, & 8.20  Also, the Court should 
endeavor to interpret the definitions in consonance with the other parts of the Statute21 
especially Part III of the Statute on General Principles of Criminal Law.  Specifically, the 
Court should adhere strictly to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege as formulated by 
article 22 which obligates the Court to strictly construe the definitions and not to extend it 
by analogy.22   
 
6.3. ICC Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae  
 
6.3.1. The Crime of Genocide 
 The term genocide and its eventual criminalization are attributed to Raphael 
Lemkin.23  The Polish-Jewish scholar and jurist coined the word “genocide” from a 
combination of the ancient Greek word genos, meaning, according Lemkin, “race” or 
                                                 
16 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 10. 
17 Id., art. 20(1)(b). 
18 Article 9(1) of the ICC Statute provides that the Elements of Crimes “shall be adopted by two-thirds 
majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties.”  Id. See Elements of Crimes, adopted by the 
Assembly of States Parties at its first session in New York 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 at 
www.un.org/law/icc/asp/1stsession/ report/english/part_ii_b_e.pdf (visited October 7, 2005) [hereinafter 
ICC Elements of Crimes]. 
19 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at its first session in 
New York 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 at www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/ 
Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf (visited October 7, 2005) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence].     
20 ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts 9 & 20(1)(a). 
21 Id., art. 20(1)(a). 
22 Id., art. 22(2). 
23 See Samantha Power, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 42-
60 (2002). 
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“tribe” and the derivative cide from the Latin word caedere, which means “killing”.24   
According to Lemkin, genocide is “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves.”25  In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which 
criminalized the acts of genocide as defined in article II of the Convention.26   
By 1951, the crime and definition of Genocide were already generally 
acknowledged as reflecting customary international law.27  Attempts to expand or 
otherwise restrict the definition of genocide at the Preparatory Committee meetings to 
reflect changing circumstances of the twenty-first century proved unsuccessful.28  Thus, 
the provisions of Article II of the Geneva Convention were adopted mutatis mutandis in 
the Statute of the ICC29 as was the case with the Statutes of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, (ICTY)30 and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
                                                 
24 Raphael Lemkin, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE, LAWS OF OCCUPATION: ANALYSIS OF 
GOVERNMENT: PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1944); Samantha Power, supra note 23, at 42. 
25 Id., at 79. 
26 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 
280, approved  and  opened  for signature and ratification or accession on December 9, 1948, (entered into 
force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].  As at October 7, 2005, 137 States have ratified the 
Genocide Convention.  Information on ratification, reservations and declarations of the Genocide 
Convention are available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/1.htm (visited October 10, 
2005).  
27 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ Rep., 15, 23 (May 28, 1951) (ICJ noted that “the principles underlying the 
Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without 
conventional obligation”); Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 (Feb 5, 1970) 
(Second Phase) (discussing genocide as an obligation erga omnes). 
28 Preparatory Committee for Establishment of International Criminal Court Discusses Definitions of 
“Genocide”, “Crime Against Humanity”, March 26, 1996, U.N. Press Release L/2762 (1996); Herman von 
Hebel and Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court in THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE – ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, 
RESULTS 79-126, 89 (R.S. Lee Ed. The Hague/Boston/London: Kluwer Law International, 1999).  
29 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6. 
30 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 4, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/25704 (1993), appended to SC Resolution 827, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993) (hereinafter ICTY 
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Rwanda (ICTR).31   Therefore, article 6 of the ICC Statute which replicates the definition 
of genocide in the Geneva Convention provides that: 
For the purposes of this Statute, “genocide” means any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.32 
 
Article 6(a-e) lists the various ways in which a protected group may be targeted 
for destruction, but it has been suggested that killing represents one manifestation of 
genocidal intent.33  Therefore, the sine qua non of genocide is the intent to destroy the 
group and not the act of killing itself which is just one way of achieving the objective.34 
In addition to the crime of genocide, article 25 of the ICC Statute enlarges punishable 
acts, adding soliciting or inducing the commission of a crime of genocide, conspiracy to 
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to genocide, attempted genocide, and 
complicity in genocide as punishable crimes.35  For an act to be considered as genocide, 
it is necessary that one of the acts listed above has been committed, with the special 
                                                                                                                                                 
Statute]. The ICTY Statute was unanimously adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, May 
25, 1993, for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.  
31 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 
3453rd mtg., Art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES 955, (1994) reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).  
32 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6. 
33 By stating that perpetrators’ objectives include “the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, 
dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups,” Lemkin clearly suggests that 
“killing” is but one among other unspecified acts that may constitute genocide. See Raphael Lemkin, supra 
note 24, at 42.  
34 Thomas W. Simon, Defining Genocide, 15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 243, 244-47 (1996) (proposing killing as 
critical element in definition of genocide). 
35 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25, Genocide Convention, supra note 26, art. III. 
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intent to destroy in whole or in part one of the protected groups covered under article 6.  
These three elements are briefly considered below.   
 
6.3.1.a. The Mental Element of the Crime of Genocide 
Article 6 of the ICC Statute provides that an accused shall be guilty of the crime 
of genocide as defined in the Statute if committed with “intent to destroy …a group.”  
The requirement of the “intent to destroy” in article 6 is consistent with the general 
requirement in article 30 of the ICC Statute to the effect that: 
Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge.36 
 
Thus, in order for the Court to convict an individual for a crime of genocide, the 
Prosecutor must establish that the accused committed one or more of the acts listed in 
article 6(a-e) with a culpable mens rea.37  It is probably easier to establish the occurrence 
of any of the prohibited acts than it is to establish the intent requirement.  As noted by the 
International Law Commission, the actus reus of genocide: 
are by their very nature conscious, intentional or volitional acts 
which an individual could not usually commit without knowing 
that certain consequences were likely to result.  These are not the 
type of acts that would normally occur by accident or even as a 
result of mere negligence.  However, a general intent to commit 
one of the enumerated acts combined with a general awareness of 
the probable consequences of such an act with respect to the 
immediate victim or victims is not sufficient for the crime of 
genocide.  The definition of this crime requires a particular state 
of mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall 
consequences of the prohibited act.38 
                                                 
36 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 30(1) [emphasis added]. 
37 Id., art. 6. 
38 See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session May 6 –July 26, 1996, p 88, U.N. GAOR. 51st Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. GA/51/10 (1996), [hereinafter 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes].  
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The ICC Statute did not offer general guidelines for deciphering intent, however, 
article 30 suggests that intent will be found “in relation to conduct [where] that person 
means to engage in the conduct”39 and “in relation to a consequence, [where] that person 
means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.”40  On the other hand, ‘“knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists 
or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”41  For the actus reus to 
amount to genocide, the mens rea to destroy a group must be established, the outcome of 
the act is of no consequence in itself.42  Thus, the intent of the perpetrator is paramount in 
a finding of genocide because it is that intent to destroy a particular protected group in 
whole or in part, that makes crimes of mass murder and crimes against humanity qualify 
as genocide.43   
Taken together therefore, the question of intent must be interpreted against the 
background that “genocide is a crime of specific or special intent, involving a perpetrator 
who specifically targets victims on the basis of their group identity with a deliberate 
desire to inflict destruction upon the group itself.”44  Thus, attacks on moderate Hutus 
during the Rwandan hostilities cannot constitute genocide under the Convention,45 even 
though many of those crimes were an essential part of the overall scheme to destroy 
                                                 
39 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 30(2)(a). 
40 Id., art. 30(2)(b). 
41 Id., art. 30(3). 
42 Nehemiah Robinson, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 59 (New York, 1960). 
43 See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, par. 97 (May 5, 1994). Also see 
1996 Draft Code of Crimes, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, p. 88 (1996) [noting that the intent of the perpetrator must 
be to destroy a group and not merely individuals who are coincidentally members of a particular group]. 
44 Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocide Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based 
Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259, 2264 (1999). 
45 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T 710 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial 
Chamber I, September 2, 1998), available at: 
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm [hereinafter Akayesu 
Judgment]. 
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Tutsis as a group because there was no intent to destroy the Hutu ethnic group in whole 
or in part. 46    
While the Court is yet to be confronted with the interpretation of the intent 
requirement, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda have addressed the issue.  In each case, the tribunals attempted to formulate 
general guidelines for inferring genocidal intent absent an admission of intent to commit 
genocide by the accused.  In Prosecutor v. Akayesu,47 the first case to convict an accused 
for genocide, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR noted that the specific intent of the accused 
is a mental factor which is difficult, if not impossible to determine.48  Notwithstanding, 
the Trial Chamber suggested that “in the absence of a confession from the accused, intent 
can be inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact.”49  The ICTR then 
proceeded to establish that genocidal intent may be inferred from the following factors: 
The Chamber considers that it is possible to deduce the genocidal 
intent inherent in a particular act charged from the general 
context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically 
directed against that same group, whether these acts were 
committed by the same offender or by others.  Other factors, such 
as the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a 
region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and 
systematically targeting victims on account of their membership 
of a particular group, while excluding the members of other 
groups can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a 
particular act.50   
 
                                                 
46 Atrocities against moderate Hutu probably constitute crimes against humanity.  See ICTR Statute, supra 
note 31, art. 3. 
47Prosecutor v. Akayesu Judgment, supra note 45, p.523. 
48 Id., at 523. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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Prior to Akayesu judgment, the Trial Chamber 1 of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Karazic and Mladic51 had suggested 
that genocidal “intent derives from the combined effect of speeches or projects laying the 
groundwork for and justifying the acts, from the massive scale of their destructive effect 
and from their specific nature, which aims at undermining what is considered to be the 
foundation of the group.”52 Also, the “general political doctrine that gave rise to the acts” 
is relevant just as the “repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts.”53  In addition, 
acts which “violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to violate, the very 
foundation of the group” may also give rise to the inference.54    
 In another ICTR case of Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana,55 Trial 
Chamber II opined that “intent can be inferred either from words or deed and may be 
demonstrated by a pattern of purposeful action.”56  Apart from “words” or “deed”, the 
Trial Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana suggested that the Chamber may also 
consider “evidence such as the physical targeting of the group or their property to the 
exclusion of other groups;57 the use of derogatory language toward members of the 
targeted group; the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury;58 the methodical 
                                                 
51 Prosecutor v. Karazic and Mladic, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, Case No. IT-95-5-R61 and 
IT-95-18-R61 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber 1, July 11, 1996) in 1 ANNOTATED 
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1993-1998, at 679 (Andre Klip & Goran 
Sluiter eds., 1999) [hereinafter Karazic and Mladic]. 
52 Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, supra note 51, p 94-95, at 711. 
53 Id., p 94, at 711. 
54 Id.  The Trial Chamber cited Serbian destruction of Muslim libraries and religious institutions as 
evidence of genocidal intent toward Muslims. Id., at 95. 
55 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, 
Trial Chamber II, May 21, 1999) available at:   
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/KayRuz/judgement/index.htm [hereinafter Kayishema and 
Ruzindana]. 
56 Id., p 93. 
57 Id., p.94. 
58 Id. 
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way of planning, the systematic manner of killing.59  Further, the scale and general nature 
of the atrocities committed is also important.60  
While the Kayishema and Ruzindana case suggested that “words” or “deed” may 
suffice to infer genocidal intent, in the ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Jelisic,61 the Trial 
Chamber seems to suggest that words alone without the existence of a plan to destroy a 
protected group as such may make it impossible for the prosecution to proof genocidal 
intent.  In this case, Jelisic had openly remarked his hatred for and desire to kill all 
Muslims, a protected religious group.62  The Trial Chamber decided that the Prosecutor 
has not discharged its burden of proof regarding Jelisic’s genocidal intent because the 
“Prosecutor has not provided sufficient evidence allowing it to be established beyond all 
reasonable doubt that there existed a plan to destroy the Muslim group … within which 
the murders committed by the accused would allegedly fit.”63  On appeal, the Appeals 
Chamber rejected the requirement of a plan as an ingredient of the crime.64   
Additional factors have also been proffered by the prosecution in Prosecutor v. 
Sikirica.65  The prosecution in Sikirica offered seven factors which it considered relevant 
to prove the defendant’s mental culpability for genocide.66   
                                                 
59 Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 55, p.94. 
60 Id. 
61 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-10-T P 102 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial 
Chamber, Dec. 14, 1999), http://www.un.org/icty/brcko/trialc1/judgement/jel-tj991214e.pdf [hereinafter 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment]. 
62 Id., at p 93. 
63 Id., at p 98.  
64 See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeal, Case No. IT-95-10-A Pp 47, 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Appeals 
Chamber, July 5, 2001) where the Appeals Chamber common to both the ICTR and ICTY upheld the 
inferability of intent and stated that “The Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that the existence of a plan or 
policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime.” P 48, available at:   
http://www.un.org/icty/brcko/appeal/judgement/jel-aj010705.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeals 
Chamber]. 
65 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-8-T PP 86, 90 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial 
Chamber, Sept. 3, 2001), http://www.un.org/icty/sikirica/judgement/010903r98bis-e.pdf [hereinafter 
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment]. 
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The above factors that have been put forward by the Tribunals and the 
prosecution are obviously offered as guidelines and were based on the consideration of 
the facts of each case.  While the guidelines may differ from one case to the other, the 
Tribunals’ appear to agree that a court could infer genocidal intent from a methodological 
examination of the factual record before the court on a case by case basis.67  In any event, 
the underlying motivations for the crime of genocide are irrelevant.68   
Note however the decision of the ICTY Prosecutor in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic69 
not to charge Erdemovic with genocide ostensibly on the basis that Erdemovic does not 
have genocidal intent when he and his detachment were ordered to a farm where they 
shot and killed unarmed Bosnian Muslim men because he acted pursuant to superior 
orders and under threat of death.70  This case should not stand for the proposition that 
subordinates who acted pursuant to superior orders cannot form genocidal intent.  As 
explained in the comment to article 17 of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
66 The seven factors, which apparently derived from the prosecutor’s brief before the Appeals Chamber in 
Jelisic, were: 
 
(a) The general and widespread nature of the atrocities committed; 
(b) The general political doctrine giving rise to the acts; 
(c) The scale of the actual or attempted destruction; 
(d) Methodical way of planning the killings; 
(e) The systematic manner of killing and disposal of bodies; 
(f) The discriminatory nature of the acts; 
(g) The discriminatory intent of the accused. 
 
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, supra note 65, p 46 & n.123. 
67 See Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T P 167 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial 
Chamber, Jan. 27, 2000) at  http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgement/index.htm;   
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-3 P 63 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber, 
Dec. 6, 1999), http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Rutaganda/judgement/index.htm;  The 
Appeals Chamber common to both the ICTR and ICTY upheld the inferability of intent in Prosecutor v. 
Jelisic.  See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeals Chamber, supra note 64, p 47.  See also William A. Schabas, 
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 222-25 (2000).  
68 Note, however, that it is not always clear whether specific evidence relates to motive or intent at trial. 
See, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, The Case for a Federal Bias Crime Law, 16 Nat’l Black L.J. 144, 156-57 
(1999) (noting that motive and intent are not always analytically distinct). 
69 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, March 5, 1998) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Erdemovic]. 
70 Id., p 14. 
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definition of genocide applies to subordinates who carry out the order as well as those 
who plan or order the genocide, even though the subordinate may not have the same level 
of knowledge as the planner or superior.  The ILC noted that: 
The definition of genocide requires a degree of knowledge of the 
ultimate objective of the criminal conduct rather than knowledge 
of every detail of a comprehensive plan or policy of genocide.  A 
subordinate is presumed to know the intentions of his superiors 
when he receives orders to commit the prohibited acts against 
individuals belonging to a particular group.  For example, a 
soldier who is ordered to go from house to house and kill only 
persons who are members of a particular group cannot be 
unaware of the irrelevance of the identity of the victims and the 
significance of their membership in a particular group.  He 
cannot be unaware of the relevance of the destructive effect of 
this criminal conduct on the group itself.  Thus the necessary 
degree of knowledge and intent may be inferred from the nature 
of the order to commit the prohibited acts of destruction against 
individuals who belong to particular group and are therefore 
singled out as the immediate victims of the massive criminal 
conduct.  He cannot escape responsibility if he carries out the 
orders to commit the destructive acts against victims who are 
selected because of their membership in a particular group by 
claiming that he was not privy to all aspects of the 
comprehensive genocidal plan or policy.  The law does not 
permit an individual to shield himself from the obvious.71 
 
It is also necessary to distinguish between intent to destroy a community as such 
because they belong to a protected group from intent to persecute individuals because 
they belong to a specific community without the intent to destroy the community.  While 
the former is genocide, the latter is a crime against humanity, the underlying difference 
being that a discriminatory murder is not proof of genocidal intent.72  Thus, in Prosecutor 
v. Jelisic,73 the ICTY noted that the crime of “genocide … differs from the crime of 
                                                 
71 1996 ILC Report, supra note 9, at p 60. 
72 See William A. Schabas, supra note 67, at 230-38 (discussing quantitative elements in determining 
requisite intent); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 523 (1999) (reiterating necessity of intent).  
73 Persecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, supra note 61, p 21. 
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persecution in which the perpetrator chooses his [or her] victims because they belong to a 
specific community but does not necessarily seek to destroy the community as such.”74  
The ICTY opined that the intent to discriminatorily persecute individuals of a particular 
group without the objective to destroy the entire group qualifies as a crime against 
humanity while intent to destroy the entire group is genocide.75  On the other hand, it is 
the intent to destroy a group, in whole or in part, that differentiates genocide from 
homicide.76 
Another related issue to genocidal intent is the question of motive.  Although the 
draft of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Genocide Convention included motives,77 the final 
text of the Convention is silent on the question of genocidal motive.78  However, it 
remains a source of contention whether the words “as such” require the prosecutor to 
establish the perpetrator’s motive as well as the perpetrator’s intent.79  It appears that the 
                                                 
74 Persecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, supra note 61, p 79.  
75 Id., pp 67, 68. 
76 Mathew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty 
Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 415, 455 (1998). 
77 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, UN ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 6, U.N. Doc. 
E/794/Corr.1 (1948), art. 2 (defined genocide as a crime committed “on grounds of the national or racial 
origin, religious belief or political opinion of [the] members [of the group].” 
78 Final Report of the Commission of Experts for the former Yugoslavia, para. 97, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 
(1994); P.N. Drost, supra note 69, at 33 (noting that the Genocide Convention final text “does not mention 
motive beside the definition of the protected group which as such must be the object of persecution.”); 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeal Chamber, supra note 64, at  p 49 (“The existence of a personal motive does 
not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide.”).  
79 See Nehemiah Robinson, supra note 42, at 59-61; M. Lippman, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 41 (1985) (arguing that it is 
clear that under article II [of the Convention] the requisite intent to commit genocide must be accompanied 
by proof of motive … ”).  See however, Lawrence Leblanc, THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
GENOCIDE CONVENTION 80 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press 1991) (noting that “[n]either 
article 2 or any other article of the Convention refers to the motives that must lie behind the commission of 
such acts”).  The United Nations Genocide Convention and Political Groups: Should the United States 
Propose an Amendment?, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 268, 288-90 (1988). 
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general consensus is that since the ultimate objective of genocide is to destroy a protected 
group, the motive for such objective is irrelevant.80   
Adopting the Genocide Convention definition of the crime of genocide, the ICC 
Statute does not require the existence of motive for the crime of genocide.  No doubt, 
requiring the existence of motive would provide perpetrators with a defense to argue that 
their actions had been actuated by motives other than those enumerated.81 Once the 
requisite intent exists, it should make no difference whether that intent was fueled by 
personal animus toward the protected group, by hopes of financial gain, by political 
reasons, by a personal grudge against individual group members, by ideological 
resistance, to win a war, or indeed by any reason whatsoever.82  Thus, the underlying 
motives for the crime of genocide are irrelevant.  Motive can, however, serve as evidence 
toward proving the existence of genocidal intent,83 as well as nature and duration of 
punishment.84   
 
 
6.3.1.b. Extent of Intended Destruction   
Article 6 of the ICC Statute provides that an accused shall be guilty of the crime 
of genocide as defined by the Statute if committed with intent to destroy “in whole or in 
                                                 
80 P.N. Drost, supra note 69, at 84; John Webb, Genocide Treaty: Ethnic Cleansing, Substantive and 
Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the genocide Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Former 
Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 377, 391 (1993), cited with approval in Final Report of the 
Commission of Experts for Rwanda established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), Dec. 
9, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994) at paras. 158-59, (where the Commission opined that if the intent 
to destroy a group is established, the absence or presence of a political motive would not negate the intent 
to commit genocide); Hurst Hannum, International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence, 
11 HUM. RTS. Q. 82, 108-12 (1989); Lawrence LeBlanc, supra note 79, at 289-90; Paul Starkman, 
Genocide and International Law: Is There a Cause of Action?, 8 ASILS INT’L L.J. 1, 7 n.14 (1984). 
81 Mathew Lippman, supra note 78, at 454.  In any event, the line between motive and intent is often time 
blurred.  See Frederick M. Lawrence, The Case for a Federal Bias Crime Law, 16 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 
144, 156-57 (1999) (noting that motive and intent are not always analytically distinct). 
82 See, Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeals Chamber, supra note 64, p 49; P.N. Drost, supra note 69, at 83-84. 
83 See Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 55, p 93; Karadzic and Mladic, supra note 51, pp 94-95. 
84 P.N. Drost, supra note 69, at 83; ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 78. 
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part …”,   The meaning of the words “in part” has been a source of controversy.  On the 
one hand are those who express the view that proportionate scale and total number of 
victims should be read into the definition of genocide in order to prevent trivializing the 
gravity of the concept behind the crime of genocide.85  Other proponents of the 
“substantial part” test argue that the test is satisfied if it is the intent of the perpetrator to 
destroy a multitude of persons of the same group because of their belonging to this group, 
even though those persons constitute only part of a group either within a country or 
within a region or within a single community, provided the number is substantial.86  The 
Convention, they argue, is intended to deal with action against large numbers, not 
individuals even if they happen to possess the same group characteristics.87  The 
underlying argument being that the perpetrator need not target the entire group wherever 
                                                 
85 See Benjamin Whitaker (U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Commission), Whitaker Report, 
Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the Sub-Commission Has Been Concerned: Revised 
and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 16, 29-
30, Jul. 2, 1985, 38 UN ESCOR, Human Rights Sub-Comm’n on the Prevent. of Discrim. and Protect. of 
Minorities, 38th Sess.  U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (1985) [hereinafter Whitaker Report]; Malcolm 
Shaw, Genocide and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 797, 806 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989) (expressing the 
view that “the offence can only retain its awesome nature if the strictness of its definitional elements is 
retained and not in any way trivialized”).  Also, this appears to be the understanding of the U.S. as 
expressed by the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee pursuant to U.S. ratification of the 
Genocide Convention and in the U.S. implementing legislation which defines “substantial part” as “a part 
of a group of such numerical significance that the destruction or loss of that part would cause the 
destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part.” See Proxmire 
Act, 18 U.S.C. 1093(8) (2001). Similarly, the ILC had suggested that “the crime of genocide by its very 
nature requires the intention to destroy at least a substantial part of a particular group.”  See ILC Draft 
Code of Crimes, supra note 38, at 89.  
86 Nehemiah Robinson, supra note 42, at 62-63, (arguing that the word “in part” suggests that genocide 
could occur even if the victims constitute only a part of a group “provided that the number is substantial” 
(emphasis added)).  In the same vein, Raphael Lemkin seems to suggest that the Convention was designed 
to apply to large numbers of people and that the “destruction in part must be of such a substantial nature … 
so as to affect the entirety” (cited by Lawrence J. Leblanc, supra note 80, at 44, referring to a Hearing on 
the Genocide Convention before a Sub-Commission of the Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, 92nd 
Cong., 1st sess. 106-7 (1971)); and William A. Schabas, supra note 67, at 238, n. 171 (citing Letter from 
Raphael Lemkin to Dr. Kalijarvi, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 2 Executive Sessions of the 
Foreign Relations Committee 370 (1976)).   
87 Nehemiah Robinson, supra note 42, at 63.   
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they may exist, provided the perpetrator targets a substantial part of the group within a 
geographic location.88 
In furtherance of the above position, two ICTY cases have required that the 
alleged acts for which a defendant stands trial affect a “reasonably substantial number of 
the group relative to its total population” prior to making any inference of the “intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.”89 In 
Sikirica, the ICTY referred to this as a “quantitative criterion.”90  Similarly, the ICTR in 
Kayishema’s case interpreted the “in part” language as mandating “the intention to 
destroy a considerable number of individuals who are part of that group.”91  In 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, the court held that destroying a group “in part” required 
intent to “destroy a considerable number of individuals.”92  However, while the 
Kayishema and Ruzindana court considered the number of victims significant, it did not 
consider it to be a threshold issue.93 
Under this approach, the court must determine whether the number of victims 
constitute a significant number of victims or a significant percentage of the targeted 
group.  The court may do this by comparing the number of victims to the size of the 
overall group or by inquiring whether the number of victims alone, is sufficiently large to 
determine whether the victimization was “substantial”.94  This exercise must be 
conducted within the context of a particular geographical area, be it a city, a state, a 
                                                 
88 Nehemiah Robinson, supra note 42, at 63. 
89 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, supra note 65, pp 57, 67-75 (analyzing genocidal intent of defendant 
under ICTY Statute, supra note 30, art. 4,) and Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, supra note 61, pp 66-77.   
90 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, supra note 65, p 76. 
91 See Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 55, p 97. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. p 93.   
94 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, supra note 61, n.111. 
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region or a country taken into consideration the composition and size of that group within 
the particular geographical area.95   
Invariably, what constitutes a “substantial part” becomes relative and to that 
extent is fluid.  In situations where the group is broadly defined, the number or 
percentage of victims that would constitute a “significant part” will obviously be higher 
than where the group is narrowly defined.  For example, the Trial Chamber in Kayishema 
found the accused guilty of genocide, inter alia for the killing of at least 8,000 Tutsi at 
the Gatwaro Stadium in Kibuye Town and another 4,000-5,500 at a Church in Mubuga.96  
Both killings took place within the Kibuye prefecture, (one of eleven regional areas in 
Rwanda), which was in turn divided into nine communities.97  Because the Trial 
Chamber considered these killings within the limited geographical area of Kibuye 
prefecture, it found that the killings constitute “substantial part” of the Tusti ethnic group.   
Evidently, the result would be different if the Trial Chamber adopted a wider 
conception of the geographic area which looks at genocide as an act intended to destroy a 
substantial part of the protected group within a nation.98  If Kayishema intended only to 
rid the Kibuye prefect of Tutsi, he probably could not be convicted of genocide because 
the killings of over 13,500 individuals would probably not constitute acts against a 
“substantial part” of the overall Tutsi population in Rwanda, where minimum estimates 
of the number killed exceed 800,000.  The implication of this approach is that a 
perpetrator who deliberately targeted and killed more than 13,500 persons because of 
                                                 
95 See Nehemiah Robinson, supra note 42, at 63. 
96 Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 55, pp 531, 535, 556-563. 
97 Id., pp 2, 20. 
98 Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1093(8). 
 203 
their membership to a protected group would be found not guilty of genocide.  This 
outcome is nothing but judicial absurdity. 
Opposing the “substantial part” approach, are those who argue that the 
perpetrator’s genocidal intent may manifest from a deliberate desire to target only a 
limited number of individuals within a protected group because of the impact the 
destruction of those persons may have on the survival of the group as such.99  It is noted 
that the targeting of some group members is more harmful because their loss contributes 
more significantly to the destruction of the group.100  Thus, as suggested by the U.N. 
Commission of Experts, a focused attack on a specific segment of a protected group (i.e., 
political, business, or intellectual leaders or military or law enforcement personnel) “may 
be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the numbers killed.”101  This view 
recognizes the impact the elimination of the selected persons would have not just on the 
physical and biological survival of the group but also in the area of the group’s economic, 
social and cultural preservation.102   
The approach has been criticized for its underlying presumption that some human 
beings are inherently more valuable than others and therefore somewhat elitist.103  
However, suffice it to suggest that the evaluation if any, is not what their lives worth 
                                                 
99 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 
279, 323-24 (1994) (arguing that the concept of genocide “is sufficiently pliable to encompass not only the 
targeting of an entire group, as stated in the Convention, but also the targeting of certain segments of a 
given group, such as the Muslim elite or the Muslim women”). 
100 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, supra note 61, p 81 (noting that the extermination of the group’s 
leadership may make the reminder of the group more vulnerable to further victimization) 
101 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 
(1992), U.N. Doc. A/1994/674 at P 94 (1994). See also Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33-
T, p 587 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Aug. 2, 2001), 
http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/judgement/krs-tj010802e.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Krstic, 
Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, supra note 65, p 65. 
102 See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, supra note 61, p 81. 
103 See Steven R. Ratner, The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years: Contemporary Strategies for 
Combating a Crime Against Humanity, 92 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 1, 11 (1998). 
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personally, but its worth to the continued existence of the group.  Therefore, where the 
dislodgment of some selected individuals within the group will affect the foundational 
structure of the group such that the reminder of the group becomes endangered species, 
the court should find that the perpetrator possess the necessary genocidal intent.  
Adopting this reasoning, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Krstic104 after 
analyzing the effect on the group of an attack on all Bosnian Muslims men of military 
aged in Srebenica concluded that the intent to kill them constituted an intent to destroy in 
part the Bosnian Muslim group.105 
On the other hand, it has been argued that the number of victims should not be a 
threshold issue in defining the crime of genocide because it is the genocidal intent which 
makes the act genocide that is paramount, not the result of the act.106  It is sufficient to 
impose criminal responsibility for genocide if the accused aimed to destroy a large 
number of the group in a particular community even if the accused was unable to 
accomplish that objective.107  It follows therefore that a perpetrator can be guilty of 
genocide even in cases where the genocidal conduct resulted in the death of one victim 
provided the intent of the perpetrator is directed at the destruction of the entire group or 
part of it.108   
Thus, regardless of the approach adopted, the application should not apply to 
actual destruction but to the intent of the perpetrator.  In other words, if the intent of the 
                                                 
104 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgment, supra note 101.  
105 Id., p 595. 
106 William A. Schabas, supra note 67, at 233-34 (noting that “the actual quantity killed or injured remains 
a material fact, but what is really germane to the debate is whether the author of the crime intended to 
destroy the group ‘in whole or in part.’”)  
107 Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: Fundamental Principles 
Concerning the Elements of Genocide, AI Index: IOR 40/001/1999, February 17, 1999 available at: 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR400011999?open&of=ENG-385 
108 P.N. Drost, supra note 69, at 84-86. 
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perpetrator is to destroy a “substantial” or “large” or “considerable” or “selected” part of 
the group, the perpetrator is guilty of genocide.  The extent to which the perpetrator was 
successful in his or her design is inconsequential to determine whether genocide has 
occurred.  To ascribe a threshold number will result in situations where genocidal victims 
would be left without justice.   
In Sikirica, the ICTY in acquitting the accused on the charges of genocide for 
allegedly killing 1,000-1,400 Muslims held that “this would represent between 2% and 
2.8% of the Muslims in the Prijedor municipality and would hardly qualify as a 
‘reasonably substantial’ part of the Bosnian Muslim group in Prijedor.”109  Such decision 
is disturbing in light of the Trial Chamber’s observation that “the fact that the evidence 
does not establish that a substantial number of Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats were 
victims ... does not necessarily negate the inference that there was an intent to destroy in 
part the Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat group.”  The Trial Chamber consigned itself 
with the number of victims and therefore concluded that when the quantitative figures are 
“considered long with other aspects of the evidence, it becomes clear that this is not a 
case in which the intent to destroy a substantial number of Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian 
Croats can properly be inferred.”110   
If the ICTR Trial Chamber in Kayishema adopted the ICTY Trial Chamber’s 
approach in Sikirica’s case, Kayishema probably would not be convicted of genocide 
because the killings of over 13,500 individuals would probably not constitute a 
                                                 
109 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, supra note 65, p 72. 
110 Id., p 75. 
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“substantial part” of the overall Tutsi population in Rwanda, where minimum estimates 
of the number killed exceeds 800,000.111   
The ICC Preparatory Committee considered whether the words “intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part … [a] group” includes a specific intent to destroy more than a small 
number of individuals who are members of the group and rejected the idea of ascribing 
quantitative criteria to genocide because it would prohibit the application of genocide to 
attacks against small number of individuals carried out within a broader context.112  Thus, 
article 6 expressly requires only that the acts be committed with the “intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part,” a protected group.113  Therefore, adopting a literal interpretation of the 
plain meaning of article 6, there is no requirement that the accused have intended to 
destroy the whole of a group in a particular geographic region or that the aim must be the 
destruction of a substantial part of that group.  Adopting “quantitative criterion” as a 
threshold requirement undermines the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention on 
which article 6 of the ICC Statute is based.114    
Suffice it to note that the use of the plural in article 6(a-e) to enumerate the acts 
which constitute genocide may support the contention that more than one victim is 
                                                 
111 Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 55, pp 531, 535, 556-563. 
112 See Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy 
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 425 (2000) (citing Jordan J. Paust, Commentary on Parts 1 and 2 of the 
Zutphen Intersessional Draft: Article 5[20], Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, and Articles 19[C] 
and 26[M], Leader and Responsibility and Superior Orders, in OBSERVATIONS ON THE 
CONSOLIDATED ICC TEXT BEFORE THE FINAL SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY 
COMMITTEE (Leila Sadat Wexler ed., 1998). 
113 Id.  
114 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S 340 (1969), which 
states the “General Rule of Interpretation” that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.” 
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required.115  However, the use of the singular in the ICC Elements of Crimes appears to 
support the proposition that one victim suffices as genocide.116  Thus, it may be argued 
that the use of the plural in article 6(a-e) was not a deliberate attempt by ICC to require 
more than one victim for genocide conviction but a result of the decision to wholly adopt 
the definition of genocide from the Genocide Convention.  Perhaps, it may be good 
prosecution strategy to include conspiracy to commit genocide and attempted genocide as 
part of the counts in a charge of genocide such that where the Court is of the opinion that 
the degree of the perpetrator’s conduct is not sufficient for genocide, the Court may find 
the perpetrator guilty of attempted genocide or conspiracy to commit genocide or other 
associated genocidal crime.117 
While it is conceded that as a practical matter, “the evidentiary hurdles posed by 
the intent requirement would seem to preclude prosecution for acts directed at a small 
number of people”,118 the utility of the quantitative element should be consigned to its 
evidentiary value as a determinant to deciphering genocidal intent and making a prima 
facie case of genocide.119  It has correctly been observed that “[n]umbers do not count in 
cases of genocide”, … because “we cannot defend the establishment of a threshold above 
which a certain number of killings would become genocide per se”, … rather, “we must 
                                                 
115 See Whitaker Report, supra note 85, at 16 (discussing Article 2(a-e) of the Genocide Convention which 
is impair material with Article 6(a-e) of the ICC Statute). ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6(a-e) using the 
words such as “members”, “measures”, “births” and “children.” 
116 ICC Elements of Crimes uses the term “one or more persons”, See Elements of Crimes, adopted by the 
Assembly of States Parties at its first session in New York 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 at 
www.un.org/law/icc/asp/1stsession/ report/english/part_ii_b_e.pdf (visited October 7, 2005) [hereinafter 
ICC Elements of Crimes]. 
117 See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3). 
118 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, 2nd Ed., 39 (Oxford: Clarendon 
2000). 
119 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 523; Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment, supra 
note 55, p 93; Final Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405, para. 166 
(noting that “unless the intent were express … the intent to destroy the group would be difficult to prove, 
except in those instances where the number of people of the group affected was significant”  
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acknowledge that the higher the number of killings, the easier a prima facie case for 
genocide may be made.”120  Beyond this, application of quantitative criteria as a 
threshold issue to determine whether genocide has occurred will result in situations where 
genocidal destructions or killings which were mercifully ended by the perpetrators or 
stopped by rescue force before it gets out of proportion or meets the “prevailing” 
quantitative criterion may go unpunished.   
The submission to either the numeric test or percentage test to determine whether 
sufficient number of victims have been met in order to establish genocide is outside the 
purview of the power of the ICC judges given the admonition to avoid judicial 
activism.121  Any attempt to undertake an evaluation of quantitative analysis is an 
exercise in judicial activism.  Once intent to destroy a group wholly or in part has been 
established, it suffices that a crime of genocide has been made.  After all, genocide is an 
inchoate offence because it criminalizes certain acts committed with a particular mental 
state, whether or not those acts actually lead to the injury contemplated (i.e., attempts).122  
This is in contrast to result-oriented offenses, which require the act in question actually 
achieve a specified result (i.e., murder).123 
 
6.3.1.c. Protected Groups of the Crime of Genocide 
Under article II of the Genocide Convention which is repeated in article 6 of the 
ICC Statute, the only victims of genocide recognized under the Convention and Statute 
                                                 
120 Thomas W. Simon, supra note 34, at 254. 
121 See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 22. 
122 See, e.g., Andrew J. Ashworth, Defining Criminal Offences Without Harm, in CRIMINAL LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF J.C. SMITH 7, 8 (Peter Smith ed., 1987). 
123 Id. 
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are persons who are members of national, ethnical, racial or religious groups.124  Any of 
the prohibited acts under article II of the Convention or article 6 of the ICC committed 
against an individual only becomes a crime of genocide if the individual is a member of 
one of the four protected groups and the act was done with the intent to destroy the group 
in whole or in part.125  Thus, it is only the protected groups that are considered victims of 
the crime of genocide and not individual members of the group.126  Therefore, the 
prohibited acts are not genocide if carried against members of the group without the 
intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.127  
During the drafting of the Genocide Convention, there were debates on whether 
the protected groups should include a political, social, economic, cultural, and any other 
group in the definition of genocide.  Under Raphael Lemkin’s conception of genocide, an 
attack directed on the various aspects of human existence such as physical, political, 
                                                 
124 Genocide Convention, supra note 26, art. II; ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6. 
125 Raphael Lemkin, supra note 24, at 79 (arguing that “[g]enocide is directed against the national group as 
an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as 
members of the national group”). 
126 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 521; see also 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, supra 
note 38 (“The group itself is the ultimate target or intended victim of this type of massive criminal 
conduct... The intention must be to destroy the group ‘as such’, meaning as a separate and distinct entity.”); 
United Nations, Relations Between the Convention on Genocide on the One Hand and the Formulation of 
the Nuremberg Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on 
the Other, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/3/Rev.1 (1948) (“The victim of the crime of genocide is a human group. It is 
not a greater or smaller number of individuals who are affected for a particular reason but a group as 
such.”), quoted in Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgment, supra note 101, p 552 n.1222; William A. Schabas, supra 
note 67, at 231; Nehemiah Robinson, supra note 42, at 58 (noting that the main characteristic of Genocide 
is its object: the act must be directed toward the destruction of a group. Groups consist of individuals, and 
therefore destructive action must, in the last analysis, be taken against individuals. However, these 
individuals are important not per se but only as members of the group to which they belong.).  
127 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL.W. INT’L L.J. 201, at 251 (1979); see also 
Bunyan Bryant, Substantive Scope of the Convention, 16 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 686, 691 (1975) explaining the 
scope of article II:  
 
From the ordinary meaning of article II of the Genocide Convention, it would seem that the killing of a single 
person could be considered genocide if the killing were done with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the 
national, ethical, racial, or religious group of which the victim was a member. On the other hand, without this 
intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part, mass killings of members of the group would presumably not 
constitute genocide under the Convention.  
Id. at 691. 
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social, biological, cultural will qualify as genocide.128  Lemkin campaigned for the 
criminalization of genocide to provide protection for racial, national, and religious groups 
whose cultural, political, social, or physical existence was imperiled, regardless of 
whether the acts were committed in time of peace or war.129  Consistent with Lemkin’s 
definition of genocide, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 96(1) adopted a non-
exhaustive enumeration of various groups that may be protected against the crime of 
genocide.130  Resolution 96(1) stated that racial, religious, political, and other groups had 
been historically targeted for genocide, and the punishment of this crime was of 
international concern.131  The resolution affirmed that genocide was an offense whether 
the perpetrator committed it on religious, racial, political, or any other grounds.132   
Although these principles enunciated in Resolution 96(1) were part of the 
reference submitted to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly which considered 
the drafting of the Genocide Convention, the committee produced a narrow definition of 
genocide that was wildly divergent from the original resolution as well as the definition 
originally derived by Raphael Lemkin.133  During the Committee’s hearing, the matter of 
the groups to be included in the definition of genocide, especially the inclusion of 
                                                 
128 Raphael Lemkin, supra note 24, at 79.  Lemkin defined genocide as “a coordinated plan of different 
actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups. . . . The objectives 
of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions of culture, language, national 
feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal 
security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.”  Id. 
129 Id. 
130 G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. GAOR 1st Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1947) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 
96(1)]. 
131 Id., at 189. 
132 Id. 
133 Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot, 
106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2264 (1997). 
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political group, was one of the most debated provisions.134  There was tension between 
the desire to condemn the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and the aspiration to 
craft a Convention that was sufficiently expansive to anticipate and prevent future acts of 
genocide.135   
The delegates opposed to broad definition of genocide wanted the definition to 
include only groups that were based on perceived “homogeneity and stability.”136  On 
this basis, the USSR argued that political groups unlike a national, racial or religious 
group, lacked stability or permanence and has no common characteristic features.137  
Additionally, it has been suggested that the USSR opposed the inclusion of political or 
social groups because Stalin’s government had already targeted both.138  It was suggested 
that the inclusion of political and other groups may deter some States from ratifying the 
Convention because States would reject “such limitations to their right to suppress 
internal disturbances.”139    
Delegates in support of defining genocide to include political and other groups 
questioned the “permanence and stable” criterion for inclusion of national or religious 
groups under the definition of genocide arguing that the members of these groups are 
usually free to leave at any time.140  They noted that “strife between nations has now 
been superseded by strife between ideologies.  Men no longer destroyed for reasons of 
national, racial, or religious hatred, but in the name of ideas and the faith to which they 
                                                 
134 Frank M. Afflitto & Margaret Vandiver, The Political Determinants of Ethnic Genocide, in ANATOMY 
OF GENOCIDE: STATE SPONSORED MASS KILLINGS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 7 
(Alexandre Kimenyi & Otis L. Scott eds., 2001); Beth V. Schaack, supra note 133, at 2264.  
135 Louis Henkin et al., International Law 448 (3d ed. 1993).  
136 Id. (quoting U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 63d mtg. at 6 (1948)). 
137 U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 64d mtg. at 19 (1948)). 
138 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 212.  
139 U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 65th mtg. at 21 (1948).   
140 Beth V. Schaack, supra note 133, at 2265.  
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gave birth.”141  The delegates noted that while the Nazis had destroyed millions of human 
beings in the Netherlands and elsewhere on account of their race or their nationality, they 
had also destroyed a great many others for their political opinions.  Similarly, the Nazis 
had also attacked the members of the Socialist and Communist parties as well as their 
parliamentary representatives in Germany.142  
The opposition view was not enough to sway the Committee which agreed to 
adopt a definition of genocide that recognizes fewer groups than was contained in 
Lemkin’s definition of genocide and Resolution 96(1).143 The Committee justified the 
inclusion of only a national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups on the basis that each of 
the said groups have historically been target of animosity and each group is characterized 
by cohesiveness, homogeneity, inevitability of membership, stability, and tradition.144 It 
noted that membership of a political group is a matter of personal choice and as such not 
stable enough to be afforded protection under the statute.145   
In 1993 and 1994, attempts to expand the definition of genocide to include 
political and other groups were unsuccessful as the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR 
respectively, ultimately adopted the definition of genocide as contained in article II of the 
Convention.146  Similarly, during the Rome Conference, some delegates suggested 
                                                 
141 Beth V. Schaack, supra note 133, at 2265 (quoting U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 74th mtg. at 103 
(1948)). 
142 Id. (quoting U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 74th mtg. at 100 (1948)). 
143 The Sixth Committee accepted the argument that the inclusion of groups that are not readily 
unidentifiable such as political groups would cause international interferences in the domestic political 
affairs of states.  See U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.69/128 (1948). 
144 Frank M. Afflitto & Margaret Vandiver, The Political Determinants of Ethnic Genocide, in Anatomy of 
Genocide: State Sponsored Mass Killings in the Twentieth Century 7 (Alexandre Kimenyi & Otis L. Scott 
eds., 2001). 
145 Id. 
146 ICTY Statute, supra note 30, art. 4 and ICTR Statute, supra note 31, art. 2. 
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expanding the Convention definition of genocide to include political and social groups147 
but in the end, the Preparatory Committee for the ICC Statute failed to support any 
changes to article II of the Genocide Convention.148  Roman Kolodkin, a representative 
of the Russian Federation, thought that the “idea of amending the definition to include 
social and political groups would be counter-productive” and John Hope of the United 
Sates asserted that to “try to add to that definition would just create controversy.”149  Mr. 
Hope therefore suggested that “[t]he Preparatory Committee should resist the temptation 
to add new categories to the definition included in the Genocide Convention.”150  The 
French representative thought that “the crime of genocide should be defined by adopting 
the definition in the 1948 Convention. The desire to improve the wording contained in 
that Convention was not appropriate at present.”151  
As a result of the above opposition, the Committee concluded that expanding the 
definition of genocide would jeopardize the consensus or at least affect widespread 
support for the Rome Statute.152 With apprehensions like these in mind, the delegates at 
                                                 
147 H. von Hebel and D. Robinson, supra note 28, at 89.  The Japanese representative opined that “caution 
needed to be exercised since that Convention . . . had only been acted upon three times . . . . It was worth 
considering whether the Genocide Convention definition was fully operational . . . .” See Press Release, 1st 
Preparatory Committee on Establishment of International Criminal Court, Preparatory Committee For 
Establishment of International Criminal Court Discusses Definitions of “Genocide,” “Crimes Against 
Humanity” (Mar. 25, 1996), at http://www.iccnow.org/romearchive/documentsreportsprepcmt1.html 
Similar attempts by some NGOs to address what they perceived as the limitations in the Convention 
definition of genocide by including political, social, and other identifiable groups in the list of the protected 
persons, was rejected by overwhelming support to refrain from opening the definitional debate.  See 
Timothy L.H. McCormick & Sue Robertson, Jurisdictional Aspects of the Rome Statute for the New 
International Criminal Court, 23 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 635, 647 (1999). 
148 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 213-14; see generally Press Release, 1st Preparatory 
Committee on Establishment of International Criminal Court, Preparatory Committee on Establishment of 
International Criminal Court Begins First Session (Mar. 25, 1996) U.N. Press Release L/27614 (1996), at  
http://www.iccnow.org/romearchive/documentsreportsprepcmt1.html [hereinafter Preparatory Committee 
First Session]. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id.  
152 See Preparatory Committee on Establishment of International Criminal Court Begins First Session, Mar. 
25, 1996, U.N. Press Release L/27614 (1996). 
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the preparatory committee decided not to expand the group but to treat persecution on 
social and political grounds as crimes against humanity.153  The Preparatory Committee 
argued that its decision not to expand the definition of genocide is consistent with the 
political pragmatism and international recognition of the peremptory status of the 
prohibition of genocide.154   
Contrast with the view that the exclusion of political groups from the Genocide 
Convention “contravenes the customary jus cogens prohibition of genocide, which 
protects political groups in addition to national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups.”155  
Beth Van Schaack pointed inter alia to Resolution 96(1) and referred to some States’ 
national laws as instances where genocide prohibition extended beyond the four groups 
mentioned in the Convention.156   
However, in view of the reluctance of the international community to expand the 
definition of genocide in the Convention and the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and the 
ICC, it is plausible to suggest that “evidence of state practice to date appears insufficient 
to support the proposition that the definition of genocide under customary international 
                                                 
153 See Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, supra note 112, at 425; ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 
7(1)(h). 
154 Id. 
155 Beth Van Schaack, supra note 133, at 2280 (arguing that “support for this argument comes from 
positive law sources, the application of analogous international legal norms, the dictates of public 
sentiment, and the lack of a legally justifiable principle to justify the exclusion of political groups’).  Also 
see, Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 286, 306 (1999) (suggesting that “[t]here is much to be said for the view that a customary-law 
concept of genocide is much broader than the definition of that crime contained in the Genocide 
Convention. Acts of the kind mentioned in the convention targeting a group not falling within the narrow 
categories expressly mentioned or impliedly included in the convention’s definition of genocide would 
nevertheless be genocide under customary international law, provided that genocidal intent can be 
demonstrated. …  However, jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals, including the ICC, is limited to 
the Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide. Therefore, prosecutions for genocide under customary 
international law in cases falling outside that definition can only occur in municipal criminal courts”). 
156 Beth Van Schaack, supra note 133, at 2281.   
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law is broader than that in the Convention …”157  These international treaties more than 
any other source of international law serves as clear indicators of international law 
because they unequivocally bind the States that have ratified them.158  Thus, the 
prohibition of genocide that has attained the status of jus cogens is the prohibition of the 
crime of genocide as defined in Article II of the Convention which is reproduced in 
article 6 of the ICC Statute.159  
 
6.3.1.1. Defining the Composition and Application of the Protected Groups 
Within the four categories of protected national, religious, ethnic and racial 
groups covered by the Statute, there has been much difficulty defining the precise 
contours of each of the protected groups under the Convention.  Nonetheless, attempts 
have been made to define these groups based on certain characteristics that are thought to 
be common to each of the group.  In Nottebohm Case, the International Court of Justice 
defined nationality as: 
a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a 
genuine connection of existence, interests, and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may 
be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the 
individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law 
                                                 
157 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 42.  See also, Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 (listing the sources of international law as; 
international conventions, international custom, as evidenced by state practice; general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists); The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (where the Supreme Court of the United States demonstrated the classical 
method for ascertaining international legal principles by analyzing several centuries of interactions between 
individual nations); G. Schwarzenberger & E. Brown, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 
(6th ed. 1976)(describing how customary principles are ascertained). 
158 Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Determining 
Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 Duke L.J. 876, 878 (1983).  See also, 
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
Introductory Note at 16 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) (listing customary law and treaties as the two principal 
sources of international law). 
159 Machteld Boot, GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES: NULLEM CRIMEN 
SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 428 (Intersentia: New York, 2002). 
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or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely 
connected to the population of the State conferring nationality 
than with that of any other State.160 
 
The Trial Chamber of the ICTR in Akayesu, adopting the definition of the ICJ 
defined a “national group” as “a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal 
bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.”161  On 
the other hand, the Proxmire Act defines a national group as one “whose identity as such 
is distinctive in terms of nationality or national origins.”162   
An ethnic group has been generally defined as “a group whose members share a 
common language or culture.”163  The idea that ethnic groups share cultural and linguistic 
identity appears to find support from the travaux preparatoires of the Genocide 
Convention.164  On the other hand, a racial group has been conventionally defined on 
basis of “the hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, 
irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors.”165  An ethnic group 
differs from a racial group because ethnic groups are bonded by cultural values166 while a 
racial group is identified primarily by “external, physical features and appearance ...”167  
                                                 
160 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala),1955 I.C.J. REP. 4, 23 (6 April 1955) (Second Phase). 
Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
161 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 512. 
162 Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1093(6). 
163 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 513; Mathew Lippman, supra note 78, at 456. 
164 See U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 73rd mtg. at 97-98 (1948) (Mr. Petren, Swed.); U.N. GAOR 6th 
Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg. at 115-16, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (1948) (Mr. Petren, Swed.). 
165 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 514.  Also see, Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1093(6) 
(which defines racial groups as “a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of 
physical characteristics or biological descent”). 
166 See Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 and Corr. 1-3, P 58 (1986), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. 
COMM’N 53, 60, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1986/Add.1 (1986). 
167 Pieter N. Drost, THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE 62 (1959). 
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The ICTR defines a religious group as one “whose members share the same 
religion, denomination or mode of worship.”168  Elsewhere, a religious group was defined 
as one whose members have a “common religious creed, beliefs, doctrines, practices or 
rituals.”169  It is an open question whether the definition of religious group includes 
theistic, agnostic, and atheistic communities.170  For purposes of genocide, avoiding the 
perplexities attending the concept of “religion” in this instance is innocuous.171  
Application of the these conventional definition nonetheless remains problematic 
especially in situations where there is a congruence of characteristics between the 
perpetrators and the victims which may qualify both into one or two protected groups.  
As the Trial Chamber of the ICTR noted in the case of Prosecutor v. Rutaganda: 
The concepts of national, ethnical, racial and religious groups 
have been researched extensively and ... at present, there are no 
generally and internationally accepted precise definitions thereof. 
Each of these concepts must be assessed in the light of a 
particular political, social, and cultural context.172 
 
An example of such difficulty presented itself in the trial of Akayesu before the 
Trial Chamber of the ICTR.  The Trial Chamber had to decide whether the Rwandan 
                                                 
168 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 515. 
169 Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1093(7) (1988) (emphasis added). 
170 Mathew Lippman, supra note 78, at 455.  Also see, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 
515; Mathew Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the Century - The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of 
the new Millennium, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 467, 475 (2001); See Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR, 
73d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 51, at 171, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981) (“Everyone shall have the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or 
whatever belief of his choice ... .”). 
171 Those perplexities appear, for example, in a South African case, Wittmann v. Deutscher Schulverein, 
Pretoria and Others, identifying “religion” with a “system of faith and worship” as “the human recognition 
of superhuman controlling power and especially of a personal God or gods entitled to obedience and 
worship.” The judgment then mentions “Jewish, Christian, Moslem, Buddhist and other faiths practicing 
their religion ....”as instances of religious communities. Buddhism is, however, a non-theistic religion and 
would therefore not qualify as a “religion” under above circumscription. Wittmann v. Deutscher 
Schulverein, Pretoria and Others, 1998 (4) SA 423 (T), at 449 (South Africa 1998). 
172 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, P 56 (ICTR Trial Chamber Dec. 6, 1999), available at 
www.ictr.org; See also Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33 (ICTY Trial Chamber Aug. 2, 2001) P 557, 
available at www.un.org/icty (“A group’s cultural, religious, ethnical, or national characteristics must be 
identified within the socio-historic context which it inhabits.”) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Rutaganda]. 
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Tutsis constituted a protected group under the Genocide Convention.  Since it is given 
that the Tutsis and the Hutus share the same nationality, race, and religion, the Trial 
Chamber has to find that the Rwandan Tutsis are of a different ethnic group from the 
Rwandan Hutus.  To do this, the Trial Chamber would have to find that Tutsis and the 
Hutus do not share a common cultural and linguistic identity.  This is hardly the case 
since the Tutsis could not be significantly distinguished from the Hutus in terms of 
language and culture.173  Realizing this, the Trial Chamber looked beyond the plain text 
of the Genocide Convention (and its own articulation of the characteristics of an ethnic 
group) and analyzed the Convention’s drafting history.  The Trial Chamber argued that it 
was “particularly important to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide 
Convention, which according to the travaux preparatoires, was patently to ensure the 
protection of any stable and permanent group.”174 
Analyzing the traveux preparatories of the Genocide Convention, the Rwandan 
Tribunal proffered that the common denominator among protected groups is involuntary 
membership, which must be ‘determined by birth,’ “in a continuous and often 
irremediable manner.”175  The Trial Chamber further recognized that the intent to protect 
extends beyond the four enumerated groups, reaching any group similar in terms of its 
stability and permanence.176  Applying this analysis, the tribunal found that Tutsi 
                                                 
173 William A. Schabas, Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting Interpretations from 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 6 ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L 375, 379 (2000); Guglielmo 
Verdirame, The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 49 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 578, 592 (2000) (stating that Kinyarwanda, a tonal language of the Bantu family, is spoken by both 
Hutus and Tutsis, and that there is no difference in the customary practices of the two groups). 
174 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 516 (emphasis added).  Diane Marie Amann, 
International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Akayesu - Case ICTR-96-4-T - International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, September 2, 1998, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 195, 196 (1999).  
175 William A. Schabas, supra note 173, at 379; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 511. 
176 Diane Marie Amann, supra note 174, at 196. 
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constituted a distinct and stable ethnic group even though they shared language, society, 
and culture with the Hutu that massacred them.177   
The Trial Chamber approach has been criticized as a contradiction of the 
Genocide Convention and the conventional definition of ethnicity.178  It is seen as an 
attempt to define genocide by analogy which will include all permanent and stable 
groups.179  It has been argued that the supposed ethnic differences between the Tutsis and 
the Hutus did not actually exist,180 and that the only obvious divide between the Tutsis 
and the Hutus was based on social, economic, and political factors.181  However, a 
financial or class distinction was not mentioned in the Genocide Convention as a means 
of classifying groups into one of the four enumerated categories.  Nevertheless, the ICTR 
was determined not to let what it considers an obvious genocide to go unpunished, 
therefore the ICTR used constructive ethnicity to force the two groups into different 
ethnic classifications.182    
Be that as it may, it should be noted that the Trial Chamber did not create 
additional group beyond the four groups stated in the Convention.  Rather, the Trial 
                                                 
177 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, pp 122, 124, at 702, and n.56.  For the contrary view, 
see Tara Sapru, Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security Council Into the 
Rwandan Crisis, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 329, 343-44 (1997) (arguing that Tutsi do not qualify as a distinct 
ethnic, national, religious or racial group). 
178 Machteld Boot, supra note 159, at 432; Johan D. van der Vyver, supra note 155, at 302 (quoting 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 512). 
179 Johan D. van der Vyver, supra note 155, at 304; Machteld Boot, supra note 159, at 431. 
180 William A. Schabas, supra note 173, at 379 (noting that “distinguishing between them was so difficult 
that the Belgian colonizers established a system of identity cards, and determined ‘ethnic origin’ based on 
the number of cattle owned by a family”); Diane Marie Amann, supra note 174, at 196 (observing that 
decades of discrimination by custom of “patrilineal descent” and by laws that required each person to be 
identified by their membership in either the Hutu or Tutsi group led the Tutsis to be regarded as a distinct, 
stable and permanent group). 
181 William A. Schabas, supra note 173, at 379; See, e.g., Mariann Meier Wang, The International Tribunal 
for Rwanda: Opportunities for Clarification, Opportunities for Impact, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
177, 179 (1995). 
182 Johan D. van der Vyver Manuscript, supra note 155, at 16 (noting that the ICTR considered that the 
victims were selected not as individuals, but rather as members of an involuntary group). 
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Chamber found that Tutsi witnesses testified credibly as to their separate ethnic 
identity.183  The Trial Chamber also determined that the former Belgian colonizers in 
Rwanda distinguished between Hutu and Tutsi.184  Based on “the facts brought to its 
attention during the trial,”185 the ICTR ruled that “Tutsi did indeed constitute a stable and 
permanent [ethnic] group and were identified as such by all.”186  Thus, the Trial Chamber 
did not suggest that all “permanent and stable” groups should automatically be included 
in the definition of genocide.  The “permanent and stable” group still has to satisfy the 
requirement of involuntary membership, which must be ‘determined by birth,’ “in a 
continuous and often irremediable manner.187  However, to be consistent with the 
Convention, the “permanent and stable” group must fit into one of the four groups since 
the Convention’s list of protected groups is exhaustive. 
Further, while the Trial Chamber’s approach appears to contradict its definition of 
ethnicity, it seems that this contradiction is not so much about the limitation of the 
Convention but an exposure of the inadequacy of the conventional definition of the 
protected groups in general.  Recognizing this limitation, the ICTR in Kayishema and 
Ruzindana suggested that an ethnic group should comprise “one whose members share a 
common language or culture” as well as “a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self 
identification); or, a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the 
crimes (identification by others).”188  In view of this obvious problem, the Trial Chamber 
of the ICTY in Jelisic rejected the objective approach to determining group status.189  It 
                                                 
183 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 56. 
184 Id. at p 122. 
185 Id. at p 702. 
186 Id. (emphasis added). 
187 William A. Schabas, supra note 173, at 379; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 511. 
188 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgment, supra note 55, p 98. 
189 See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, supra note 61, p 61. 
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may be appropriate to adopt a subjective approach to the definition of protected groups as 
suggested by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Jelisic where the Tribunal stated as 
follows: 
[a]lthough the objective determination of a religious group still 
remains possible, to attempt to define a national, ethnical or racial 
group today using objective and scientifically irresponsible 
criteria would be a perilous exercise whose result would not 
necessarily correspond to the perception of the persons concerned 
by such categorization.  Therefore, it is more appropriate to 
evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or racial group from the 
point of view of those persons who wish to single that group out 
from the rest of the community. The Trial Chamber consequently 
elects to evaluate membership in a national, ethnical or racial 
group using a subjective criterion.190   
 
The Trial Chamber was convinced that “it is the stigmatisation of a group as a 
distinct national, ethnical or racial unit by the community which allows it to be 
determined whether a targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group 
in the eyes of the alleged perpetrators.”191  The subjective approach was adopted by the 
ICTR in the Rutagandan192 and Musema193 cases.  The subjective theory recognizes that 
perpetrators of genocide can stigmatize, and thus define, the victim group positively or 
negatively. Positive stigmatization distinguishes the target group based on the 
perpetrator’s assessment of the group’s peculiar characteristics (i.e., dark skin, attending 
Synagogue, social and cultural traits, etc.).194  On the other hand, by negative 
stigmatization, the perpetrator defines the characteristics of his or her national, ethnical, 
                                                 
190 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, supra note 61, p 70. (The Trial Chamber did not explain why it claimed that 
objective determination of religious groups is still possible.  As noted above, religious characteristics seem 
no less and no more immutable than those of nationality, ethnicity or race). 
191 Id., p 70. 
192 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 172, p 55. 
193 Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 67, p 161. 
194 Id., p 71. 
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racial, or religious group and disassociates others that lack those characteristics.195  The 
rejected individuals form a distinct (and protected) group by virtue of their exclusion.196   
Although the Convention does not require perpetrators to belong to a different 
group than the victims,197 a case of genocide where the victim and perpetrator belonged 
to the same group may be difficult to establish because the perpetrator is likely to have 
chosen the victims on grounds besides nationality, ethnicity, religion or race.198  For 
example, the killing of moderate Hutus in Rwanda by Hutus does not qualify as genocide 
because the moderate Hutus were persecuted because of their perceived political 
alignment or social association with the Tutsis.  Negatively stigmatized or not, groups so-
targeted based upon such other criteria do not qualify for protection under the 
Convention.199 
Since “[g]enocide is a crime that we punish, not based upon the underlying acts 
themselves (murder, assault, etc.), but based upon the special intent with which those acts 
were accomplished, … [w]ithout a subjective definition, the aims of the Convention are 
thwarted because the conduct and intentions of the perpetrator, which we seek to punish, 
may bear no relation to an “objective” measure of the group attacked.”200  Therefore, 
neither the objective nor the subjective approach should be dispositive.  As the Jelisic 
court noted, the “perilous exercise” of defining groups “using objective and scientifically 
irreproachable criteria” does not necessarily lead to sensible results corresponding “to the 
                                                 
195 Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 67, p 71. 
196 Id.  See, Helen Fein, GENOCIDE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (1993) (arguing that 
negative stigmatization could be used to “[make] the case that genocide could be committed by perpetrators 
of the same ethnicity who justified their murders by an ideology which reclassified and labeled the victims, 
discriminating their collaborators and those to be saved as a new kind of people..”). 
197 Whitaker Report, supra note 85, at 37.  
198 David L. Nersessian, The Razor’s Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups Under the Genocide 
Convention, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 293, 310 (2003). 
199 Id. 
200 Id., at 313-14.  
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perceptions of the persons concerned by such categorization.”201  On the other hand, the 
group may exist solely because the perpetrators conceived of it as a group and not 
because of a predefined description.202  Perpetrators often irrationally and inconsistently 
define the victim group.203  Therefore, as noted by the Trial Chamber in Bagilishema: 
 The Chamber notes that the concepts of national, ethnical, racial, 
and religious groups enjoy no generally or internationally 
accepted definition. Each of these concepts must be assessed in 
the light of a particular political, social, historical, and cultural 
context. Although membership of the targeted group must be an 
objective feature of the society in question, there is also a 
subjective dimension. A group may not have precisely defined 
boundaries and there may be occasions when it is difficult to give 
a definitive answer as to whether or not a victim was a member 
of a protected group. Moreover, the perpetrators of genocide may 
characterize the targeted group in ways that do not fully 
correspond to conceptions of the group shared generally, or by 
other segments of society. In such a case, the Chamber is of the 
opinion that, on the evidence, if a victim was perceived by a 
perpetrator as belonging to a protected group, the victim could be 
considered by the Chamber as a member of the protected group, 
for the purposes of genocide.204 
 
Thus, as has been suggested by both the Trial Chambers of the ICTY and ICTR, 
the determination of whether a particular group may be considered protected from the 
crime of genocide should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account both the 
relevant evidence proffered and the specific political, social and cultural context in which 
the acts allegedly took place.205  It is better to redefine the law than weaken it by denying 
                                                 
201 See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, supra note 61, p 70; Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, pp 53-77 (ICTY 
Appeal Chamber Jul. 5, 2001), available at www.un.org/icty [hereinafter Jelisic (AC)]. 
202 Thomas W. Simon, supra note 34, at 245.  
203 Id. 
204 See Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T (ICTR Appeal Chamber Jul. 3, 2002), 
available at www.ictr.org [hereinafter Bagilishema]. P 65. See also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 
178, p 56; Prosecutor v. Krstic, supra note 101, p 557 (“The Chamber identifies the relevant group by using 
as a criterion the stigmatization of the group, notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis of its 
perceived national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics”). 
205 Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 67, p 162; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 122, at 
702, and n.56; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 178, p 58.  
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its insufficiency.  In any event, whatever approach is adopted, the inquiry should be 
limited to whether the group is within any of the four protected groups under the 
Convention.206  For it is without doubt that under a strict application of the Convention 
and the ICC as presently worded, the crime of genocide is only applicable to a national, 
ethnical, racial and religious group.207  
 
 
6.3.2. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
 
6.3.2.a. The Development of the Legal Prohibition of Crimes Against Humanity 
 
I. Before World War II 
Unlike the crime of genocide which was defined in the Genocide Convention of 
1948 and remained unchanged for nearly half a century by the time the ICC Statute was 
been drafted, crimes against humanity have never been consistently defined in a single 
treaty.  On the contrary, the definition and development of crimes against humanity has 
continue to evolve and clarified in several legal international instruments since these 
crimes first received international legal recognition in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 
1868.208  Noting that the Declaration was aimed at limiting the use of explosives or 
incendiary projectiles as “contrary to the laws of humanity”, the parties agreed to draw up 
additional instruments “in view of future improvements which science may effect in the 
armament of troops, in order to maintain the principles which they have established, and 
                                                 
206 See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, supra note 61, pp 69-72. 
207 See, Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the Failure 
of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 793, 821-22 (1997) 
(observing that there is no protection for gender-based groups under the Genocide Convention). 
208 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight,  
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds, 30-31 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 2d ed., 1989) [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868]. 
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to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity.”209  However, no 
additional instrument was drawn until the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 
unanimously adopted the Martens clause.210  The Martens clause which forms part of the 
preamble to the Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land 
provides as follows: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High 
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that, in cases not 
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the 
principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity 
and the requirements of the public conscience.211 
 
The Martens clause was reaffirmed by the Contracting Parties to the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV concerning the Law and Customs of War on Land.212  Similarly, the 
Martens clause was incorporated virtually unchanged in subsequent humanitarian law 
instruments such as the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols I and 
II.213  Although the Martens Clause did not contain the particular acts which are 
prohibited as crimes against humanity, it is regarded as the first articulation of “the notion 
                                                 
209 St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, supra note 208. 
210 The Martens Clause is named after Fyodor Martens, the Russian diplomat and jurist who drafted it at the 
first Hague Conference to address the laws of war.  
211 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899, Preamble, para. 9. 
212 Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Preamble, Annex to the 
Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, [hereinafter 
1907 Hague Convention IV], reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 638 (1992). (A rephrased version of the Martens clause states that 
“Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it 
expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the 
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the laws of nations, as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the 
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213 First Geneva Convention, art. 63; Second Geneva Convention, art. 62; Third Geneva Convention, art. 
142; Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 158; Additional Protocol I, Art. 1 (2); and Additional Protocol II, 
Preamble. 
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that international law encompassed transcendental humanitarian principles that existed 
beyond conventional law.”214 
However, the origin of individual criminal responsibility for crimes against 
humanity is traced back to the failed attempts to hold members of the Turkish 
government responsible for the massacres of the Armenians during World War I.215  
After World War I, the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia on May 24, 
1915, issued a joint declaration denouncing the Ottoman Empire’s massacre of the 
Armenians in Turkey as “crimes against humanity and civilization,” for which the Allied 
government would hold personally responsible “all members of the Ottoman government 
and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.”216  On January 25, 1919, 
the Allied governments set up a fifteen member Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws and 
Customs of War which concluded inter alia, that the Central Empires together with their 
allies, Turkey and Bulgaria acted in barbarous or illegitimate methods “in violation of the 
established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity”.217   
                                                 
214 Beth Van Schaak, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 
COLUM. J. TRANSNA’L L., 787, 795-97 (1999). 
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216 Declaration of France, Great Britain and Russia, May 24, 1915, (cited in Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide 
as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary 
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217 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Report 
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March 1919, Conference of Paris 1919, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of 
International Law, Pamphlet No. 32, reprinted in 14 Am. J. Int’l L. (1920) (Supp.), p. 95, 123-124; Treaty 
of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany  Versailles, June 28, 1919, arts 227-230, 
11 Martens (3d) 323, reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 216, at 551-52 [hereinafter Versailles 
Treaty]. The military tribunals were to be national tribunals established by the states of the victim’s 
nationality or, if the victims were of more than one nationality, international and composed of members of 
military tribunals of the states of the victims. Versailles Treaty, Art. 229. See generally James F. Willis, 
PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG (1982). 
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The 1919 Peace Conference Commission for the first time indicated that 
violations of the laws of humanity include crimes such as murders and massacres, 
systematic terrorism, putting hostages to death, torture of civilians, deliberate starvation 
of civilians, rape, abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution, 
deportation of civilians, internment of civilians under inhuman conditions, forced labor of 
civilians in connection with the military operations of the enemy, imposition of collective 
penalties and deliberate bombardment of undefended places and hospitals.218  
Consequently, the 1919 Peace Conference Commission recommended that “all 
persons belonging to enemy countries . . . who have been guilty of offences against the 
laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution.”219  
However, the U.S. members of the Commission argued against criminal prosecution 
because in their view, the standard of laws and principles of humanity was too vague to 
provide individuals adequate notice of the crime and as such, the concept of laws of 
humanity was ‘not the object of punishment by a court of justice’.220  Thus, Versailles 
Treaty concluded shortly by the Allied Powers did not include any provision for the 
prosecution of violators of crimes against humanity.221  Eventually, no person was 
prosecuted for violations of the laws of war and the laws of humanity in the Ottoman 
Empire because of national opposition and Allied loss of interest.222 
                                                 
218 1919 Peace Conference Commission Report, supra note 217, at pp. 95, 114-115 (the factual allegations 
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II.  “Crimes Against Humanity” in the Nuremberg Charter, Control Council 
Law No. 10, and the Tokyo Charter 
Although the 1919 Conference recommended that violations of the laws of 
humanity covers offenses committed on the territory of Germany and its Allies against 
their own nationals, during World War II, there was no clearly identified law of war 
which protected victims who share the same nationality with the accused.  However, the 
degree of Germany’s atrocities against its nationals during World War II, particularly, its 
desire to exterminate all persons of Jewish descent, acted as a catalyst for the first attempt 
to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity.  After the end of World War II, the 
Allied Powers in 1943 established the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(UNWCC).223  The UNWCC, bothered by the unparalleled record of atrocities by the 
Nazi regime recommend to the Allied Governments that “the retributive action of the 
United Nations should not be restricted to what was traditionally considered as war 
crimes in the technical sense, namely, a violation of the laws and customs of war.”224   
As a result, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal225 adopted by the 
Allied Powers for the trial of the Major War Criminals marked the beginning of the 
modern notion of “crimes against humanity.”226  The Nuremberg Charter became the first 
international instrument to define crimes against humanity.  Article 6(c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter defined crimes against humanity as follows: 
                                                 
223 History of the U.N. War Crimes Comm’n and the Development of the Laws of War complied by the 
U.N. War Crimes Comm’n (1948) [hereinafter UNWCC], reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 
216, at 570. 
224 UNWCC, supra note 223, at 193-95; Egon Schwelb, supra note 216, at 184-85.  (Egon Schwelb was a 
legal officer for the United Nations War Crimes Commission).  
225 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 
8, 1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S 279, 286-88 [hereinafter 
Nuremberg Charter]. 
226 Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 47. 
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murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhuman acts committed against any civilian  population,  before  
or  during  the  war;  or  persecutions  on  political,  racial  or 
religious  grounds  in  the  execution  of  or  in  connection  with  
any  crime  within  the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not 
in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated.227 
 
Article 6(c) created two types of crimes against humanity, namely crimes of the 
“murder-type” such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and “other 
inhuman acts” on the one hand, and “persecutions” on political, racial, or religious 
grounds.”228  Reference to the phrase “on political, racial or religious grounds” serves as 
clarifying the basis of persecution, rather than imposing a requirement of discriminatory 
motive for inhuman acts.229  Also, as observed by Egon Schwelb, article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Charter maintained the distinction made in 1919 between violations of the 
laws and customs of war on the one hand, which is referred to as “war crimes in Article 
6(b), and offences against the laws of humanity on the other, which is referred to as 
“crimes against humanity” in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter.230   The Nuremberg 
Tribunal convicted sixteen of the eighteen Nazi leaders indicted for crimes against 
humanity.231   
Also, Control Council Law No. 10, which formed the legal basis for a series of 
subsequent trials at Nuremberg within each of the Allied occupation zones provided for 
the prosecution of crimes against humanity.232  Article II(c) of the CCL offers a 
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definition of crimes against humanity which differs slightly from the Nuremberg 
Charter.233  The definition omitted the words “in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” thereby removing the requirements that 
crimes against humanity occur in connection with either “crimes against peace” or “war 
crimes.”234  Similarly, the Tokyo Charter provided for the prosecution of crimes against 
humanity.235  Article 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter definition of crimes against humanity 
differs from the Nuremberg Charter and CCL No. 10.  While it maintained the connection 
between “crimes against humanity” and “crimes against peace” or “war crimes” it 
omitted persecution on religious grounds.236   
The tribunal established pursuant to the Tokyo Charter tried twenty-five Japanese 
leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but the judgment of the Tribunal 
addressed only war crimes.237  Trial of major war criminals by allied tribunals or by 
German courts under supervision by Allies in their occupied zones in accordance with 
                                                                                                                                                 
Berlin, Jan. 31, 1946, reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 212 at 590 [hereinafter Control Council 
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237 Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 47-48. 
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CCL No. 10 resulted in the convictions of hundreds of Nazi soldiers for crimes against 
humanity.238   
 
III. The International Law Commission and the Codification of “Crimes Against 
Humanity”  
In 1947, the United Nations through Resolution 177(II) mandated the newly 
created International Law Commission (ILC) to formulate the principles of international 
law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the 
Tribunal.239  In 1950, the ILC issued its report on the formulation of the Nuremberg 
Principles.240  Article VI of the Nuremberg Principles contained a definition of crimes 
against humanity as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman 
acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in 
connection with any crime against peace or any war crime”.241   
The 1950 ILC definition of crimes against humanity maintained the nexus 
between crimes against humanity and crimes against peace or war crimes as contained in 
article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter.  However, it had to omit the phrase “before or 
during the war” since the phrase in the Nuremberg Charter referred to a particular war, 
the World War II.242  
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240 International Law Commission Report on the Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th 
Sess., Supp. No. 12 at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 225, at 
624-26.  
241 Id., art. VI(c). D.H.N. Johnson, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
4 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 445, 449-50 (1955).  
242 Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at para. 123, U.N. 
Doc. A/1316 (1950). 
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The next phase of the works of the ILC was directed towards the drafting of a 
Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind.  The ILC Draft Code of 
Offenses codifies acts which would constitute violations of international law and entail 
international responsibility if committed or tolerated by a State.  The first ILC Draft Code 
adopted in 1951 contained a definition of crimes against humanity.243  The ILC 1951 
Draft Code for the first time prohibited inhuman acts on cultural grounds and severed the 
nexus between crimes against humanity with war crimes or crime against peace.  Also, by 
beginning the definition of crimes against humanity with the words “inhuman acts such 
as”, the 1951 Draft Code blurred the previous distinction between “murder-type” and 
“persecution” categories of crimes against humanity.    
In 1954, the ILC adopted another Draft Code of Offenses which also contained a 
revised definition of crimes against humanity.244  Article 2 of the ILC 1954 Draft Code 
defines crimes against humanity as: 
Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, or persecutions, committed against any civilian 
population on social, political, racial, religious, or cultural 
grounds by the authorities of a state or by private individuals 
acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such 
authorities.245  
 
                                                 
243 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Code of Offences Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951); 
[hereinafter ILC 1951 Draft Code].  Article 2 of the 1951 Draft Code defines crimes against humanity as: 
 
Inhuman acts by the authorities of a State or by private individuals against any civilian population, such as 
murder, or extermination, or enslavement, or deportation, or persecutions on political, racial, religious, or 
cultural grounds, when such acts are committed in execution of or in connection with other offences 
defined in this article. 
 
Id. 
244 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Code of Offences Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, ch. 3, U.N. Doc. A/2691 (1954). 
[hereinafter ILC 1954 Draft Code]. 
245 ILC 1954 Draft Code, Id., art. 2(11).  
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The 1954 Draft Code omitted the phrase “when such acts are committed in 
execution of or in connection with other offences defined in this article” which was 
contained in the 1951 Draft Code, to make it clear that these acts are punishable whether 
or not they were committed in connection with another crime prohibited by the Draft 
Code.  Further, the 1954 Draft Code in addition to retaining persecution on cultural 
grounds from the 1951 Draft Code, added persecution on social grounds.   
Also, the 1954 Draft Code maintained the prohibition introduced by the 1951 
Draft Code regarding the previous distinction between the “murder-type” and 
“persecution-type” categories of crimes against humanity.  The abolition of this 
distinction has been criticized because of the implication that “inhumane acts,” including 
murder, extermination, enslavement and deportation, as well as persecutions are now 
required to be committed on social, cultural, political, racial, and religious grounds.246  
Contrast with the previous situation in the Nuremberg principles where it was only 
persecution which was required to be on “political, racial or religious grounds.”247  
In addition, under the ILC 1954 Draft Code, the Commission decided that 
inhuman acts committed by individuals without State’s direction or assistance should not 
be regarded as international crimes.  Therefore, article 2(11) was drafted to indicate that 
an individual is responsible for “inhumane acts” only if it can be shown that the 
individual committed these acts “at the instigation or with the toleration” of the 
authorities of a State.248  The requirement of State involvement has been question in light 
                                                 
246 D.H.N. Johnson, supra note 241, at 465.   For the redrafting of the 1954 Draft Code, see Doudou Thiam, 
Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Agenda Item 5, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (1986), reprinted in 2 Year Book of Int’l L. Comm’n 53, 38th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1986/Add.1 (1986). Mr. Thiam’s 1991 version was more specific and far more elaborate 
than the 1954 Draft Code.  
247 See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 225, art. 6(c). 
248 ILC 1954 Draft Code, supra note 244, art. 2(11).  
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of the Genocide Convention which holds individuals responsible if they commit genocide 
under any circumstances.249 
After the 1954 ILC Draft Code, ILC deactivated further works on the draft code 
for several decades.  However, within this interlude, particular crimes against humanity, 
such as genocide, apartheid and enforced disappearance, were identified in subsequent 
international instruments.250  The next ILC Draft Code was adopted in 1991.251  The 1991 
Draft Code contained a definition of crimes against humanity under a provision entitled 
“Systematic or Mass Violation of Human Rights”.252  In 1996, the ILC adopted yet 
another Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.253  Article 18 
of the ILC 1996 Draft Code proclaimed an expanded definition of crimes against 
humanity.254  
                                                 
249 D.H.N. Johnson, supra note 241, at 465. 
250 See Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 
U.N.T.S. 243; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, GA Res. 47/133, 
UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1992); Inter-American Convention on the 
Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, OEA Doc. AG/RES. 1256 (XXIV-0/94), reprinted in 33 
I.L.M. 1529 (1994). 
251 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Report of the Int’l Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 265, U.N. 
Doc. A/46/10 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Draft Code]. 
252 Id. Article 21 defines crimes against humanity as: 
 
An individual who commits or orders the commission of any of the following violations of human rights: 
murder; torture; establishing or maintaining over persons a status of slavery, servitude or forced labour; 
persecution on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds, in a systematic manner or on a mass 
scale; or deportation or forcible transfer of population shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced . . . .  
 
1991 Draft Code, supra note 251, art. 21. 
253 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR. 48th Sess., at 6-7, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (July 8, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Draft Code].   
254 Article 18 of the 1996 Draft Code states that: 
 
A crime against humanity means any of the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on a 
large scale and instigated or directed by a government or by any organization or group: 
a) murder; 
b) extermination; 
c) torture; 
d) enslavement; 
e) persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds; 
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The 1991 and 1996 Draft Codes re-established the dichotomy between “murder-
type” and “persecution-type” crimes against humanity.  In the 1991 Draft Code, an 
individual is liable for crimes against humanity with or without State policy, but the 1996 
Draft Code required the acts to have been carried out at the instigation or direction of a 
“[g]overnment or by any organization or group”.255   
Further, both the 1991 and 1996 Draft Codes do not include a requirement that 
crimes against humanity be committed against a civilian population.  There is no 
explanation in the Commentary to the Draft Code for the elimination of the requirement 
as an element of the offense of “crimes against humanity” that the acts be directed to a 
civilian population.  This omission leaves room for speculation whether the ILC intended 
that crimes against humanity be committed against civilian and non-civilian population or 
against civilian population including ex-combatants.  The latter approach seems to be 
consistent with the development of crimes against humanity and the ICTY opinion in the 
Rule 61 Decision in the Vukovar case.256   
                                                                                                                                                 
f) institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds involving the violation of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population; 
g) arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
h) forced disappearance of persons; 
i) rape, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse; 
j) other inhumane acts which severely damage physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity, such 
as mutilation and severe bodily harm. 
 
Id. 
255 See 1991 Draft Code, supra note 251, art. 21; 1996 Draft Code, supra note 262, art. 18.  For comments 
on the 1991 and 1992 Draft Codes, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 225, at 186-92; Christian 
Tomuschat, Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of Mankind and the Recalcitrant Third State, in 
WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 41, 49-50 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996);  
256 Prosecutor v. Mile Msksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, (Case No. IT-95-13-R 61) 
Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules and Procedure and Evidence, April 3, 1996, at 
para. 29, [hereinafter Vukovar Hospital Decision], quoted in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 
Opinion and Judgment, at para. 643 (Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997) 
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment]. 
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Also both Draft Codes mandated that acts constituting crimes against humanity 
has to be committed in a “systematic manner or on a large scale”.257  The words 
“systematic manner” refers to acts committed as a result of methodological plan or policy 
while “large scale” refers to the degree or multiplicity of victims.258  These requirements 
were imposed to distinguish isolated or random act which falls under domestic 
prosecution from systematic and large scale violations which constitute crimes against 
humanity.259  The above works by the ILC may have influenced the development of 
international law but none of the Draft Codes was directly developed into international 
instruments. 
 
IV. “Crimes Against Humanity” in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR 
The next major development of “crimes against humanity” was its inclusion in the 
Statutes of the ICTY260 and ICTR261 respectively.  Both Statutes contain identical list of 
                                                 
257 See 1991 Draft Code, supra note 251, art. 21; 1996 Draft Code, supra note 253, art. 18.  The ILC 1991 
Draft Code used the words “systematic” or “mass violations of human rights”. 
258 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session U.N. GAOR, 51st 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, ch. 2, art. 18, at paras. 3 & 4, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm. 
259 Id. 
260 ICTY Statute, supra note 30.  Article 5 of the ICTY provides that: 
 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes 
when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any 
civilian population: 
(a) murder; 
(b) extermination; 
(c) enslavement; 
(d) deportation; 
(e) imprisonment; 
(f) torture; 
(g) rape; 
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) other inhumane acts. 
 
Id.  
261 ICTR Statute, supra note 31.  Article 3 of the ICTR provides that: 
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prohibited inhuman acts but the differences between the Statutes lie in the chapeau that 
describes the circumstances under which the commission of those acts amount to a crime 
against humanity.  First, the ICTY Statute which is modeled after the Nuremberg Charter 
suggests that a nexus to armed conflict, whether international or internal, is required, 
whereas the ICTR Statute does not require proof of the existence of an armed conflict.  
However, the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic’s case has noted that: 
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that 
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to 
international armed conflict.  Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out, 
customary international law may not require a connection 
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all.  Thus, 
by requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either 
internal or international armed conflict, the Security Council may 
have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary 
under customary international law. . . .262  
 
   On the other hand, while the ICTR requires the crimes to have been committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack, the ICTY does not expressly include such 
requirement.263  Also, the ICTR suggests that all acts constituting crimes against 
                                                                                                                                                 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the 
following crimes when committed as a part of a wide spread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: 
(a) murder; 
(b) extermination; 
(c) enslavement; 
(d) deportation; 
(e) imprisonment; 
(f) torture; 
(g) rape; 
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) other inhumane acts.  
 
Id. 
262 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 141 (Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35 ILM 32 (1996), available at: 
<www.un.org/icty>) (citing the Control Council Law No. 10, the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the 1973 
Apartheid Convention) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction]. 
263 While the ICTY definition does not include the requirement that the acts be “systematic and 
widespread”, the ICTY Tribunal has observed that the term “widespread or systematic” constitutes an 
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humanity must have been committed on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious 
grounds, the ICTY Statute restricted this requirement to persecutions.  These differences 
which have been elaborated on by both Tribunals are discussed in more detail below.264  
 
V. ICC Statute and Codification of the “Crimes Against Humanity” 
The divergent approaches to the definitions of the crime against humanity 
indicated above and the body of international jurisprudence on crimes against humanity 
coming from the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda helped 
shape the debate at the Preparatory Committee and at the Rome Conference.  Therefore, 
the ICC Statute which results from multilateral negotiations contains a more detailed 
definition of crimes against humanity than any of the previous instrument discussed 
above.  Hence, the most important and authoritative codification of crimes against 
humanity to date is contained in article 7 of the ICC Statute.  Article 7(1) defined crimes 
against humanity as follows: 
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack: 
  (a)  Murder; 
  (b)  Extermination; 
  (c)  Enslavement; 
  (d)  Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
  (e)  Imprisonment  or  other  severe  deprivation  of  physical  
liberty  in  violation  of fundamental rules of international law; 
  (f)  Torture; 
  (g)  Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity; 
                                                                                                                                                 
essential element of the notion of “crimes against humanity” under the ICTY Statute.  See Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 264, p 644. 
264 For a legislative history of Article 5 of the ICTY, see M. Cherif Bassiouni & Peter Manikas, THE LAW 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 538-54 
(1996). 
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  (h)  Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as 
defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with  any  act  referred  to  in  this  paragraph  or  any  
crime  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the Court; 
  (i)  Enforced disappearance of persons; 
  (j)  The crime of apartheid; 
 (k)  Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health.265  
 
Unlike previous instruments, article 7 elaborated on the meaning of 
“imprisonment”, “persecution”, and “other inhuman acts”.  While the list of criminal acts 
which constitute crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute encompasses the 
traditional acts which constitute crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter and 
subsequent instruments, it also includes additional criminal acts.  The new acts added by 
the ICC Statute include “forcible transfer of population”;266 “severe deprivation of 
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law”;267 “sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form 
of sexual violence of comparable gravity”;268 “enforced disappearance of persons”;269 
and “the crime of apartheid”.270  Article 7 ends the list with a broad category: “other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury 
to body or mental or physical health”.  This leaves the door open to the future inclusion 
of other acts within the category of crimes against humanity.   
                                                 
265 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1). 
266 Id., art. 7(1)(d). This is added as an alternative to “deportation”.  
267 Id., art. 7(1)(e).  This was added to “imprisonment”, which is contained in the Statutes of the ICTY and 
ICTR. 
268 Id. art. 7(1)(g).  This is an improvement to the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR which recognize only the 
crime of rape and sexual violence. 
269 Id., art. 7(1)(i). 
270 Id., art. 7(1)(j). 
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Apart from enumerating the list of criminal acts which constitutes crimes against 
humanity, article 7(2) of the ICC Statute defines some of the acts such as extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, torture, forced pregnancy, persecution, the crime of apartheid, 
and the enforced disappearance of persons as follows: 
For the purpose of paragraph 1: 
     (a)  “Attack  directed  against  any  civilian  population”  means  a  
course  of  conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred 
to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy  to commit such attack; 
     (b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of 
conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and 
medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population; 
     (c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right 
of  ownership  over  a  person  and  includes  the  exercise  of  such  
power  in  the  course  of trafficking in persons, in particular women 
and children; 
     (d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced 
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive 
acts  from  the area  in which  they are lawfully present, without 
grounds permitted under international law; 
     (e)  “Torture”  means  the  intentional  infliction  of  severe  pain  
or  suffering,  whether physical  or mental,  upon  a  person  in  the  
custody  or  under  the  control  of  the  accused; except  that  torture  
shall not  include pain or  suffering arising only  from,  inherent  in  or 
incidental to, lawful sanctions; 
     (f)  “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a 
woman forcibly made pregnant,  with  the  intent  of  affecting  the  
ethnic  composition  of  any  population or carrying out other grave 
violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be 
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy; 
     (g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity; 
     (h)  “The  crime  of  apartheid” means  inhumane  acts  of  a  
character  similar  to  those referred  to  in  paragraph  1,  committed  
in  the  context  of  an  institutionalized  regime  of systematic 
oppression and domination by one  racial group over any other  racial 
group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that 
regime; 
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     (i) “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, 
detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, 
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, 
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or 
to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with 
the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a 
prolonged period of time.271 
 
From the above definition, the ICC Statute defines the crimes of torture and 
enforced disappearance272 more expansively than the relevant human rights 
instruments273 by dissociating them from the requirement of the perpetrator’s official 
capacity.  Generally, ICC definition of crimes against humanity offers a reflection of the 
development of international law since Nuremberg.  Thus, the ICC Statute definition 
codifies the contemporary notion of crimes against humanity as it has developed from the 
Nuremberg Charter through the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, and the case law of those 
tribunals.   
 
6.3.2.b. Changes in the Crimes Against Humanity Under the ICC Statute  
In furtherance of customary international law development in this area, article 7 
of the ICC Statute dropped the requirement of a nexus between crime against humanity 
and armed conflict as well as the requirement of a discriminatory motive.  The chapeau 
reveals that a nexus to an armed conflict or a discriminatory motive is no longer required.  
These positive developments are discussed below while discussions on the elements of 
crimes against humanity contained in the chapeau to article 7 follow thereafter.  
  
                                                 
271 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2). 
272 Id., art. 7(2)(f )(i). 
273 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 
December 1984, Article 1 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture], and Declaration on the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, GA Res. 47/133, 18 December 1992, preambular para. 3. 
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I.  Elimination of Nexus to Armed Conflict 
The Nuremberg Charter definition of crimes against humanity incorporated a 
compromise which tied crimes against humanity only “in connection with crimes against 
peace and war crimes.”274 Although the UNWCC envisaged crimes against humanity 
occurring independent of the existence of an armed conflict, the IMT regarded itself as 
bound by its Charter to confine itself to those crimes against humanity committed after 
the beginning of World War II because of a requirement to consider only those crimes 
against humanity which were committed in the execution of or in connection with crimes 
against peace or war crimes.275   
Control Council Law No. 10, which provided the legal basis for a series of 
subsequent trials at Nuremberg, excluded the requirement that crimes against humanity 
be committed in execution of or in connection with war crimes or crimes against 
peace.276  Thus, tribunals hearing cases pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 adopted 
differing approaches concerning whether crimes against humanity could be committed in 
peace time as well as in war.  In the Einsatzgruppen Case277 and in the Justice Case,278 
the Tribunals held that crimes against humanity could be committed during peace.  In the 
Flick Case279 and in the Ministries Case,280 the Tribunals held to the contrary. 
                                                 
274 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 225, art. 6(c). 
275 See International Military Tribunal (Nurenberg), 1 Trial of Major War Criminals 254-5 (1948). 
276 See H. Levie, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 559 (1993). 
277 U.S. v. Ohlendorf, Case No. 9, reprinted in 4 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nurenberg Military 
Tribunals Under Council Law No. 10 (1946-48) 3, 499 (1949) [hereinafter Einsatzgruppen Case]. 
278 U.S. v. Altstoetter, Case No. 3, reprinted in 3 NMT 974 (1949) [hereinafter The Justice Case]. 
279 U.S. v. Flick, Case No. 5, reprinted in 6 NMT 3, 1212-13 (1949) (the court acquitted the defendant of 
“crimes against humanity” for his acquisition of Jewish property before the war, finding itself without 
jurisdiction) [hereinafter The Flick Case]. 
280 U.S. v. von Weizsaecker, Case No. 11, reprinted in 14 NMT 1, 316 (1949) (The tribunal dismissed the 
counts of “crimes against humanity” against officials in the Nazi foreign ministry  and other bureaucracies, 
noting that CCL No. 10 was meant to go no further than the Nuremberg Tribunal itself, which codified 
international law). [hereinafter The Ministries Case]. 
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The requirement of a nexus to an international armed conflict or any conflict was 
dropped in the Statute of the ICTR.  On the other hand, the requirement of a connection 
of crimes against humanity to armed conflict was contained in article 5 of the ICTY 
Statute which is similar to that of article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter which limited the 
Nuremberg Tribunal’s jurisdiction to “crimes against humanity” committed “before or 
during the war.”  Although constrained by the language of the ICTY Statute, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in its Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction in the Tadic’s case rightly opined that the requirement of a nexus to armed 
conflict was peculiar to the Nuremberg Charter and does not appear in subsequent 
instruments.281  The Appeals Chamber while holding that “crimes against humanity” may 
be committed notwithstanding the absence of any connection with an armed conflict, 
observed as follows: 
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that 
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to 
international armed conflict.  Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out, 
customary international law may not require a connection 
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by 
requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either 
internal or international armed conflict, the Security Council may 
have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary 
under customary international law.282  
 
At the Rome Conference, a minority of delegations expressed the view that 
crimes against humanity could be committed only in the context of an armed conflict. 
However, the majority of delegations believed that such a limitation would have rendered 
crimes against humanity largely redundant, as they would have been subsumed in most 
                                                 
281 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 262, pp 140-41. 
282 Id., para. 141.  
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cases within the definition of “war crimes.”283  In the view of the majority, such a 
restriction would have been contrary to post-Nuremberg developments, as observed in 
statements of the International Law Commission (ILC), judicial decisions and reflected in 
instruments addressing specific crimes against humanity, such as the Genocide 
Convention and the Apartheid Convention.284   
In the end, the ICC Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity made no 
reference to a nexus to armed conflict thereby affirming that crimes against humanity 
may be committed not only in war time but also in peacetime or during civil strife.  This 
outcome was essential to the practical effectiveness of the ICC in responding to large-
scale atrocities committed against civilian population by their government during peace 
time.285  Also, it avoids the difficulty of differentiating crimes against humanity from war 
crimes. 
 
II.  Elimination of Discriminatory Intent 
Consistent with the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter, CCL No. 10 and the 
Statute of the ICTY, the ICC Statute does not contain an express requirement that crimes 
against humanity be committed “on national, political, ethnic, racial, religious, or other 
grounds.”286  However, the ICC Statute adopted the distinction between “murder-type” 
crimes against humanity and “persecution-type” crime against humanity which originated 
                                                 
283 Darryl Robinson, Developments in International Criminal Law: Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at 
the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L. L. 43, 45-6 (1999); Darryl Robison, Crimes Against Humanity: 
Reflections on State Sovereignty, Legal Precision and the Dictates of the Public Conscience, in ESSAYS 
ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 144-49 (Flavia Lattanzi & 
William A. Schabas eds., 1999) [hereinafter Essays on the Rome Statute]. 
284 Id., Leila Sadat & Richard Carden, supra note 112, at 428. 
285 Darryl Robinson, supra note 283, at 46. 
286 Although the ICTY Statute contains no such requirement, the ICTY Trial Chamber applied it in the 
Tadic’s case.  See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 256, pp 650-52. However, the 
Appeals Chamber reversed this holding in its judgment of July 15, 1999.  See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case 
No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, para 305 (Appeals Chamber, July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment]. 
 245 
from Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter.287  Thus, the ICC Statute provides that 
discriminatory intent is required only for persecution on “political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with  any  
act  referred  to  in  this  paragraph  or  any  crime  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court”.288     
With this approach, the ICC Statute adopted the dominant view that 
discriminatory motive is relevant only to the crime of persecution.289 Therefore, the 
elimination of discriminatory intent accords with the concept of humanity as victim of 
crimes against humanity which essentially characterizes this crime.  As noted by the 
ICTY in the Erdemovic case: 
Crimes against humanity are serious acts of violence which harm 
human beings by striking what is most essential to them: their 
life, liberty, physical welfare, health and/or dignity. They are 
inhumane acts that by their extent and gravity go beyond the 
limits tolerable to the international community, which must 
perforce demand their punishment. But crimes against humanity 
also transcend the individual because when the individual is 
assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated.290 
 
The approach by the ICC Statute avoids the imposition of an onerous and 
unnecessary burden on the prosecution to establish discriminatory intent for crimes 
against humanity.  Moreover, the requirement of a discriminatory motive, particularly 
                                                 
287 Note that the ICTR Statute does not follow this distinction as it required a discriminatory motive for all 
crimes against humanity.  See ICTR Statute, supra note 31, art. 3. 
288 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h). 
289 Darryl Robinson, supra note 283, at 46 (noting that when the 1954 ILC draft Code of Crimes suggested 
that discriminatory motive was required for all crimes against humanity, it was strongly criticized for 
misconstruing the Nuremberg Charter in D. H. N. Johnson, Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, supra note 241.  Robinson notes that Johnson’s article was widely received as 
expressing the correct interpretation, and the subsequent ILC draft codes have reflected Johnson’s 
approach). 
290 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-T (Trial Chamber, November 29, 1996).  
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when coupled with exhaustive list of prohibited grounds, could have resulted in the 
inadvertent exclusion of some very serious crimes against humanity.  Thus, the expansion 
of the group in the ICC Statute to include “political”, “cultural”, “gender” and “other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law” is a 
remarkable development that allows extension of protection to other groups subjected to 
“persecution-type” crime against humanity.   
 
 
6.3.2.c.  Elements of the Crime Against Humanity 
The discussions contained in the various codifications of the crimes against 
humanity and the case-law jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR developed the 
characteristics of the crimes against humanity which is now expressed in the chapeau of 
article 7 of the ICC Statute.  Under the chapeau of article 7 of the ICC Statute, “crime 
against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge 
of the attack.”291  According to paragraph two of article 7, for “attack directed against any 
civilian population” to constitute crime against humanity, it must be a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts prohibited in paragraph 1 carried out “pursuant 
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”.292    
From the foregoing, to establish that crimes against humanity have taken place, 
the Prosecutor in addition to establishing the occurrence of any of the prohibited acts 
enumerated in article 7(1)(a-k) must also establish that the perpetrator committed the acts 
as part of (1) a widespread or systematic attack, (2) directed against a civilian population, 
(3) with knowledge that the attack was part of, or intended to be part of a widespread or 
                                                 
291 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1). 
292 Id., art. 7(2). 
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systematic attack against a civilian population, and (4) was carried out pursuant to State 
or organizational policy.293   
 
  
I. Widespread or Systematic Attack 
Both the Statute of the ICTR and article 7 chapeau of the ICC Statute require that 
crimes against humanity be committed either as part of a “widespread” or “systematic” 
attack against a civilian population.294  The term “widespread” has been defined as 
“massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable 
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.”295  On the other hand, 
“systematic” means “thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on the basis of 
a common policy involving substantial public or private resources.”296  In other words, 
“widespread” focuses on the number or multiplicity of victims,” whereas “systematic” 
refers to the existence of a pattern of conduct or methodical plan.297   
Although the ICTY Statute does not contain this requirement as a threshold 
issue,298 the ICTY has noted that the requirement that the attack be “widespread or 
systematic” is an essential element of the notion of crime against humanity as it elevates 
                                                 
293 See  the  Finalized  draft  text  of  the  Elements  of  Crimes  adopted  by  Preparatory  Commission  for  
the International Criminal Court, at its 23rd meeting on 30 June 2000 UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, p. 
9-17. See also, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 45, p 578. 
294 ICTR Statute, supra note 31, art. 3; ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7. 
295 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 45, p 580. 
296 Id. 
297 Id.  
298 See Interpretive Report of the Secretary-General, para. 48, which states that crimes against humanity are 
those “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population”.  The report 
was approved by Security Council Resolution 827 (May 25, 1993), 32 ILM 1203 (1993). In the Security 
Council discussion of Resolution 827, Ambassador Albright stated:  
 
Secondly, it is understood that Article 5 applies to all acts listed in that article, when committed contrary to 
law during a period of armed conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, gender, or religious 
grounds. 
 
UN Doc. S/PV.3217, at 16 (1993). 
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ordinary common crimes from the realm of national crimes to the level of crimes under 
international law.299  Therefore, the rationale for the requirement that the attack be 
widespread or systematic and directed against any civilian population is designed to 
target crimes involving a course of conduct thereby excluding isolated or random acts 
from the notion of crimes against humanity.300  
In view of the above, it is not the single killing that is targeted, but mass killings, 
unless the single killing can be linked to a “systematic” policy or to “widespread” 
attacks.301  Once “there is a link with the widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime against humanity”.302  In other 
words, a “single act by a perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility 
and an individual perpetrator need not commit numerous offences to be held liable.”303  
The requirement that the attack be “widespread” or “systematic” should be read 
disjunctively thereby eliminating the need to prove a cumulation of these two 
elements.304  As noted by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, “it is now well established that 
the requirement that the acts be directed against a civilian ‘population’ can be fulfilled if 
the acts occur on either a widespread basis or in a systematic manner.  Either one of these 
is sufficient to exclude isolated or random acts.”305 Once it is convinced that either 
requirement is met, the Trial Chamber is not obliged to consider whether the alternative 
qualifier is also satisfied. 
                                                 
299 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 45, pp. 646-48. 
300 Id., Decision on Form of the Indictment, para. 11 (Nov. 14, 1995). 
301 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 216, at 193-99.  
302 Vukovar Hospital Decision, supra note 256, p 30. 
303 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 45, p 649. 
304 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, at para. 93 (June 12, 2002) 
305 Id., p 644. 
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II.  Attack Directed against Any Civilian Population 
The requirement that the attack be directed against “any civilian population” 
originated from the Nuremberg Charter and was adopted in the Statutes of the ICTY, 
ICTR, and the ICC.306  An attack is “directed against” any civilian population in the 
context of crimes against humanity where the civilian population is the primary object of 
the attack rather than an incidental target of the attack.307  On the other hand, the word 
“any” serves to clarify that crimes against humanity can be committed against civilians of 
the same nationality as the perpetrator or those who are stateless, as well as those of a 
different nationality.308  The term is broad enough to support the notion that for purposes 
of crimes against humanity, all civilians are protected be they nationals of the perpetrator, 
foreign nationals or stateless.309    
With respect to the term “civilian” the UNWCC took the position that the term 
should be construed to exclude attacks against armed forces.310 Latter jurisprudence 
however supports a more expansive definition of the term “civilian.” Thus, the 
Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 noted 
                                                 
306 See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 225, art. 6(c), ICTY Statute, supra note 30, art. 5; ICTR Statute, 
supra note 31, art. 3; and ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7.  
307 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 304, para. 92. 
308 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 256, p 634; Prosecutor v. Jelisic, supra note 61, p 54.  Schwelb in his 
analysis of the text of Article 6(c) of the Charter wrote that “From the word ‘against any civilian 
population’ it follows that a crime against humanity can be committed both against the civilian population 
of territory which is under belligerent occupation and against the civilian population of other territories, 
irrespective of whether they are under some other type of occupation or whether they are under no 
occupation at all. The civilian population protected by the provision may therefore also include the civilian 
population of a country which was occupied without resort to war. . . .” Egon Schwelb, supra note 216, at 
188.  
309 Darryl Robinson, supra note 283, at 51 (citing UNWCC, supra note 223, at 193). 
310 UNWCC, supra note 223, at 193. 
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that while the term “any civilian population” principally applies to noncombatants, it 
does not necessarily exclude those “who at one particular point in time did bear arms.”311  
Similarly, the ICTR has construed the term “civilian population” broadly such 
that “the presence of those actively involved in the conflict should not prevent the 
characterization of a population as civilian and those actively involved in a resistance 
movement can qualify as victims of crimes against humanity.”312  In the Vukouar 
Hospital Decision, civilians or resistance fighters who had laid down their arms were 
considered victims of crimes against humanity.313  And “in case of doubt as to whether a 
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be civilian . . .”314  
The term “population” ensures that what is to be alleged will not be one particular 
act but, instead, a course of conduct.”315  It places emphasis on the collective rather than 
on the individual victim,316 and calls for some element of scale of the attack which will 
exclude single or isolated acts.317  The ICC Statute appears to reflect this view in article 
7(2)(a) which refers to “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in paragraph 1.”318  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
311 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, 
U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994) [hereinafter Commission of Experts’ Report]; 
Annexes to the Final Report, U.N. Doc S/1994/674/Add.2, P 75 (1994) [hereinafter Annexes to 
Commission of Experts’ Report]. 
312 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 256, p 643. 
313 Vukovar Hospital Decision, supra note 256, p 29. 
314 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 304, p 435. 
315 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Form of the Indictment, No. IT-94-1-T, para. 11 (Nov. 14, 1995). 
316 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, supra note 61, p 54. 
317 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 256, p 644. UNWCC, supra note 223, at 193 (noting that the term 
“population” “appears to indicate that a larger body of victims is visualized and that single or isolated acts 
against individuals may be considered to fall outside the scope of the concept.”) 
318 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a). 
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III.  Mens Rea/Knowledge of the Act  
Apart from satisfying the general mental element under article 30 of the ICC 
Statute,319 the Prosecutor must also establish under article 7(1) that the perpetrator knew 
the widespread or systematic nature of the attack and that his or her criminal activity 
constitutes part of the attack.320  Therefore, “the acts of the accused must comprise part of 
a pattern of widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population and 
that the accused must have known that his [or her] acts fit into such pattern.”321  In other 
words, “to be guilty of crimes against humanity the perpetrator must know that there is an 
attack on a civilian population and that his [or her] act is part of the attack.”322   
The connection to a widespread or systematic attack is the essential and central 
element that raises an “ordinary” crime to one of the most serious crimes known to 
humanity.  Therefore, “to convict a person of this most serious international crime, if the 
person was truly unaware of this essential and central element would violate the principle 
actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”.323  However, it shall not be a defense for the 
accused to argue that he or she was not aware that the acts constitute crimes against 
humanity.  In the Canadian case of Finta, the Canadian Supreme Court noted as follows: 
However, it would not be necessary to establish that the accused 
knew that his or her actions were inhumane. For example, if the 
jury was satisfied that Finta was aware of the conditions within 
the boxcars [in which the Jews were deported] that would be 
                                                 
319 Under Article 30 of the ICC Statute, “knowledge means awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.” 
320 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1). 
321 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 256, p 248. 
322 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 55, p 134 (noting that “part of what transforms an individual’s act 
into a crime against humanity is the inclusion of the act within a greater dimension of criminal conduct; 
therefore an accused should be aware of this greater dimension in order to be culpable thereof.  
Accordingly, actual or constructive knowledge of the broader context of the attack, meaning that the 
accused must know that his act is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population and 
pursuant to some kind of policy or plan, is necessary to satisfy the requisite mens rea element of the 
accused.” 
323 Darryl Robinson, supra note 283, at 52.  
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sufficient to convict him for crimes against humanity even 
though he did not know that his action in loading the people into 
those boxcars were inhumane.324  
 
It is not expected that the obligation to prove the accused mens rea should impose 
an inappropriate burden on the prosecution.  Given the inescapable notoriety of any 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, it is difficult to imagine a 
situation where a person could commit a murder (for example) as part of such an attack 
while credibly claiming to have been completely unaware of that attack.325 
 
 
IV.  State or Organizational Policy 
To ensure that a spontaneous wave of widespread, but completely unrelated 
crimes do not qualify as crime against humanity, an “attack directed against any civilian 
population”, is further defined as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission 
of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”.326  On the other 
hand, according to the Introduction to the Elements of Crimes against humanity, “it is 
understood that ‘policy to commit such attack” requires that the State or organization 
actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population.327 This 
understanding was further clarified in the footnote to this part of the text as follows: 
A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the 
attack would be implemented by State or organizational action.  
Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented 
by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed 
at encouraging such attack.  The existence of such a policy 
                                                 
324 Regina v. Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 820 (Can. 1994). See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 256, p 657. 
325 Darryl Robinson, supra note 283, at 52.  
326 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a). 
327 ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 116, Introduction. 
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cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or 
organizational action.328 
 
By virtue of the Elements of Crimes, it follows that the policy element includes a 
policy of commission or a policy of omission to stop the commission of the attacks.  
According to Professor Bassiouni, because crimes against humanity consists of a number 
of crimes which may be found in many national criminal laws, the “state action or 
policy”, provides the international or jurisdictional element which transforms the hitherto 
domestic crimes to international crimes.329   
The policy element was not explicitly required in the Nuremberg Charter but the 
travaux preparatoires of the Nuremberg Charter and the decisions of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal referred to the “policy of terror” and a “policy of persecution, repression, and 
murder of civilians.”330  Also, the jurisprudence of the military tribunals suggests that the 
policy element was a requisite for crimes against humanity.331   
This policy element has been adopted by decisions of national courts.  In the 
French cases of Barbie and Touvier respectively, the French Cour de Cassation required 
that “the criminal act be affiliated with the name of a state practicing a policy of 
ideological hegemony.”332  The Netherlands Hoge Raad in the Menten case held that “the 
concept of crimes against humanity also requires . . . that the crimes in question form part 
                                                 
328 ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 116,  p 116, n 6. 
329 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 216, at 243-245. 
330 See, excerpts of the Nuremberg Judgment compiled by the UNWCC, supra note 232, 194-95, reprinted 
in M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 212, at 572-73.  
331 See, Darryl Robinson, supra note 283, at 49 (citing the decision of the U.S. Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg in the Altstotter case, regarding “proof of systematic governmental organisation of the acts as a 
necessary element of crimes against humanity.” 6 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS 1, 79-80 (UN War Crimes Commission, 1948)). 
332 Barbie, French Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), June 3, 1988, reprinted in 100 I.L.R 331, 336 
(1995); Touvier French Court of Appeal of Paris (First Chamber of Accusation), April 13, 1992, reprinted 
in 100 I.L.R. 338, 350-51 (1995); Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), 27 Nov. 1992, 100 ILR 338 at 
351). Barbie, Cass. Crim., Dec. 20, 1985, 1985 Bull. Crim., No. 407, at 1053; Touvier, Cass. Crim., Nov. 
27, 1992, 1992 Bull. Crim., No. 394, at 1085.  
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of a system based on terror or constitute a link in consciously pursued policy directed 
against particular groups of peoples.”333  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Finta case held that “what distinguishes a crime against humanity from any other 
criminal offence under the Canadian Criminal Code is that the cruel and terrible actions 
which are essential elements of the offence were undertaken in pursuance of a policy of 
discrimination or persecution of an identifiable group or race.”334    
These cases appear to recognize the policy element of crimes against humanity, 
but some commentators have criticized the traditional conception that the policy must be 
that of a State335 or the requirement of an “official policy of discrimination.336  While it 
may be the case that crimes against humanity could be committed only by States or 
individuals exercising State power during World War II, events after World War II 
particularly in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have shown that multiplicity of crimes 
can be committed by persons not associated with a recognized State.  Consequently, the 
Security Council Resolutions establishing the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR made no 
reference to State policy requirement.337  Recognizant of this development, the ICTY 
observed that customary international law has evolved “to take into account forces which, 
                                                 
333 Public Prosecutor v. Menten, The Netherlands, District Court of Amsterdam, Extraordinary Penal 
Chamber, 75 I.L.R. 361-63 (1981).  
334 Regina v. Finta, supra note 324, at 814. 
335 See Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of 
Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 289, 360 (1994) 
(questioning both the requirement of State action and the requirement that the State be one “practicing a 
hegemonic political ideology.”  Wexler argued that it is illogical to require State action for crimes against 
humanity but not for genocide and notes that it would significantly hinder prosecutions for atrocities 
committed in civil wars or other situations, in which identification of the offending “State” is difficult to 
make).  
336 See Mark R. von Sternberg, A Comparison of the Yugoslav and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: 
Universal Jurisdiction and the “Elementary Dictates of Humanity,” 22 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 111 
(1996), argues that the suggestion of the UN Commissions of Inquiry (for former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda) that an “official policy of discrimination” is required would add a difficult evidentiary hurdle.  
337 Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 67. 
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although not those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to 
move freely within, defined territory.”338   
In light of the above, the ICTY expressed the view that crimes against humanity 
may be committed by “entities exercising de facto control over a particular territory but 
without international recognition or formal status of a de jure state, or by a terrorist group 
or organization”.339  Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the phrase “directed  at  any  
civilian  population  entailed  that  “there  must  be  some  form  of  a governmental,  
organizational  or  group  policy  to  commit  these  acts”.340  Also, in the 1996 Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security, ILC stated that “[a] crime against 
humanity means any of the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on 
a large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or 
group.”341   
The retention of State policy in the ICC Statute is recognition that there is still 
some sort of ‘official’ action associated with the concept of crime against humanity.342  
On the other hand, inclusion of organizations is recognition that non-state actors such as 
terrorist groups, de facto government or armed insurrections or other non-state entities 
seeking political or ideological relevance or territorial control “can and do commit 
egregious assaults on human dignity that should incur individual responsibility under 
international law”.343  However, the term “organizational policy” should be interpreted 
broadly to include public and private organizational policy whether aimed at public or 
                                                 
338 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 256, p 654. 
339 Id., pp 654-655; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic Judgment, pp 551-52; Darryl Robinson, supra note 283, at 50. 
340 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 256, p 644. 
341 ILC 1996 Draft Code, supra note 253, art. 18. 
342 Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 68-69 (noting that the Prosecutor of the ICTY 
and ICTR has not indicted private persons in the sense of those not associated with one of the sides in the 
conflict). 
343 Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 67. 
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private gain only.  Significantly, the ICTY has noted that a policy to commit crimes 
against humanity need not be formal, and can be inferred from the manner of the crime.  
Thus, evidence that “the acts occur on a widespread or systematic basis that demonstrates 
a policy to commit those acts, whether formalized or not” should suffice.344   
 
 
6.3.3.  WAR CRIMES 
 
6.3.3.a. Introduction 
The first comprehensive codification of war crimes was in the Leiber Code issued 
by President Lincoln in 1863 during the American Civil War.  However, as noted in part I 
of this study, the origin of war crimes in international law is traced to the Hague 
Conference of 1899345 and the Hague Conference of 1907346 as well as the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol I to the 1907 Hague Convention.347  The Hague Law as both Conventions are 
known is concerned with regulating the materials and means of combat itself, such as 
permissible weaponry and targets on land, sea, and air, as well as neutrality and 
prohibited attacks on undefended towns, use of arms designed to cause unnecessary 
suffering, use of poisonous weapons, collective penalties, and pillage; and includes 
various protections for hospitals, religious and cultural sites, and family honor.348   
Following the aftermath of World War I which witnessed violations of the Hague 
Law, including killings of civilian populations, bombings of nonmilitary targets, 
                                                 
344 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 256, p 653. 
345 Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 
1 Bevans 247 (entered into force, September 4, 1900). 
346 Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2277; 1 Bevans 631(entered into force, January 26, 1910). 
347 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 461 (entered into 
force, February 8, 1928). 
348 See Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 81. 
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unnecessary destruction of private industry, sinking of merchant ships, and looting,349 the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in 1929 facilitated what would be later known 
as the Geneva Law to supplement the Hague Law.350  The Geneva Law focuses on the 
protection of classes of victims of armed conflict such as wounded soldiers, prisoners of 
war, and civilians.   
After the end of Word War II, the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter, and 
Control Council Law No. 10 contain provision on “war crimes” enabling the Tribunals to 
prosecute persons accused of war crimes during the war.351  Four years later, another 
codification of war crimes was carried out under the 1949 four Geneva Conventions to 
update the 1929 Geneva Conventions.352   In 1977, the four Geneva Conventions were 
supplemented by Protocols I & II.353  Protocol I applicable to international armed conflict 
elaborates, clarifies, and expands on much of the Geneva Conventions.354  Protocol II 
refers to non-international armed conflict offering new rules and protections for civil 
                                                 
349 Remigiusz Bierzanek, The Prosecution of War Crimes, in A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 562 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973). 
350 See, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the 
Field, July 27, 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 303; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
July 29, 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter Geneva Law]. 
351 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 225, art. 6(b). 
352 Each Geneva Convention protects a different class of persons and property. The First Convention 
protects wounded and sick members of the armed forces in the field. See Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950). The Second protects wounded, sick, and 
shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950). The Third protects prisoners of war. See 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950). The Fourth protects civilian persons in times of war. See 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950). Each Convention contains a more specific 
definition of precisely who is protected by its terms. [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]. 
353 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entry into force 7 
December 1979); [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
8 June 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex II, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entry into force 7 December 1978) 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
354 Additional Protocol I, supra note 353, art. 1. 
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conflicts meeting a certain threshold.355  The Geneva Conventions have been universally 
ratified by States and undoubtedly represent customary international law.356  The Statutes 
of ad hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda also contain provisions for war 
crimes.357  
Unlike previous instruments which provided very brief provisions concerning war 
crimes, article 8 of the ICC Statute which defines war crimes, is one of the Statute’s 
longest and most comprehensive codification of war crimes to date.  Article 8 of the ICC 
Statute defines war crimes in four categories: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions; 
other serious violations of laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict; 
serious violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 committed 
during a non-international armed conflict “against persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities”; and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in non-
international armed conflicts.358  Therefore, the application of war crimes under the ICC 
will depend on whether the acts occurred in international or non-international armed 
conflict.   
 
6.3.3.b. International Armed Conflict 
War crimes occurring in international armed conflict are divided into two 
categories.  Article 8(2)(a) which incorporates most of the graves breaches provisions of 
the four Geneva Conventions provides that for the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” 
means:  
                                                 
355 Additional Protocol II, supra note 360, art. 1. 
356 Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 82; Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions 
as Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L 348 (1987). 
357 ICTY Statute, supra note 30, arts. 2 & 3; ICTR Statute, supra note 31, art. 4. 
358 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(a)-(c), (e). 
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(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of 
the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of 
the relevant Geneva Convention:  
 
(i) Wilful killing;  
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments;  
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or 
health;  
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly;  
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve 
in the forces of a hostile Power;  
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person 
of the rights of fair and regular trial;  
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;  
(viii) Taking of hostages.359  
 Victims of “grave breaches” must be “protected persons” under the relevant 
Geneva Conventions.360  In accordance with article 2 common to the Geneva 
Conventions, an international armed conflict exists and thus triggers the application of 
the Conventions in situations of declared war or of any other armed conflict between two 
or more State Parties to the Conventions, even if one of the States does not recognize the 
war or armed conflict.361  Also, the Conventions apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a State party to the Conventions, even if the said occupation 
meets with no armed resistance.362   
                                                 
359 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(a). 
360 Id.  See, Geneva Convention IV, supra note 352, art. 4. 
361 See article 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 352. 
362 Id. 
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Further, the fact that one of the parties to the armed conflict is not a State Party to 
the Conventions does not suspend the application of the Conventions between the parties 
who are States Parties to the Conventions.  In the event that the non-State party accepts 
and applies the Conventions, the States Parties to the Convention will then be obligated 
to apply the Conventions in relation to the said State.363 
It follows that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over graves breaches of the 
Geneva Convention when the victims are nationals of a State party to the Conventions 
involved in the international armed conflict or nationals of a non-State party which 
accepts and applies the Conventions, and the victims have become hors de combat due to 
injury, shipwreck, illness, or prisoners of war or civilians who are “in the hands of a Party 
to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.364  However, the 
ICTY has observed that “nationals” in the traditional international law sense are protected 
if they cannot rely upon the protection of the State of which they are citizens especially in 
situations where they belong to a national minority.365  For purposes of nationality, the 
perpetrator need not know the nationality of the victim provided the perpetrator is aware 
that the victim belonged to an adverse party to the conflict.366 
                                                 
363 See Article 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 352. 
364 See William A. Schabas, AN INTRIDUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 46 
(2003) (noting that the first three Geneva Conventions which protects only members of the armed forces of 
a party to the international armed conflict and the fourth Geneva Convention which provides that 
“protected persons” must be “in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Powers of which they are 
not nationals”); Frits Kalshoven, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 40-41 (ICRC, 2nd ed, 
1991) (drawing up a list of protected persons based on Article 4 of Third Geneva Convention).  
365 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, supra note 286, pp 164-6.  The Appeals Chamber 
noted that the primary purpose of the Convention “is to ensure the safeguards afforded by the Convention 
to those civilians who do not enjoy the diplomatic protection, and correlatively are not subject to the 
allegiance and control, of the State in whose hands they may find themselves.  In granting this protection, 
Article 4 [of the Fourth Geneva Convention] intends to look into the substance of relations, not to their 
legal characterization as such”.  Id., p 168.  
366 ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 116, art. 8(2)(a)(i), para. 3, n.33. 
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The second category of war crimes occurring during international armed conflict 
is contained in Article 8(2)(b) and includes: 
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict, within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts:  
 
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as 
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities;  
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, 
objects which are not military objectives;  
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, 
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to 
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict;  
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated;  
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, 
dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not 
military objectives;  
(vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his 
arms or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at 
discretion;  
(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the 
military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United 
Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva 
Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury;  
(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power 
of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, 
or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the 
occupied territory within or outside this territory;  
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(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to 
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are 
collected, provided they are not military objectives;  
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to 
physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any 
kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital 
treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her 
interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health 
of such person or persons;  
(xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the 
hostile nation or army;  
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will be given;  
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities 
of war;  
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of 
law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party;  
(xv) Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the 
operations of war directed against their own country, even if they 
were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the 
war;  
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;  
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;  
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices;  
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the 
human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not 
entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions;  
(xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of 
warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in 
violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that 
such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are 
the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an 
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annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the 
relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123;  
(xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment;  
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting 
a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions;  
(xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person 
to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from 
military operations;  
(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, 
medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive 
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with 
international law;  
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of 
warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their 
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided 
for under the Geneva Conventions;  
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen 
years into the national armed forces or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities.367  
This definition focuses on Hague Law because it consists of crimes found in the 
regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV and Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Convention as well as new developments in the laws of war.368  In all, twenty-six actions 
are prohibited under this section, including some new crimes to the laws of war such as 
attacks directed against humanitarian or peacekeeping missions,369 acts that severely 
                                                 
367 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b). 
368 William A. Schabas, supra note 364, at 47-50.   
369 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(iii).  This provision mirrors the Convention on the Safety of 
United Nations and Associated Personnel, Annex to U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/59 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 
482, (1995) (entered into force January 15, 1999); For further reading see Evan T. Bloom, Protecting 
Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 89 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 621(1995); M.-Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
and Associated Personnel, 44 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 560 (1995); Major Corn, United Nations Convention 
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damage the environment,370 population transfers,371 sexual offenses,372 and the 
conscription or enlistment of child soldiers.373    
With respect to the words, “within the established framework of international 
law” which is contained in subparagraphs 2(b) and (e), it has been suggested that “these 
words were intended to include implicitly considerations of the jus in bello such as 
military necessity and proportionality”.374 Some delegates at the Rome Conference 
however, expressed the view that these words also included requirements such as those in 
article 85(3) and (4) of Protocol I, dealing with causing death or serious injury to body or 
health or when committed willfully and in violation of the Geneva Conventions or the 
Protocols.375  Also, the words appears to dispel doubts as to the customary law status of 
subparagraphs 2(b) and (e) thereby avoiding any requirement on the Prosecutor to 
establish the nullum crimen sine lege of each of the numerated acts independent of the 
Statute.376   
                                                                                                                                                 
on the Safety of United Nations (UN) and Associated Personnel Enters Into Force, Army Law., Feb. 1999, 
at 21. 
370 See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). For a full discussion on the law of war and environmental 
damage, see Mark J.T. Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern Warfare: 
Customary Substance over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 (1993); Michael D. 
Diederich, Jr., “Law of War” and Ecology - A Proposal for a Workable Approach to Protecting the 
Environment Through the Law or [sic] War, 136 MIL. L. REV. 137 (1992); Stephanie N. Simonds, 
Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International Legal Reform, 29 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 165 (1992). 
371 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(viii); See William A. Schabas, supra note 371, at 48, n. 91 (noting 
that this provision led Israel to vote against the ICC Statute).  On the topic of the legality of population 
transfer in international law, see Christopher M. Goebel, Population Transfer, Humanitarian Law, and the 
Use of Ground Force in U.N. Peacemaking: Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Wake of Iraq, 25 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 627 (1993). 
372 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii). 
373 Id., art. 8(2)(b)(xxiv).  Under this provision, a child solider is anyone less than fifteen years of age.  
Article 8(2)(b)(xxiv) codifies the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res. 44/25, Annex, 
art.38; and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, supra note 363, art. 77(2). 
374 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Developments In International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 33 (1999). 
375 Id. 
376 Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 144, 151-152 (1999).  
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Unlike grave breaches violations, there is no requirement that the victims of 
“other serious violations of the laws and customs” should be “protected persons” because 
the focus of the Hague Law was aimed at punishing the architects of the war.377  Thus, 
several of the provisions in this category list weapons that have been prohibited in 
warfare.378  Also, by adopting Protocol I, the ICC Statute provides for individual criminal 
responsibility for violations of the Hague Law which was first introduced under Protocol 
I.379  
 
6.3.3.c. Non-International Armed Conflict 
Until the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Convention, war crimes have been 
traditionally regarded as serious violations of the law applicable to international armed 
conflict.380  States were very reluctant to accept international regulation of internal 
conflict or civil war.  This reluctant was manifested in the 1949 Geneva Convention 
which only made provision for non-international armed conflict in common article 3 of 
the four Geneva Conventions.  States’ objection to the application of international law to 
non-international armed conflict continued during the 1977 update of the Geneva 
Conventions.  Efforts to expand the scope of common article 3 were met with opposition 
such that Protocol II only contained a slight improvement on common article 3 and 
avoided any suggestion that grave breaches of war crime could be committed during a 
non-international armed conflict.381   
                                                 
377 William A. Schabas, supra note 364, at 47.   
378 Roger S. Clark, Methods of Warfare That Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Are Inherently 
Indiscriminate: A Memorial Tribute to Howard Berman, 28 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 379 (1998). 
379 See Protocol Additional I, supra 353, art. 85. 
380 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmerman, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUG. 1949, 1320 (Yves, 
Swinarski, & Zimmerman eds., 1987). 
381 William A. Schabas, supra note 364, at 51. 
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Similarly, the Statute of the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia contain 
provisions proscribing grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the 
laws or customs of war which limits the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to international armed 
conflict.382  On the other hand, the Statute of the ad hoc Tribunal for Rwanda provides 
that ICTR shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes when committed only in non-
international armed conflict.383   However, notwithstanding the clear provisions of the 
Statute of the ICTY, the Tribunal held that the ICTY has jurisdiction to try serious 
violations of laws or customs of war irrespective of whether “the serious violations has 
occurred within the context of an international or internal armed conflict”.384  While this 
decision has been criticized as an attempt at “judicial law making”, it has also been 
praised as reflection of customary international law development in this area of law.385 
Article 8 of the ICC Statute reflects this development by expressly providing for 
the application of war crimes in non-international armed conflicts.  However, the 
expansion of war crimes to include acts committed in non-international armed conflict 
was by no means a foregone conclusion when the treaty negotiations began.386  Even 
though article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol Additional II of 
1977 prohibit certain acts in internal armed conflict, not all governments were happy to 
                                                 
382 ICTY Statute, supra note 30, arts. 2 & 3. 
383 ICTR Statute, supra note 31, art. 4. 
384 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 262, pp 86-94.  See also Theodor Meron, 
International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 554 (1995). 
385 William A. Schabas, supra note 364, at 42. 
386 See Darryl Robinson and Herman von Hebel, War Crimes in Internal Conflicts: Article 8 of the ICC 
Statute, 2 Y.B. INT’L HUM. L., 193, 199 (1999) (noting that “it remained controversial throughout the 
negotiations whether war crimes in internal armed conflict should be included in the Statute at all. Some 
delegations strongly believed that the ICC Statute should not include such norms, as it was feared that ICC 
competence over such crimes would be an unacceptable intrusion on sovereignty and would undermine the 
general acceptability of the Statute”); Thomas Graditzky, War Crime Issues Before the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L & POL’Y, 
199, 210 (1999) (recalling that “the issues of whether to include a non-international armed conflicts clause 
and what threshold should be adopted dominated discussions”).  
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see some of them defined as war crimes entailing individual criminal responsibility.  
Partly as a result of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and partly due to the obvious 
prevalence of internal conflicts globally, those objections were overcome.387   
The ICC Statute is thus the first international treaty to explicitly provide for 
individual criminal responsibility for “serious” violations of common article 3 and for 
twelve other “serious violations of the laws and customs” applicable in non-international 
armed conflict, including intentional attacks against civilians, crimes of sexual and 
gender violence, and forced displacement.388  
War crimes during non-international armed conflict are divided into two 
categories.  The first set of war crimes during non-international armed conflict which 
covers serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Convention is contained 
in Article 8(2)(c) which provides: 
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, 
serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against 
persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:  
 
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;  
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment;  
(iii) Taking of hostages;  
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted 
                                                 
387 See Daryl Robinson and Hermann von Hebel, supra note 386, at 199. 
388 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(c)(e)(i), (vi) and(viii). 
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court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally 
recognized as indispensable.389  
Article 8(2)(c) is impari material with common article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions.  However, under the ICC Statute, “serious violations of common article 3” 
does not apply “…to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.”390  This limitation 
which is also contained in Protocol II is intended to ensure that only non-international 
armed conflict of certain degree and intensity should trigger the application of the 
Convention.391  According to the ICTY Trial Chamber: 
the test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of an 
armed conflict for the purposes of the rules contained in Common 
Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the 
conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict. In an 
armed conflict of an internal or mixed character, these closely 
related criteria are used solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of 
distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and 
short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not 
subject to international humanitarian law.392 
 
This formula has been adopted and applied in other cases by the ICTY and ICTR 
tribunals to determine the existence of non-international armed conflict.393 
                                                 
389 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(c). 
390 Id., art. 8(2)(d). 
391 Additional Protocol II, supra note 353, art. 1. 
392 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 256, p 562 [emphasis added].  Also see, Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., 
Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21, paras. 183-84 (16 November 1998) (noting that “in order to 
distinguish from cases of civil unrest or terrorist activities, the emphasis is on the protracted extent of the 
armed violence and the extent of organisation of the parties involved”). 
393 See, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 45, p 620 (holding that in order to determine the existence of 
armed conflict it is “necessary to evaluate both the intensity and organization of the parties to the conflict”); 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1, para 59 (December 10, 1998) 
(applied the formula to determine the existence of armed conflict between the Croatian Defence Council 
(HVO) and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH) during May 1993); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac 
and Vukovic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-96-23, para. 56 (June 12, 2002) (The Appeals 
Chamber applied the formula in upholding the Tribunal’s position on the existence of armed conflict 
between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims in the municipalities of Foca, Gacko and Kalinovik). Also 
see, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Trial Chamber II Judgment, Case No. IT-97-25, P 51 (March 15, 
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The second category of war crimes during non-international armed conflict is 
drawn mainly from Protocol II but also from the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I and the 
United Nations Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. 394  
Article 8(2)(e) of the ICC Statute defines this category of war crimes as:  
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed 
conflicts not of an international character, within the established 
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:  
 
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as 
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities;  
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, 
medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive 
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with 
international law;  
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, 
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to 
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict;  
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to 
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are 
collected, provided they are not military objectives;  
(v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;  
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced 
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions;  
                                                                                                                                                 
2002); and Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlado Radic, Zoran Zigic, Dragoljub Prcac, 
Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-98-30/1, P 123 (November 2, 2001).  
394 However, not all serious violations of Protocol II are included in Article 8.  See Christopher Keith Hall, 
The Fifth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, 92 AM. J. INT’L L 331, 336 (1998); Christopher Keith Hall, The Third and Fourth Sessions of the 
UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT’L L 
124 (1998).    
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(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen 
years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities;  
(viii) Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for 
reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians 
involved or imperative military reasons so demand;  
(ix) Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;  
(x) Declaring that no quarter will be given;  
(xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to 
the conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific 
experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, 
dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out 
in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously 
endanger the health of such person or persons;  
(xii) Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities 
of the conflict;395  
Acts which constitute war crimes under this subparagraph are mainly drawn from 
Protocol Additional II.396  Article 8(2)(e) is intended to protect intentional attacks 
directed against civilians, buildings belonging to non-governmental and humanitarian 
organizations, and prohibits sexual and gender violence as well as child soldiers as is the 
case under international armed conflict.  However, this subparagraph has a lower 
threshold application than Protocol II because it applies to “armed conflicts that take 
place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups”.397 
  Contrast with Protocol II which requires dissident or other organized armed 
groups to control territory, maintain responsible command over troops sufficient to carry 
                                                 
395 ICC Statute, supra note 1, Article 8(2)(e). 
396 See Christopher Keith Hall, supra note 394, at 336.     
397 ICC Statute, supra note 1, Article 8(2)(f) (emphasis added). 
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out sustained and concerted military operations, and possess the ability to implement 
international agreement.398  The lowering of the threshold: 
is important because it reduces the chances that a situation arises 
in a state that can be qualified neither as an internal conflict nor 
as an emergency as provided for in the human rights conventions. 
A better protection of human rights may be achieved because of 
this reduction.399 
 
Also, the use of the term “protracted” implies that hostilities need not be 
continuous because interruptions in fighting do not suspend the obligations of States 
Parties to the Convention.400  On the other hand, the use of the term “governmental 
authorities” broadens the scope of the parties to non-international armed conflict.  
According to Zimmerman, the term “has to be understood as including not only regular 
armed forces of a State but all different kinds of armed personnel provided they 
participate in protracted armed violence, including, where applicable, units of national 
guards, the police forces, border police or other armed authorities of a similar nature.”401  
Furthermore, Article 8(2)(f) extends the application of Protocol II to armed 
conflict between warring factions without the involvement of a de jure governmental 
authority.  Hitherto, such situations, irrespective of their scale, were generally not 
recognized in international humanitarian law as constituting armed conflicts.402  This 
development makes it possible to apply laws of war to non-international armed conflict 
between belligerent groups who are the principal parties to armed conflict especially in 
                                                 
398 Protocol II, supra note 353, art. 1(1), (emphasis added).  
399 Adriaan Bos, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 229, 233 (1998). 
400 See Andreas Zimmermann, War Crimes Committed in an Armed Conflict Not of an International 
Character, in Otto TRIFFTERER, COMMENTARY ON STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 285 (1999). 
401 Andreas Zimmermann, supra note 407, at 286 (noting that this was due to the “experiences of the last 
twenty years after the adoption of the Second Additional Protocol”). 
402 See however the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision by the ICTY, supra note 286. 
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situations where State structures have disintegrated such as was the case in Somalia and 
Liberia.403  The recognition that de facto armed conflict may exist between organized 
armed groups is significant in ensuring a greater degree of protection to the victims of 
such situations.   
In conformity with Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Convention, the ICC Statute 
excludes application of “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
armed conflicts not of an international character”, from “situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other 
acts of a similar nature”.404  Further, in extending the application of certain war crimes to 
non-international armed conflict, the ICC Statute in conformity with the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocol Additional II, reiterated that this will not affect the general 
right of States “to maintain or establish law and order or to defend their unity and 
territorial integrity by all legitimate means”.405   
This limitation implies that the Court has no jurisdiction over atrocities committed 
during internal disturbances and tensions.  This provision is intended to assure States that 
the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes committed during non-international armed 
conflict will not intrude on State sovereignty.406  However, the provision generally, and 
                                                 
403 See, ICRC, Armed Conflicts Linked to the Disintegration of State Structures: Preparatory Document 
Drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross for the First Periodical Meeting on International 
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405 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(g) (emphasis added); Protocol II, art. 3(1).  This provision generally, 
and in particular, the words “by all legitimate means” should be strictly interpreted to avoid resort by States 
as a defense to war crimes. 
406 Additional Protocol II, supra note 360, art. 3(1);  Darryl Robinson & H von Hebel, supra note 386, at 
205 (noting that some States such as China and Russia expressed the concern at the Rome Conference that 
the provisions of the ICC Statute on non-international armed conflict may be used for unjustified 
interference in their internal affairs). 
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in particular, the words “by all legitimate means” should be strictly interpreted to avoid 
resort by States as a defense to war crimes. 
 
6.3.3.d. Requirements for the Application of War Crimes 
I. Part of a Policy or Large Scale 
In a broad sense, the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes in international armed 
conflict emanates “in particular” when those crimes are “committed as a part of a plan or 
policy or as part of a large scale commission of such crimes”.407  The words “in 
particular” serves as a compromise between those in favor of a jurisdictional threshold 
and those opposed to such limitation.408  This requirement has been described as a “non-
threshold threshold”409 in the sense that while it does not limit the Court’s jurisdiction 
only to cases involving large-scale commission of war crimes or cases involving plans or 
policies to commit war crimes, it requires the Court to take into consideration the gravity 
of the crime in determining admissibility under article 17(1)(d) of the Statute.410     
Therefore, unlike crimes against humanity, there is no requirement for the act to 
be widespread or systematic or as in the case of genocide, war crimes do not require a 
very high level of specific intent.411  Thus, a war crime can be a single, isolated, 
                                                 
407 ICC Statute, supra note 1, Article 8(1). 
408 Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, supra note 28, at 107-08. 
409 Id., at 124.  
410 Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, supra note 112, at 434-35; ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 
17(1)(d) which provides that: 
 
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is 
inadmissible where … (d) the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. 
411 William A. Schabas, supra note 364, at 42. 
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dispersed or random act.  This means that the Court may assume jurisdiction over 
isolated acts of war crimes committed by individuals.412   
However, discussing United States argument that U.S. nationals involved in 
peacekeeping operations may be unwittingly charged with war crimes by a “politically” 
minded Prosecutor, Professor Cherif Bassiouni, noted that a situation in which war 
crimes charges were brought against U.S. military personnel on peacekeeping missions 
would not hold up because the ICC Statute defines war crimes as primarily acts 
committed “as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such 
crimes.”413  Therefore, he argued that isolated incident carried out by a “trigger-happy 
Marine wouldn’t fall under that.”414  Suffice it to note that to reach this desired result, the 
Court would have to be guided by the purpose of the Statute which requires the Court to 
prosecute only the “most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole”.415  
 
II. The Existence of Armed Conflict  
In order for an act to qualify as a war crime, the act must occur during an armed 
conflict.416 This requirement which is jurisdictional provides the essential difference 
between a war crime and a crime against humanity is that “[a] war crime can only be 
prosecuted if committed during a war, whereas a crime against humanity can be 
                                                 
412 Marie-Claude Roberge, The New International Criminal Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 325 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 671, 674 (Dec. 1998); William A. Schabas, supra note 371, at 44; Von Hebel & 
Robinson, supra note 28, at 124. 
413 See James Podgers, War Crimes Court Under Fire, 1998 ABA Journal 68 (Sept.1998).  
414 Id., at 68. 
415 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1). 
416 Id., art. 8 2(d). 
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prosecuted during times of war or peace”.417  Thus, the existence of an armed conflict, 
international or non-international is a pre-condition for holding individuals accountable 
for war crimes.  
As to what constitutes an armed conflict, the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia proffered that: 
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State.418 
 
The above definition encompasses international and non-international armed 
conflict.419  While international armed conflict is between two or more States, non-
international armed conflict results from a protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed group(s) on the one hand or between 
organized armed groups within a State.  In other words, internal armed conflict may exist 
between two armed groups without the involvement of a State or governmental 
authorities.  The recognition that protracted armed conflict may exist between “organized 
                                                 
417 Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 340 (2002).  
418 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 262, p 70. 
419 This definition was imported into the ICC Statute with a minor change in that while the ICTY referred 
to “protracted armed violence”, the ICC Statute used the words “protracted armed conflict”, see ICC 
Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(f).  The substitution of the word “violence” for “conflict” has been criticized 
as inaccurate and capable of introducing a new crime.  See Claus Kress, War Crimes Committed in Non-
International Armed Conflict and the Emerging System of International Criminal Justice, 30 ISR. Y.B. 
Human Rights 103, 117-118 (2001) (arguing that “it was not the intention of the drafters to substitute 
“protracted armed conflict” for “protracted armed violence.”  Noting that the French version of the Rome 
Statute includes the original wording of the Tadic decision, he suggested that the English version should 
not give rise to misunderstanding).  This is significant as Article 128(1) of the ICC Statute states that 
“Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic.”  Thus, the ICRC has 
suggested that “the addition of the word “protracted” to armed conflict seems to be redundant since 
protracted violence is a constituent element of an armed conflict not of an international character.  See, 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Working Paper, June 29, 1999, available at 
http://www.igc.org/icc/html/icrc8_2e 19990629.html.  Therefore, in view of this, it has been suggested that 
the provision “should not be considered as creating yet another threshold of applicability.”  See, Theodor 
Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 260 (2000). 
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armed groups” is “both welcome and realistic”,420 as often times, this kind of conflict 
constitutes the vast majority of contemporary internal conflicts.   
It is pertinent to note that armed conflict could also “be international in character 
alongside an internal armed conflict”.421  In other words, an internal armed conflict may 
become international or assume an international character.  This may result in situations 
where another State directly intervenes in an internal conflict through its armed force or 
indirectly where a party to the internal conflict acts at the direction of the other State.  In 
some situations, it is difficult to ascertain when an armed group is acting at the direction 
of another State.422      
Concerning the commencement of armed conflict, it has been suggested that the 
“firing of weapons by soldiers of opposing sides across a contested border or the 
uninvited intervention of the armed forces of one state, even in small numbers, in the 
territory of another state may trigger the application of the Geneva Conventions in 
                                                 
420 Theodor Meron, Classification of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout, 92 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 236, 237 (1998). 
421 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, supra note 286, p 84.  
422 In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 
REP. 14, para 115 (June 27, 1986), the ICJ expressed the view that the other State must be in “effective 
control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were 
committed’.  However, the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, supra 
note 286, pp 145, 156 rejected Trial Chamber II application of the test in the Nicaragua’s case, Prosecutor 
v. Tadic, supra note 265, pp 584-588, Judge McDonald, dissenting.  The Appeals Chamber rejected the 
“effective control” test offered by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case on the basis that it would not seem to be 
consonant with the logic of the law of state responsibility and because the test was at variance with judicial 
and state practice.   Id., at pp 115-145.    See also, Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo, Trial 
Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, pp 230-34 (16 November 1998) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. 
Delalic]; Theodor Meron, supra note 427, at 237 (arguing that the Trial Chamber misapplied the Nicaragua 
test because the “Nicaragua’s test addresses only the question of state responsibility. Conceptually, it 
cannot determine whether a conflict is international or internal. In practice, applying the Nicaragua test to 
the question in Tadic produces artificial and incongruous conclusions”).  But see Judge McDonald 
dissenting opinion where he opined that “overall control” by a foreign State over a military organization is 
sufficient for considering the armed conflict to be international.”  See, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate and 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute, Case IT-94-
1-T (May 7, 1997), 36 I.L.M. at 970, 979, para. 34.] 
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totality”.423  For purposes of determining the duration and territorial application of war 
crimes provisions, the Appeals Chamber discussing the situation in Prijedor region of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, opined that “the temporal and geographical scope of both 
internal and international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of 
hostilities.”424   
With respect to the duration of armed conflict for purposes of the application of 
international law, the ICTY Appeals Chamber suggests that “international humanitarian 
law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation 
of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal 
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.”425  The Appeals Chamber noted that “until 
that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of 
the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the 
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.”426 
Thus, international humanitarian law does not pertain only to those areas where 
actual fighting takes place; it applies to the entire territory of the State involved in armed 
conflict.  This is also supported by the position of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Delalic 
case, holding that “whether or not the conflict is deemed to be international or internal, 
there does not have to be actual combat activities in a particular location for the norms of 
international humanitarian law to be applicable.”427  This approach is consistent with 
                                                 
423 W.J. Fenrick, Article 8, margin No. 6 in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE (Otto 
Trifferer ed., 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE]. 
424 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 271, p 67. 
425 Id., p 70. 
426 Id. 
427 Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 422, p 185. 
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application of international humanitarian law to situations of protracted armed violence 
where hostilities are not necessarily to be characterized as continuous.428  
Regarding the awareness of the perpetrator to the existence of armed conflict, the 
Prosecutor only has to establish that the perpetrator has knowledge of the factual 
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict to satisfy the 
requirement that the act(s) “took place in the context of and associated with” [an 
international armed conflict].  The Prosecutor is not required to prove that the perpetrator 
was aware of the existence of the armed conflict or that the perpetrator had knowledge of 
whether the armed conflict is international or non-international.429  The perpetrator’s 
knowledge of the factual circumstances that led to the existence of armed conflict, 
establishes the nexus between the perpetrator’s war crime violation(s) and the armed 
conflict.430  
 
6.4. Observations and Commentary 
The reluctance to tinker with the definition of genocide prevented the possibility 
of expanding the protected group to include attack on political and social groups. As a 
consequence of this omission, the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia 
between 1975 and 1985, which resulted in the killing of an estimated one million persons, 
can be argued to have not constituted genocide because the perpetrators are of the same 
                                                 
428 See Andreas Zimmermann, supra note 399, at 285. 
429 See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 116, art. 8, Introduction. 
430 For what amounts to sufficient nexus between the crime and the armed conflict, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Opinion and Judgment, supra note 262, pp 572-73 (expressing the view that it is not necessary that “the 
crime alleged takes place during combat, that it be part of a policy or of a practice officially endorsed or 
tolerated by one of the parties to the conflict, or that the act be in actual furtherance of a policy associated 
with the conduct of war or in the actual interest of a party to the conflict”).  See also, Prosecutor v. Delalic, 
supra note 422, pp 193-98. 
 279 
ethnic group as the victims.431  Also, the Khmer Rogue may argue that the victims were 
targeted as a political, social or economic group which is not covered by the 
Convention.432  Thus, when in 1980 the United Nations General Assembly convened an 
international conference, it mandated the conference to focus on Vietnam’s invasion in 
Cambodia, not the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge.433  Consequently, the Khmer Rouge 
would arguably avoid prosecution for genocide because of the restrictive definition of 
genocide which clearly excluded political groups and other groups from protection.434  
Similarly, the crimes of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet would not meet 
the definition of Genocide because he allegedly targeted individuals due to their politics 
rather than their race or religion.435  Arguably, the Soviet Union’s extermination of 15 to 
20 million Soviet citizens before, during, and after the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention, may not be considered as genocide as the victims were targeted because they 
are “class enemies” and “enemies of the people.”436 
While it is unfortunate that an unscrupulous entity could attempt to avoid 
application of the Convention and the ICC Statute in cases of discriminate killings by 
labeling the victims as a political group,437 the class of protected groups cannot be 
justifiably extended without corresponding amendment of the Convention or the ICC 
Statute.   There is no doubt that since the Convention was concluded, there has been an 
                                                 
431 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 212. 
432 See Jason Abrams, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities and Prospects: The Atrocities in Cambodia 
and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of Genocide, 35 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 303, 304-06 (2001). 
433 See Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AM .J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1993).  
434 Mathew Lippman, supra note 78, at 464. 
435 Diane F. Orentlicher, Putting Limits on Lawlessness: From Nuremberg to Pinochet, Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 
1998, at C1.  
436 Frank Chalk, Redefining Genocide, in Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions 47, 50 (George 
J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994). 
437 Through the assertion of what amounts to an affirmative defense, the accused state may characterize 
victims as “political” or “economic” opponents, or even deny that the group exists at all, and in doing so 
avoid responsibility under the Convention.  See Paul Starkman, Genocide and International Law; Is there a 
Cause of Action?, 8 ASILS INT’L L.J. 1, at 13, 37 (1984).  
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increasing number of violent crimes directed against groups that are not categorized as 
national, ethnic, racial, or religious.  These developments should have necessitated the 
redefinition of genocide to overcome the ambiguities or limitations that plague the 
current definition.438  For “it would be reprehensible if the world could not condemn 
massive slaughter of members of a group ... simply because of a preordained idea of what 
types of groups qualified for coverage under the [Genocide] Convention.”439  
Crimes against humanity have developed from doubtful precedent and now forms 
part of the core international crimes.  The ICC Statute has overcome the uncertainty 
behind the categorization of crimes against humanity by attempting to detail the contours 
of the crime in the Statute.  Also, the elimination of the requirement of governmental 
action broadens the scope of crimes against humanity.  Further, the dissociation of crimes 
against humanity from armed conflict clears any doubt as to the distinct nature of the 
crime.  As noted by the ICTY in the Erdemovic case, crimes against humanity can best be 
understood as “serious acts of violence which harm human beings by striking what is 
most essential to them: their life, liberty, physical welfare, health, or dignity”.440   
While some of the crimes prohibited under article 7 of the ICC Statute may fall 
under the purview of domestic criminal law, such atrocious acts graduate to crimes 
against humanity once accompanied by special elements associated with an overall attack 
on a civilian population.441 In addition, the distinction between “murder-type” and 
“persecution-type” crimes against humanity expands the groups that are protected against 
persecution beyond the scope of the Genocide Convention.  In deed, article 7 leaves the 
                                                 
438 Thomas W. Simon, supra note 34, at 247.  
439 Id. 
440 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, supra note 290, para. 28 
441 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 78. 
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group wide open to include all persecutions on “other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law …”442  Thus, “intentional and severe 
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity 
of the group or collectivity” amounts to persecution-type crimes against humanity.443  
This will no doubt expand the application of crimes against humanity to include 
violations of acts prohibited in international conventions such as the international bill of 
rights and other human rights treaties.444   
As can be seen above, article 8 of the ICC Statute includes a far more 
comprehensive codification of war crimes under customary international law than existed 
in the statutes of previous tribunals.445  Article 8 of the ICC Statute confers jurisdiction to 
the Court over a wide range of war crimes committed during international armed conflict.  
Also, article 8 of the ICC Statute reaffirms recent developments in international law by 
conferring the Court with power to try war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts, such as civil wars, which are the most common conflicts today.  The ICC 
Statute finds its justification for the international supervision of internal conflicts in 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II.   
                                                 
442 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h). 
443 Id., art. 7(2)(g) [emphasis added]. 
444 See discussion and accompanying notes in Part I, chapter 3, pp 65-74. 
445 For example, article 3 of the ICTY Statute provides a non-exhaustive list of five sub-clauses which 
constitute violations of the laws and customs of war. By contrast, Article 8(2)(b) of the ICC Statute, 
covering violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict alone, contains 
twenty-six sub-clauses.  Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter simply defines “violations of the laws or 
customs of war” as: 
 
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for 
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of 
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of 
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.  
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 234, art. 6(b). 
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The use of the word “namely” in each of the four categories of war crimes 
appears to suggest that the enumerated list of acts constituting war crimes in the ICC 
Statute is exhaustive rather than inclusive in nature.446  However, while the ICC Statute 
contain a list of more prohibited acts as war crimes than previous instruments, it would 
have been better to list them in an inclusive form to leave open the inclusion of additional 
“grave breaches” or “other serious violations” that may develop in the future without 
necessarily amending the Statute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
446 Jordan J. Paust, supra note 112, at 29, Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, supra note 112, at 435. 
CHAPTER 7 
=============================================================== 
 7.0.         PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
                                               CRIMINAL COURT 
__________________________________________________ 
7.1. ICC Jurisdiction Ratione Personae 
 
7.1.1. Jurisdiction Ratione Personae (Personal Jurisdiction) 
The Court has jurisdiction over natural persons only and “a person who commits a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be held individually responsible and liable 
for punishment ...”.1  Thus, the Court’s jurisdiction does not extend to States or 
organizations.2  During the preparatory phase, France proposed extending the court's 
jurisdiction to organizations.  The proposal was addressed at Rome but could not gather 
sufficient support and was dropped.  The accused person must have attained the age of 
eighteen3 and be in the custody of the Court as the ICC Statute does not allow trials in 
absentia.4  In conformity with customary international law, crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court are not subject to any statute of limitations.5  
 
7.1.2. Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis (Temporal Jurisdiction)   
 The Court’s jurisdiction will not apply retroactively because the Statute limits the 
Court’s jurisdiction to crimes committed after July 1, 2002, being the date the ICC 
Statute entered into force.6  With respect to States that become parties to the ICC Statute 
after its entry into force, the Court will exercise its jurisdiction only for crimes committed 
                                                 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 1, 25, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
2 Id., art. 25(4) (stating that “no provisions of this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall 
affect the responsibility of States under international law”). 
3 Id., art, 26. 
4 Id., art. 63(1). 
5 Id., art. 29. 
6 Id., art. 11(1). 
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after the State becomes a party to the ICC Statute, unless the State has made a declaration 
accepting the Court’s jurisdiction at an earlier time.7  It has been suggested that the Court 
may exercise jurisdiction over continuing crimes that began before the enactment of the 
ICC Statute.8  However, for such conduct to be included within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, it must first meet the conditions for a continuing crime, and international 
principles of legality, that is to say, the act must have been criminal at the time the 
accused committed it.9 
 
7.1.3. Jurisdiction Ratione Loci (Territorial Jurisdiction) 
An overwhelming majority of States at the Diplomatic Conference in Rome 
supported giving the Court automatic jurisdiction regarding genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.  Also, a great majority of the States at 
the Diplomatic Conference supported a proposal by South Korea that the Court should 
exercise jurisdiction if the ICC Statute has been ratified by a State on whose territory the 
crimes were committed or the State of nationality of the accused or the State of 
nationality of the victim, or the State with custody of the accused.10  However, a few 
States, including the United States, wanted automatic jurisdiction only for genocide and 
for other crimes, they preferred some form of a consent regime on individual cases.  At 
the end of the conference, a compromise arrangement was reached which ensures that 
                                                 
7 ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 11, 12(3).  
8 Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. 
Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 79-80 (2001). Such crimes include forced removal of 
children from a specific ethnic group or disappearances. Id; see also ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6-8 
(defining the terms genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes to include continuing crimes).  
9 Alan Nissel, Continuing Crimes in the Rome Statute, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 653, 663-64 (2004). 
10 See Human Rights Watch, The ICC Jurisdictional Regime; Addressing U.S. Arguments 1, available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-regime.htm.    
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States Parties to the ICC Statute accept automatic jurisdiction of the Court over all crimes 
contained in the Statute.11   
With respect to the territorial scope of the Court, this varies depending on how a 
situation is referred to the Court.  Where a situation is referred to the Court by a State 
Party or by proprio motu investigation by the ICC Prosecutor, the Court has jurisdiction 
if the crimes have been committed in the territory of a State which has ratified the ICC 
Statute or on its vessel and aircraft; or when the crimes have been committed by a citizen 
of a State which has ratified the ICC Statute.12  Further, the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory of a non-party State or crimes 
committed by a citizen of a non-party State if the State which has not ratified the ICC 
Statute makes a declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime.13   
On the other hand, where a situation is referred to the Court by the Security 
Council pursuant to Article VII of the UN Charter, the Court’s territorial jurisdiction 
literally extends to the whole world.14  In other words, the Court has jurisdiction over 
such situation whether or not the crime occurred in the territory of a State party and/or 
whether or not the accused is a national of a State party.  It is also immaterial that the 
non-Party State in whose territory the crime occurred or whose national is accused of the 
crime did not consent to the Court’s jurisdiction.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12(1).  Note however that a State party may opt out of the Court’s 
jurisdiction over war crimes for a period of seven (7) years after the entry into force of the Statute for the 
State concerned.  See Id., art. 124.  
12 Id., arts. 12; 13(a)(c).  
13 Id., art. 12(3). 
14 Id., art. 13(b). 
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7.2. ICC and Individual Criminal Responsibility 
In accordance with the principle of individual criminal responsibility firmly 
established in Part III of the ICC Statute, an individual is criminally responsible for his or 
her conduct.15  The individual’s criminally responsibility extends to the commission of 
the crime, whether as an individual or jointly, and includes the ordering, soliciting or 
inducing the commission of a crime that in fact occurs or is attempted; or facilitating the 
commission of a crime, or aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in its commission or 
attempted commission.16  Also, individual criminal responsibility attaches in any other 
way, where for instance, the individual intentionally contributes to the commission or the 
attempted commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, 
when that contribution is made with the “aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of 
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court,” or is “made in the knowledge of the 
intention of the group to commit the crime.”17 
In cases of genocide, an individual would also have criminal responsibility for 
direct and public incitement.18  Further, an individual is criminally liable for attempt to 
commit a crime so long as the individual has taken substantial steps toward commission 
of the crime, even if the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of 
the individual’s intention.19  However, a timely withdrawal resulting in complete and 
                                                 
15 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3). 
16 Id., art. 25(3)(a-c). 
17 Id., art. 25(3)(d). 
18 Id., 25(3)(e). 
19 Id., 25(3)(f). 
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voluntary abandonment of the criminal purpose shall excuse punishment under the 
Statute.20 
The Court’s jurisdiction extends to all people regardless of their official 
capacity.21  This means that any member of government or Head of State shall be subject 
to the jurisdiction of the ICC.22  Therefore, the official position of the individual or any 
immunity or special procedural rules that may attach to the individual because of his or 
her official capacity will not bar the jurisdiction of the Court.23  In essence, national 
amnesties, pardons or similar measures of impunity for crimes under the Court’s 
jurisdiction, which prevent the discovery of the truth and prevent accountability in a 
criminal trial, cannot bind the Court.24   
However, it is not unlikely that the Court may consider the outcome of credible 
alternative measures of accountability such as Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  
The Court may do this before or after the completion of investigation, if the Prosecutor 
taking into account all circumstances including the gravity of the crimes, the interests of 
victims, and other  strategic factors,25 determines that it is not “in the interests of justice” 
                                                 
20 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3)(f). 
21 See, art. 27(1) which provides that the Statute: 
 
shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity.  In particular, official 
capacity as whether as a Head of State or …… [any other capacity] shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of 
sentence. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. at art. 27(2).  Article 27 (2) provides that: 
 
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under 
national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. 
24 Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CHECKLIST FOR 
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 6, AI Index: IOR 40/011/2000, 1 August 2000, available at: 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400112000?open&of=eng-385 [hereinafter Checklist for 
Effective Implementation]. 
25 Hans-Peter Kaul, Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction Site For More Justice: 
The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 370, 375 (2005) (observing that 
examples of factors that might be considered are the protection of victims, the potential impact of 
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to investigate or prosecute.26  According to Judge Kaul, this question is not simply 
theoretical because the “Prosecutor operates in the context of ongoing conflicts, often at 
the same time as peace negotiations are taking place, purely legal considerations may not 
always be the sole basis for deciding whether or not to prosecute”.27  The Trial Chamber 
may, on its own initiative review the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with an 
investigation or prosecution on the grounds that it will not serve the interest of justice.28  
Regarding command responsibility, the ICC Statute provides that command 
responsibility is a form of criminal responsibility in addition to other forms of 
responsibility and that military commanders are not immune from responsibility for the 
acts of their subordinates.29  Also, command responsibility extends to any superior in a 
nonmilitary setting.30  Thus, article 28 deals with the responsibility of military 
commanders and other superiors with respect to the criminal acts of subordinates under 
their “effective authority and control”.31  The military commander or other superior is 
liable if he or she knew or should have known that his or her subordinates were 
committing or about to commit crimes prohibited by the Statute and failed to take 
                                                                                                                                                 
investigations on the conflict in question, and the question of the existence of national criminal prosecution 
initiatives). 
26 ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 53(1)(c), 53(2)(c). See also, Annex to the “Paper on Some Policy Issues 
Before the Office of the Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications 1 (Apr. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Paper 
on Some Policy Issues].  
27 Hans-Peter Kaul, supra note 19, at 375.  Judge Kaul is a Judge of the International Criminal Court, and 
President of the Pre-Trial Division. 
28 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 53, para. 3(b); Regulations of the Court, Reg. 48, Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04 
(May 26, 2004) [hereinafter ICC Regulations].  
29 Id., art. 28(a). 
30 Id., art. 28(b). 
31 Id. (emphasis added). The words “effective authority and control” are intended to superimpose in a 
civilian setting the requirements of the same types of relationships between superior and subordinate in the 
military. 
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reasonable steps to “prevent or repress . . . or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities.”32  
The ICC Statute prohibits superior orders and prescription of law as grounds for 
excluding criminal responsibility unless (1) the person was under a legal obligation to 
obey such orders, (2) the person did not know that the order was unlawful, and (3) the 
order was not manifestly unlawful.33  The application of this exception is limited because 
the ICC Statute makes it clear that orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity 
are manifestly unlawful.34  
Also, mental incapacity as a result of mental disease or defect, involuntary 
intoxication, self defense, defense of others and defense of property essential for survival 
during war times as well as duress are grounds for excluding criminal responsibility.35  
Also, mistake of fact or law may be grounds to exclude criminal responsibility if it 
negates the mental element required by the crime.36  However, superior orders and 
prescription of law are not grounds for excluding criminal responsibility unless the 
person was under a legal obligation to obey such orders, the person did not know that the 
order was unlawful, and the order was not manifestly unlawful.37  The exception offers 
little or no defense as orders to commit genocide, or crimes against humanity, or war 
crimes are generally manifestly unlawful.38  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art 28(b). 
33 Id., art. 33(1)(a-c) (emphasis in the original). 
34 Id., art. 33(2) 
35 Id., art. 31. 
36 Id., art. 32. 
37 Id., art. 33 (emphasis added). 
38 Id., art. 33(2). 
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7.3. ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Parties 
The Court may exercise jurisdiction over a national of a non-party State if he or 
she commits a crime in the territory of a State party and the State party elects to surrender 
the accused to the jurisdiction of the Court rather than prosecute him or her in its national 
court.39  For this to occur, the accused must remain in the territory of a State party or be 
otherwise lawfully apprehended by the State party.  Also, the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States if a non-party State by declaration consents 
to the Court’s jurisdiction over its national.40    
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the Court extends to nationals of non-party States 
if the Security Council refers a situation to the Court.41  Article 13 paragraph (b) allows 
the Security Council to refer situations to the ICC with “mandatory effect.”42  Thus, 
regardless of whether an accused is a national of a State party to the ICC Statute or not, if 
a situation involving him or her is referred to the Court by the Security Council, the Court 
can obtain jurisdiction over the person.43  This provision makes it difficult for a national 
of a rouge State to escape the Court’s jurisdiction but only if the Security Council gets 
involve.44   
                                                 
39 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(a). 
40 Id., art. 12(3).  See also art. 4(2) which provides that “the Court may exercise its functions and powers, as 
provided in this Statute, on the territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any 
other State”). Id.    
41 See Id., art. 13(b).   
42 John Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination of U.S. Objections to the 
Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 85, 95 (2000). 
43 Id. 
44 Id., at 95 (citing David J. Scheffer, Developments at Rome Treaty Conference, p. 3 (July 23, 1998) 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy remarks/1998/981021/scheffer icc.html> where he stated that the 
“United States believed that this was a particularly important objective in order to ensure that a rogue state 
could not escape the Court’s jurisdiction”. [hereinafter “Scheffer Report”]. 
 291 
The Court’s potential jurisdiction over nationals of non-State parties has been 
raised by the United States as a basis to object to its participation in the ICC.45  The 
United States expresses the view that the ICC should require the authority of the Security 
Council in order for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over non-party nationals.46 
However, as noted above, the Court’s jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States in 
situations referred to the ICC by a State will only materialize with the consent of a State 
party in whose territory the crime was committed or with the consent of a non-State party 
whose national is accused of committing the crime.47  Absent such consent, the Court 
will only exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-State parties if the situation was 
referred to the Court by the Security Council.48  
 
 
7.4. Triggering the Court’s Jurisdiction  
Article 13 provides three mechanisms to trigger the Court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction for the crimes listed in Articles 6 to 8 of the Statute. 
 
7.4.1. Referral by a State 
Under article 14(1), a State party to the Court may refer a situation to the 
Prosecutor in which one or more of the crimes covered by the Statute appears to have 
been committed.49  The Prosecutor is obliged to investigate such referrals for the purpose 
of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the 
commission of such crimes.50  
                                                 
45 See, Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2002-Sep Army Law. 1, 11 (2002).  
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 John Seguin, supra note 42, at 95-96. 
49 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(a). 
50 Id. 
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Under article 12(3) a non-party State in whose territory a crime subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court occurred, or of which the accused person is a national may, by 
declaration lodged with the registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with 
respect to the crime in question.51  Thus, it follows that such a non-party State may refer 
on ad hoc basis, a case to the Prosecutor who shall in turn treat the referral in accordance 
with article 14.  
 
7.4.1(1). First Sets of States’ Referrals to the Court  
In accordance with article 14(1), three States Parties; Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic, have referred situations in their 
respective countries to the Office of the Prosecutor.52  Also, pursuant to article 12(3), 
Cote d’Ivoire, a non-State party accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to 
crimes committed on its territory since the events of September 19, 2002.53  Already the 
Chief Prosecutor has opened investigations into the situations in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo54 and Uganda55 respectively. 
                                                 
51ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(3). 
52 See ICC Press Release, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) to the ICC, The Hague, January 29, 2004, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=16&l=en.html (visited February 26, 2006); Prosecutor Receives Referral of 
the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 19, 2004, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=19&l=en.html (visited February 26, 2006); ICC Press Release, Prosecutor 
Receives Referral Concerning Central African Republic, January 7, 2005, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=87&l=en.html (visited February 26, 2006). 
53 ICC Press Release, Registrar Confirms that the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire Has Accepted the Jurisdiction 
of the Court, February 15, 2005, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/93.html (visited 
February 26, 2006). (The text of the declaration remains confidential at the moment). 
54 ICC Press Release, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens its First 
Investigation, June 23, 2004, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=26&l=en.html (visited 
February 26, 2006).  
55 See ICC Press Release, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into 
Northern Uganda, July 29, 2004, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=33&l=en.html (visited 
February 26, 2006).  
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On June 23, 2004, the ICC Presidency decided to set up three Pre-Trial Chambers 
to prepare for the referrals.56  On July 5, 2004, the Presidency assigned the situation in 
the Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I57 and the situation in northern Uganda to Pre-Trial 
Chamber II.58  The respective Chambers are now duly seized of the two situations and are 
functioning accordingly.  On January 19, 2005, the situation in the Central African 
Republic was assigned to Pre-Trial Chamber III59 in anticipation of the Prosecutor’s 
decision on whether or not to open an investigation.  On July 8, 2005, Pre-trial Chamber 
II issued its first warrant of arrests against Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, 
Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Onguen.60 
As noted above, the Prosecutor received the three referrals from States Parties and 
has initiated investigations on the first two referrals.  Such referrals evince confidence in 
the works of the Court and the Chief Prosecutor.  Also, they facilitate the practical work 
of the ICC, since cooperation with national authorities become easier when the 
government in question supports the Court’s activities regarding its investigation and 
                                                 
56 See ICC Press Release, Decision Constituting  Pre-Trial Chambers, June 23, 2004, ICC-Pres-01/04, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/presidency/decisions.html (the Presidency issued its decision to 
constitute three Pre-Trial Chambers, composed of the following judges: Pre-Trial Chamber 1, Judges Akua 
Kuenyehia, Claude Jorda, and Sylvia Steiner; Pre-Trial Chamber II, Judges Tuiloma Neronis Slade, Mauro 
Politi, and Fatoumata Dembele Diarra; and Pre-Trial Chamber III, Judges Tuiloma Neronis Slade, Hans-
Peter Kaul, and Sylvia Steiner.   
57 See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision Assigning the Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I, No. ICC-01/04-1 (July 5, 2004). 
58 Situation in Uganda, Decision Assigning the Situation in Uganda to Pre-Trial Chamber II, No. ICC-
02/04-1 (July 5, 2004). 
59 See Situation in the Central African Republic, Decision Assigning the Situation in the Central African 
Republic to Pre-Trial Chamber III, No. ICC-01/05-1 (Jan. 19, 2005). 
60 Situation in Uganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Warrant of Arrests, No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53-57, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/current_situations/Uganda.html  
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prosecution.  In the two cases currently under investigation, no requests for deferral have 
been submitted, which could be interpreted as a sign of confidence in the ICC.61  
With respect to the referral by Cote d’Ivoire, the State accepted ICC jurisdiction 
to investigate in the country and requested the ICC’s help in bringing to justice rebels 
who started the civil war in that country.  However, since only “situations” can be 
referred to the ICC, the Prosecutor will consider the actions of all individuals in groups 
involved in the conflict.  Consequently, on January 28, 2005, the Chief Prosecutor of the 
ICC announced that an ICC team will visit the Ivory Coast.  The team’s mission will be 
to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to open a formal investigation into 
alleged war crimes that occurred during the civil war there.  So far, no formal procedural 
steps have followed its acceptance, and it is unclear whether the Ivorian government is 
intending to refer the situation to the ICC, or whether it will be for the prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation under article 15(3). 
 
 
7.4.2.  Proprio Motu Investigation by the ICC Prosecutor 
Article 15 allows the Court’s independent Prosecutor to initiate investigations 
proprio motu based on information from victims, non-governmental organizations, or any 
other source.62   This power of the Prosecutor was strenuously objected to by some States 
on the grounds that the office might be overwhelmed by frivolous complaints and would 
have to waste the limited resources at his or her disposal to attend to them.  In addition, 
concerns were expressed that the Prosecutor might be placed under political pressure to 
bring a complaint even if the complaint might not be justifiable or helpful in a particular 
                                                 
61 Such a request must be made within one month after the Prosecutor has notified “all States Parties and 
those States which, taking into account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over 
the crimes concerned.” ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(1).  
62 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(1)(2). 
 295 
political context.  But majority of States were of the view that, despite the potential for 
waste and abuse, it was better to empower the Prosecutor with such independence. 
Despite the controversy surrounding this provision occasioned by the United States’ 
objection, its advantage cannot be overemphasized because one cannot always rely on 
national governments and the Security Council to bring matters to the Court. 
In any event, there exist various safeguards within the ICC treaty to avoid 
frivolous and politically motivated cases.  For instance, the ICC Statute confers adequate 
supervisory powers on the Pre-trial Chamber with regard to the power of the Prosecutor 
to initiate a proprio motu investigation.  Thus, investigations and indictments initiated by 
the Prosecutor will have to be confirmed and approved by a Pre-Trial Chamber of three 
judges, after examining the evidence.63  The accused and/or the State will have the 
opportunity to challenge the indictment during confirmation hearings before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.   
In other words, the Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is subject to the approval of 
the Pre-trial judges who determine whether there is a reasonable basis for the 
investigation.64  Should the Pre-trial judges conclude that there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed with the investigation, and that the case appears within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, it shall authorize the Prosecutor to proceed with investigation.65  On the other 
hand, if the Pre-trial judges are of the opinion that there is no sufficient basis to proceed 
with investigation, they would decline authorization.  The Prosecutor may subsequently 
represent the case based on new facts or evidence regarding the same situation.66  
                                                 
63 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(3). 
64 Id., art. 15(3). 
65 Id., art. 15(4). 
66 Id., art. 15(5). 
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In addition, where a situation has been referred by a State or the Prosecutor has 
initiated a case proprio motu, the Prosecutor must inform all States parties to the Statute, 
as well as non-States parties that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes 
concerned.67  This provision was proposed by the United States.  Many States accepted 
the provision with great reluctance and as a compromise necessary for securing the 
Prosecutor’s power to bring a case on his or her own initiative.  The Prosecutor would 
have to defer to the State’s investigation unless the Pre-trial Chamber decided 
otherwise.68  The Prosecutor may review a State’s investigation six months after the date 
of deferral or at any time when there has been a significant change of circumstances 
indicating the State’s unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation.69  
The State or the Prosecutor may appeal to the Appeals Chamber against a ruling of the 
Pre-trial Chamber regarding admissibility of the situation.70  Where the Prosecutor has 
deferred an investigation to a State, the Prosecutor may request that the State periodically 
inform him or her of the progress of its investigation.71    
 
 
7.4.3.  Referral by the Security Council 
In a situation in which one or more of the crimes covered under the ICC Statute 
appears to have been committed, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, may refer such matter to the prosecutor.72 Since the Security Council is 
exercising its power under Article VII of the UN Charter, it has been suggested that the 
                                                 
67 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art 18(1). The one-month period is designed to permit a State that is already 
investigating the alleged crimes to inform the ICC and ask the prosecutor to defer to its jurisdiction under 
the complementarity principle. 
68 Id., art. 18(2). 
69 Id., art 18(3). 
70 Id., art. 18(4). 
71 Id., art. 18(5). 
72 Id., art. 13(b). 
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ICC, acting under Security Council’s direction, shall have jurisdiction over nationals of 
States Parties and non-State parties without their consent.73  In other words, the UN 
Security Council may confer jurisdiction on the Court even when the alleged crimes 
occurred in the territory of a State which has not ratified the ICC Statute or the crime was 
committed by the national of a non State Party to the ICC Statute.  Also, when the 
Security Council refers a situation to the ICC, it is expected that it will avail the Court 
with its enforcement mechanism should a State fail to cooperate with the Court.74   
 
7.4.3.1. Security Council First Referral to the Court 
On January 25, 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Sudan, 
issued its report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.75  Relying on article 
13(b) of the ICC Statute, the Commission recommended that the situation in Darfur be 
referred to the ICC by the Security Council because “the Sudanese judicial system has 
proved incapable, and the authorities unwilling, of ensuring accountability for the crimes 
committed in Darfur.”76  Although the U.S. was instrumental to the inclusion of article 
13(b) in the ICC Statute77, the U.S. initially hesitated to support the recommendation to 
refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC because of the U.S. opposition to the Court.    
However, after lengthy discussions, the Security Council, acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, by Resolution 1593 decided “to refer the situation in Darfur since 
                                                 
73 Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and 
Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 324 (1998). 
74 Id., at 325.   
75 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 
(Jan. 25, 2005), available at <http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf>. 
76 Id., para. 569. 
77 The former ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues and head of the U.S. delegation in Rome, David 
Scheffer, even describes Article 13(b) as one of the “major [U.S.] objectives . . . achieved” in the Statute. 
David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47, 
73 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002). 
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1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.”78  The Resolution was 
adopted by a vote of 11 in favor, none against, and 4 abstentions, namely Algeria, Brazil, 
China, and the United States.  The Security Council enjoined the Sudanese government 
and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate fully with and provide any 
necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to Resolution 1593.79  
Also, while recognizing that non-State parties to the ICC Statute have no obligation under 
the Statute, the Resolution implores all States and concerned regional and other 
international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court.80  
On April 1, 2005, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
announced his intention to make contact with the relevant national and international 
authorities, including the United Nations and the African Union, in order to establish the 
necessary arrangements for his work.81  Mr. Moreno-Ocampo noted that continuous 
support will be required from the Security Council.  On April 21, 2005, the Presidency 
assigned the situation in the Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I.82  On June 6, 2005, the ICC 
Chief Prosecutor opened an investigation into the situation in Darfur, Sudan.83   
The referral by Resolution 1593 is the first case in which the Security Council has 
used the trigger mechanism provided by article 13(b) of the ICC Statute.  Resolution 
1593 reflects the complex negotiation and discussions in the Security Council and the 
                                                 
78 U.N. Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International 
Criminal Court, March 31, 2005, SC/8351, S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg., U.N. SC 
Res. 1593, 1 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm 
(hereinafter “SC Resolution 1593”). 
79 Id., para. 2. 
80 Id. 
81 ICC Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur to ICC Prosecutor (Apr. 1, 2005). 
82 Situation in the Darfur, Decision Assigning the Situation in Darfur to Pre-Trial Chamber I, No. ICC-
02/05-1 (April 21, 2005). 
83 See ICC Press Release, The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigation in Darfur, June 6, 2005, available 
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=107&l=en.html.  
 299 
difficult compromise that allowed the situation in Darfur to be referred to the Court.84  It 
remains to be seen how the ICC will be able to cope with the situation in Darfur.  
Hopefully, the dissenting States, particularly, the United States may find it necessary to 
put aside its opposition to the Court and support the decision of the Security Council to 
refer the situation in Darfur to the Court to enhance the effectiveness of the Court in that 
matter.85  
 
 
7.5. Authorization of Investigation and Confirmation of Charges 
 Under the ICC Statute, the Court must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any 
case brought before it.86  Therefore, regardless of how a situation is brought under the 
jurisdiction of the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber has an important role to play with regard 
to the investigation and preparation of the cases that may result.  With respect to 
situations where the Prosecutor triggers the Court’s jurisdiction suo moto, the Prosecutor 
must seek and obtain the authorization of the Pre-trial Chamber before commencing an 
investigation into the situation.87   
   Generally, once the Prosecutor concludes investigation in any situation whether 
based on State referral, proprio motu investigation, or Security Council referral, the 
Prosecutor will, before charges are brought, consider other strategic factors to determine 
                                                 
84 In this context, it is noteworthy that Brazil, a State party and one of the strong supporters of the Court, 
reaffirmed its support for the ICC but felt unable to cast a positive vote because of doubts about the 
compatibility of Resolution 1593 with the Rome Statute. On the other side, Sudan, the country most 
directly concerned, expressed its opposition to the decision of the Council.  See the summary of the 
explanation of vote made by Ambassadors Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg of Brazil and Elfatih Mohamed 
Ahmed Erwa of Sudan respectively. UN Press Release SC/8351, Security Council Refers Situation in 
Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, at 6-7 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm>. 
85 This possibility was proposed in the so-called Compact Between the United States and Europe, a 
document signed on February 17, 2005, by fifty foreign policy experts proposing to bridge the differences 
between the United States and Europe on some fundamental policy questions. The compact is available 
online at <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cuse/analysis/USEUCompact.pdf>. 
86 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19. 
87 Id, art. 15(3). 
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whether and when, having regard to the gravity of the crimes and the interests of victims, 
it is “in the interests of justice” to prosecute.88  Should the Prosecutor decide not to 
prosecute, the decision may be subject to review by the Pre-trial Chamber on application 
by the referring State or the Security Council.89  Also, the Pre-Trial Chamber on its own 
may review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on 
considerations of the “interests of justice.”90  In other words, the Prosecutor’s decision 
not to proceed shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.91   
On the other hand, if after the commencement of an investigation, the Prosecutor 
conclude that there are sufficient evidence against a person to show that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has committed a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court, the Prosecutor will apply to the Pre-trial Chamber for a warrant of arrest or 
a summons to appear.92  After the person’s surrender or voluntarily appearance before the 
Court, the Prosecutor must apply to the Pre-trial Chamber for confirmation of the charges 
for which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial.93  A confirmation hearing is held by the 
Pre-trial Chamber to determine whether to approve the charges.  Also, the confirmation 
hearing serves to define the scope of the trial in terms of the exact nature of the alleged 
crimes and the precise form of participation attributed to the accused.94   
 
                                                 
88 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1)(c). Examples of factors that might be considered are the protection 
of victims, the potential impact of investigations on the conflict in question, and the question of the 
existence of national criminal prosecution initiatives.  
89 Id., art. 53(3)(a). 
90 Id., art. 53(3)(b); Regulation 48. 
91 Id. 
92 Id., art. 58. 
93 Id., art. 61. 
94 Regulation 52 requires the Prosecutor to provide a precise characterization of the facts, specifying the 
type of crimes alleged, as well as the precise form of participation.   See ICC Regulations, supra note 28, 
Regulation 52. If later it becomes apparent that a different crime or a different form of participation may be 
at stake, the chamber is permitted to modify the legal characterization of the facts in the document 
containing the charges. Id. 
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7.6. Grounds for Challenging Admissibility of a Case or the Court’s Jurisdiction  
The ICC Statute states that the Court’s jurisdiction may be challenged on grounds 
of inadmissibility of a case under article 17 or on any other ground by certain entities.95  
Article 19 provides that the following entities may challenge the admissibility of a case or 
the jurisdiction of the Court: (1) the accused or an individual against whom a warrant of 
arrest or a summons to appear has been issued, (2) a State with jurisdiction over the case, 
(3) a State party in whose territory the crime was committed or the State of nationality of 
the accused or a non State party which has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with 
respect to a particular crime.96  In addition, the Prosecutor may request the Court to issue 
a ruling regarding a question of jurisdiction or admissibility.97  Further, since the ICC 
Statute vests the Court with jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction,98 the Court may also 
determine the admissibility of a case sua sponte.99   
Suffice it to note that the ICC Statute makes a distinction between jurisdiction and 
admissibility.  While a challenge on jurisdiction is an attack on the Court’s authority over 
the matter and/or the accused, challenge based on admissibility recognizes the Court’s 
authority over the matter and the accused but argues that the Court is precluded from 
exercising that authority in that particular matter based on any of the grounds listed in 
article 19.100  Thus, a challenge of the Court’s jurisdiction should be made first before a 
challenge on admissibility since the former is more fundamental because if a Court lacks 
                                                 
95 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(2). 
96 Id., art. 19(2)(a-c).  Note however that where the Prosecutor has determined pursuant to Article 53(1) & 
(2) that a case is inadmissible, the referring authority – the State or the Security Council, may request the 
Court to rule on the admissibility of the case.  Id., art. 53(3)(a). 
97 Id., art. 19(3). 
98 See id. arts. 17, 19.  
99 Id., arts. 19(1), 53(3)(b). 
100 See William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 68 
(2nd ed. 2004) (noting that the “question of admissibility … seeks to establish whether matters over which 
the Court properly has jurisdiction should be litigated before it”). 
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jurisdiction, the issue of admissibility does not arise.101  Hence, while the ICC Statute 
mandates that the Court must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction, it only requires the 
Court to discretionary determine the admissibility of a case.102 
Where the challenge is brought before the confirmation of charges, the challenge 
shall be entertained by the Pre-trial Chamber.103  On the other hand, the challenge shall 
be made before the Trial Chamber if brought after the confirmation of the charges.104  
Decisions of the Pre-trial Chamber or the Trial Chamber on challenge of jurisdiction or 
admissibility of a case may be appealed to the Appeals Chamber whose decision is 
final.105   
 
7.6.1. Inadmissibility of the Case 
There are two ways the admissibility of a case may be challenged.  First, for 
situations referred to the Court by a State or investigations initiated proprio motu by the 
Prosecutor, a State may challenge the admissibility of the case under the procedure laid 
down in article 18.106  Second, admissibility of case irrespective of how it was referred to 
the Court may be challenged by any party listed under article 19.107  However, the 
                                                 
101 See ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, First Session, 
New York, 3-10 Sept. 2002), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add. 1, R. 58(4), available at:,  http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf (visited March 3, 2006) 
[hereinafter ICC Rules] (providing that a challenge or question regarding jurisdiction be considered prior to 
any challenge or question of admissibility). 
102 ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 19(1), 53(3)(b).  See also, Christopher K. Hall, Article 19, Challenges to 
the Jurisdiction of the Court or the Admissibility of a Case, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY 
ARTICLE 405, 408(Otto Triffterer, ed. 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE]   
(noting that the Court has a duty to determine jurisdiction, but determinations as to admissibility are 
discretionary). 
103 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(6). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id., art. 18(1)(2). 
107 Id., art. 19(2)(a-c).  Article 19 expands the entities that can challenge the admissibility of a case unlike 
article 18, which limits it to only a State.  Also, article 19 refers to admissibility of a case while article 18 
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grounds for challenging the admissibility of a case whether under article 18 or 19 are the 
same.108   
A case is inadmissible by the Court where: (1) the case is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction, (2) the case has been investigated by a State with 
jurisdiction and the State decided not to prosecute the person concerned, (3) the person 
concerned has already been tried for the conduct which is the subject of the complaint, or 
(4) the case lacks sufficient gravity to warrant further action by the Court.109 
However, the Pre-trial Chamber may determine that the case is admissible if the 
Pre-trial Chamber is of the opinion that the State is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry 
out the investigation or prosecution.110  The ICC Statute provides guidelines on how to 
determine the “unwillingness”111 or “inability” 112  of a State to conduct an investigation 
or prosecution.  Note however, the position of the International Commission of Inquiry 
                                                                                                                                                 
talks about challenging the power of the Prosecutor to initiate investigation on a situation referred to the 
Court by a State or initiated proprio motu.   See also, ICC Rules, supra note 101, R. 133. 
108 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1), art. 19(2).   
109 Id., art. 17(1)(a-d). 
110 Id., art. 17(1)(a)(b). 
111 Id., art 17(2) provides that a State is unwilling if one or more of the following situation is applicable: 
 
(a)     The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5;  
 
(b)     There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;  
 
(c)     The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they 
were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent 
to bring the person concerned to justice.  
 
Id., art. 17(2). 
112 See, Id., art. 17(3) provides that: 
  
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total 
or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain 
the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings.  
 
Id., art. 17(3). 
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on Darfur, Sudan to the effect that a referral presumptively by the Security Council “is 
normally based on the assumption that the territorial State is not administering justice 
because it is unwilling or unable to do so”.113   
The word “genuinely” is not defined by the ICC Statute but appears to evoke a 
requirement of good faith on behalf of the State.114  In other words, a State should not 
proceed to conduct investigation for the sole purpose of depriving the Court of 
jurisdiction without a good faith believe in its willingness or a good faith assessment of 
its ability to conduct the investigation or prosecution.   
With respect to inadmissibility based on prior prosecution by a State, obviously a 
re-trial of the person concerned by the Court will violate the principle of double jeopardy.  
However, the Court may disregard the prior prosecution if it was conducted for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court.115  Similarly, the case will be admissible if the national 
prosecution was not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the 
norms of due process recognized by international law and lacked a meaningful intent to 
                                                 
113 See Report of the International Commission on Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of September 18, 2004, 608 (Jan. 25, 2005). The 
Commission however notes that the final decision in this regards rests with the ICC Prosecutor.  Id., at 608, 
n. 220.  See also, John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC in 1 THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667, 683 (Cassese, 
Gaeta & Jones, eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE ROME STATUTE: A COMMENTARY] (expressing the 
view that even if a Council decision includes a determination that the state(s) concerned is unwilling or 
unable to investigate or prosecute, the Court as an independent body will not be bound by such a 
determination, though it will likely be given great weight in the context of admissibility challenges).  This 
view accords with the position of the ICC Prosecutor to the effect that “before starting an investigation, I 
am required under the Statute to assess factors including crimes and admissibility”.  See Press Release, 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Chief Prosecutor, Security Council refers Situation in Darfur to ICC Prosecutor 
(April 1, 2005), available at: http://www.icc-cpi-int/pressrelease_details&id=98.html (visited February 28, 
2006).   
114 Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 
88 GEO. L.J. 381, 418 (2000). 
115 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(3)(a). 
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bring the person concerned to justice.116  In the event that the Pre-trial or Trial Chamber 
determines that a State is unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute the case, article 
18(4) allows the requesting State to appeal an adverse ruling to the Appeals Chamber.117  
In addition, under article 18(7) a State which has challenged a ruling of the Pre-trial 
Chamber may challenge the admissibility of the case under article 19 on grounds of 
additional significant facts or significant change of circumstances.118  
The provisions of article 17 paragraphs 2 & 3 and article 20 paragraphs 3(a-b) call 
for judicial review of the decision of the State concern and/or its national judicial system.  
Under article 20(3), the appropriateness of the prior prosecution by a national court is to 
be determined by the ICC.119  Ordinarily, States see judicial review of its national court 
decision by an outside judicial organ as unwelcome challenge to its sovereignty.  As 
such, it remains to be seen how States would respond to a decision by the Court that the 
State’s decision not to investigate or prosecute was based on its inability or 
unwillingness.  Probably, a decision based on “inability” to investigate or prosecute may 
be easier to justify as it generally stems from a breakdown of or unavailability of 
institutions of legal enforcement.120  On the other hand, “unwillingness” to prosecute 
involves a deliberate decision of the State not to hold the accused person accountable.121  
                                                 
116 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(3)(b). 
117 Id., art 18(4). The State concerned or the Prosecutor may appeal to the Appeals Chamber against a 
ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance to Article 82.  Such appeal may be heard on an expedited 
basis.  
118 Id., art. 19(2) (b), provides that Challenges to the admissibility of a case under Article 17 or challenges 
to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by a State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground 
that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted the case.  
119 Leila Sadat & S. Richard Carden, supra note 114, at 418. 
120 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(3). 
121 Id., art. 17(2). 
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Lastly, a case is inadmissible if the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify 
action by the Court.122  Although not stated, it appears that the basis for this ground stems 
from the fact that jurisdiction of the Court shall be reserved for “the most serious crime of 
concern to the international community”.123  Be that as it may, it is up to the Court to 
determine which case meets the “sufficient gravity” test as the ICC Statute does not 
define the term “gravity”.  In this regard, it has been suggested that the Court may draw a 
clue from the chapeau of articles 6, 7 and 8 which provide the jurisdictional threshold for 
the crimes under the ICC Statute.124    
Thus, the ICC may consider whether the genocidal act was committed with intent 
to destroy in part or in whole any of the protected “group”,125 whether a crime against 
humanity was “widespread or systematic”,126 and whether the war crime was “part of a 
plan or policy” or committed on a large scale basis127 respectively.  Therefore, elements 
of gravity will include scale - that is, the magnitude or widespread nature of the crimes; 
the heinous nature of the offense, and level of participation of the accused – with a view 
to distinguish “major” war criminals from “minor” offenders who should be tried 
locally.128  
On the other hand, the first three grounds for inadmissibility find support on the 
Court’s complementary jurisdiction which confers primacy of jurisdiction to national 
courts.129  It follows that where the national court has assumed jurisdiction, the Court will 
find the case inadmissible unless the Court determines that the domestic authorities are 
                                                 
122 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(d). 
123 Id., art. 5(1). 
124 Leila Sadat & S. Richard Carden, supra note 114, at 419. 
125 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6. 
126 Id., art. 7(1). 
127 Id., art. 8(1). 
128 Leila Sadat & S. Richard Carden, supra note 114, at 419. 
129 See ICC Statute, supra note 1, Preamble, para. 10; arts. 1, 17.  
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unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution.  Article 17 
firmly establishes the authority and prerogative of States to preserve their sovereign right 
to prosecute these cases in their national courts, as opposed to relying on the Court.130 
It is noteworthy that under the ICC Statute, the Security Council may pursuant to 
its powers under article VII of the UN Charter refer a situation in non-Party State to the 
Court without the consent of the non State party.131  This raises the question whether the 
ICC Statute permits a non-Party State to challenge the admissibility of the case under 
article 19 if the case was referred to the Court by the Security Council.  While the consent 
of a non State party is not required for referrals from the Security Council,132 a non State 
party may still challenge the admissibility of a case or the Court’s jurisdiction regarding 
referrals made to the Court by the Security Council pursuant to article 19, paragraph 
2(b).133   
Since article 19 is of general application, that is, it covers all cases regardless of 
how it was brought before the Court, it follows that a non-State party may challenge the 
admissibility of a case referred to the Court by the Security Council if the non-State party 
has jurisdiction over the case.134  This may be so in situations where the accused is a 
national of the non-State party and the State wishes to exercise jurisdiction based on 
                                                 
130 Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 47-48 (2001). 
131 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 14. 
132 See Id., art. 12(2) which requires the consent of a State only if the Court’s jurisdiction was triggered 
under Article 13, paragraph (a) or (c).  
133 See Id., art. 19(2)(b) which provides that challenges to the admissibility of a case may be made by  “[a] 
State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has 
investigated or prosecuted” the case.  
134 John T. Holmes, supra note 113, at 683. 
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nationality principle.135  Similarly, a non-State party may challenge the admissibility of 
case against its national even where the case was referred to the Court by the territorial 
State that is a State-party to the ICC Statute because the non-State party qualifies as a 
“State which has jurisdiction over [the] case.”136   
In view of the above, Sudan may elect to challenge the situation in Darfur, Sudan 
referred to the Court by the Security Council via Resolution 1593.137  However, it is 
debatable whether the non-State party may procedurally make such challenge without 
first recognizing the ICC Statute or the Court’s jurisdiction even for the limited purpose 
of challenging the admissibility of case or the Court’s jurisdiction for the said case.  
It should be noted that neither the ICC Statute nor the ICC RPE provide for who 
bears the burden to proof inadmissibility of a case.  Generally, under the principle of 
actori incumbit probation, the burden of proof rests initially on the party asserting the 
existence of any of the grounds for inadmissibility or admissibility and in situations.138  
With respect to admissibility based on on-going and or completed investigation or 
prosecution, it appears the ICC Statute only require the State to communicate this to the 
Prosecutor together with supporting information.139  Once a State has asserted that it is 
investigating or prosecuting or has investigated or prosecuted the accused, the onus is on 
                                                 
135 Under the nationality principle, which, like the territorial principle, is widely recognized, every State has 
jurisdiction to prosecute its own nationals for crimes even when committed outside of its own territory.  
See Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (3d ed. 1979). 
136 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(2)(b). 
137 The Sudanese government has handed to the United Nations a list of individuals of the regular services 
who have been allegedly tried for perpetrating crimes connected with the Darfur conflict thereby preparing 
the ground to assert inadmissibility of the case.  See Agence France Presse, Sudan Hands UN Darfur 
Suspects List, February 26, 2006, available at:  
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14276 (visited February 28, 2006). 
138 See Mojtaba Kazazi, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE 
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 54-66 (1996) (tracing the genesis of the rule and its 
applicability in Islamic law, and common and civil law jurisdictions).  See notes 96-99 and accompanying 
text (for parties that may challenge the admissibility of a case). 
139 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 118(2) 
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the ICC Prosecutor to prove that a State is unable or unwilling to prosecute, or that 
investigations and trials carried out by a State are fraudulent.140  On the other hand, 
where the Prosecutor has determined that the case is inadmissible, on challenge by a 
party, the Prosecutor has to substantiate the grounds for determining that the case is 
inadmissible.  Thereafter, the challenging party has to establish the admissibility of the 
case.    
Apart from grounds for challenging the inadmissibility of a case, the ICC Statute 
does not list grounds for challenging the Court’s jurisdiction.  However, some of the 
grounds by which the Court’s jurisdiction may be challenged are discussed below. 
 
7.6.2. Age Requirement  
The Court’s jurisdiction may be challenged on the ground that the accused was 
under the age of eighteen at the time the crime was committed.141  While this may appear 
a non-issue, it could sometime be a knotty legal issue to determine the age of an 
individual in situations where there is no proper record of birth or where the record is 
otherwise unavailable.  Given the increasing participation of under-aged “soldiers” in 
recent armed conflicts, this may prove to be a ground for challenging the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  Successful challenge based on age of criminal liability means that no body 
will be criminally liable for atrocities committed by individuals between the age of 
fifteen and eighteen years because the ICC Statute only provides for the punishment of 
persons responsible for conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years to 
participate in armed conflict.142 
                                                 
140 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2) & (3). 823. 
141 Id., art. 26. 
142 Id., art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii). 
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Perhaps, the ICC should have adopted the position of the Sierra Leone Special 
Court to the effect that where any person who was at the time of the alleged commission 
of the crime between 15 and 18 years of age, the Court’s objective should be to 
rehabilitate and reintegrate the juvenile offender back to the society.143  It is however 
doubtful if the Court would be confronted with a lot of offenders in this age group given 
that the Court will focus on those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. 
 
7.6.3. Security Council Deferral/Opt Out Period 
The jurisdiction of the Court may be temporarily suspended by the Security 
Council for a renewable period of 12 months.144  Similarly, a State party may at the time 
of becoming a party to the Statute, suspend the jurisdiction of the Court for a one time 
period of seven (7) years with respect to war crimes.145  Thus, a challenge to the Court’s 
jurisdiction or admissibility of a case may be based on the ground that the investigation 
and/or prosecution of the case have been suspended by the Security Council or that the 
territorial State or State of nationality of the accused has opted out of the Court’s 
jurisdiction with respect to war crimes.146   During the period of the deferral or opt out, 
the Court lacks jurisdiction to authorize investigation or prosecution of the case. 
 
7.6.4. Nationality  
Where a crime is committed in the territory of a State that is not a party to the ICC 
Statute, the accused person may challenge the Court’s jurisdiction if the State of which 
                                                 
143 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii). See also, article 15(5) requiring the Prosecutor 
to “ensure that the child-rehabilitation programme is not placed at risk and that, where appropriate, resort 
should be had to alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms, to the extent of their availability.” 
144 Id., art. 16. 
145 Id., art. 124. 
146 Id., arts. 16, 124.    
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the accused is a national is not a State party to the ICC Statute and has not given its 
consent, unless the case was referred to the Court by the Security Council147  The State 
must be a State party to the ICC Statute before the date of the commission of the crime 
unless the State makes a declaration to accept the Court’s jurisdiction in accordance with 
article 12 paragraph 3.148  Such declaration must however not be for crimes committed 
earlier than the date of the entry into force of the ICC Statute as “no person shall be 
criminally responsible for conduct prior to entry into force of the Statute”.149 
The ICC Statute does not address the issue of dual nationality and therefore leaves 
a loophole which may be exploited by an accused with dual nationality if one of the State 
to which the accused is a national is not a State party to the Statute.  For example, an 
accused person may be a national of State A which is a State party to the Statute and 
State B which is not a State party to the Statute.  The act did not occur in State A but in 
the territory of State B which has declined to give its consent.  The situation has not been 
referred to the Court by the Security Council.   
In the above hypothetical situation, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction 
through State A because the accused person is a national of State A and State A is a State 
party to the ICC Statute.  However, the accused may try to avoid the jurisdiction of the 
Court by denouncing his or her citizenship of State A.  In which case, the accused may 
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that he or she is not a national of a State 
party to the ICC Statute.  It remains to be seen what the Court would do if faced with this 
circumstance.  It is suggested that the Court may find that it has jurisdiction since the 
                                                 
147 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12. 
148 Id., 11(2). 
149 Id., art. 11(1), 24(1).    
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accused was a national of a State party at the time the crime was committed.  Also, the 
Court may invoke jurisdiction if the accused normal place of residence is in State A.  
 
7.6.5. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege  
The ICC Statute does not have ex post facto subject matter or personal 
jurisdiction.150  Therefore, a challenge on the Court’s jurisdiction may be made on the 
basis that the conduct was committed before the entry into force of the ICC Statute151 or 
that the conduct was not a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court at the time it was 
committed.152   
 
7.7. Time of Challenge 
In principle, article 19 provides that there can only be one challenge on the 
admissibility of a case or jurisdiction of the Court and that it must take place prior to or at 
the commencement of the trial unless the Court grants leave for the challenge to be made 
more than once or to be brought after the beginning of a trial.153  However, challenges to 
the admissibility of a case at the commencement of the trial or with leave of the Court is 
limited to challenges on grounds of neb is in idem.154  This is so because the ICC Statute 
enjoins States to make a challenge at the earliest opportunity.155  Under the ICC Statute, 
the earliest opportunity for a State to challenge the admissibility of a situation referred to 
the Court by another State or by the Prosecutor proprio motu, is within one month of its 
notification by the Prosecutor.156   
                                                 
150 ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 11(1), 24(1). 
151 Id., arts. 11. 
152 Id., art. 22(1). 
153 Id., art. 19(4). 
154 Id. 
155 Id., art. 19(5). 
156 Id., art. 18(2). 
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However, a State which has unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of a 
situation under article 18 may challenge the admissibility of a case under article 19 on 
grounds of additional significant facts or significant change of circumstances.157  Where 
the State failed to challenge the admissibility of a situation within the stipulated time, the 
Court cannot grant the State leave to initiate the challenge at the commencement of the 
trial or thereafter as the Court’s authority in this regard is limited to challenges on 
grounds of neb is in idem.158 
 It follows that a State that failed to make the challenge within one month of its 
notification by the Prosecutor has permanently waived its right to challenge the 
admissibility of the case even if there are additional sufficient facts or change of 
circumstance.  The State can no longer challenge the admissibility of the case on the basis 
that it is investigating or has investigated or prosecuted the case unless the case was 
referred to the Court by the Security Council in which case there is no obligation on the 
Prosecutor to notify the States before commencement of investigation.159   
 
 
7.8. Observations and Commentary 
It is commendable that three States have taken the step to refer situations in their 
respective States to the ICC.  However, such steps raises issues of procedural compliance 
with the ICC Statute and Rules since the instruments did not anticipate a situation where 
the referral State is both the territorial State and the State of nationality of the accused.160  
                                                 
157 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(7). 
158 Id., art. 19(4). 
159 Id., art. 18(1).  The Prosecutor is only required to notify all State Parties and States that may have a right 
to exercise jurisdiction if the situation was referred to the Court by a State or where the Prosecutor intends 
to initiate an investigation proprio motu based on information available to the Prosecutor. Id. 
160 The ICC Statute and the ICC Rules do not have any provision that deals with such scenario. 
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First, does a State referral equal a waiver of its primacy jurisdiction and ability to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of the case?  In other words, 
can the State open its domestic investigation and/or prosecution of the case after it had 
referred the case to the Court thereby positioning itself to assert jurisdiction.   Second, 
should State referral imply an expression by the State that it is unwilling or unable to 
investigate or prosecute?  Lastly, should the Prosecutor comply with the procedural 
requirements to notify the referral State before commencing investigation?     
With respect to the issue of waiver, the question first came up for discussions at 
the 1995 Ad hoc Committee session without a resolution.161  Some delegates favored an 
inclusion of a provision in the ICC Statute that expressly allows a State to voluntarily 
decide to relinquish its jurisdiction in favor of the ICC while others expressed the view 
that such provision would be inconsistent with the principle of complementarity as the 
ICC should in no way undermine the effectiveness of national justice systems and should 
only be resorted to in exceptional cases.162  Although the issue came up again in 
subsequent Preparatory Committee sessions, no consensus was reached on this other than 
to insert the proposal as a footnote.163  When the issue came up at the Rome Conference, 
the Conference suggested that the issue would be better addressed in the Rules of 
                                                 
161 See, Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, G.A., 
50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, A/50/22, para. 47 (1995). 
162 Id. 
163 See Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held on 4 to 15 August 1997, 
A/Ac.249/1997/L.8?Rev.1, art. 35, p. 11. n. 17 (1997); Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting From 19 to 30 
January 1998 in Zutfen, The Netherlands, A/AC.249/1998/L.13, art. 11, p. 42 n. 53 (1998); Report of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft Statute & Draft 
Final Act, A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, art. 15, p. 48 n. 38, p. 40 n. 38 (1998).  
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Procedure and Evidence.164  The ICC Rules however does not address the issue and it is 
now up to the Court to determine this issue if it does come up before the Court.   
Should the Court determine that the referral amounts to a waiver of jurisdiction by 
the referral State, such waiver may be limited only to the right to investigate because a 
State referral may be for purposes of investigation to determine “whether one or more 
specific persons should be charged with the commission of crimes” under the ICC 
Statute.165  Thus, the referral State may take the position that after investigation, the 
Prosecutor should advise it of persons to be prosecuted and the State may decide to 
commence domestic investigation and/or prosecution or give its consent for prosecution 
by the Court under article 12.166   
Be that as it may, if the Court determines that a State referral amounts to a waiver 
of jurisdiction, the State should regain jurisdiction where the Prosecutor determines and 
the Pre-Trial Chamber concurs, that the ICC cannot investigate or prosecute the case in 
accordance with article 53 because a decision not to investigate or prosecute pursuant to 
article 53 does not equal a determination that a crime under the Statute has not been 
committed.167    
In the event that the referral State is the territorial State where the crimes occurred 
and State of nationality of the accused, as is the case with the first three States’ referrals, 
this may raise the question whether the Prosecutor still has to comply with article 18 
paragraph 1 and Rule 54 requiring the Prosecutor to inform all States that would 
                                                 
164 John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in Roy S. Lee (ed) THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, 
RESULTS 78 (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
165 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 14(1). 
166 Id., art. 12(2). 
167 Id., art. 53 (the Prosecutor may decide not to investigate or prosecute if there is not insufficient 
evidence, or the case is inadmissible under article 17, or a prosecution would not be in the interest of 
justice).  Id. 
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generally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes of the Prosecutor’s intent to commence 
investigation.168  In this situation, the State that would exercise jurisdiction is the State 
that has referred the situation to the Prosecutor with a request that the Prosecutor 
investigate the situation.  Thus, there would be no need for the Prosecutor to notify the 
State of his or her decision to commence investigation because the State requested the 
investigation.  Even if the Prosecutor notifies the State of his or her intent to commence 
investigation, such notice should serve as an update and should not be intended to invoke 
article 18 paragraph 2.   
On the other hand, it may be that between the time the State made the referral and 
before the Prosecutor commence investigation, there has been a change in circumstance 
which positions the State to carry out the investigation domestically.  In such event, the 
State may argue that its referral does not amount to a waiver of their rights under article 
18, paragraphs 1 and 2.  On the face of article 18, paragraph 1, this argument may be 
sustained since the subparagraph provides that “the Prosecutor shall notify all States 
Parties and those States which … would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes 
concerned.”169  In the first place, the requirement is mandatory and secondly, the notice is 
to be given to all States entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the crime concerned.  Thus, 
to avoid a situation where the Prosecutor may be forced to terminate its investigation 
prematurely as a result of a challenge by the referral State, it is suggested that the prudent 
thing to do is to comply with article 18, paragraph 1, afortiori such compliance would be 
innocuous.   
                                                 
168 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art 18(1); ICC Rules, supra note 101, R. 54. 
169 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(1) [emphasis added]. 
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Should the Prosecutor notify the referral State of his or her intent to commence 
investigation and the referral State fails within one month of receipt of the notification to 
inform the Prosecutor that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals, or the State 
fails to challenge the admissibility of the case under article 18, the State would lose its 
right to challenge the admissibility of the case under article 19 unless there are 
“additional significant facts” or “significant change of circumstances” enabling the Court 
to allow a dilatory challenge.170   On the other hand, if the Prosecutor failed to notify the 
referral State of his or her intent to commence investigation, the referral State may 
challenge the admissibility of the case under article 19 for the first time.171  
Also, a related issue to States referrals is whether such referrals amount to 
abdication of States Parties’ duties under the ICC Statute which affirms that to realize the 
Statute’s objective that crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Statute “must 
not go unpunished … effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the 
national level”.172  Thus, the Statute obligates States to “exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes.”173  This raises the question whether 
States can discharge this obligation to “exercise its criminal jurisdiction” by simply 
referring the case to the ICC.  Put differently, must a State carry out domestic prosecution 
of those responsible for international crimes to satisfy its obligation under the ICC 
Statute?   
It may be argued that a joint reading of preamble four requiring that measures be 
taken at the national level and preamble six imposing a duty on States to exercise its 
                                                 
170 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(7). 
171 Id., art. 19(4) (stating that the admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction of the Court may be challenged 
only once by any State). 
172 Id., preamble, para. 4. 
173 Id., preamble, para. 6. 
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criminal jurisdiction implies that States have an affirmative duty to first attempt domestic 
prosecution.  While national prosecution is desirable and appears preferable by the ICC 
Statute, the Statute does not expressly require that the duty to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction can only be discharged by pursuing domestic criminal prosecution.  The duty 
is akin to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare which requires a State to either 
prosecute or extradite the accused to a third State willing to prosecute without preferring 
one to the other.174  Similarly, under the ICC Statute, the duty of a State should be to 
prosecute or surrender the accused to the Court or extradite to a third party State 
(territorial State or State of nationality of the accused) that is willing to prosecute the 
accused.   
It is submitted that where a State elects to surrender those responsible for 
international crimes to the Court, the State has discharged its obligation under the Statute 
because such decision to refer the matter to the ICC involves taking measures at the 
national level and exercising its criminal jurisdiction to the effect that the matter should 
be handled by the Court.  Also, the ICC Statute expressly allows the States to refer a 
situation in which one or more of the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction may have 
been committed to the Prosecutor for investigation without any requirement that the 
States Parties must first attempt domestic prosecution.175 
With respect to referral by the Security Council referral, there is the question 
whether the admissibility of the case may be challenged by the concerned State(s).  The 
                                                 
174 See Colleen Enache-Brown and Ari Fried, Universal Crime, Jurisdiction and Duty: The Obligation of 
Aut Dedere Aut Judicare in International Law, 43 MCGILL L. J. 613, 626 (1998); M. Cherif Bassiouni and 
Edward M. Wise, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-5, 56-57 (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) (emphasis 
added).  
175 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 14(1). 
 319 
Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan promises to test the effect of 
such referral.  Already, the Sudanese government has left no one in doubt that they have 
no intention of cooperating with the Court and will not surrender any of their nationals to 
the Court regarding this referral.176  As a prelude to asserting jurisdiction, after the 
Security Council via Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Court, 
the Sudanese government established its own special court in June 2005 to allegedly try 
Darfur criminals and has vehemently maintained its right to handle the case 
domestically.177  Contrast with the position of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Sudan who 
has argued that the special court is not able to try Sudanese officials responsible for 
violating international crimes in Darfur, Sudan.178   
The plain language of article 19 does not take away the right of a State to 
challenge the admissibility of a case, even when that case was referred to the Court by the 
Security Council.  Thus, the admissibility of the situation in Darfur is likely going to be 
challenged by the government of Sudan on the ground that it has investigated and 
                                                 
176 See, Sudan Tribune, ICC Delegation to Visit Sudan’s Darfur”, February 27, 2006, available at: 
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14271 (reporting that the Sudan’s Justice Minister 
Mohamed al-Mardi told Reuters in an interview on 13 December 2005 that Moreno Ocampo’s investigators 
would not have any access to Darfur, where ethnic cleansing has resulted in killings, rape and the uprooting 
of 2 million refugees. The paper quoted the Justice Minster as saying that “the ICC officials have no 
jurisdiction inside the Sudan or with regards to Sudanese citizens,” and that “they cannot investigate 
anything on Darfur”). 
177 The Sudanese government has handed to the United Nations a list of individuals of the regular services 
who have been allegedly tried for perpetrating crimes connected with the Darfur conflict thereby preparing 
the ground to assert inadmissibility of the case.  See Agence France Presse, Sudan Hands UN Darfur 
Suspects List, February 26, 2006, available at:  
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14276 (visited February 28, 2006). 
178 Reuters, Sudan Unable to Try Darfur Suspects - UN Official, March 6, 2006, available at: 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/MCD652175.htm (quoting Sima Samar, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Sudan to the effect that “Sudan’s special court for Darfur is not able to try Sudanese officials 
responsible for war crimes and authorities continue to abuse freedom of expression.”  Ms. Samar said the 
courts had not yet tried anyone with command responsibility for crimes in Darfur and that she had only 
been given a list of 15 officers from the police and army who had been tried for crimes between 1991 and 
2003, before the Darfur conflict even began. “We did ask for information and they didn’t provide much 
information so that means that maybe they are not able to bring anybody to justice,” she said). 
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prosecuted those that it considered responsible for the situation in Darfur.179  It remains 
to be seen how the Court will deal with this challenge.  It is not unlikely that the Court 
may consider such prosecution as an attempt to shield the individuals from the 
jurisdiction of the Court or to completely deny the Court of jurisdiction in the case.180  
Such determination will lead the Court to conclude that the Sudanese government is 
unwilling and/or unable to investigate or prosecute thereby opening the door for exercise 
of jurisdiction by the Court.   
Hopefully, with the enforcement powers of the Security Council, the Prosecutor 
will be able to carryout his investigations in the matter and that indicted individuals will 
be apprehended and surrendered to the Court.  However, it is suggested that if the 
Security Council referral should have the anticipated boast, the ICC Statute should be 
amended to clearly indicate that a referral by the Security Council should suffice as 
evidence of the unwillingness or inability of the State concerned to investigate or 
prosecute the case thereby removing the procedural hurdle of article 19 admissibility 
challenge.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
179 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(2)(b).  
180 Id., art. 17(2). 
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OBSTACLES TO INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN THE ROME 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
=============================================================== 
 
8.0.  BOTTLENECKS AND LIMITATIONS TO THE COURT’S JURISDICTION 
 
______________________________________________ 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
The understandable euphoria surrounding the establishment of the ICC obscured 
the fact that many compromises that were necessary to reach the successful conclusion 
significantly diluted the original aspirations.  The reality is that the ICC Statute cut down 
on the ability of the Court to exercise universal jurisdiction through the principle of 
complementarity.  The ICC could act only in those cases where national States were 
unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute the accused.  The Prosecutor could not act 
without prior approval of the Pre-trial Chamber.  Also, absent U.N. Security Council 
action, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction after it has passed through the layer of 
procedural rules requiring the Prosecutor to obtain the consent of either the State on 
whose territory a crime is committed or the State of nationality of the accused.1  Further, 
the UN Security Council has authority to halt prosecutions if in its opinion such 
prosecution will not be compatible with its responsibilities under Article VII of the UN 
Charter.2  Some of these compromises which severely limited the Court’s jurisdiction are 
discussed below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 ICC Statute, supra note 1art. 12. 
2 Id., art. 16. 
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8.2. The Complementarity Principle  
The principle of complementarity which permeates the ICC Statute confers 
jurisdictional primacy on national courts over the ICC.3   In other words, the Court has no 
jurisdiction over a case when the matter “is being appropriately dealt with by a national 
justice system”.4  National sovereignty concerns informed the introduction of the 
principle of complementarity in the operation of the ICC.5  Article 17 provides that the 
ICC will defer its jurisdiction to a national court except in situations where national 
courts have been genuinely unable or unwilling to investigate and/or prosecute the 
accused.6  Article 17 is applicable even when the State’s leaders are themselves 
implicated.7   
The Prosecutor is duty-bound to notify all States that might normally exercise 
jurisdiction of his or her intention to commence an investigation.8  Thereupon, any State 
with jurisdiction over the case, whether a State party or not, may within one month of 
receipt of such notice inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated the 
situation domestically.9  Such notice may be accompanied with a request that the 
Prosecutor stop his or her own investigation in the case.10  On receipt of the request, the 
                                                 
3 Id., Preamble, Para. 10, arts. 1, 17. (Article 1 of the Statute provides that the Court shall have the power to 
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in 
this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction).  
4 William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 85 (2nd 
ed. 2004). 
5 See David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 47, 59-60 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002) (noting that Article 17 was ostensibly drafted to accommodate and 
protect the United States’ interest). 
6 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(a). 
7 Id., art. 28. 
8 Id., art. 18(1).  
9 Id., art 18(2).    
10 The request must be made in writing and must contain information regarding the State’s investigation.  
See, ee ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, First Session, 
New York, 3-10 Sept. 2002), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add. 1, ICC-ASP/1/3, Rules 53 & 54, available 
at:,  http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf (visited 
March 3, 2006) [hereinafter ICC Rules].  
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Prosecutor must defer to the State’s investigation but may make an application to the Pre-
Trial Chamber which may decide to authorize the investigation.11  To the extent that the 
Prosecutor has no choice in the matter but to comply, “the ‘request is really not a request.  
It is a demand or an assertion by the State of its right to primacy”.12 
Therefore, the complementarity notion in the ICC Statute replaces the primacy 
jurisdiction of international tribunals as was the case with the ad hoc tribunals such as the 
Nuremberg13  and Tokyo14 war tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia15 (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda16 (ICTR) 
as well as the mixed tribunals in Sierra Leone, Timore-Leste, and Cambodia with priority 
for national courts.17  This deference to national courts suggestively makes the ICC a 
court of last resort.18 
                                                 
11 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(2).     
12 See Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Article 18 Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 395, 401 (Otto Triffterer, ed. 1999) [hereinafter 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE].   
13 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established by an agreement between four 
victorious Allied Powers at the end of World War II.  See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment 
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted 
in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. 
14 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established in Tokyo pursuant to the Special 
Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Establishment of an 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20. 
15 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, annexed to S.C. Res. 827, 
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1192 
(1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
16 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th 
Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1602 (1994) [hereinafter 
ICTR Statute]. 
17 See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and 
International Criminal Tribunals 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 385 (1998) (noting that ICTY and ICTR raised 
for the first time the appropriate relationship between the jurisdiction of national courts and that of an 
international criminal court which was clearly to resolve the jurisdictional conflict in favor of the 
International Tribunal). Id. 
18 John Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination of U.S. Objections to the 
Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 85, 94 (2000);  James L. Taulbee, A Call to Arms Declined: The United 
States and the International Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 105, 129 (2000). 
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Thus, under the complementarity provision, any State with jurisdiction can 
effectively prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over its nationals by informing 
the Court of its willingness to investigate the allegation under article 18(2).19  In the event 
that the Pre-trial Chamber rejects such request, article 18(4) allows the requesting State to 
appeal an adverse ruling of the Pre-trial Chamber to the Appeals Chamber.20  In addition, 
under article 18(7) a State which has challenged a ruling of the Pre-trial Chamber may 
challenge the admissibility of the case under article 19 on grounds of additional 
significant facts or significant change of circumstances.21  With these arrangements, the 
possibility that the ICC would exercise its jurisdiction without hindrance from one State 
or the other is exceedingly remote because no State will wish the Court to remove a case 
from its jurisdiction where it intended to conduct the investigation and prosecution 
itself.22   
In view of this development, the complementarity provisions have watered down 
the jurisdiction of the Court and created an avenue where a State may use the 
complementary provisions to shield its nationals from the Court’s jurisdiction.23 The 
Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan exposes this concern as it 
promises to test the effect of such referral.  Already, the Sudanese government has left no 
one in doubt that it has no intention of cooperating with the Court and will not surrender 
                                                 
19 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art 18(2). 
20 Id., art 18(4).   
21 Id., art. 19(2) (b), provides that Challenges to the admissibility of a case under Article 17 or challenges to 
the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by a State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that 
it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted the case.  
22 Id.  
23 Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal 
Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 1 (2002). 
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any of their nationals to the Court regarding this referral.24  Thus, after the referral, the 
government of Sudan created a special court to prosecute individuals suspected of 
perpetrating crimes in Darfur.   
The Sudanese government has not made any pretensions as to its intention in 
creating the special court as an official of the Sudanese Ministry of Justice avers that 
“ICC article 17 stipulates that it can refuse to look into any case if investigations and 
trials can be carried out in the countries concerned except if they are unwilling to carry 
out the prosecutions”.25  Consequently, the Sudanese government has gone ahead to 
allegedly prosecute some security officials over the Darfur conflict.26  Contrast with the 
position of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Sudan who has argued that the special court is 
not able to try Sudanese officials responsible for violating international crimes in Darfur, 
Sudan.27   Therefore, the alleged prosecution is nothing but a charade to shield Sudanese 
nationals from the reach of the Court by taking advantage of article 17. 
                                                 
24 See, Sudan Tribune, ICC Delegation to Visit Sudan’s Darfur”, February 27, 2006, available at: 
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14271 (reporting that the Sudan’s Justice Minister 
Mohamed al-Mardi told Reuters in an interview on 13 December 2005 that Moreno Ocampo’s investigators 
would not have any access to Darfur, where ethnic cleansing has resulted in killings, rape and the uprooting 
of 2 million refugees. The paper quoted the Justice Minster as saying that “the ICC officials have no 
jurisdiction inside the Sudan or with regards to Sudanese citizens,” and that “they cannot investigate 
anything on Darfur”). 
25 See Wim van Cappellen, Sudan: Judiciary Challenge ICC Over Darfur Cases, Integrated Regional Info. 
Networks, June 24, 2005 (reporting that the Sudanese Council of Ministers avowed a total rejection of 
Security Council Resolution 1593 and that Sudan’s Justice Minister, Ali Mohamed Osamn Yassin, has 
been quoted by local media as stating that the new domestic institution would be a substitute to the 
International Criminal Court).   
26 See, Agence France Presse, Sudan Hands UN Darfur Suspects List, February 26, 2006, available at:  
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14276  (reporting that the head of the governmental 
Human Rights Advisory Council (HRAC) Abdel Monim Osman Taha Gave a UN official in charge of 
human rights in the Sudan, Sima Samar, a list individuals of the regular services who have been tried for 
perpetrating crimes connected with the Darfur conflict). 
27 Reuters, Sudan Unable to Try Darfur Suspects - UN Official, March 6, 2006, available at: 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/MCD652175.htm (quoting Sima Samar, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Sudan to the effect that “Sudan’s special court for Darfur is not able to try Sudanese officials 
responsible for war crimes and authorities continue to abuse freedom of expression.”  Ms. Samar said the 
courts had not yet tried anyone with command responsibility for crimes in Darfur and that she had only 
been given a list of 15 officers from the police and army who had been tried for crimes between 1991 and 
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It has been suggested that a State may be unable to prosecute if it lacks the 
required manpower and institutions to carry out a meaningful criminal prosecution.28 
Such a situation could have arisen after the genocide in Rwanda, where very few lawyers 
and judges survived the 1994 massacre.29  On the other hand, a State may be unwilling to 
prosecute a perpetrator if it demonstrates that it lacks the political will to do so.  This may 
occur where the accused is a member of the State government, or exerts influence over or 
accepts favors from those in government.   
Certainly, the situation in Darfur, Sudan fits into this latter category as the 
government has been fingered as an active party to the crisis in Darfur and has done 
nothing to disarm militias or end the “culture of impunity” there.30  Human Rights Watch 
notes that “the Sudanese government’s systematic attacks on civilians in Darfur have 
been accompanied by a policy of impunity for all those responsible for the crimes,” and 
requests that “[s]enior Sudanese officials including President Omar El Bashir must be 
held accountable for the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur.”31  Whether the 
government and military officials Sudan will be held accountable or would hide under 
article 17 protection is anyone’s guess.  
                                                                                                                                                 
2003, before the Darfur conflict even began. “We did ask for information and they didn’t provide much 
information so that means that maybe they are not able to bring anybody to justice,” she said). 
28 David Rider, Canadian Judge Pans New International Court: Arbour Says Rules Shield World’s Worst 
Criminals, The Ottawa Citizen, Jan. 21, 2002, at A7 (quoting Justice Louise Arbour of the Supreme Court 
of Canada and former ICTY/ICTR prosecutor).   
29 Id. 
30 See Human Rights Watch Report, Entrenching Impunity Government Responsibility for International 
Crimes in Darfur December 12, 2005, Volume 17, No. 17A available at: 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/; (visited March 14, 2006) (documenting the role of more than a 
dozen named civilian and military officials in the use and coordination of “Janjaweed” militias and the 
Sudanese armed forces to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur since mid-2003) 
available at: http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/; (visited March 14, 2006). 
31 Human Rights Watch, U.N.: Put Sudan’s Top Leaders on Sanctions List: ICC Should Investigate Darfur 
Officials, available at: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/09/sudan12186.htm (visited March 14, 2006) 
(quoting Peter Takirambudde, Africa director at Human Rights Watch). 
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A related matter concerning article 17 is that under the guidelines for determining 
“unwillingness” or “inability” to prosecute or investigate, it is difficult to imagine a 
situation where an investigation or prosecution carried out by western countries with an 
advanced judicial system and history of criminal prosecution would be considered 
fraudulent. On the contrary, developing countries are less likely to benefit from the 
complementarity provision as their legal systems and political climate would easily be 
judged unable or unwilling to undertake satisfactory and successful prosecutions.  As has 
been observed by Justice Arbour, “states with relatively developed legal systems will 
have a ‘major trump card’ to evade justice and will clash with developing countries that 
don’t.”32  She rightly posits that such a clash will be intensely political so that the ICC 
risks becoming the true default jurisdiction for developing countries, subjecting the Court 
to major political legal battles with everyone else.33  This may result in the Court been 
viewed suspiciously by developing countries as a vestige of western countries thereby 
tainting the Court as an independent judicial institution.34 
While this study disputes the primacy jurisdiction of national courts over the ICC, 
it however suggests that an assessment that a government is unwilling to prosecute 
should not be based on lack of action in a single case, but on a systematic pattern of 
                                                 
32 David Rider, supra note 28. 
33 Id., (quoting  Justice Louise Arbour). 
34 See, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Fred Bridgland, Darfur Sanctions Deadlock as ICC 
Considers Prosecutions, February 28, 2006, available at: 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=259927&apc_state=henh (visited February 28, 2006) (reporting that 
the ICC’s main work is so far concentrated on Darfur, northern Uganda and the Ituri region of the Congo, 
and that this heavy concentration on one continent has perplexed many Africans. They argue that it would 
have made public relations sense for such a new and important international court to have cast its net over 
several continents, including Europe from where it operates). 
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judicial inaction in pertinent cases.35  Where a judicial system is considered unable to 
conduct trials, the ICC should not concern itself with assuming jurisdiction; rather the 
international community should offer assistance and training to overcome any 
shortcomings.36  In this way, the ICC would retain the integrity of governments’ judicial 
systems. This is necessary, considering the fact that governments constitute the Court’s 
national partners, and their cooperation and compliance are integral to its functioning.37  
Also, since States are likely to perceive the process by which the Court 
determines that a State is unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute as a challenge to 
their sovereign powers, the Court is likely to refrain from making such determination.38  
Conferring the Court with primacy jurisdiction ratione personae over all cases within the 
Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae would avoid the need for the Court to sit on judicial 
review of a State’s national legal system or the likelihood of abdicating in its 
responsibility by avoiding confrontation with a State anxious to defend its sovereignty.   
                                                 
35 See Wilton Park Conference, Towards Global Justice: Accountability and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), Feb. 4-8, 2002, at http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/web/welcome.html (last visited Feb. 18, 
2003). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 In a related development, the general approach followed by the Office of the Prosecutor with respect to 
its proprio motu powers indicates a clear preference for initiating investigations of alleged core crimes, 
wherever possible, on the basis of a referral by a State party pursuant to Article 14 or by the Security 
Council pursuant to Article 13(b).  While this predilection does not mean, of course, that the Prosecutor 
will never exercise the authority to initiate investigations proprio motu, the Prosecutor seems inclined not 
to use these powers unless absolutely necessary, for example where states have failed to refer an 
objectively serious situation.  See Annex to the “Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the 
Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications 1,5 (Apr. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Paper on Some Policy Issues]; 
Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of  States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 8, 2003). 
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As poignantly argued by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, jurisdictional 
primacy is a functional necessity for an international criminal tribunal.39  According to 
the Appeals tribunal: 
Indeed, when an international tribunal such as the present one is 
created, it must be endowed with primacy over national courts. 
Otherwise, human nature being what it is, there would be a 
perennial danger of international crimes being characterized as 
“ordinary crimes” or proceedings being “designed to shield the 
accused,” or cases not being diligently prosecuted.  
If not effectively countered by the principle of primacy, any one 
of those stratagems might be used to defeat the very purpose of 
the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, to the 
benefit of the very people whom it has been designed to 
prosecute.40 
 
The Appeal’s Chamber rightly noted that States and/or their national courts may 
not be able to handle the trial of some high profile persons.  For instance, in spite of the 
U.S. support, the Iraqi Special Tribunal has not been able to conduct a hitch free trial of 
Saddam Hussein and some members of his Baath party.41  The chaotic scenes that have 
marred the trial so far have prompted one commentator to suggest that the whole trial is 
being undermined and to observe as follows: 
I think it was a big mistake that this trial was held in Iraq because 
the judge, you cannot find a person, one individual today in Iraq - 
judge, lawyer, prosecutor who is impartial vis-à-vis Saddam 
Hussein. Either they are with him or against him.42  
  
Therefore, the Court is in a better position to withstand the political pressure 
associated with prosecuting high level individuals and avoid allegations of unfairness that 
may be leveled against a State.  The Court will also hold individuals to a worldwide 
                                                 
39 Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, P 58-59 (I.C.T.Y. Oct. 2, 1995) (Appeal on Jurisdiction) [hereinafter 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction]. 
40 Id. 
41 Saddam Walks Out in Trial Uproar, BBC News, January 29, 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4659274.stm 
42 Id. (referring to Saad Djebbar, an international lawyer and commentator on Middle East politics 
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standard of international justice.43  This approach would promote universal and uniform 
individual criminal responsibility for the crimes concerned because any person accused 
of a core crime would normally be tried by the ICC, not by national courts.44  
Further, it should be borne in mind that the Court’s jurisdiction is designed to 
target a limited number of “persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern”.45  In addition, the high threshold requirements for the crimes under the ICC 
Statute, provides additional device limiting the Court’s jurisdiction only over crimes 
against humanity committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack”46 or war 
                                                 
43 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 60 (1997) (noting that “A 
permanent system of international criminal justice based on a preexisting international criminal statute 
would allow any person from any nation to be held accountable for violations. Equal treatment for violators 
would be guaranteed”).  Id. at 60. 
44 See Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE FAILURE OF STATES TO 
ENACT EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, AI Index: IOR 40/019/2004, 1 September 
2004, [hereinafter AI: Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation] available at:  
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR400192004?open&of=ENG-385 (observing that not many 
States have enacted national legislation implementing the ICC Statute, and that the few States that have 
done so, enacted flawed and inconsistent legislation.) 
The report notes that the most common problems that are emerging in draft legislation now being prepared 
or considered are:  
· weak definitions of crimes; 
· unsatisfactory principles of criminal responsibility and defenses; 
· failure to provide for universal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by international law; 
· political control over the initiation of prosecutions; 
· failure to provide for the speediest and most efficient procedures for reparations to victims; 
· inclusion of provisions that prevent or could potentially prevent cooperation with the Court; 
· failure to provide for persons sentenced by the Court to serve sentences in national prisons; and 
· failure to establish training programs for national authorities on effective implementation of the Rome 
Statute. 
 
Id., at 2. 
 
Also of concern is the failure of some of the implementing legislation to provide adequate procedural 
guarantees, including the right to fair trial.  Further, some national implementing legislation allow the 
imposition of death penalty.  This is contrary to Article 77 of the ICC Statute which provides that the 
maximum penalty the Court may impose is life imprisonment.  It is therefore inappropriate that national 
courts should impose a more severe penalty for a crime under international law than the one chosen by the 
international community itself. 
 
Id., at 25, 27. 
45 ICC Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. 9, arts. 1, 5. 
46 Id., art. 7. 
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crimes when such crimes have been committed as part of a plan or policy or have taken 
place on a particularly large scale.47  The Prosecutor is also required under the ICC 
Statute to satisfy the Court that the case is of “sufficient gravity to justify further action 
by the Court”.48   
In view of the above, the Court will not occupy the field as it will target only a 
small portion of perpetrators who are highly responsible for the atrocities and decline to 
exercise its inherent jurisdiction in cases in which deferral to national jurisdiction will be 
more appropriate.  Thus, the States would still exercise concurrent jurisdiction by 
prosecuting others responsible at a lower degree. 
 
 
8.3. Suspension of the Court’s Jurisdiction by the UN Security Council 
One concern throughout the negotiations for the ICC Statute, expressed mostly by 
the permanent members of the Security Council, was the possibility of conflict between 
the jurisdiction of the Court and the functions of the Council.  It was argued that there 
may be situations in which the investigation or prosecution of a particular case by the 
Court could interfere with the resolution of an ongoing conflict by the Security Council.  
Also, the permanent members of the Security Council wanted to preserve a central role 
for the Council in the new Court.49  To this extent, some lobbied for a provision that 
would automatically exclude the Court’s jurisdiction over any situation under 
consideration by the Council.  Most States regarded this proposal too sweeping and 
feared it would undermine the Court, for situations could remain pending before the 
Council indefinitely without its taking any final or serious action.  In the end, a 
                                                 
47 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8. 
48 Id., art. 17(1)(d). 
49 John Seguin, supra note 18, at 95-96. 
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compromise provision was reached, which provided that the Security Council, acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, could adopt a resolution requesting deferral of an 
investigation or prosecution for a period of twelve months and that such a request could 
be renewed at twelve-month intervals.50  
Article 16 is an unnecessary limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court because it 
allows the Security Council by resolution to stop a prosecution initiated by a State or the 
ICC Prosecutor from going forward, for an initial period of twelve months if in the 
opinion of the Security Council the prosecution will interfere with the Council’s efforts to 
maintain international peace and security under Article VII of the UN Charter. The 
Security Council can renew its request indefinitely, in twelve month segments, under the 
same conditions.51  In other words, the UN Security Council may perpetually intervene to 
suspend a case before the ICC at every twelve month interval on same grounds because 
article 16 does not limit the number of times the UN Security Council may request the 
suspension of a case for security reasons.52  This provision was a result of a compromise 
suggestion by Singapore to placate the U.S.53    
One of the main reasons for the creation of the ICC was to end the culture of 
impunity by holding individuals criminally responsible for egregious violations of crimes 
prohibited by international law.54  Therefore, the rationale behind the establishment of the 
ICC is that it would help end or at least reduce the commission of genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and other related atrocities that shock the conscience of 
                                                 
50 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 16. 
51 Id., art. 16. 
52 Id. 
53 John Washburn, The International Criminal Court Arrivers - The U.S. Position: Status and Prospects, 25 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 873, 878 (2002) (citing Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and the 
Security Council, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE ROME 
STATUTE 143 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999)). 
54 ICC Statute, supra note 1, preamble. 
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humankind.55  Thus, it is an irony of sort to suggest that the Court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute individuals accused of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes may impede the Security Council’s efforts to maintain 
international peace and security under Article VII of the UN Charter. 
It is plausible to suggest that only States that are permanent members of the 
Security Council stands in a better position to use this provision to perpetually forestall 
the prosecution of a case concerning their nationals.  Members of the Security Council 
may choose to use this provision to stop investigations into situations concerning 
nationals of member States and would be likely to do so at the urging of one of its 
powerful permanent members.  In deed, in 2002, the U.S. threatened to withdraw its 
nationals from U.N. peacekeeping missions unless the Security Council pass a resolution 
grating immunity to U.S. nationals from the ICC.  The Security Council yielded to U.S. 
pressure and passed Resolution 1422 in July 2002 which deferred the Court’s jurisdiction 
for one year over personnel of non-State parties participating in peacekeeping missions or 
operations authorized by the UN.56  Resolution 1422 was renewed for another year by 
Resolution 1487 in June 2003.57   
While Resolution 1422 was adopted unanimously in 2002, France, Germany and 
Syria abstained from voting in 2003 for Resolution 1487.  In 2004, the U.S. withdrew the 
request to renew Resolution 1487 because it failed to receive the necessary votes to 
support a draft resolution to defer the Court’s jurisdiction.58  However, the Security 
                                                 
55 See discussions on chapter five, pages 163-164 and accompanying notes.  
56 See Security Council Resolution 1422, S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 4572nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 
(2002), July 12, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/Scres/2002/sc2002.htm.  
57 Security Council Resolution 1487, S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. SCOR, 4772nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 
(2003), June 12, 2003, available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html.   
58 See Coalition for the ICC, Chronology of the Adoption and Withdrawal of Security Council Resolutions 
1422/1487, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/declarationsresolutions/UN1422_2004.html. The failure to 
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Council has created a precedent that may be latched onto by other States to demand 
similar exemptions in the future.  To forestall the unnecessary hindrance to the Court’s 
jurisdiction, it is suggested that article 16 should be deleted from the Statute as it serves 
no useful purpose.59   
Further, even where the Security Council refers a case to the Court, the Council 
may seek to micro manage the investigation or prosecution of the case.  For instance, 
Security Council Resolution 1593 which referred the situation in Darfur to the Court 
requires the Chief Prosecutor of ICC to periodically apprise the Security Council with 
actions taken by the ICC pursuant to Resolution 1593.60  Accordingly, the Prosecutor has 
addressed the Security Council on the Darfur situation twice.61  It is not impossible that 
the Security Council may decide at a latter stage to invoke article 16 to stop the Court 
from going forward with the case. 
                                                                                                                                                 
secure the vote to renew Resolution 1487 has to do with concerns about allegations of abuse by U.S. 
soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Id.  See Amnesty International, US Threats to the International 
Criminal Court, [hereinafter US Threats to the ICC] available at: http://web.amnesty.org/pages/icc-
US_threats-eng (visited February 10, 2006). 
59 See Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: The Unlawful Attempt by the Security Council 
to Give US Citizens Permanent Impunity From International Justice, AI Index, IOR 40/006/2003 (Legal 
analysis of S.C. Resolutions 1422 & 1487 by Amnesty International concluding that the resolution is 
contrary to the Rome Statute, and also to the United Nations Charter).  A summary of the Legal analysis is 
available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engIOR400082003?Open&of=eng-393 (visited February 
10, 2006). 
60 SC Resolution 1593, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593, 8 (March 31, 2005) 
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 1593] supra note 46, para. 8 (The Prosecutor is required to address the Council 
within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions 
taken pursuant to this resolution).  
61 Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSR 1593 (2005), June 29, 2005, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=108&l=en.html and Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSR 1593 (2005), 
December 13, 2005, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/current_situations/Darfur_Sudan.html.  
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The idea that the Security Council should play an oversight role on the operations 
of the Court should be resisted.62  The Court is envisioned as an independent entity and 
should remain as such and the Security Council should not be allowed to politicize the 
judicial functions of the Court.  While the Security Council cooperation with the Court 
will enhance its effectiveness, any attempt to subject it to the whims and caprice of the 
Security Council will greatly undermine the Court’s independence and credibility.  
States, particularly developing and “third” world countries may view the Court as another 
vestige of western domination.  
 
8.4. Failure to Provide for Universal Jurisdiction  
The jurisdictional reach of the ICC is more limited than the general international 
jurisdiction currently enjoyed by States or groups of States over jus cogens violations.63  
As noted above, States delegates at the Rome Conference agreed on a compromised 
article 12 which sets out the preconditions for the Court’s jurisdiction when a situation is 
not referred to the Court by the Security Council.  Throughout the Conference, the U.S. 
sought to limit the Court’s jurisdiction by arguing that the Court should exercise 
jurisdiction only against nationals of States Parties or territorial States on claims of 
                                                 
62 Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
2002-Sep Army Law. 1, 11 (2002) (noting that one of the main concerns of the United States is the limited 
role played by the United Nations Security Council in the operation of the ICC). 
63 Damrosch et al., supra note 39, at 534; (noting that “Jus cogens norms also give rise to obligations erga 
omnes, thus, all states have standing to bring to justice violators of jus cogens norms and have, even before 
the introduction of the ICC”).  See also Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of 
Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 116 (2001) 
(observing that “the core crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction-genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes-are crimes of universal jurisdiction.”).  
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official acts.  The United States wanted a situation in which no U.S. national would ever 
be brought before the ICC without U.S. consent.64   
Also, the U.S. demanded a guarantee that no U.S. servicemen or women would be 
investigated or prosecuted by the ICC without U.S. consent.65  It has been suggested that 
the justification for the U.S. position was that “more than any other country the United 
States is expected to intervene to halt humanitarian catastrophes around the world.”66  It 
was therefore argued that this position renders U.S. personnel “uniquely vulnerable to the 
potential jurisdiction of an international criminal court.”67  According to Ambassador 
David Scheffer: 
The illogical consequence imposed by Article 12, particularly for 
non-parties to the treaty, will be to limit severely those lawful, 
but highly controversial and inherently risky, interventions that 
the advocates of human rights and world peace so desperately 
seek from the United States and other military powers. There will 
be significant new legal and political risks in such 
interventions...68  
 
Apart from the apparent inequality of this request, its obvious implication is that a 
guarantee for America would mean a de jure and de facto exemption of all other States 
which would effectively render the purpose of the Court moribund.69 
Although the U.S. position was not acceptable to most States at the Rome 
Conference, they rejected a proposal by Korea that the Court should also exercise 
                                                 
64 Ruth Wedgwood, Harold K. Jacobson & Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 
AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 126 (2001).  
65 Id., supra note 64, at 126.  See also, Thomas W. Lippman, America Avoids the Stand: Why the U.S. 
Objects to a World Criminal Court, Wash. Post, July 26, 1998, at C01 (noting that the American 
government insisted that the Rome Statute must contain an ironclad guarantee that no American would ever 
come before the Court). 
66 Michael P. Scharf, Rome Diplomatic Conference for an International Criminal Court, ASIL Insights 
(June 1998), available at http://asil.org/insights/insigh20.htm (accessed Mar. 15, 2002). 
67 Id. 
68 David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L 12, 19 
(1999).   
69 Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of 
“Operation Enduring Freedom”, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 44-45 (2003). 
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jurisdiction if the victim’s State or the custodial State has ratified the ICC Statute in order 
to accommodate U.S. concerns regarding supposed over-reach of the Court’s 
jurisdiction.70  Thus, absent submission of a case to the ICC by the UN Security Council, 
the Court can only exercise jurisdiction if the case occurs in the territory of a State party, 
or if the crime is committed by a national of a State party.71  It should be noted that in 
most cases, the State of nationality and the territorial State are likely to be the same, as 
was the case with Pol Pot of Cambodia, Idi Amin of Uganda, Pinochet of Chile, and as 
exemplified by the first three State referrals to the Court.   
The inclusion of the custodial State would have made it possible to apprehend an 
accused while traveling outside his or her State, or in the alternative, make it difficult for 
the accused to travel outside his or her State, thereby denying a safe haven anywhere. 
But, given the way article 12 was drafted, a country in whose territory an accused is 
residing will have no legal basis under the ICC Statute to surrender the accused to the 
Court. This is because article 12 only requires a State party to submit to the Court’s 
jurisdiction if the crime was committed on its territory, or the person accused of the crime 
is a national.72  In other words, a situation in which a national of State A commits a crime 
in State A and then enters State B ostensibly to evade justice, State B is not obliged to 
surrender him or her to the Court because the crime was not committed in State B’s 
territory and the accused is not a national of State B.  The situation becomes compounded 
if State B is not a State party to the ICC Statute.   
                                                 
70 Human Rights Watch, Text Analysis International Criminal Court Treaty, July 17, 1998 available at 
http://www.hrw.org/press98/july/icc-anly.htm (last modified Apr. 4, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Treaty Text 
Analysis]. Id.  
71 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12. 
72 Id., art. 12(2)(a-b). 
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Article 12 also makes it impossible for the victim’s State to initiate a case to the 
ICC if its nationals were victims of international crimes in the territory of another State or 
by nationals of a non-State party.  It has been suggested that if a victim’s State is allowed 
to submit a case to the Court, the Spanish government would have been in a position to 
petition the ICC (if it were then in existence) for the “disappearance” of some Spaniards 
in Argentina in the 1970s and 80s.73  This possibility is not available even under the new 
ICC Statute. 
The idea that extending the ICC jurisdiction to include custodial and/or victim’s 
States or that the current jurisdiction of the Court is overreaching and therefore violates 
fundamental principles of international law because it binds non-State parties74 is 
untenable. The U.S. takes the position that under customary international law, a treaty-
based international court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-party 
State when acting under the direction of such a non-party State.75   
Also, another commentator has suggested that, by conferring upon the ICC 
jurisdiction over non-party nationals, the ICC Statute would abrogate the pre-existing 
rights of non-parties which, in turn, would violate the law of treaties.76  This 
commentator suggested that a State has a right to be free from the exercise of exorbitant 
jurisdiction over its nationals which cannot be abrogated by a treaty to which it is not a 
party.77 Cited in support were the ILC official Commentaries on the Vienna Convention 
to the effect that “international tribunals have been firm in laying down that in principle 
                                                 
73 ICC Treaty Text Analysis, supra note 70. 
74 David Scheffer, supra note 195, at 18. 
75 Id. 
76 Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 26 (2001).  
77 Id., at 27. 
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treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, neither imposes obligations on States which are 
not parties nor modify in any way their legal rights without their consent.”78  
Furthermore, it was argued that because of the gravity of the outcome, member States 
cannot delegate to the ICC their territorial or universal jurisdiction.79  
Those who make the argument that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over 
individuals if his or her State has not ratified the ICC Statute confuse and/or equate the 
position of a nonparty State with that of its nationals.  As would be expected, this 
argument has been rejected by international law commentators on the simple basis that 
while a non-party State is not itself obligated under a treaty to which it has not consented, 
the same cannot be said of its nationals if they commit an offense in the territory of a 
State that is a party.80  Responding to criticism of the Court’s jurisdiction over nationals 
of non-party States for crimes committed within the territory of State parties to the ICC 
Statute, Judge Philippe Kirsch, current President of the Court, noted as follows: 
This does not bind non-parties to the [s]tatute.  It simply confirms 
the recognized principle that individuals are subject to the 
substantive and procedural criminal laws applicable in the 
territories to which they travel, including laws arising from treaty 
obligations.81 
 
The above expression accords with article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties which provides that “a treaty does not create either obligations or rights 
for a third state without its consent.”82 Also, article 35 states that a treaty cannot establish 
                                                 
78 Madeline Morris, supra note 76, at 27.  
79 Id., at 26. 
80 Ruth Wedgwood et al., supra note 64, at 127 
81 Philippe Kirsch, The Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court: A Comment, American 
Society of International Law Newsletter 1 (AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L., WASHINGTON, D.C.) Nov./Dec. 
1998.  Judge Kirsch was the Chairman of the Rome Diplomatic Conference. 
82 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 
entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980 reprinted in 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969); 25 I.L.M. 543 (1969) 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties].  
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an obligation on a non-party State unless it “expressly accepts that obligation in 
writing.”83  The ICC Statute does not violate the above provisions of the Vienna 
Convention as no provision of the ICC Statute expressly created obligations for non-party 
States.  Also, allowing the ICC to exercise jurisdiction based on the consent of a custodial 
or victim’s State will not violate the Vienna Convention.84 
Suffice it to note that there are plethora of international conventions acceded by 
the U.S. and many States that are globally binding on nationals of party and non-party 
States because they reflect the common interest of humanity.85  No doubt, the crimes 
prohibited by the ICC Statute reflect the common interest of humanity.  Presently, any 
individual State may try perpetrators of these crimes under the universal or territorial 
jurisdiction principle without consent from the State of his or her nationality.86  Thus, if 
individual States can exercise universal jurisdiction over the same crimes contained in the 
                                                 
83 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 35. 
84 Id., art. 38 (“Nothing …  precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State 
as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such”). 
85 See Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done Sept. 14, 1963, 
220 U.N.T.S. 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2941; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft done 
Dec. 16, 1970, 106 U.N.T.S. 1973, 22 U.S.T. 1641 (“Hague Convention”); Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971, 178 U.N.T.S. 1975; 24 U.S.T. 
565 (“Montreal Convention”); The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, done Dec. 
17, 1979, 206 U.N.T.S. 1983; 1979 U.S.T. 186; The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 
168 U.N.T.S. 1977, 28 U.S.T. 1975 (“Protected Persons Convention”); The Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85, 1988 U.S.T. LEXIS 202 (“Torture Convention”); The International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (“Apartheid 
Convention”); The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material done Oct. 26, 1979, 1979 
U.S.T. LEXIS 187. These treaties provide for and obligate states, both states of nationality and territorial 
states, to exercise jurisdiction or extradite. Furthermore, the Montreal Convention, the International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the Protected Persons Convention, the Torture Convention and 
the Apartheid Convention allow for the victim's state to either exercise jurisdiction or extradite. The U.S. is 
a member of all except the Apartheid Convention.  
86 Paul Arnell, International Criminal Law and Universal Jurisdiction, 11 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 53, 60-63 
(1999). See also, Attorney-General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 26 (Israel S.Ct. 1962); 
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571, 582-583 (6th Cir. 1985).  
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ICC Statute,87 there has not been any convincing legal argument to deny a group of States 
joining together to set up a court that does the same thing.  Indeed, the Nuremberg 
tribunal set the precedent for this situation when it stated: “[the Allied Powers] have done 
together what any one of them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any 
nation has the right thus to set up special courts to administer law.”88  
In view of the above, it cannot be argued that the Court’s exercise of treaty-based 
jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party State for international crimes contravenes this 
rule of international law.89  Therefore, the argument that the ICC Statute is 
“overreaching” because it purportedly obligates non-party States through the exercise of 
jurisdiction over their nationals is a gross distortion of customary international law.90  
Conferring the ICC with universal jurisdiction helps to realize one of the objectives 
behind the establishment of the Court, which is, to ensure there is no safe sanctuary for 
individuals wanted for committing egregious crimes.   
Until the Court is invested with universal jurisdiction, we will continue to see a 
similarity of what is going on in the case of Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia 
finding safe haven in Nigeria even though there is an international arrest warrant for his 
surrender to the tribunal in Sierra Lone.  The only reason Nigeria is under guided 
pressure to surrender Mr. Taylor to the Sierra Leonean tribunal is because Nigeria has 
                                                 
87 Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, a State is permitted to prosecute non-nationals for certain 
crimes committed outside that State’s territory.  See, M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 520 (1992); Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300-04 (4th ed. 1990); Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under 
International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988). 
88 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis and 
Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, annex, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (Supp. 1945). 
89 Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States, 
35 NEW ENG. L.R. 363, 376 (2001).  
90 See Human Rights Watch, The ICC Jurisdictional Regime; Addressing U.S. Arguments, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-regime.htm (last modified Apr. 4, 2002). 
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expressed its willingness to surrender Mr. Taylor but for its stated reasons.91  It would be 
a different situation if Mr. Taylor was wanted by the ICC after he had successfully fled to 
or granted amnesty by a non-party State.  The non-party State would have no obligation 
whatsoever to surrender Mr. Taylor to the Court and in that circumstance Mr. Taylor 
would find a safe haven in that State.  Also, even if Mr. Taylor finds himself in the 
territory of a State party to the ICC Statute, that State cannot confer jurisdiction on the 
Court if Mr. Taylor did not commit the crime in the territory of the said State and he is 
not a national of the State party.  In the above scenario, the traveling tyrant is allowed to 
exploit the limitation in the ICC jurisdiction to evade justice.92        
 
8.5. War Crimes Opt-Out Provision 
With pressure from the United States the Rome Conference agreed on article 124 
which allows a State party to opt out of the Court’s jurisdiction for war crimes committed 
on its territory or by its nationals in internal armed conflict for seven years after 
                                                 
91 Mr. Obasanjo, Nigerian’s President takes the position that it granted asylum to Mr. Taylor pursuant to the 
so called Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord to prevent a bloodbath in Liberia on the understanding that 
he would not be required to try or surrender Mr. Taylor to an International Tribunal except at the request of 
the government of Liberia or if Mr. Taylor violates his undertaking not to interfere in Liberian politics.  
See, James Seitua, Why Obasanjo Has Not Turned Taylor Over?, The Perspective, Atlanta, Georgia, May 
31, 2005, available at: http://www.theperspective.org/articles/0531200502.html (visited February 28, 
2006); BBC News, Taylor meets Obasanjo in Nigeria, February 27, 2006, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4754982.stm (visited February 28, 2006); BBC NEWS, Taylor 
off Agenda at Abuja Talks, March 4, 2006, available at:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4775012.stm (reporting that Mr. Taylor departure into exile was 
part of a deal backed by African and Western powers and quoting BBC’s Elizabeth Blunt in Abuja as 
saying that the terms of the deal are believed to have included a comfortable home in Nigeria and a pledge 
that he would not be handed over for prosecution.  BBC News also quoted Remi Oyo, Mr. Obasanjo’s 
spokeswoman that “the prerogative of the return of former President Taylor remains that of the Liberian 
people and government.”); BBC News, Taylor Meets Obasanjo in Nigeria, February 27, 2006, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4754982.stm (visited February 28, 2006).  
92 Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Cadern, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 
88 GEO. L.J. 381, 414, n. 194 (2000) (attributing the phrase “traveling tyrant” to Jelena Pejic, 
representative of the Lawyer’s Committee at the Rome Conference).  
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becoming a party to the ICC Statute.93  The United States’ representatives to the Rome 
Conference had sought a ten year “opt out” from the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes, 
but the Conference agreed only to a seven year opt-out period for war crimes.94  Article 
124 provides a compromise capable of “undermining the status of war crimes as truly 
universal crimes [that might] result in a court with a fragmented jurisdiction.”95  Such 
declaration effectively grants impunity from prosecution by the Court for those who 
commit war crimes in the future that have caused immense suffering to humankind for 
many years.  Therefore, it has been criticized as creating a loophole to evade justice 
which is legally and morally unjustifiable.96   
Presently, Columbia and France have availed themselves of the provisions of 
article 124.97  Fortunately, the Burundian government’s desire to make article 124 
                                                 
93 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 124.  Article 124 provides that a state party to the ICC may elect to exempt 
its nationals from the jurisdiction of the Court for a non-renewable period of seven years from the date of 
ratification of the statute for war crimes.  
94 See David Scheffer, U.N. International Criminal Court, Statement Before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the U.S. Senate (July 23, 1998) available at 1998 WL 12762512 [hereinafter David Scheffer 
Testimony]. 
95 Jonathan Stanley, Focus: International Criminal Court: A Court that Knows No Boundaries?: The 
International Criminal Court Treaty is a Big Achievement but Can it Deliver what it Promises?, The 
Lawyer, Aug. 11, 1998, available at 1998 WL 9167987.  
96 Phillippe Kirsch, Q.C., The International Criminal court: Current Issues and Perspectives, 64 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10 (2001).   
97 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Declarations and Reservations, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp#N7 [hereinafter 
“ICC Statute: Declarations and Reservations”]. 
The Columbian article 124 Declaration states as follows: 
 
5. Availing itself of the option provided in article 124 of the Statute and subject to the conditions 
established therein, the Government of Colombia declares that it does not accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been 
committed by Colombian nationals or on Colombian territory.  Id. 
 
The French government article 124 Declaration states: 
 
III. Declaration under article 124 
 
Pursuant to article 124 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the French Republic declares that 
it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 
when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory.  Id. 
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declaration was rejected by the Senate.98  The “opt out” clause is an unwarranted 
restriction on the Court’s jurisdiction which will severely hamper its effectiveness for 
years, if not decades.99  While it is reassuring that only two States have made article 12 
declaration, it is however necessary that States demonstrate their willingness to hold war 
criminals accountable by ensuring that article 124 is deleted from the ICC Statute when it 
comes up for review in 2009.100 
 
8.6. Reliance on States’ Cooperation 
Generally, in other for the Court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction, the Court 
must rely on the ability and willingness of State parties to discharge their obligations 
under the ICC Statute.101  In the preamble to the ICC Statute, States Parties affirm that 
“'the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not 
go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at 
the national level and by international cooperation”.102  With the efforts of likeminded 
States,103 delegates at the Rome Conference agreed on the need for effective and speedy 
                                                 
98 See Amnesty International, Burundi - Urge the President to Ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC, available 
at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/icc-290104-action-eng (Appeal Letter from Amnesty International urging 
the Burundian government to ratify the Rome Statute without such a ‘license to kill’ declaration.  The ICC 
Statute was ratified by Burundi on September 21, 2004, without such declaration. See ICC Statute: 
Declarations and Reservations, supra note 97.   
99 James Rodgers, War Crimes Court Under Fire, 1998 ABA JOURNAL 68 (Sept. 1998) (quoting Jelena 
Pejic, Senior Program Coordinator, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York). 
100 Article 124 is subject to review at the Review Conference which is scheduled to take place seven years 
after the entry into force of the ICC Statute.  Since the ICC Statute came into force in 2002, the Review 
Conference will be held in 2009.  See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 123, 124. 
101 Hans-Peter Kau, Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction Site For More Justice: 
The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 370, 383 (2005)(noting that “the 
hopes and expectations at the International Criminal Court are that the states parties will support it as 
responsible joint owners by engaging in unreserved and systematic cooperation in matters of criminal 
law”). 
102 ICC Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 4. 
103 See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The 
Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L. L 2, 4 (1999). 
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cooperation with the Court.  As a result, Part 9 of the ICC Statute contains the obligations 
of international cooperation and judicial assistance of States Parties to the Court. 104  
When a State ratifies the ICC Statute, it assumes the obligations to “cooperate 
fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court”.105  Further, the ICC Statute requires that States Parties ensure that there are 
procedures under their national law for all forms of cooperation specified in the 
Statute.106   
A significant aspect of this obligation is arresting and surrendering persons 
accused of crimes to the Court.107  This is necessary as the Court cannot try an accused 
person in absentia.108  Thus, “a decision by the Prosecutor to bring charges against an 
accused will prompt the critical, indeed crucial question of arrests and transfer to The 
Hague”.109  In other words, the Court would be unable to exercise its jurisdiction if States 
refused, delayed or otherwise failed to carry out their obligation to arrest and/or surrender 
                                                 
104 For a discussion of the cooperation regime in the Rome Statute, see Bruce Broomhall, The International 
Criminal Court: Overview, and Cooperation with States, in ICC RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 45 (Nouvelles Etudes Penales, 1999); Annalisa Ciampi, Other Forms 
of Cooperation, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY 1705 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002); Frederik 
Harhoff & Phakiso Mochochoko, International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 
AND EVIDENCE 637 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001); Hans-Peter Kaul & Claus Kre beta, Jurisdiction and 
Cooperation in the Statute of the International Criminal Court: Principles and Compromises, 1999 Y.B. 
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 143; Claus Kre beta et al., International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance: 
Preliminary Remarks, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 12, at 1045; Phakiso 
Mochochoko, International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE -- ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 305 (Roy 
S. Lee ed., 1999); Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry, & John McManus, The Cooperation of States with the 
International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 767 (2002); Bert Swart & Goran Sluiter, The 
International Criminal Court and International Criminal Co-operation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 91 (Herman von Hebel et al. eds., 1999). 
105 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 86. 
106 Id., art. 88. 
107 Id., art. 89. 
108 Id., art. 63.  Article 63 makes it very clear that “the accused shall be present during the trial” and that 
there can thus be no trials in absentia. 
109 Hans-Peter Kau, supra note 101, at 375 (citing the Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (Sept. 8, 2003).   
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the accused to the Court.  There is no doubt that “the credibility of the Court would suffer 
if an arrest warrant issued by the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the request of the 
prosecutor pursuant to article 58 remained ineffective over a long period because the 
States Parties were slow, or failed, to execute it”.110 
Apart from other express and implicit obligations contained in the ICC Statute, 
Article 93 of the Statute details certain specific cooperation obligations on States parties 
to assist the Court with respect to investigations and prosecutions.111  These obligations 
are by no means exhaustive and should at best represent a minimal requirement on State 
parties to the ICC Statute.  However, a study by Amnesty International in 2004 reveals 
that States Parties’ response to their obligations under the Statute has been 
disappointing.112  The study notes that among the few States that have adopted national 
legislation implementing their obligations under the ICC Statute, almost all the States 
                                                 
110 Hans-Peter Kau, supra note 101, at 383. 
111 Article 93 provides: 
 
1.         States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and under procedures of national 
law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following assistance in relation to investigations or 
prosecutions:  
(a)     The identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items;  
(b)     The taking of evidence, including testimony under oath, and the production of evidence, 
including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Court;  
(c)     The questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted;  
(d)     The service of documents, including judicial documents;  
(e)     Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts before the Court;  
(f)     The temporary transfer of persons as provided in paragraph 7;  
(g)     The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and examination of grave sites;  
(h)     The execution of searches and seizures;  
(i)     The provision of records and documents, including official records and documents;  
(j)     The protection of victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence;  
(k)     The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets and 
instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without prejudice to the rights of 
bona fide third parties; and  
 
(l)     Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested State, with a 
view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 93(1)(a-l).   
112 See Amnesty International, Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation, supra note 
44.  
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have taken a minimalist approach to cooperation with the Court and few have included 
provisions that go beyond the express requirements of the ICC Statute.113  This author 
shares the concern of Amnesty International that “if every state party were to take a 
minimalist approach to implementing its cooperation obligations, the effectiveness of the 
Court would be greatly reduced, leading in some cases to impunity.”114  
 
8.7. Article 98 Immunity Agreements 
While the ICC Statute requires States Parties to ensure that there are procedures 
under their national law for all forms of cooperation specified in the Statute,115 some 
States Parties have taken steps that make their compliance with article 88 impossible such 
as entering into an “impunity” agreement with the U.S.  The bilateral immunity 
agreement is an undertaking by the States concerned that U.S. persons will not be 
surrendered to the Court without U.S. consent.116  The Bush administration has 
threatened ICC States Parties with withdrawal of military aid, including education, 
training, and financing the purchases of equipment and weaponry, if they fail to protect 
Americans serving in their countries from ICC reach.117  By May of 2005, about 100 
                                                 
113 Amnesty International, Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation, supra note 44,  
at 32. 
114 Id.  Regarding the situation in Darfur, Sudan, see, Sudan Tribune, ICC Delegation to Visit Sudan’s 
Darfur, February 27, 2006, available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14271 
(visited February 28, 2006) (reporting that the ICC Prosecutor, Mr. Moreno Ocampo has told the Security 
Council that the International Criminal Court and the African Union, which has troops in Darfur, had 
drawn up a Cooperation Agreement in May 2005, which still was not signed). 
115 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 88. 
116 Christopher Marquis, U.S. Seeking Pacts in a Bid to Shield its Peacekeepers, New York Times, August 
6, 2002 .  
117 Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers’ Immunity, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2002, at A1.  
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States have signed this immunity agreement which is referred to colloquially as “Article 
98 Agreement”.118   
It has been suggested that “these bilateral agreements … are provided for under 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute”.119  This argument is inapposite.120  Article 98, which 
emerged at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, was drafted to address the question of the 
relationship between the obligations of States Parties under the future ICC Statute and 
existing obligations of States Parties under international law.121 
                                                 
118 See U.S. Department of State Press Statement, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement, May 3, 2005, 
2005/463, available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm (the press statement notes that on 
May 2, 2005, Angola became the 100th country to conclude such an agreement with the United States). As 
at May 18, 2005, Amnesty International reports that the States that have ratified an impunity agreement 
with the USA include Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Djibouti, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, 
Macedonia, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, 
Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, and Uzbekistan have ratified such agreements.  
See Amnesty International, available at: http://web.amnesty.org/pages/int_jus_icc_imp_agrees (last 
updated May 18, 2005). 
119 Id.  See also, Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 93 (1999).  As at May 18, 2005, Amnesty International reports that the States that have ratified an 
impunity agreement with the USA include Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, India, Israel, 
Kazakhstan, Macedonia, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Palau, Panama, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, and Uzbekistan have ratified 
such agreements.  See Amnesty International, available at: 
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/int_jus_icc_imp_agrees (last updated May 18, 2005).  
120 For a detailed analyses on this, see generally, Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: US Efforts to Obtain Impunity for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, AI 
Index: IOR 40/025/2002, September 2, 2002, [hereinafter US Efforts to Obtain Impunity Agreement] 
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engIOR400252002?Open&of=eng-385 (visited February 
10, 2006); Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: The Need for the European 
Union to Take More Effective Steps to Prevent Members From Signing US Impunity Agreements, AI 
Index: IOR 40/030/2002, October 1, 2002, [hereinafter The Need for EU to Take More Effective Steps], 
available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400302002?open&of=eng-385 (visited February 
10, 2006); Human Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal Court: 
Article 98 (2) Agreements, July 9, 2002, available at www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/icc_article98.pdf (visited 
February 10, 2006) (expressing the view “that existing U.S. SOFAs are not the type of agreement that 
would qualify under Article 98 (2), and cannot trump any obligations under the Rome Statute”. Ibid. 
(footnote omitted); Steffen Wirth, Immunities, Related Problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute, 12 
CRIM. L.F. 429 (2001).    
121 Amnesty International, US Efforts to Obtain Impunity Agreement, supra note 120, at p. 7.   Article 98 
(Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender) reads:  
 
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested 
State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic 
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Article 98 paragraph 1 deal exclusively with the limited question of the 
relationship between the obligations of States Parties to the ICC Statute and their prior 
obligations under customary or conventional international law concerning diplomatic 
immunities and State immunities, particularly those incorporated in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.122  On the other hand, article 98 paragraph 2 was 
intended to address the question of the effect of the ICC Statute on existing Status of 
Forces Agreements (SOFAs).123  As explained by Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, both 
members of the German delegation, article 98 (2) was designed to address possible - not 
certain - conflicts between existing obligations under SOFAs and under the ICC Statute:  
The idea behind the provision [Article 98 (2)] was to solve legal 
conflicts which might arise because of Status of Forces 
Agreements which are already in place. On the contrary, Article 
98 (2) was not designed to create an incentive for (future) States 
Parties to conclude Status of Forces Agreements which amount to 
an obstacle to the execution of requests for cooperation issued by 
the Court.124 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that 
third State for the waiver of the immunity.  
 
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a 
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain 
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.  
 
 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(1)(2). 
122 Amnesty International, US Efforts to Obtain Impunity Agreement, supra note 120, at p. 7.  William A. 
Schabas, supra note 4, at 92; See Bruce Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 145 
(2003); John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667 (Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002); Paola Gaeta, Official Capacities and Immunities, in THE ROME 
STATUTE,   
123 Amnesty International, US Efforts to Obtain Impunity Agreement, supra note 120, at p. 7 (emphasis in 
the original). 
124 Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Principles and Compromises, 2 Y.B. INT’L. HUM. L. 143, 165 (1999).  See also, 
Christopher Keith Hall, The First Five Sessions of the UN Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 773, 786 n. 36 (2000) (noting that Article 98 (2) was added to address 
existing agreements on status of forces);  
 351 
Similarly, Kimberly Prost, a member of the Canadian delegation, and Angelika 
Schlunck, a member of the German delegation, have noted that States were concerned 
about existing international obligations when drafting article 98.125  Thus, “it would be 
very hard indeed to concede by way of an interpretive statement that a State Party acted 
in conformity with its obligation to ‘fully cooperate’ with the Court in concluding [a] new 
Statu[s] of Forces Agreement to this effect.”126   
However, even if article 98 (2) were to be construed by the Court to apply to 
renewed SOFAs and new SOFAs entered into by States Parties to the ICC Statute, these 
agreements would have to be consistent with the object and purpose of the Statute, as 
well as with other international law.127  The object and purpose of the ICC Statute is to 
end impunity by ensuring that no one is above the law and immune for genocide, crimes 
against humanity or war crimes.128  Article 98 “immunity” agreement is what it is called 
– an immunity of U.S. nationals from the Court’s jurisdiction.  Therefore, to the extent 
that the immunity agreement is intended to insulate certain persons from the Court’s 
jurisdiction, the immunity agreement is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
                                                 
125 Kimberly Prost & Angelika Schlunck, Article 98, in Otto Triffterer, ed., THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1131 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999) (“All States participating in the negotiations in Rome had 
concerns about conflicts with existing international obligations. Thus, there are several provisions within 
Part 9, including those in articles 90, 93 para. 9 and 98 which address that concern. . . . Even States which 
advocated for a strong Court were concerned about actions taken pursuant to this Statute, which would 
violate these existing fundamental obligations at international law.”). 
126 Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, supra note 124, at 174.  
127 Amnesty International, US Efforts to Obtain Impunity Agreement, supra note 120, at p. 9 (citing the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 210, art. 31(1)).  Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that:  
[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
128 ICC Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 5, art. 27(1).  Article 27(1) provides that:  
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity.  In 
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an 
elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
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ICC Statute.  States Parties to the ICC Statute should therefore not enter into such 
immunity agreement as they are obligated to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of the treaty.129 
Further, the conclusion of immunity agreements between States Parties to the ICC 
Statute and the United States or any other State is questionable, as it contradicts the 
customary international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which obligates a State 
party to a treaty not to do anything that will undermine its treaty obligations.130  Besides, 
the validity of these bilateral immunity agreements are doubtful considering that they 
were procured under coercion131 and/or by threat132 of withdrawal of military aid, 
including education, training, and financing the purchases of equipment and weaponry if 
the States failed to sign the immunity agreements.133   
Also, the immunity agreements are void because they contradict a jus cogens 
norm of pacta sunt servanda134 which is undoubtedly universally recognized as a 
                                                 
129 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 18 (“A state is obliged to refrain from 
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty …”).  See, Judy Dempsey, Accords with US 
‘will violate’ ICC treaty, Financial Times, 27 August 2002, (referring to the text of the legal opinion of 
European Union’s legal experts which concluded that a:   
contracting party to the statute concluding such an agreement with the US acts against the object and 
purpose of the statute and thereby violates its general obligation to perform the obligations of the statutes in 
good faith.  …[a contracting party’s] legal obligation vis-à-vis its co-contracting parties and the Court to 
surrender a person to the Court upon request cannot be modified by concluding an agreement of the kind 
proposed by the US.  
130 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”).   
131 The expression of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of 
its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal effect. 51, 52 
132 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 52 (“A treaty is void if its conclusion has 
been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations”). 52 
133 See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers’ Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, 
at A1. 
134 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its 
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.  For the purposes of the 
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”).  
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peremptory norm of customary international law.135   States Parties to the ICC agreed in 
article 88 to “ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all 
forms of cooperation” listed in Part 9 of the Rome Statute.  Therefore, any national 
legislation, procedures or practices which would delay or obstruct full cooperation with 
the Court would be inconsistent with States Parties’ obligations under the ICC Statute. 136 
Thus, since States Parties to the ICC have an affirmative duty to comply 
immediately with requests by the ICC to arrest and surrender accused persons in their 
territories,137 they should be concluding agreements that will expedite this obligation. 
However, the essence of a bilateral treaty with the United States is to insulate U.S. 
nationals from the jurisdiction of the ICC, which will directly affect the ability of the 
Court to prosecute those accused of committing international crimes.  The ICC was 
created to ensure that anyone, no matter his or her position, who commits international 
crime, is held accountable for his or her actions.  Therefore, there is no doubt that States 
Parties to the ICC are violating their international obligations under the Statute by signing 
such impunity agreement and that such violation could lead to a finding of non-
cooperation pursuant to article 87, paragraph 7.138   
 
8.8. Observations and Commentary  
The highlighted bottlenecks to the Court’s effective exercise of jurisdiction are by 
no means exhaustive.  Due to sovereignty concerns, some of the noted impediments were 
                                                 
135 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, pmbl. Para 3, (“Noting that the principles 
of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are universally recognized”). 
136 Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CHECKLIST FOR 
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 9, AI Index: IOR 40/011/2000, 1 August 2000, available at: 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400112000?open&of=eng-385 [hereinafter Checklist for 
Effective Implementation]. 
137 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 59(1). 
138 Amnesty International, Checklist for Effective Implementation, supra note 136, at p. 9.  
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not mere oversights, but compromises that had to be made in order to gather enough 
support to establish the Court.  While there is nothing to suggest that these sovereignty 
concerns are waning, it is nevertheless imperative that more is required from the 
international community to ensure the effective operation of the Court and to enable the 
Court achieve its stated objective.  Fortunately, there is an expectation from States Parties 
that the ICC Statute require further elaboration which informed the requirement to review 
the Statute within seven years of entry into force.139   
A meaningful review of the ICC Statute should consider amending the operation 
of the complementarity principle to at least, grant the Court primacy jurisdiction over the 
crime of genocide140 and certain categories of offenders who by virtue of their official 
position are unlikely to be genuinely prosecuted domestically.141  The complementarity 
principle remains a viable threat to the future of the international criminal system and the 
effectiveness of the Court.  It is worrisome that States may under the guise of 
complementarity shield their nationals from the Court and only selectively refer 
situations or willingly surrender accused persons to the Court that it does not want to deal 
with.142  This kind of selective referral by States may unwittingly expose the Court to 
accusations of aiding the State to pursue its vendetta against perceived opponents.  A 
                                                 
139 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 123. 
140 See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the International Law Commission on 
the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 
(1994) art. 21 (prescribing inherent jurisdiction to the ICC only for the crime of genocide); Johan D. van 
der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 1, 20 (2000) (noting that the United States was willing to concede “inherent jurisdiction”  of the ICC 
in regard to the crime of genocide).  
141 Such amendment would draw from the Statute of the Sierra Leone which restricted the primacy 
jurisdiction of the tribunals to “those who bear the greatest responsibility” for the atrocities.  See The 
Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, as amended [hereinafter Sierra Leone Special Court 
Statute], annexed to the Secretary-General’s Sierra Leone Report, available at:  
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf, also available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html. 
142 Claus Kress, ‘Self-Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’ Some Considerations in Law and 
Policy, 2 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUS. 944, 946 (2004) (noting that States may embark on ‘selective or 
asymmetrical self-referral’ where the de jure government is itself party to an internal armed conflict). 
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perception of the Court as an avenue to pursue victor’s justice will not augur well for the 
image of the Court. 
Further, States Parties should at the next review conference delete article 124 
from the Statute because its retention sends a dangerous signal that it is okay to commit 
war crimes for seven years before accountability can be attributed.  Equally, there is the 
need to discourage States Parties from concluding the so called “article 98” immunity 
agreement.  Such immunity agreement flies in opposition to the States Parties obligation 
under the ICC Statute.  Without States Parties’ assistance and cooperation to surrender 
accused persons to the Court, the Prosecutor and the Court will face a formidable 
challenge to discharge the objective of the ICC Statute.  Such support is urgently needed 
because, except when a situation is referred by the Security Council pursuant to article 
13(b) of the Statute, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Court will constantly be 
confronted with a special problem and would need to make special efforts to ensure the 
ready and voluntary support and cooperation of States Parties to the extent possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER NINE 
====================================================== 
 
9.0.                                          CONCLUSION 
__________________________________ 
 
The conflicts witnessed during the recent decade gave rise to an increasing 
attention to the issue of accountability for international crimes such as genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious human rights violations.  It seemed that the 
natural legal response to address these atrocious violations is to devise a means to hold 
the individuals responsible for those acts accountable.  While individual criminal 
responsibility at the international level for violations of international crimes began to 
creep into international criminal law from the Nuremberg trials through the ad hoc 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively, it has now become firmly 
established with the adoption of the Statute of the ICC.  The principle of individual 
criminal responsibility is also reflected in the mixed tribunals for Sierra Leone, Timor-
Leste, and Cambodia that were established after the ICC Statute was adopted.   
With the entry into force of the ICC Statute, 129 years after the idea was first 
suggested by Gustave Moynier in 1872,1 the ICC Statute became the first multilateral 
legal document in recent years to detail the investigation and prosecution of international 
crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  After the 
establishment of the ICC, it is very unlikely that the international community may 
establish another ad hoc international or hybrid criminal tribunal to prosecute persons 
                                                 
1 Gustave Moynier, Note sur la creation d'une institution judiciaire internationale propre a prevenir et a 
reprimer les infractions a la Convention de Geneve, BULLETIN INTERNATIONAL DES SOCIETES DE 
SECOURS AUX MILITAIRES BLESSES, NO. 11, Apr. 1872, at 122, translated in Christopher Keith 
Hall, The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court, INT’L REV. RED CROSS, NO. 
322, Mar. 1998, at 57, 72. 
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accused of international crimes post 2002 when the ICC Statute entered into force.2  
Thus, the continued application of international individual criminal responsibility rests on 
the Court.  It is therefore imperative that the Court be endowed with sufficient personal 
jurisdiction in order to ensure that perpetrators of egregious international crimes do not 
go unpunished.   
This study suggests that the ICC should be endowered with universal jurisdiction 
to enable the Court reach pepertrators of international crimes prohibited in the ICC 
Statute.  The exercise of universal jurisdiction by the Court will ensure that international 
criminal justice is on a progressive path and not retrogressing from the Nuremberg 
standard which recognizes that States may do together what any one of them could have 
done separately.3  The crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction are crimes which there exists 
universal jurisdiction enabling each State to exercise jurisdiction over those crimes.4   
Thus, since States have come together to establish the ICC, the Court should exercise that 
jurisdiction which national courts of the States can individually exercise.  Limiting the 
Court’s jurisdiction to crimes committed in the territory of a State party or by a national 
of a State party unfairly limits the Court’s jurisdiction and inadvertently creates a safe 
haven for perpetrators of international crimes.  
                                                 
2 For instance, instead of establishing another ad hoc tribunal in Sudan, the Security Council chose to refer 
the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Court. 
3 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L. L. 172, 216-17 
(1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment]. 
4 See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The 
Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2, 12 n.19 (1999).  Also see, the preamble to the ICC Statute, 
supra note 1, which “affirms that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole must not go unpunished,” states that the Rome Conference is “determined to put an end to impunity 
for the perpetrators of these crimes,” and “recalls that it is the duty of every state to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.” Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].  See also  
Michael P. Scharf, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the 
Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 67 (2001). 
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Similarly, the application of complementarity principle serves as a labyrinth 
capable of rendering the Court otiose.  The complementarity principle is a foundational 
principle that will not only shape the international criminal law system but will also 
determine the functioning of the Court.5  As presently stated in the ICC Statute, the 
complementarity principle will so dramatically limit the Court’s jurisdiction, role, and 
authority such that the Court could easily become only a meaningless, residual 
institution.6  Should States satisfactorily discharge their overriding duty to prosecute 
individuals for the crimes under the ICC Statute, the Court will be redundant.7  This is 
however a utopian expectation.  As already mentioned, the ICC was created in part, 
because of unwillingness or inability of national authorities to conduct domestic 
prosecutions and trials of perpetrators of serious crimes under international law.8   
For the Court to exercise jurisdiction under the complementarity principle absent 
Security Council referral, all States that have colorable jurisdiction must consent.  Where 
State(s) failed to consent, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction after determining that 
the State(s) with jurisdiction is/are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute.9  
Using ICC as a residuary Court is certainly not what was envisioned by the pioneer and 
advocates of a permanent international criminal court.  Besides, the international 
supervision necessary for the full implementation of complementary jurisdiction under 
                                                 
5 Hans-Peter Kaul, Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction Site For More Justice: 
The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 370, 384 (2005). 
6 Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and 
International Criminal Tribunals 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 425 (1998) (citing the Report of  the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 
Supp. No. 22, P 157, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996) [hereinafter 51st Sess. Preparatory Committee Report]. 
7 Hans-Peter Kaul, supra note 5, at 384. 
8 Peter Finell, ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW FOR ATROCITIES AGAINST MINORITY GROUPS COMMITTED BY NON-
STATE ACTORS 23 (Åbo Akademi Institute for Human Rights, 2002). 
9 ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 17. 
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this circumstance could be extremely embarrassing to States10 and may pitch the Court 
and States Parties in an unhealthy rivalry.  Thus, the likely scenario is that the Court and 
the State may be locked in a contest for jurisdiction.   
By design, the Court’s jurisdiction extends only to a small number of persons who 
commit the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.11  
Also, the high subject matter jurisdictional threshold of the Court12 as well as the limited 
instructional and financial resources of the Court further makes it inevitable that the 
Court can only target those few individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for the 
violations of crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction.  Therefore, this study suggests that 
conferring the Court with primacy jurisdiction over this category of individuals would not 
impinge States’ sovereignty.  The Court would still rely on the ability and willingness of 
States to prosecute other perpetrators at the national level in order to minimize the burden 
on the ICC.  Should States insist upon preserving the totality of their sovereign 
prerogatives, no effective international criminal jurisdiction will thrive.13   
The challenge is to establish appropriate balance between the need for 
international prosecutions in some cases and national prosecutions in others.  It may well 
be that in some cases, the Court may be preferable than national courts for reasons 
unrelated to national courts’ credibility.14  For instance, the Court may be better 
                                                 
10 Bartram S. Brown, supra note 6, at 431(noting that some of the States may eventually conclude that the 
complementarity principle compromises their sovereignty more than would a general primacy). 
11 See ICC Statute, supra note 4, arts. 1, 5. 
12 See the Chapeau of Articles 6,7, & 8 which further limits the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to 
genocide “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part”; crimes against humanity committed “as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack”, and war crimes “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part 
of a large-scale commission of such crimes.”  ICC Statute, supra note 4, arts. 6, 7, & 8.   These 
jurisdictional thresholds ensures that the application of the Statute is limited to serious violations.  
13 Bartram S. Brown, supra note 6, at 431. 
14 See Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-OTP, September 2003, 5 
(noting that “There may be cases where inaction by States is the appropriate course of action. For example, 
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positioned to prosecute individuals responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity 
because these crimes are principally crimes of States.  The major actors are more often 
agents of the State or other state like or quasi-state entities.15  What distinguishes these 
crimes from other international crimes is that they are the product of a “state action or 
policy”, and require some form of organizational structure.16  In such situations, it might 
well serve the interest of justice to have the Court prosecute the responsible individuals.  
The Court will also be in a better position to absorb the political pressure that may be 
associated with domestic prosecution of the “high” profile individuals.      
The idea that the Security Council may block the Court’s jurisdiction is troubling 
as it is an invitation of political meddlesomeness in judiciary function.  It puts the 
independence and credibility of the Court at issue.  At the same time, it exposes the Court 
to allegations of institution of western dominance by developing countries.  There is no 
doubt that an effective and independent judiciary can only be achieved when courts are 
institutionally shielded from direct political influence.  Independence of the judiciary is a 
sine qua non to effective and credible national court.  There is no reason why the ICC 
Statute which exerts its independence status should not confer unfettered independence 
on the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.17  Should the Security Council prevent ICC 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Court and a territorial State incapacitated by mass crimes may agree that a consensual division of labour 
is the most logical and effective approach.”). 
15 John Dugard, Criminal Responsibility of States in M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW, vol. 1, CRIMES, 2nd ed. (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1999) p. 239. 
16 Peter Finell, supra note 8, at 29-30 (observing that up to the Second World War victimization of civilians 
and mass scale human rights violations of human rights was perpetrated by the State’s public apparatus, 
such as the armed forces, the police, paramilitary units and the civilian bureaucracy, as products of a State 
action or policy.   
17 See ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 2; Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
International Criminal Court, Oct. 4, 2004, UN Doc. A/58/874, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/1/Add.1, pmbl.4., 
UN Doc. A/58/874, annex (2004) (entered into force Oct. 4, 2004). (Preamble 4 to the Relationships 
Agreement states expressly that “the International Criminal Court is established as an independent 
permanent institution in relationship with the United Nations.”).   Thus, ICC is not a specialized agency or 
as otherwise belonging to the “UN Family.”  For a discussion on the earlier draft of the Relationship 
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investigations or prosecutions willy nilly, this will violate the principle of prosecutorial 
independence.18   
While the inclusion of article 16 in the ICC Statute was not a popular decision, 
and that the prudent thing to do is to delete it from the Statute of the Court, it is not 
politically feasible as long as the lonely super power maintains its grip on the Security 
Council.19  However, the value of a permanent ICC will lie in its international credibility 
as an impartial institution capable of promoting equal justice for all.  Much of that 
credibility would be lost if its prosecutions can be halted or otherwise subject to the 
approval of the Security Council.  This would represent a step backwards from the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals, which, apart from matters of enforcement, operate 
independently of the Security Council.  No doubt, the ICC may have to rely on the 
support of the Security Council for the enforcement of its arrest warrants and other 
orders.  This unavoidable dependence will do doubt influence relations between the two 
bodies.  Hopefully, the Security Council will rise above political considerations and apply 
high moral leadership in the exercise of its powers under article 16.   
Further, an important aspect to the success of the Court depend to a large extent, 
on the willingness of States Parties to the ICC Statute to rise above sovereignty 
protection, embrace the Court wholeheartedly as they did at the Rome Conference, by 
demonstrating the political will to cooperate with the Court by providing the Court the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Agreement, see Daryl A. Mundis, The Assembly of States Parties and the Institutional Framework of the 
International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L 132  (2003).  
18 Bartram S. Brown, supra note 6, 389. 
19 See Barbara Crossette, World Criminal Court Having a Painful Birth, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1997, at A10 
(noting that “Washington wants the Security Council to be the arbiter of what cases would go to the 
international court, a view at odds with nearly all other countries. Europeans and some Latin American 
nations would give international prosecutors wide latitude in bringing cases.”).  
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necessary resources and cooperation it needs to carry out its responsibility. 20  The ICC, 
as currently structured, has no police force to assist it with finding, arresting, and 
securing potential suspects.21   The ICC relies on the cooperation of States to arrest and 
surrender suspects to the Court.22  Also, the ICC does not have a facility where ICC 
convicts will be incarcerated but depends on “willing States” to provide prison 
facilities.23  In addition, the ICC depends on the assessed contributions of States Parties 
and the United Nations to fund the operations of the Court.24  Thus, the Court can only be 
as strong and effective as the States Parties would want it to be.25    
While this study advocates the review of the ICC Statute to grant the Court 
primacy or inherent jurisdiction, it notes this may not be politically feasible yet because 
States believe that conferring the Court with such jurisdiction over its nationals somehow 
                                                 
20 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International Criminal Court in Historical Context, ST. LOUIS-WARSAW 
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 55, 66 (1999). 
21 Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 
88 GEO. L.J. 381, 415 (2000).   
22 The ICC is based in The Hague but its investigations may need to be conducted in the territory of a State 
where the crime allegedly happened.  Without the support of the local authorities, the work of the ICC 
investigators will be difficult and probably impossible.  The credibility of the Court would suffer if an 
arrest warrant issued by the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the request of the Prosecutor pursuant to 
Article 58 remained ineffective over a long period because the State parties were slow, or failed, to execute 
it.   In this respect, it is encouraging to note that the government of Uganda has held talks with the ICC 
about the possible arrest of rebel leader Joseph Kony and his co-indictees.  See Govt Meets ICC Over Kony 
Arrest, The Monitor (Kampala), February 3, 2006, at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200602020781.html (last 
visited February 9, 2006) (reporting that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sam Kuteesa told journalists 
on February 8, 2006 that he met the ICC Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, at The Hague in 
Netherlands to explore issues of possible partners and financing of the process of arresting and surrendering 
the indictees to the Court.  Last year the ICC issued arrest warrants for Kony, Vincent Otti, the second in 
command, and three other top rebel commanders the Lord’s Resistance Army for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 
23 See ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 103. Article 103 provides in pertinent part that: 
 
1(a) A sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a list of States 
which have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons.  
 
1(b) At the time of declaring its willingness …, a State may attach conditions to its acceptance as agreed by 
the Court … .  Id.  
24 ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 115.   The ICC may also receive additional voluntary contributions from 
governments, nongovernmental organizations, individuals, corporations and other entities.  Id., art. 116. 
25 Bartram S. Brown, supra note 6, 383. 
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deprives or belittles its sovereignty.  Thus, the principle of complementarity set out in the 
ICC Statute can only be effective if States Parties fulfill their obligations to cooperate 
fully with the Court.  Satisfactory national legislation that criminalizes the crimes in the 
ICC Statute and fully implements the obligation of each State party to cooperate with the 
Court is essential to ensure that the Court is able to fulfill its historic function with full 
cooperation by the States.  Therefore, it is of serious concern that draft and enacted 
implementing legislation deals unsatisfactorily, and in some cases not at all, with the 
question of cooperation.  This trend may undermine the ability of the Court to function 
effectively given that the foundation of the Court is based on the proper application of the 
principle of complementarity.26   
Therefore, to ensure that national courts of States Parties to the Statute serve as 
effective complement to the Court, States Parties should enact implementing legislation 
and/or reform their national criminal justice systems to fully integrate the ICC Statute and 
international system of justice in their national legal systems.  Also, such legislation 
should strengthen the existing system of interstate cooperation through extradition and 
mutual legal assistance by eliminating inappropriate grounds of refusal and having courts, 
not political officials make decisions on whether to cooperate.27  The implementing 
                                                 
26 Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE FAILURE OF STATES TO 
ENACT EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 29, AI Index: IOR 40/019/2004 1 September 
2004, available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR400192004?open&of=ENG-385 (visited 
February 20, 2006) [hereinafter The Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation]  
27 See Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CHECKLIST FOR 
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 3, AI Index: IOR 40/011/2000, August 1, 2000, available at: 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400112000?open&of=eng-385 (visited February 20, 2006); 
Amnesty International,  The Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation, supra note 25, 
at 26 (noting that several States are including the requirement of consent to prosecute by the Attorney 
General, a political official, in their national implementing legislation. These States include Australia 
(Article 268.121 of the International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002), Canada 
(Section 9 (3) and (4)), Malta (Article 54 (I) (2) of the Criminal Code, as amended by the ICC Act), New 
Zealand (Section 13), UK (England, Wales and Northern Ireland Act, Sections 53 (3), 54 (5), 60 (3) and 61 
(5)) and Uganda (Section 17). Although these States have argued that such consent is given in the Attorney 
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legislation should also define the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction as crimes under 
national law consistent with the ICC Statute and international law to expressly confer 
adequate jurisdiction to their national courts to prosecute the crimes.   
Further, the implementing legislation should clearly permit the surrender of 
accused persons to the Court and require relevant authorities to cooperate with the Court.  
To this end, States Parties and the ICC should develop, on the basis of Part 9 of the Rome 
Statute, a system of “best practices” for effective cooperation in conducting criminal 
investigations, in particular with regard to arrests and transfers to The Hague.28 
This study argues unequivocally that the conclusion of bilateral immunity 
agreements between States Parties and the U.S. which serves to insulate U.S. nationals 
from the Court’s jurisdiction is indubitably a violation of the obligations of States Parties 
under the ICC Statute.  Such conduct sends a wrong signal that States may avoid the 
Court’s jurisdiction by offering military and economic assistance to States Parties to the 
ICC Statute.  Therefore, this study urges the Assembly of States and the Court to reject 
any argument that the immunity agreement serves as a legal basis prohibiting States 
Parties from complying with their obligation to arrest and surrender accused persons to 
the Court.  
Although the Court is an independent institution and not a specialized agency of 
the United Nations, the Relationship Agreement between the Court and the United 
Nations calls for close cooperation and consultation between them on matters of mutual 
                                                                                                                                                 
General’s role as a professional prosecutor, rather than as a political official, and is in keeping with 
common law doctrine, Amnesty International is concerned that such a requirement risks creating the 
perception that prosecution decisions in cases involving crimes under international law have been made for 
political reasons.  Such a requirement should be excluded in all implementing legislation.  On the other 
hand, the better approach is one adopted by some States, including South Africa (Section 5) which provides 
that the decision whether to prosecute a person for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes is to be 
made by a professional prosecutor).  Id. 
28 Hans-Peter Kau, supra note 5, at 379. 
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interest.29  In particular, under the Relationships Agreement, the United Nations 
undertakes to cooperate with the ICC on judicial matters.30  This obligation requires the 
United Nations to provide inter alia, information and other forms of cooperation and 
assistance compatible with the UN Charter and the Rome Statute.  Also, the United 
Nations has agreed, in principle, to waive the confidentiality obligations of its officials 
when they testify in ICC proceedings.31  How this cooperation will work out in practice 
remains to be seen.  It is hoped that the Court will not be hamstrung by the cumbersome 
United Nations’ bureaucratic and financial procedures.   
This study however notes that the extent of United Nations’ cooperation with the 
Court will depend to a large extent, on the disposition of the UN Secretary-General to the 
Court.  Thus, as the term of office of the current Secretary-General nears to an end, 
Assembly of States parties to the ICC Statute should play an active role in the selection of 
the next Secretary-General to ensure the continuation of the cordial relationship between 
the Court and the United Nations under Kofi Annan.32  Considering U.S. current 
objection to the ICC, it is necessary that Assembly of States Parties, especially those in 
the Security Council should work together to ensure that the next Secretary-General is 
not adverse to the operation of the ICC. 
The ICC Statute has been praised for detailing the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes more than previous legal instruments.  On the other 
                                                 
29 Relationship Agreement, supra note 17, art 3.   
30 Id., art. 15. 
31 Id., art. 16. 
32 Already the United States is looking to influence the choice of the next U.N. Secretary-General.  See 
Edith M. Lederer, Bolton Launches Talks on Replacing Annan, AP News, February 17, 2006, available at  
http://www.townhall.com/news/ap/online/headlines/D8FQOOF02.html (visited February 18, 2006); Patrick 
Goodenough, Security Council Discord Expected Over Annan’s Successor, Cybercast News Services, 
February 13, 2006, available at: 
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/viewstory.asp?Page=\ForeignBureaus\archive\200602\FOR20060213b.htm
l (visited February 18, 2006).   
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hand, the Statute has also been criticized for its failure to elaborate on these crimes due to 
sovereignty concerns and reluctance to tinker with the definition of genocide as stated in 
the Genocide Convention.  While further elaboration may and are indeed desirable in 
some situations, it should however be noted that no criminal Statute addresses all possible 
crimes at once. The Review Conference should serve as opportunities to embark on this 
objective.  The emphasis now should be on breathing life to the crimes prohibited in the 
ICC Statute to achieve the objectives of the Statute.  The objectives of the ICC Statute to 
instill a culture of individual criminal accountability and end the culture of impunity 
would be achieved if States and the Court successfully prosecute individuals who commit 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.    
Suffice it however to note that one of the major disappointments of the Rome 
Conference was the inability of States to agree on a definition of the crime of aggression 
based on the Nuremberg conclusions regarding the crime of aggression.33  Hopefully at 
the Review Conference in 2009, States Parties may find the political will to agree on a 
definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions for the exercise of the Court’s 
jurisdiction. 34 
Notwithstanding the highlighted jurisdictional limitations of the Court, the 
establishment of the ICC remains one of the remarkable achievements of the twentieth 
century.  In this respect, it is commendable that the governments of Uganda, DR Congo, 
                                                 
33 Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression For the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (observing that the “the crime of aggression was extremely 
controversial during the Rome Statute's negotiations. Although many countries wished to see the crime 
included in the Statute, there was no agreement on the definition or on how to respect the Security 
Council’s mandate under the United Nations (U.N.) Charter with respect to determining whether an act of 
aggression has occurred). 
34 The Rome Conference resolved that the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is deferred until 
a definition of the crime and conditions under which the Court will exercise jurisdiction over the crime is 
concluded.  ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 5(1).  
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and Central African Republic (CAR) have referred situations in there respective States to 
the Court. Equally commendable is the decision of the Security Council to refer the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Court.  Fortunately, the Court obtained jurisdiction over 
these situations based on self referrals and “waivers of complementarity”,35 thereby 
avoiding the concerns of procedural hurdles expressed in this study that may follow the 
application of the complementarity principle.36   
These referrals give the Court its first set of opportunities to show to the 
international community that the ICC is a useful institution capable of successfully 
handling international criminal investigation and prosecution.  At the same time, there is 
the concern that the implementation of State referrals may lead to a “temptation of the 
territorial state to proceed to what may be called a ‘selective or asymmetrical self-
referral’ where the de jure government is itself party to an internal armed conflict.”37  
Cognizant of this possibility, the Prosecutor interpreted the referral by the 
Ugandan government to the ‘situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army’ as 
covering ‘crimes within the situation of northern Uganda by whomever committed’.38  
                                                 
35 See generally, Claus Kress, ‘Self Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’: Some Considerations in 
Law and Policy, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 944 (2004).  
36 Note however that Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir has vowed not to extradite any of its citizens to 
the ICC, insisting that it can prosecute any war criminal in its own courts.”  See, Xinhua News Agency, 
“Sudan Vows Not to Extradite Suspects of Darfur War Crimes, February 19, 2006, available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-02/19/content_4200443.htm (visited February 28, 2006); Sudan 
Tribune, Only Sudanese Judiciary Can Try Darfur War Crimes -al-Bashir, February 19, 2006, available at: 
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14151 (visited February 28, 2006).  See also, IWPR, 
Fred Bridgland, Darfur Sanctions Deadlock as ICC Considers Prosecutions, February 28, 2006, available 
at: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=259927&apc_state=henh (visited February 28, 2006) (reporting 
that President al-Bashir has warned that Sudan will not cooperate and has also sworn “before Allah three 
times” that he will never extradite a Sudanese citizen to any foreign court). 
37 Claus Kress, ‘Self-Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’ Some Considerations in Law and 
Policy, 2 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUS. 944, 946 (2004). 
38 Letter by the Chief Prosecutor of 17 June 2004 addressed to the President of the ICC as attached to the 
decisions of the Presidency of ICC, supra note 5. See the Decision of the Presidency assigning the situation 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 July 2004, ICC-01/04, and the Decision of 
the Presidency assigning the situation in Uganda to Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 July 2004, ICC-02/04. 
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Similarly, with respect to the referral by Cote d’Ivoire, although the State accepted ICC 
jurisdiction to investigate in the country and requested the ICC’s help in bringing to 
justice rebels who started the civil war in that country, the Prosecutor noted that since 
only “situations” can be referred to the ICC, the Prosecutor will consider the actions of all 
individuals in groups involved in the conflict.  Such approach is consistent with the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility espoused in the Statute to the effect that the 
“Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction …”39 
The establishment of the Court is only the beginning as the important work of the 
Court lies ahead.  The sustainability of international criminal justice will depend on how 
well the Court is able to deliver on its objective to bring justice to victims of international 
crimes and to end the culture of impunity.  It is hoped that in the interest of justice, States 
Parties to the ICC Statute will support the Court to establish confidence in the 
international criminal system.  Thus, efforts are necessary across the board, not only by 
the new institution and its staff, but also by the States Parties that established the Court, 
the United Nations as an institution, the Security Council as well as nongovernmental 
organizations to support the works of the Court.  A successful cooperation between the 
above named entities and the ICC can cement an international consensus in favor of 
strong and effective ICC jurisdiction. 
The cooperation of the United States as a permanent member of the Security 
Council and the lone super power is vital to the success of the Court.  States Parties 
should therefore make every effort to persuade the United States’ government to abandon 
                                                 
39 ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 27(1) (emphasis added). 
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its hostility toward the ICC.40  The U.S. and other States that fear the scrutiny of an 
independent international Prosecutor should heed the counsel of Justice Louise Arbour, 
former Prosecutor of the ICTY and the ICTR, who observed that there is more reason to 
fear that the international prosecutor will be impotent than there is to fear that the 
Prosecutor will overreach.41  According to Justice Arbour, the ICC Prosecutor must 
necessarily depend upon States and the Security Council for essential political support 
and enforcement, thus, the Prosecutor will have no reason to pursue frivolous 
prosecutions against the citizens of any State.42   
There is therefore no reason for the United States, as a permanent member of the 
Council, to fear frivolous international prosecutions of U.S. military personnel and other 
U.S. nationals.  It would be both futile and irrational for the ICC to pursue such a course 
                                                 
40 See Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of 
Operation Enduring Freedom, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 48-52 (2003) (noting that U.S. has 
taken various measures to undermine the ICC such as “un-signing of the ICC Statute; the adoption of the 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002; and systematic campaign to coarse States parties to 
sign the so-called Article 98 agreements).   
41 See NATO: Statement by Justice Louise Arbour on Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
M2 Presswire, Dec. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Currnws File.  In her statement before 
the ICC PrepCom, Justice Arbour observed: 
  
Turning then to the powers of the Prosecutor of the permanent Court, I would like to expand on my earlier 
remarks that it may be unwarranted for States to fear the possible overreach, or simply the untrammelled 
power of the Prosecutor of the permanent Court. Despite the fact that the ad hoc Tribunals’ powers 
originate in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the taxing experience of my Office suggests that it 
is more likely that the Prosecutor of the permanent Court could be chronically enfeebled by inadequate 
enforcement powers combined with a persistent and widespread unwillingness of States Parties to co-
operate. The existence of jurisdiction will not necessarily correspond to the reality facing the Prosecutor of 
the permanent Court on a day-to-day basis. 
  
Id. 
42 Justice Arbour drawing on her experience as Prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR noted as follows: 
  
In my experience, based on the work of the two Tribunals to date, I believe that the real challenge posed to 
a Prosecutor is to choose from many meritorious complaints the appropriate ones for international 
intervention. …. [A]n appropriate process of vigorous internal indictment review, such as we presently 
have in place at the two Tribunals [as is the case in the ICC Statute], confirmation by a competent judge, 
and the inevitable acquittal that would result from an unfounded prosecution, should alleviate any fear that 
an overzealous or politically-driven Prosecutor could abuse his or her powers. 
Id. 
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of action.  There are implicit safeguard in the ICC Statute to ensure that the United States 
will be able to protect its legitimate interests without compromising the independence of 
the ICC. 
We must always remember that it is now the expectation of many that the ICC is 
necessary to ensure that acts of mass murder, rape and torture whether committed in the 
form of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity are not committed with 
impunity.43  To realize this noble goal, it is imperative that the Court be endowed with 
jurisdiction and provided the necessary resources and cooperation to enable the Court 
hold individuals responsible for these heinous acts and egregious violations of 
international crimes that are of grave concerns to the international community as a whole, 
accountable for their actions.   
In the final analysis, whether the Court will achieve the aspirations behind its 
establishment will depend largely on the application of the complementarity principle, a 
concession to States’ sovereignty, whose retention in the Statute remains a potential 
source of conflict between the Court and States.  The complementarity principle is 
capable of undermining the efficacy of the Court because it is antithetical to the objective 
of the Court.44    
Lastly, it should be reiterated that the full cooperation of States Parties and the 
United Nations, particularly the Security Council, is necessary for the realization of the 
objectives of the ICC.  In deserving situations, such support should include timely 
military actions especially where it will lead to immediate end to the killing of innocent 
                                                 
43 Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal 
Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2001)  
44 See Leila N. Sadat & S. Richard Carden, supra note 21, at 413 (noting that “the ends sought by the 
Statute are imperfectly addressed by the means chosen”).  Id. 
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civilians.45  As one of the Judges of the International Criminal Court, and President of the 
Pre-Trial Division noted, “[w]hether they will do so remains, as it were, the question to 
end all questions”.46 
                                                 
45 See, CNN World Edition, Senate Urges Bush to Take Action on Darfur, Friday, March 3, 2006, available 
at: http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/03/03/sudan.congress.reut/index.html ((reporting that the 
U.S. Senate on March 2, 2006, unanimously passed a resolution urging President Bush to take swift action 
to stop the genocide that the United States says is occurring in Sudan, and pressed for NATO to send troops 
and enforce a no-fly zone in the Darfur region.  The resolution also calls on the U.N. Security Council to 
approve a peace enforcement mission for the region where tens of thousands of people have been killed and 
2 million driven from their homes in three years of fighting between rebels and government-allied Arab 
militias). 
46 Hans-Peter Kau, supra note 5, at 383. 
BOOKS 
Appleman, J.A., MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, 239-58 
(1954). 
Ball, H., PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 100 (1999). 
Bassiowri, M.C. & Manikas, P., THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 538-54 (1996). 
Bassiowri, M.C. & Nanda, V.P. eds., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 590 (M. 
CherifBassiowri & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973). 
Bassiouni, M.C. & Wise, E.M., AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO 
EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-5, 56-57 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995). 
Bassiouni, M.C., A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT 
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (Dordrecht: Martin us 
Nijhoff Publishers 1987). 
Bassiowri, M.C., CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 503-26 (1992). 
Bassiowri, M.C., CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 62 (2d rev. ed., 1999). 
Bassiowri, M.C., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR 
PENAL PROVISIONS (1997). 
Bassiowri, M.C., INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNITED STATES LAW 
AND PRACTICE Ch. VIII (3d ed. 1996). 
Bassiowri, M.C., INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 431-32 
{Transnational Publishers, 2003). 
Bassiowri, M.C., THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHT~ IN THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL WSTICE: A COMPENDIUM OF UNITED 
NATIONS NORMS AND STANDARDS (1994). 
Bassiowri, M.C., THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (1998). 
Becker, E., WHEN THEW AR WAS OVER: CAMBODIA AND THE KHMER 
ROUGE REVOLUTION (Public Mfairs 2d ed. 1998) (1986) 
371 
Best, G, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, 166 (1994) 
Boot, M., GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES: NULLEM 
CRIMEN SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 428 (Intersentia: New York, 2002). 
Bossier, P., FROM SOLFERINO TO TSUSHIMA: HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 283-284 (Geneva: Henry 
Dunant Institute 1985). 
Brockman, A. C., THE OTHER NUREMBERG, THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 
TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1987) 
Broornhall, B., INTERNATIONAL WSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 145 
(2003). 
Brownlie, 1., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300-04 (4th ed. 
1990); 
Brownlie, 1., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (3d ed. 1979). 
Brownlie, I., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (Oxford, 1991) 
Brownlie, I., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ED., 678-981 
(Oxford University Press 1998). 
Buergenthal, T. & Maier, H.G., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 
(1990). 
Buscher, F.M., THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 1946-
1955 (1989); 
Carter, B., & Trimble, P.R., INTERNATIONAL LAW 411 (1991). 
Carter, B.E. & Trimble, P.R. eds., INTERNATIONAL LAW 262, (Barry E. Carter & 
Phillip R. Trimble eds., 3rd ed. 1999). 
Chanda, N., BROTHER ENEMY: THEW AR AFTER THEW AR (1986). 
Chandler, D., A HISTORY OF CAMBODIA 218 (2d ed. 1996). 
372 
• I 
Cigar, N. & Williams, P., INDICTMENT AT THE HAGUE: THE MILOSEVIC 
REGIME AND CRIMES OF THE BALKAN WAR 25 (New York University Press 
2002); 
DeNike, H.J., ed., GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE TRIAL 
OF POL POT AND IENG SARY 549 (Howard J. DeNike et al. eds., 2000) 
Dinstein, Y., THE DEFENCE OF OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS' IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965). 
Drost, P.N., THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE 62 (1959). 
Fein, H., GENOCIDE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (1993) 
Ferencz, B.B., AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP TOWARD 
PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (London: Oceana Publications 1980). 
Ferencz, B.B., AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARDS 
WORLD PEACE, Vol. 1, 30 (London: Oceana, 1980) 
Ferencz, B.B., DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGRESSION 522, 523 (1975) 
Finell, P., ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW FOR ATROCITIES AGAINST MINORITY 
GROUPS COMMITTED BY NON-STATE ACTORS 23 (Abo Akademi Institute for 
Human Rights, 2002). 
Fiore, P., INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFIED AND ITS LEGAL SANCTION OR 
THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF STATES 36, 51, 109 (5th ed. 
1918). 
Green, L.C., SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1976) 
Green, L.C., THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 2nd Ed., 43 
(2000). 
Greenlees, D. & Garran, R., DELIVERANCE: THE INSIDE STORY OF EAST 
TIMOR'S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 4 (2002). 
Henkin, L. et al., HUMAN RIGHTS (1999) 
Henkin, L. et al., INTERNATIONAL LAW 448 (3d ed. 1993). 
Holmes, O.W., THE COMMON LAW l(Little, Brown & Co.l881). 
373 
Horwitz, S., The Tokyo Trial, 465 INT'L RECONCILIATION 473 (1950). 
Hosoya, C. et al. eds., THE TOKYO W .AR CRIMES TRIAL (C. Hosoya et al. eds., 
1986). 
Jackson, K.D., CAMBODIA 1975-1978: RENDEZVOUS WITH DEATH (Karl D. 
Jackson ed., 1989) 
Jackson, R.H., THE CASE AGAINST THE NAZI W .AR CRIMINALS (New York, 
1945); 
Jackson, R.H., THE NUREMBERG CASE, (New York, 1948). 
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, THE INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSE TO CONFLICT AND GENOCIDE: LESSONS FROM THE RWANDA 
EXPERIENCE, Vols. I-V (March 1996). 
Kalshoven, F., CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF W .AR 40-41 (ICRC, 2nd ed, 
1991) 
Kazazi, M., BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON 
EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 54-66 (1996). 
Keijzer, N., MILITARY OBEDIENCE (1978) 
Kelsen, H., GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 342 (Anders Wedberg Trans., 
1949) 
Kiernan, B., THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND GENOCIDE IN 
CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79 (2d ed. 2002). 
Kiernan, B., ed., CAMBODIA: THE KHMER ROUGE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 141, 142 (Ben Kiernan ed., 1993). 
Kindred, H.M. et al. eds., INTERNATIONAL LAW AS CHIEFLY INTERPRETED 
AND APPLIED IN CANADA 4th ed. 271(1987). 
K.lip, A. & Sluiter, G., eds., 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1993-1998, at 679 (Andre K.lip & 
Goran Sluiter eds., 1999). 
Knierem, A. von, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1959) 
374 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA- THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, NATIONAL 
COURTS AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION: A GUIDE TO APPLICABLE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND ITS RELATION TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS iii (May 1995). 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 33 (April1995). 
Leblanc, L., THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 80 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press 1991) 
Lemkin, R., AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE, LAWS OF OCCUPATION: 
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT: PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944). 
Levie, H.S., TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 559 (1993). 
Malanczuk, P., AK.EHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 15-16 (Routledge, 7th rev. ed. 1997). 
Malekian, F., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES (1985). 
Manchester, W., AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 1880-1964,484-
91 (1978). 
McDonald, G.K. & Swaak-Goldman, 0. eds., SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL 
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia 
Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000). 
Mcdougal, M.S. et al., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE 
BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 96 
(1980). 
Metzl, J.F., WESTERN RESPONSES TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN 
CAMBODIA, 1975-80, at 2-3 (1996). 
Minear, R.H., VICTOR'S VENGEANCE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971). 
Moir, L., THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2002). 
Moore, J.N., CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW 302-03,310 
(1992) 
375 
' I;, I . 
~~ ~ 
~· 
·r:l 
• r 
Morris, V. & Scharf, M.P., AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS xxi (Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf eds., 1995). 
Muller, A.S., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES 75 
(1995). 
Mullins, C., THE LEIPZIG TRIALS (1921). 
Murphy, J.F., NORMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
62 (Ginsburgs & Kudriavstev eds., 1990). 
O'Connell, D.P., INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (2nd ed. 1970) 
Okeke, C.N., CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEW ENTITIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR TREATY -MAKING CAPACITY 18 (1974). 
Oppenheim, L., INTERNATIONAL LAW 264-65 (1st ed. 1906)). 
Oppenheim, L., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 5 (7th ed. 1948) 
Paust, J.J., Bassiouni, M.C. et al., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 622 (2d ed. 
2000). 
Physicians for Human Rights, MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE IN THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA: 1991-1995 24 (1996). 
Piccigallo, P.R., THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS 
IN THE EAST 1945-1951 (1979). 
Picket, J.S., ed., COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION of12 August, 
1949: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CNILIAN 
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 593 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958). 
Picket, J.S., ed., COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 
26 (J. Picted ed. 1952). 
Ponchaud, F., CAMBODIA: YEAR ZERO (Nancy Amphoux trans., 1978) 
Power, S., "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 
42-60 (2003). 
376 
Pritchard, R.J. & Zaide, S.M. eds., THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE 
COMPREHENSNE INDEX AND GUIDE TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST IN FIVE 
VOLUMES (R. John Pritchard & SoniaMagbanuaZaide eds., 1981). 
Prunier, G., THE RWANDA CRISIS 1959-1994: HISTORY OF GENOCIDE (1995). 
Ramos-Horta, J., FUNU: THE UNFINISHED SAGA OF EAST TIMOR 64-71 (1987). 
Ratner, S.R. & Abrams, J.S., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, 
2nd Ed., 39 (Oxford: Clarendon 2000). 
Roberts, A. & Guelff, R., eds., DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 169 (Adam 
Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989). 
Robinson, N., THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (New York, 
1960). 
Roling, B.V.A. & Cassese, A., THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND 3 (Oxford, 1993) 
Roling, B.V.A., The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in A TREATISE ON 
Sands, P. & Klein, P., BOWETT'S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 471 
(2001) 
Schabas, W.A., AN INTRIDUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 46 (2003). 
Schabas, W.A., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 68 (2nd ed. 2004). 
Schabas, W.A., GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 
222-25 (2000). 
Scharf, M.P. & Schabas, W.A., MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL 14 (The Continuum 
International Publishing Group, Inc., 2002). 
Schermers, H.G. & Blokker, N.M., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 979 
(1995) 
Schwarzenberger G. & Brown, E., A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 
(6th ed. 1976) 
Schwarzenberger, G., INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, Volume II: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 462 
(Stevens, London, 1968). 
377 
Shaw, M., INTERNATIONAL LAW 471 (Cambridge, 1998). 
Shawcross, H. Lord, LIFE SENTENCE (London: Constable 1995). 
Shiroyama, S., WAR CRIMINAL: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF HIROTA KOKI (1977) 
Steiner, H. & Alston, P., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 705 
(Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 2000) 
Sunga, L.S., THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 8-9 (1997). 
Tanaka, Y., HIDDEN HORRORS: JAPANESE WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR IT 
(1996). 
Taylor, T., FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE 
NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 
(1949). 
Taylor, T., THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 17 (1992). 
Terret, S., THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER 
ARBITRATION COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF PEACE-MAKING 
EFFORTS IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD 33 (Ashgate Publishing Co. 2000). 
The BRITISH MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, No. 443 (1914). 
Pritchard, R.J. & Zaide, S.M. eds., THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE FAR EAST IN TWENTY-TWO VOLUMES (R. John Pritchard & Sonia 
Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981). 
Toman, J., THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF 
ARMED CONFLICT (Paris, 1996). 
Tusa, A. & Tusa, J., THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 22 (1984). 
U.S. DEPT ofthe Army, FIELD MANUAL 27-10 (1940). 
U.S. DEPT ofthe Army, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 
(1956). 
Uhler, 0. & Coursier, H., eds., COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION 
OF CNILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 16 (0. Uhler & H. Coursier eds. 1958). 
378 
United Nations War Crimes Commission, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF 
WAR 89-92 (1948). 
Vickery, M., CAMBODIA: 1975-1982 (1984). 
Willis, J.F., PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF 
PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 37, (1982). 
Wingaert, C. van den, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION: 
THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER (1980). 
Yves, S., Swinarski, C & Zimmerman, B., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUG. 1949, 
1320 (Yves, Swinarski, & Zimmerman eds., 1987). 
Zimmermann, A., War Crimes Committed in an Armed Conflict Not of an International 
Character, in Otto TRIFFTERER, COMMENTARY ON STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 285 (1999). 
ARTICLES IN A BOOK 
Afflitto., F.M. & Margaret, M., The Political Determinants of Ethnic Genocide, in 
ANATOMY OF GENOCIDE: STATE SPONSORED MASS KILLINGS IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 7 (Alexandre Kimenyi & Otis L. Scott eds., 2001). 
Ashworth, A.J., Defining Criminal Offences Without Harm, in CRIMINAL LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF J.C. SMITH 7, 8 (Peter Smith ed., 1987). 
Bierzanek, R., The Prosecution of War Crimes, in A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 562 (M. CherifBassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973). 
Bierzanek, R., War Crimes: History and Definition, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 29, 36 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 3 vols., 1987). 
Broomhall, B., The International Criminal Court: Overview, and Cooperation with States, 
in ICC RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 45 
(Nouvelles Etudes Penales, 1999). 
Brownlie, 1., A Rebirth of Statehood, in Malcolm D. Evans, ed., ASPECTS OF 
STATEHOOD AND INSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 5 (1996). 
Chalk, F., Redefining Genocide, in GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL 
DIMENSIONS 47,50 (George J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994). 
379 
.. 
,,11 i' 
~ .. 
I" 
j I ,. 
Ciampi, A., Other Forms of Cooperation, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1705 (Antonio Cassese, 
Paola Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002). 
Deschenes, J., Toward International Criminal Justice, in PROSECUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, 29, 32 (Rogers Clark & Madeleine Sann, eds., 
Transnational Publishers, 1st ed. 1996). 
Dugard, J., Criminal Responsibility of States, in M. CherifBassiouni ed., 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, vol. 1, CRIMES, 2nd ed., 239 (Ardsley, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, 1999). 
Fenrick, W.J., Article 8, margin No.6 in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE 
BY ARTICLE (Otto Trifferer ed., 1999). 
Gaeta, P., Official Capacities and Immunities, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY 
ARTICLE 1131 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999). 
Gallagher, A., Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working with New 
Actors and Partners, in THE FUTURE OF U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
MONITORING 201 (Philip Alston & James Crawford, eds., 2000). 
Hall, C.K., Article 19, Challenges to the Jurisdiction of the Court or the Admissibility of 
a Case, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 405, 408(0tto 
Triffterer, ed. 1999). 
Harhoff, F., & Mochochoko, P., International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND 
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 637 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001). 
Hebel, H. von and Robinson, D., Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 
-ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 79-126, 89 (R.S. Lee Ed. The 
Hague/Boston/London: Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
Holmes, J.T., Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC in 1 THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 
667,683 (Cassese, Gaeta & Jones, eds., 2002). 
Holmes, J.T., The Principle of Complementarity, in Roy S. Lee (ed) THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, 
380 
' ' 
' 
ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 78 (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999). 
Kingsbury, D., East Timor to 1999, in GUNS AND BALLOT BOXES: EAST TIMOR'S 
VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE, 17, 20 (Damien Kingsbury ed., 2000). 
Kolodkin, R.A., An Ad Hoc International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, in THE 
PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, 165, 165-66 (RogerS. Clark & 
Madeleine Sann eds., 1996). 
Kre., C. beta et al., International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance: Preliminary 
Remarks, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY 
ARTICLE 1045 (Otto Triffterer, ed. 1999). 
M. CherifBassiouni, The Need for International Accountability, in INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 3 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 1986). 
Mendelsohn, J., War Crimes Trials and Clemency in Germany and Japan, in 
AMERICANS AS PROCONSULS: UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
IN GERMANY AND JAPAN, 1944-1952,226 (Robert Wolfe ed., 1984). 
Mochochoko, P., International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE-
-ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 305 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); 
Moynier, G., Note sur Ia creation d'une institutionjudiciaire intemationale propre a 
prevenir et a reprimer les infractions a Ia Convention de Geneve, BULLETIN 
INTERNATIONAL DES SOCIETES DE SECOURS AUX MILITAIRES BLESSES, 
NO. 11, Apr. 1872, at 122, translated in Christopher Keith Hall, The First Proposal for a 
Permanent International Criminal Court, INT'L REV. RED CROSS, NO. 322, Mar. 
1998, at 57, 72. 
Munch, F., Criminal ResponsibilityofStates, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
122-29 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 1986). 
Ntanda Nsereko, D.D., Article 18 Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 395, 401 (Otto 
Triffterer, ed. 1999). 
Paust, J.J., Commentary on Parts 1 and 2 of the Zutphen Intersessional Draft: Article 
5[20], Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, and Articles 19[C] and 26[M], Leader 
and Responsibility and Superior Orders, in OBSERVATIONS ON THE 
CONSOLIDATED ICC TEXT BEFORE THE FINAL SESSION OF THE 
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (Leila Sadat Wexler ed., 1998). 
381 
Prost, K. & Schlunck, A., Article 98, in Otto Triffierer, ed., THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY 
ARTICLE 1131 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellscbaft 1999) 
Rao, S.R., Article 112: Assembly of State Parties, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, 
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1201-13 (Otto Trifferer ed., 1999). 
Ratner, S.R. & Abrams, J.S., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 
4 (Oxford, 2nd Ed. 2001). 
Robert H. Jackson, R.H., Prosecutor's Address ofNov. 21, 1945 to the International 
Military Tribunal, in 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 99 (1947). 
Robinson, G., With UNAMET in East Timor- An Historian's Personal View, in BITTER 
FLOWERS, SWEET FLOWERS: EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA, AND THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY (Richard Tanter et al. eds., 2001). 
Robison, D., Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on State Sovereignty, Legal 
Precision and the Dictates ofthe Public Conscience, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 144-49 (Flavia Lattanzi 
& William A. Schabas eds., 1999). 
Shaw, M., Genocide and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME 
OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABT AI ROSENNE 797, 806 (Y oram 
Dinstein ed., 1989) 
Sinha, P ., The Position of the Individual in an International Criminal Law in, A 
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 122-34 (M. CherifBassiouni & 
Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973). 
Swart, B. & Sluiter, G., The International Criminal Court and International Criminal Co-
operation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 91 
(Herman von Hebel et al. eds., 1999). 
Tanter, R. et al., East Timor Faces the Future, in BITTER FLOWERS, SWEET 
FLOWERS: EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA, AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 243, 
260 (Richard Tanter et al. eds., 2001). 
Tomuschat, C., Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of Mankind and the 
Recalcitrant Third State, in WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 41,49-50 
(Y oram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996). 
382 
Y ee, L., The International Criminal Court and the Security Council, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 
143 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
LAW REVIEW ARTICLES 
Abrams, J., Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities and Prospects: The Atrocities in 
Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of Genocide, 35 NEW. ENG. 
L. REV. 303 (2001). 
Akhavan, P., Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229 (1995). 
Akhavan, P., The International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: The Politics and 
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501 (1996). 
Alston, P. & Simma, B., First Session of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1987). 
Amann, D.M., International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Akayesu - Case ICTR-96-4-T -
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, September 2, 1998, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 195 
(1999). 
Arnell, P., International Criminal Law and Universal Jurisdiction, 11 INT'L LEGAL 
PERSP. 53 (1999). 
Arsanjani, M.H., Developments In International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22 (1999). 
Bakuramutsa, M., Why the Government of Rwanda Called for an International Tribunal 
and Yet Opposed the United Nations Security Council Resolution, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 631 (1995). 
Bassiouni, M.C., Combating Impunity For International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 
409, 420 (2000). 
Bassiouni, M.C., From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to 
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11 (1997). 
Bassiouni, M.C., Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying 
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National 
Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235 (1993). 
Bassiouni, M.C., International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL.W. INT'L L.J. 201 (1979). 
383 
Bassiouni, M.C., The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian law in the Former 
Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 279 (1994). 
Bassiouni, M.C., The International Criminal Court in Historical Context, ST. LOUIS-
WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 55 (1999). 
Bassiouni, M.C., The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: 
Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 
(1998). 
Bassiouni, M.C., The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L 
& COMP. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
Beresford, S., The Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court: Are 
They Sufficient for the Proper Functioning of the Court or Is There Still Room for 
Improvement? 3 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 83 (2002). 
Bloom, E.T., Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety ofUnited Nations 
and Associated Personnel, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 621(1995). 
Bos, A., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 229 (1998). 
Bourloyannis-Vrailas, M.-C., The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 560 (1995). 
Bowman, H. D., Letting The Big Fish Get Away: The United Nations Justice Effort In 
East Timor 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 371 (2004). 
Brown, B.S., Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National 
Courts and International Criminal Tribunals 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383 (1998). 
Bryant, B., Substantive Scope ofthe Convention, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 681 (1975). 
Bunyanunda, M., Note, The Khmer Rouge on Trial: Whither the Defense?, 74 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1581 (2001). 
Burns, P., An International Criminal Tribunal: The Difficult Union of Principles and 
Politics, 5 CRIM. L. F. 341 (1994). 
Caggiano, M.J.T., The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modem Warfare: 
Customary Substance over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 
(1993). 
384 
Caron, D.D. & Sloss, D.L., Availability of U.S. Courts to Detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base- Reach ofHabeas Corpus- Executive Power in War on Terror 98 AM. J. 
INT'L. L. 788 (2004). 
Cassese, A., The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 144 (1999). 
Cerna, C.M., Recent Development: A Small Step Forward For Human Rights: The 
Creation Of The Post OfUnited Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights, 10 AM. 
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1265 (1995). 
Cerna, C.M., A Small Step Forward for Human Rights: The Creation of the Post of 
United Nations High Commissioner ofHuman Rights, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 
1265 (1995). 
Charney, J.I., Transnational Corporations and Developing International Law, 1983 Duke 
L.J. 748 (1983). 
Chibueze, R., United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of 
"Operation Enduring Freedom", 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 19 (2003). 
Clark, R.S., Methods ofWarfare That Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Are Inherently 
Indiscriminate: A Memorial Tribute to Howard Berman, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 379 
(1998). 
Com, M., United Nations Convention on the Safety ofUnited Nations (UN) and 
Associated Personnel Enters Into Force, ARMY LAW, Feb. 1999,21. 
Dadrian, V.N., Genocide as a Problem ofNational and International Law: The World 
War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 
221 (1989). 
Dickinson, L.A., The Promise ofHybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003). 
Diederich, Jr., M.D., "Law ofWar" and Ecology- A Proposal for a Workable Approach 
to Protecting the Environment Through the Law or [sic] War, 136 MIL. L. REV. 137 
(1992). 
Dormann, K.& Maresca, L., The Role of the Red Cross in the Development of 
International Humanitarian Law: The International Committee of the Red Cross and Its 
Contribution to the Development oflntemational Humanitarian Law in Specialized 
Instruments, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 217 (2004). 
Ehard, H., The Nuremberg Trial against the Major War Criminals and International Law, 
43 AM. J. INT'L L. 223 (1949). 
385 
Elias, T.O., The Doctrine oflntertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L. L. 285 (1980). 
Enache-Brown, C. & Fried, A., Universal Crime, Jurisdiction and Duty: The Obligation 
of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare in International Law, 43 MCGILL L. J. 613, 626 (1998). 
Etcheson, C., Accountability Beckons During a Year ofWorries for the Khmer Rouge 
Leadership, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 507 (2000). 
Ettinger, D.J., The Legal Status ofthe International Olympic Committee, 4 PACE Y.B. 
INT'L L. 97 (1992). 
Forbes, G.W., Some Legal Aspects of the Nuremberg Trial, 24 CAN. B. REV. 584 
(1946). 
Forsythe, D.P., Politics and the International Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia, 5 
CRIM. L.F. 401 (1994). 
Fritz, N. & Smith, A., Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391 (2001). 
Gallagher, K., No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra 
Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149 (2000). 
Gamer, J.W., Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War, 14 AM. J. 
INT'L. L. 70 (1920). 
Glendon, M.A., Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1153 (1998). 
Goebel, C.M., Population Transfer, Humanitarian Law, and the Use of Ground Force in 
U.N. Peacemaking: Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Wake of Iraq, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 
& POL. 627 (1993). 
Gordon, M., Justice on Trial: the Efficacy of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217 (1995). 
Graditzky, T., War Crime Issues Before the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L & POL'Y, 
199, 210 (1999). 
Green, L.C., Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, 27 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 167 
(1989). 
Greenawalt, A.K.A., Rethinking Genocide Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based 
Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259 (1999). 
386 
' r 
I r: 
,, 
'· 
l 
\· 
; 
f• 
;! 
·~ 
) 
. ,. 
' 
Gurule, J., United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an 
International Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to 
National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (2001-2002). 
Hall, C.K., The Fifth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L 331 (1998). 
Hall, C.K., The First Five Sessions ofthe UN Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 773 (2000). 
Hall, C.K., The first proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court, 322 INT'L 
REV. RED CROSS 57 (1998). 
Hall, C.K., The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 91 AM. J.INT'L L. 117 (1997). 
Hall, C.K., The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L 124 (1998). 
Hannum, H., International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence, 11 
HUM. RTS. Q. 82 (1989). 
Hannum, H., The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287 (1996). 
Koh, K.H., How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 
(1999). 
Hathaway, O.A., Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 
(2002). 
Helfer, L.R. & Slaughter, A-M, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudications, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997). 
Hickey, Jr., James E., The Source of International Legal Personality in the 21st Century, 2 
HOFSTRA L POL'Y SYM 1 (1997). 
Hobb, S., Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of 
Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 191 (1997). 
Hwang, P., Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 457 (1998). 
Ireland, G., Ex Post Facto from Rome to Tokyo, 21 TEMPLE L.Q. 27 (1947). 
Jinks, D., September 11 and the Laws ofWar, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2003). 
387 
Johnson, D.H.N., The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, 4 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 445 (1955). 
Joyner, C. C., Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former Yugoslavia, 22 
DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 235 (1994). 
Joyner, C.C., Strengthening Enforcement of Humanitarian Law: Reflections on the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L 
L. 79 (1995). 
Katzenstein, S., NOTE: Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor, 16 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245 (2003). 
Kau, H-P. & Kress, C., Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Principles and Compromises, 2 Y.B. INT'L. HUM. L. 143 (1999). 
Kau, H-P., Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction Site For More 
Justice: The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 370 
(2005). 
Kelsen, H., Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in 
International Law, 1 INT'L L.Q. 153 (1947). 
Kerwin, G.J., The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Determining 
Principles oflntemational Law in United States Courts, 1983 Duke L.J. 876 (1983). 
Kirsch, P. & Holmes, J.T., The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: 
The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2 (1999). 
Kirsch, P., Q.C., The International Criminal court: Current Issues and Perspectives, 64 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (2001). 
Kirsch, P ., The Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court: A Comment, 
American Society of International Law Newsletter 1 (AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., 
WASHINGTON, D.C.) Nov./Dec. 1998. 
Kress, C., 'SelfReferrals' and 'Waivers of Complementarity': Some Considerations in 
Law and Policy, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 944 (2004). 
Kress, C., War Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed Conflict and the 
Emerging System oflnternational Criminal Justice, 30 ISR. Y.B. Human Rights 103 
(2001). 
Kunz, J.L., The United Nations Convention on Genocide, 43 AM. J.INT'L.L., 738 
(1949). 
388 
Laber, J. & Nizich, I., The War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Problems 
and Prospects, 18 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 7 (1994). 
Landrum, B.D. The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 2002-Sep Army Law. 1 (2002). 
Lawrence, F.M., The Case for a Federal Bias Crime Law, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 144 
(1999). 
LeBlanc, L.J., The United Nations Genocide Convention and Political Groups: Should 
the United States Propose an Amendment?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 268 (1988). 
Lehr-Lehnardt, R., One Small Step for Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome 
Statute ofthe International Criminal Court, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 317 (2002). 
Lemkin, R., Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L.L., 145 
(1947). 
Linton, S., Prosecuting Atrocities at the District Court of Dili, 2 Melb. J. INT'L L. 414 
(2001). 
Lippman, M., The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1985). 
Lippman, M., Genocide: The Crime of the Century- The Jurisprudence of Death at the 
Dawn of the new Millennium, 23 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 467 (2001). 
Lippman, M., The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 415 (1998). 
Mallory, J.L., Resolving the Confusion Over Head-of-State Immunity: The Defined 
Rights ofKings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169 (1986). 
Matas, D., Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity: The Lessons of World War I, 13 
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 86 (1989). 
McCormack, T.L.H., Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in 
International Law: Panel II: Adjudication Violence: Problems Confronting International 
Law and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Selective Reaction to 
Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. 
REV. 681 (1997). 
McCormick, T.L.H. & Robertson, S., Jurisdictional Aspects of the Rome Statute for the 
New International Criminal Court, 23 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 635 (1999). 
389 
I' 
Mcintire, A., Be Careful What You Wish for Because You Just Might Get It: The United 
States and the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 249 
(2001). 
Menon, P.K., The International Personality of Individuals in International Law: A 
Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 151 (1992). 
Meron, T., Classification of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout, 
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 236 (1998). 
Meron, T., Defining Aggression For the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1 (2001). 
Meron, T., International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 
(1995). 
Meron, T., The Geneva Conventions as Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L 
L 348 (1987). 
Meron, T., The Humanization ofHumanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (2000). 
Mignone, F.A., After Nuremberg, Tokyo, 25 TEX. L. REV. 475 (1947). 
Miller, 18 A.B.A. NAT'L SECURITY L. REP. 1 (1996). 
Mochochoko, P., Completing the Work of the Preparatory Commission: The Agreement 
on Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 638 (2002). 
Moor, A., The Republic ofBosnia-Herzogovia and Article 51: Inherent Rights and 
Unmet Responsibilities, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 870 (1995). 
Morris, M.H., The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case ofRwanda, 7 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT'L L. 349 (1997). 
Morris, M., High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (2001). 
Mundis, D.A., The Assembly of States Parties and the Institutional Framework of the 
International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L 132 (2003). 
Mundis, D.A., Current Development: New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of 
International Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 934 (2001). 
Mundis, D.A., Note and Comment: The Judicial Effects of the "Completion Strategies" 
on the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT'L.L. 142 (2005). 
390 
Mutua, M., Open Forum: Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167 (1997). 
Nersessian, D.L., The Razor's Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups Under the 
Genocide Convention, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 293 (2003). 
Newton, M.A., Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent 
with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 (2001). 
Nissel, A., Continuing Crimes in the Rome Statute, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 653 (2004). 
Nowrot, K., Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental 
Organizations under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 579 (1999). 
Okeke, C.N., International Law in the Nigerian Legal System, 27 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 
311 (1997). 
Oosterveld, V., Perry, M. & McManus, J., The Cooperation of States with the 
International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 767 (2002). 
Parks, W.H., Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973). 
Paust, J.J., Book Review, 96 AM J. INT'L L. 1006 (2002). 
Paust, J.J., Selective History of International Tribunals and Efforts Prior to Nuremberg, 
10 ll.SA J INT'L & COMP. L. 207 (2003). 
Payam, A., The International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: The Politics and 
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501 (1996). 
Payam, A., Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229 (1995). 
Pejic, J., Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to 
Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291 (1998). 
Plattner, D., The Penal Repression ofViolations of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 278 INT'L REV. of the RED CROSS 
409 (1990). 
Podgers, J., War Crimes Court Under Fire, 1998 ABA Joumal68 (Sept.1998). 
Pritchard, R.J., The Gift of Clemency Following British War Crimes Trials in the Far 
East, 1946-1947, 7 CRIM. L.F. 15 (1996). 
391 
'' 
•"'!, 
Quigley, J., "Perestroika and International Law", 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 788 (1988). 
Ramji, J., Reclaiming Cambodian History: The Case for a Truth Commission, 24 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 137 (2000). 
Randall, K., Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 
(1988). 
Ratner, S.R., The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1993). 
Ratner, S.R., The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years: Contemporary Strategies for 
Combating a Crime Against Humanity, 92 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 1 (1998). 
Ratner, S.R., The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 
948 (1999). 
Ray, A.E., The Shame oflt: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the 
Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries, 46 AM. U. L. 
REV. 793 (1997). 
Reif, L.C., Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 1 (2000). 
Roberge, M-C, The New International Criminal Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 325 
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 671 (Dec. 1998). 
Robinson, D. & von Hebel, H., War Crimes in Internal Conflicts: Article 8 of the ICC 
Statute, 2 Y.B. INT'L HUM. L., 193 (1999). 
Robinson, D., Developments in International Criminal Law: Defining "Crimes Against 
Humanity'' at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 43 (1999). 
Rodgers, J., War Crimes Court Under Fire, 1998 ABA JOURNAL 68 (Sept. 1998). 
Sadat, L.N. & Carden, S. R., The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy 
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381 (2000). 
Salzman, T. A., Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural and 
Ethical Responses to Rape Victim in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348 
(1998). 
Sapru, T., Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security 
Council Into the Rwandan Crisis, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 329 (1997). 
392 
'I 
'I 
~~ 
I 
Schabas, W.A., Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting 
Interpretations from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 6 ILSA J. INT'L. & 
COMP. L 375 (2000). 
Schabas, W.A., Problems of International Codification- Were the Atrocities in Cambodia 
and Kosovo Genocide?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 287 (2001). 
Scharf, M.P., Rome Diplomatic Conference for an International Criminal Court, AS IT.., 
Insights (June 1998). 
Scharf, M.P., The United States and the International Criminal Court: The ICC's 
Jurisdiction Over the Nationals ofNon-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 67 (2001). 
Scharf, M.P., Application ofTreaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals ofNon-
Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L.R. 363 (2001). 
Scharf, M.P., Comment: The Politics ofEstablishing an International Criminal Court, 6 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 167 (1995). 
Scharf, M.P., Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International 
Crimes in Haiti? 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (1996). 
Scharf, M.P., The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals ofNon-Party States: A Critique 
ofthe U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (2001). 
Scheffer, D.J., Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J. 47 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002). 
Scheffer, D., The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L 
12 (1999). 
Scheffer, D., U.N. International Criminal Court, Statement Before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate (July 23, 1998) 1998 WL 12762512. 
Schwarzenberger, G., The Judgment ofNuremberg, 21 TUL. L. REV. 329 (1947). 
Schwelb, E., Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1946). 
Seguin, J., Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination ofU.S. 
Objections to the Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 85 (2000). 
Shabas, W.A., Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-genocide Rwanda: Searching 
for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523 (1996). 
Simon, T.W., Defining Genocide, 15 WIS. INT'L L.J. 243 (1996). 
393 
Simonds, S.N., Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for 
International Legal Reform, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 165 (1992). 
Stanley, J., Focus: International Criminal Court: A Court that Knows No Boundaries?: 
The International Criminal Court Treaty is a Big Achievement but Can it Deliver what it 
Promises?, The Lawyer, Aug. 11, 1998, 1998 WL 9167987. 
Starkman, P., Genocide and International Law; Is there a Cause of Action?, 8 ASILS 
INT'L L.J. 1 (1984). 
Taulbee, James L., A Call to Arms Declined: The United States and the International 
Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 105, 129 (2000). 
Tejan-Cole, A, Note from the Field: The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship 
Between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, 6 YALE H.R. & DEY. L.J. 139 (2003). 
Tittemore, B.D., Khmer Rouge Crimes: The Elusive Search for Justice, 7 HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF 3 (Fal11999). 
Titunov, O.I., The International Legal Personality of States: Problems and Solutions, 37 
ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 323 (1993). 
Topper, C., And Justice for All? An Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 8 N.Y. 
INT'L L. REV. 48 (1995). 
Vyver, J.D. van der, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 20 (2000). 
Vyver, J.D. van der, Prosecution and Punishment ofthe Crime of Genocide, 23 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 286 (1999). 
Schaack, V.A., The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999). 
Schaack, V.A., The Crime ofPolitical Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's 
Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259 (1997). 
Verdirame, G., The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 
49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 578 (2000). 
von Sternberg, Mark R., A Comparison of the Yugoslav and Rwandan War Crimes 
Tribunals: Universal Jurisdiction and the "Elementary Dictates of Humanity," 22 
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 111 (1996). 
394 
Wald, P.M., The International Criminal Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia Comes of 
Age: Some Observations on Day-To-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL'Y 87 (2001). 
Wang, M.M., The International Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities for Clarification, 
Opportunities for Impact, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 177 (1995). 
Washburn, J., The International Criminal Court Arrivers- The U.S. Position: Status and 
Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 873 (2002). 
Webb, J ., Genocide Treaty: Ethnic Cleansing, Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the 
Application of the genocide Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Fonner Yugoslavia, 23 
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 377 (1993). 
Wedgewood, R., War Crimes: Bosnia and Beyond, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 267 (1994). 
Wedgwood, Ruth, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J. 
INT'L L. 93 (1999). 
Wedgwood, R., Jacobson, H.K., & Leigh, M., The United States and the Statute ofRome, 
95 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (2001). 
Wexler, L.S., The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of 
Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
289 (1994). 
Wexler, L.S., The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665 (1995). 
Wirth, S., Immunities, Related Problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute, 12 CRIM. 
L.F. 429 (2001). 
Wright, L., War Crimes Under International Law, 62 LAW Q. REV. 40 (1946). 
Wright, Q., The Jural Personality of the United Nations, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 509 (1949). 
Wright, Q., The Legality ofthe Kaiser, 13 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 121 (1919). 
CASES 
Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 (Feb 5, 1970) (Second 
Phase) 
395 
International Military Tribunal Judgment and Sentence, October 1, 1946, 41 Am. J. Int'l 
L. 172, 252 (1947) 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 
1986 ICJ REP. 14 (Judgment of June 27). 
Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala),1955 I.C.J. REP. 4, 23 (6 April1955) 
(Second Phase) 
Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Sept. 30, 1946, 
22 T.M.W.C. 411. 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-1, Amended Indictment (June 1997), 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T 710 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, 
Trial Chamber I, September 2, 1998), 
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T (ICTR Appeal Chamber Jul. 3, 
2002), available at www.ictr.org 
Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21, paras. 183-84 
(16 November 1998) 
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo, Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-
96-21-T, pp 230-34 (16 November 1998). 
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-T {Trial Chamber, November 29, 
1996). 
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, Case No. IT -96-22-This 
(Int'l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, March 5, 1998) 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT -95-17/1 (December 10, 
1998) 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeal, Case No. IT-95-10-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, 
Appeals Chamber, July 5, 2001) 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, (ICTY Appeal Chamber Jul. 5, 2001), available 
at www.un.org/icty 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-10-T P 102 (Int'l Crim. Trib. 
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Dec. 14, 1999), 
Prosecutor v. Karazic and Mladic, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, Case No. 
IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61 94 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber 1, July 
11, 1996) 
396 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, (May 21, 1999) 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (Int'l Crim. 
Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber II, May 21, 1999) available at: 
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/KayRuz/judgement/index.htm 
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33 (ICTY Trial Chamber Aug. 2, 2001) available at 
www.un.org/icty 
Prosecutorv. Krstic, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33-T, (lnt'l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial 
Chamber, Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialClljudgement/krs-
tj010802e.pdf 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT -96-23/1-A, Judgment, at para. 93 (June 12, 2002) 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-
96-23, para. 56 (June 12, 2002) 
Prosecutor v. Mile Msksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, (Case No. IT -95-
13-R 61) Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules and Procedure and 
Evidence, April 3, 1996. 
Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Trial Chamber II Judgment, Case No. IT-97-25, (March 
15, 2002). 
Prosecutor v. Miroslav K vocka, Milojica Kos, Mlado Radic, Zoran Zigic, Dragoljub 
Prcac, Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-98-30/1 (November 2, 2001). 
Prosecutorv. Musema, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T (lnt'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, 
Trial Chamber, Jan. 27, 2000) at 
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot!ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgement/index.htm; 
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, (ICTR Trial Chamber Dec. 6, 1999), 
available at www .ictr.org; 
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-8-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial 
Chamber, Sept. 3, 2001 ), http:/ /www.un.org/icty/sikirica/judgement/O 1 0903r98bis-e.pdf 
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, April21 and July 28, 2004; 
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, May 24, 1999, available at: 
http://www. un.org/icty/cases-e/index -e.htm. 
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, et al., Case No. IT -99-37, May 24, 1999, available at: 
http://www. un.org/icty/cases-e/index -e.htm. 
397 
Prosecutor v. Tadic (Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-94-1-T, July 14, 1997. 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, Decision on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, (Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35 
ILM 32 (1996), available at: <www.un.org/icty>) 
Prosecutorv. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, para 305 (Appeals Chamber, July 
15, 1999). 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, (Trial Chamber II, May 
7, 1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997) 
Prosecutorv. Tadic, Form ofthe Indictment, No. IT-94-1-T (Nov. 14, 1995). 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the 
Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute, Case IT -94-1-T (May 7, 1997), 36 I.L.M. at 970, 
979, para. 34.] 
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 174 (1949) 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ Rep., 15,23 (May 28, 1951). 
S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18. 
U.S. Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in the Altstotter case, 6 LAW REPORTS OF 
TRIALS OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 1, 79-80 (UN War Crimes Commission, 
1948). 
STATES CASES 
Attorney-General oflsrael v. AdolfEichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 26 (Israel S.Ct. 1962); 
Barbie, French Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), June 3, 1988, reprinted in 100 
I.L.R 331, 336 (1995) 
Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), 27 Nov. 1992, 100 ILR 338 at 351). Barbie, 
Cass. Crim., Dec. 20, 1985, 1985 Bull. Crim., No. 407, at 1053 
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571, 582-583 (6th Cir. 1985). 
Public Prosecutor v. Menten, The Netherlands, District Court of Amsterdam, 
Extraordinary Penal Chamber, 75 I.L.R. 361-63 (1981). 
398 
Regina v. Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 820 (Can. 1994). 
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) 
Touvier French Court of Appeal of Paris (First Chamber of Accusation), April13, 1992, 
reprinted in 100 I.L.R. 338, 350-51 (1995) 
Touvier, Cass. Crim., Nov. 27, 1992, 1992 Bull. Crim., No. 394, at 1085. 
U.S. v. Altstoetter, Case No.3, reprinted in 3 NMT 974 (1949) [hereinafter The Justice 
Case]. 
U.S. v. Flick, Case No.5, reprinted in 6 NMT 3, 1212-13 (1949) [hereinafter The Flick 
Case]. 
U.S. v. Ohlendorf, Case No. 9, reprinted in 4 Trials of War Criminals Before the 
Nurenberg Military Tribunals Under Council Law No. 10 (1946-48) 3, 499 (1949) 
[hereinafter Einsatzgruppen Case]. 
U.S. v. von Weizsaecker, Case No. 11, reprinted in 14 NMT 1, 316 (1949) [hereinafter 
The Ministries Case]. 
Wittmann v. Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria and Others, 1998 (4) SA 423 (T), at 449 
(South Africa 1998). 
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS 
TREATIES/ AGREEMENTS/REGULATIONS 
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add Sess. 1, pt. 2, 55th 
Plen. Mtg. at 188 (1946). 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1981) 
(entered into force on October 21, 1986). 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the Secretary-General's 
Sierra Leone Report, available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 257 (1945). 
399 
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court (APIC), Article 2, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2001/1/Add.3 (January 2002). 
Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, 
Crimes Against Peace and against Humanity, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the 
Control Council for Germany, No.3, Berlin, January 31, 1946, reprinted in Benjamin B. 
Ferencz, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD 
PEACE 488 (1980) [hereinafter CCL No. 10]. 
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, approved Apr. 26, 1946, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 11, 4 Bevans 27 
Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, arts. 51, 59, Stat. 1031, 1044, 3 Bevans 
1153, 1165. 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 1988 U.S.T. LEXIS 202 
Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247. 
Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land (Hague IV), October 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277; 1 Bevans 631. 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
done Sept. 23, 1971, 178 U.N.T.S. 1975. 
Convention for the Suppression ofUnlawful Seizure of Aircraft done Dec. 16, 1970, 106 
U.N.T.S. 1973. 
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done 
Sept. 14, 1963, 220 U.N.T.S. 1969. 
Convention on the Physical Protection ofNuclear Material done Oct. 26, 1979, 1979 
U.S.T. LEXIS 187. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 168 U.N.T.S. 
1977 .. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime of Genocide ofDecember 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force on January 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide 
Convention]. 
400 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res. 44/25, (1989). 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Annex to U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/49/59 (1994), reprinted in 341.L.M. 482, (1995) (entered into force January 
15, 1999). 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 
1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243. 
Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the 
Period ofDemocratic Kampuchea, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 57th Sess., Annex, Agenda 
Item 109(b) U.N. Doc. N57/806 (2003). 
Draft Basic Principles Governing a Headquarters Agreement to be Negotiated Between 
the Court and the Host Country, Principle 1G), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/1/Add.1 
Elements of Crimes, adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at its first session in New 
York 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/113 at www.un.org/law/icc/asp/lstsession/ 
report/english/part ii b e.pdf(visited October 7, 2005). 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
Final Act of the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia, art. 15, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 
Annex, U.N. Doc. N46/608 & S/23177 (1991), reprinted in 311.L.M. 180, 186 (1992). 
Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
NCONF.183/10, Annex II, III (1998). 
Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Preamble, 
Annex to the Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907. 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 303 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners of War, July 29, 1929, 118 
L.N.T.S. 343. 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
401 
'JI 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members ofthe Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217. 75 
U.N.T.S. 85. 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, §. 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land of 1899, 
ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, First 
Session, New York, 3-10 Sept. 2002), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add. 1, ICC-ASP/1/3, 
Rules 53 & 54, available at:, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rules of Proc and Evid 070704-EN.pdf 
ICTY Rule ofProcedure and Evidence 47, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994)). 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("IACHR"), at http://www.oas.org/. 
Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance ofPersons, June 9, 1994, OEA 
Doc. AGIRES. 1256 (XXIV-0/94), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1529 (1994). 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("IACtHR"), at http://www.oas.org/. 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949 (1973). 
International Convention Against the Taking ofHostages, done Dec. 17, 1979, 206 
U.N.T.S. 1983; 1979 U.S.T. 186. 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14(2), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 176 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 (1966). 
402 
I, 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, G.A. Res. 2200A {XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (1966), reprinted in 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (1966) 
Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-OTP, September 
2003. 
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), November 30, 1996 (Abidjan Accord), available 
at: http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html. 
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999 [Accord] 
Press Release, Agreement Between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations, October 4, 2004, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/47.html 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection ofVictims oflntemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 16 ILM 1391 (1977) 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection ofVictims ofNon-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 16 ILM 1442 
(1977) 
Protocol for the Prohibition ofthe Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and ofBacteriological Methods ofWarfare, June 17, 1925,3 Martens Nouveau 
Recueil (3d) 461. 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc. 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPRIPROT (III). available at: http://www.africa-
union.org/organs/orgCourt of Justice.htm 
Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over 
Serious Criminal Offences, UNTAET, 1.1, 1.3, 2.3, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 
(2000). 
Regulation No. 2000/16 on the Organization of the Public Prosecution Service in East 
Timor, UNTAET, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/16 (June 6, 2000). 
Regulation No. 2001/24 on the Establishment of a Legal Aid Service in East Timor, 
UNTAET, 1-3, 6, U.N.Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/24 (2001) 
Regulations ofthe Court, Reg. 48, Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 26, 2004) 
403 
I•' 
Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Criminal 
Court, Oct. 4, 2004, UN Doc. A/58/874, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/200111/Add.l, UN Doc. 
A/58/874, annex (2004) 
Report ofthe International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/1316 
(1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 364, 374-78, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/ Add.l 
Report ofthe Prepatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Vol. I, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, paras. 212-93, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 
(1996)) [hereinafter Preparatory Committee Report]. 
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 
1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998). 
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at its 
first session in New York 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 at www.icc-
cpi.int/librarvlabout/officialjournal/ Rules of Proc and Evid 070704-EN.pdf. 
Rules ofProcedure of the Assembly of States Parties, chapter iv, ICC-Asp/1/3 (2002), 
adopted by the S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993). 
Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 3, 4 Bevans 20 
Statute ofthe International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, J 
Bevans 1179, 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, 
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted in 
33 ILM 1602 (1994). 
Statute ofthe International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, annexed to S.C. 
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,1993), 
reprinted in 32 ILM 1192 (1993) 
The Peace Treaty of Westphalia is a peace settlement enacted in 1648 in Leo Gross, The 
Peace ofWestphalia, 1648-1948, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 25 (Leo Grossed., 1969). 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, section 2(1) (2000), (Sierra Leone) 
[hereinafter TRC Act], at: http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html (last visited 
March 24, 2005). 
404 
The Special Court Agreement 2002 (RATIFICATION) ACT, (2002) (Sierra Leone) 
available at: www .specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtAct.html 
The Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, as amended [hereinafter Sierra 
Leone Special Court Statute], annexed to the Secretary-General's Sierra Leone Report, 
available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf, also available at: 
http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html. 
Treaty ofPeace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, (Versailles 
Treaty), June 23, 1919,2 BEVANS 43, 13 AM. J.I.L. (Supp) 151 (1919). 
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 109(b) U.N. Doc. A/57/806 
(2003) [Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement]. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 
(1969},1155 U.N.T.S 340 (1969). 
STATE LAWS 
Restatement (Third) ofForeign Relations ofthe United States,§ 402 cmt. (American 
Law Institute, 1987). 
ALI, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Third), s. 101 
(1987). 
Restatement (Third) ofForeign Relations Law Ill cmt. h (2002). 
Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1093(8)(2001). 
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES Introductory Note at 16 (Tent. Draft No.1, 1980) 
Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1093(7) (1988) (emphasis added). 
RESOLUTIONS/DECLARATIONS 
ACP-EU Joint Assembly, Resolution ACP-EU 1866/96/fin. on the establishment of the 
Permanent International Criminal Court, adopted on 26 September 1996, para. 1. 
by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. 
Declaration of German Atrocities, Nov. 1, 1943, 3 BEVANS 816, 834; 9 DEP'T ST. 
BULL. 308 (1943}, 
405 
~ I 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and ofDiscrimination Based 
on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55,36 U.N. GAOR, 73d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 51, at 
171, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981) 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, GA Res. 
47/133, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1992) 
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, ofExp1osive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, Adam 
Roberts & Richard Guelff eds, 30-31 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2d ed., 1989) 
E.S.C. Res. 1985/17, U.N. ESCOR, para. B, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85 (1985). 
European Pari., Resolution on the establishment of the Permanent International Criminal 
Court, B4- 0992/96, 9 September 1996. 
G.A. Res. 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 70th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 112(b), P 16, 
U.N. Doc. AIRES/52/135 (1998). 
G.A. Res. 3314,29 U.N. GAOR., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) 
G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 174 (1948). 
G.A. Res. 48/31 ofDecember 9, 1993. 
G.A. Res. 51/207, December 17, 1996. 
G.A. Res. 51/207, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/51/207 (1997) 
G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) 
G.A. Res. 177 (II), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123rd plen. mtg., at 111, U.N. Doc A/519 
(1947). 
G.A. Res. 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/52/644/Add.2 (1997). 
G.A. Res. 96 (1), U.N. GAOR 1st Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1947) 
GA Res. 44/39 of 4 December 1989 
GA Res. 45/41 of28 November 1990. 
GA Res. 49/53 of9 December 1994. 
GA Res. 50/46 of 11 December 1995. 
406 
General Assembly Resolution 57/289 (2003) para. 15 (a), 
S.C Res. 1503, U.N. SCOR, 4817th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503, para. 8 (Aug. 28, 
2003). 
S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997). 
S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1165 (1998). 
S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. SCOR, 4054tb mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (1999). 
S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000). 
S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 3106th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992). 
S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992), 
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993). 
S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (1993). 
S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 336th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/912 (1994) 
S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994). 
S.C. Res.1593, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593. 
S.C.Res.l422, S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 4572nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002). 
S.C. Res.l487, S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. SCOR, 4772nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003). 
S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/713 (1991). 
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/743 (1992). 
S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (1999) 
S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999) 
REPORTS/ADDRESS 
407 
1
:[[11 
I 
I 
Address by Jose Ayala-Lasso, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to 
the Commencement Class of 1996 of the Columbia School of International and Public 
Affairs, 14 May 1996; 
Address to the United Nations Security Council by the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Ms. Carla Del Ponte, 27 
November 2001, http://www.ictr.org/ ENGLISH/speeches/delponte271101sc.htm. 
Doudou Thiam, Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (1986), reprinted in 2 Year 
Book oflnt'l L. Comm'n 53, 38th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1986/Add.1 (1986). 
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security ofMankind, in Report of the Int'l 
Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. 
No. 10, at 265, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (July 19, 1991) 
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work oflts Forty-Eighth Session May 6 -July 26, 
1996, p 88, U.N. GAOR. 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. GA/51/10 (1996), 
Final Report of the Commission ofExperts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. A/1994/674 at P 94 (1994). 
Final Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda established pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 955 (1994), Dec. 9, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994). 
Final Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405. 
Final Report ofthe Commission of Experts for the former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. 
S/1994/674 (1994). 
Final Report of the Commission of Experts, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 5, 1994). 
Final Report on ten-year Sierra Leone conflict published; seeks to set out historical 
record, offer guidance for future, Press Release ECOSOC/6140 GA/10287 SC/8227, 
Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes adopted by Preparatory Commission 
for the International Criminal Court, at its 23rd meeting on 30 June 2000 UN Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/ Add.2, p. 9-17. 
Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 20, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993). 
International Commission of Jurists, The International Criminal Court: Third ICJ Position 
Paper (August 1995); 
408 
International Law Commission Report on the Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, U.N. 
GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12 at 11, U.N. Doc. N1316 (1950), 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, P 157, U.N. Doc. N51/22 (1996). 
Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction 27 July-20 August 
1953, 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 12), UN Doc. N2645 (1954). 
Report ofthe 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 July 27- August 
20, 1953, UN Doc. N2645 (1954). 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, UN ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No.6, U.N. 
Doc. E/794/Corr.1 (1948). 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, 49 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 22), UN Doc. N50/22 (1995). 
Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction on its session held from 1 
to 31 August 1951,7 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 11) at 21, UN Doc. N2136 (1952). 
Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly 
Resolution 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess, U.N. Doc. N53/850, S/1999/231 (1999). 
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. N51/36, 18 October 
1996. 
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General (Jan. 25, 2005). 
Report of the International Commission on Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of September 18, 2004, 
608 (Jan. 25, 2005). 
Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Second Session 5 June-29 July 
1950, 5 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at para. 140, UN Doc. N1316. 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, 
Draft Article 9(7), U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. N49/10 (1994) 
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session U.N. 
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, ch. 2, art. 18, at paras. 3 & 4, U.N. Doc. N51110 
(1996). 
409 
I 
',1 
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Code of 
Offences Against the Peace and Security ofMankind, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 
9, U.N. Doc. Nl858 (1951). 
Report ofthe Inter-Sessional Meeting From 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutfen, The 
Netherlands, NAC.249/1998/L.13, art. 11, p. 42 n. 53 (1998). 
Report ofthe Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 16, U.N. Doc. N51122 (1996)). 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Draft Statute & Draft Final Act, NConf.183/2/Add.1 (1998). 
Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 8, 2003). 
Report of the Prosecutor ofthe International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSR 1593 (2005}, June 29,2005, available at 
http:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease details&id= 1 08&l=en.html 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) [hereinafter Report of the 
Secretary-General on Sierra Leone Special Court], available at: 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration In 
East Timor, U.N. S.C., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/53 (2000). 
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, at para. 
10., Gen. Ass. 54 Sess. November 15, 1999, U.N. Doc. N54/549, at 
www. un.org/peace/srebrenica/pdf. 
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). 
Report ofthe Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 
955 (1994), P 9, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (1995). 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN 
Doc. N511457 (1996). 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, 
Dato'Param Cumaraswamy, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/37 (1996). 
Report ofthe UN Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000). 
410 
Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, UN Doc. 
S/2002/678 (2002). 
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Segui, 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of 
Commission Resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May 1994, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. 
Rts., 51st Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12, P 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995171 (1995). 
Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno 
Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSR 1593 (2005), December 13,2005, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/current situations/Darfur Sudan.html 
Whitaker Report, Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the Sub-
Commission Has Been Concerned: Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 16, 29-30, Jul. 2, 1985, 38 UN 
ESCOR, Human Rights Sub-Comm'n on the Prevent. ofDiscrim. and Protect. of 
Minorities, 38th Sess. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (1985) [hereinafter Whitaker 
Report] 
PRESS RELEASE 
Decision of the Presidency Assigning the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
to Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 July 2004, ICC-01/04, and the Decision of the Presidency 
assigning the situation in Uganda to Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 July 2004, ICC-02/04. 
ICC Press Release, Decision Constituting Pre-Trial Chambers, June 23, 2004, ICC-Pres-
0 1/04, available at http://www. icc-cpi.int/organs/presidency/decisions.html 
ICC Press Release, President ofUganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, The Hague, January 29, 2004, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease details&id=16&l=en.html (visited February 26, 
2006); 
ICC Press Release, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens an Investigation 
into Northern Uganda, July 29,2004, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease details&id=33&l=en.html (visited February 26, 2006). 
ICC Press Release, Prosecutor Receives Referral Concerning Central African Republic, 
January 7, 2005,.available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease details&id=87&l=en.html (visited February 26, 2006). 
411 
ICC Press Release, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, April19, 2004, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease details&id= 19&l=en.html 
ICC Press Release, Registrar Confirms that the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire Has Accepted 
the Jurisdiction of the Court, February 15, 2005, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/93.html 
ICC Press Release, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
Opens its First Investigation, June 23, 2004, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease details&id=26&l=en.html (visited February 26, 2006). 
Nigeria: Surrender Charles Taylor to Special Court for Sierra Leone, Amnesty 
International Press Release 8/11/2005 available at: 
http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGAFR440182005 (visited September 8, 2005). 
Press Release, 1st Preparatory Committee on Establishment of International Criminal 
Court, Preparatory Committee For Establishment of International Criminal Court 
Discusses Definitions of"Genocide," "Crimes Against Humanity'' (Mar. 25, 1996), at 
http://www .iccnow .org/romearchive/documentsreportsprepcmt l.html 
Press Release, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Chief Prosecutor, Security Council refers 
Situation in Darfur to ICC Prosecutor (April I, 2005), available at: http://www.icc-cpi-
int/pressrelease details&id=98.html (visited February 28, 2006). 
Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Approves Draft Agreement Between 
UN, Cambodia on Khmer Rouge Trials, U.N. GAOR 57th. Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. 
Doc. GA/10135 (May 13, 2003) 
Situation in the Central African Republic, Decision Assigning the Situation in the Central 
African Republic to Pre-Trial Chamber ill, No. ICC-01/05-1 (Jan. 19, 2005). 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision Assigning the Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I, No. ICC-01/04-1 (July 5, 2004). 
Situation in Uganda, Decision Assigning the Situation in Uganda to Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, No. ICC-02/04-1 (July 5, 2004). 
Situation in Uganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Warrant of Arrests, No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53-
57, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/current situations/Uganda.html 
U.N. Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of 
International Criminal Court, March 31, 2005, SC/8351, S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. SCOR, 
60th Sess., 51 58th mtg., U.N. SC Res. 1593, 1 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc835l.doc.htm (hereinafter "SC Resolution 
1593"). 
412 
ICC Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur to ICC Prosecutor (Apr. 
1, 2005). 
Situation in the Darfur, Decision Assigning the Situation in Darfur to Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, No. ICC-02/05-1 (April21, 2005). 
ICC Press Release, The Prosecutor ofthe ICC opens investigation in Darfur, June 6, 
2005, available at http://www .icc-cpi.int/pressrelease details&id= 107 &l=en.html. 
UN Press Release SC/8351, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to 
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, at 6-7 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc835l.doc.htm>. 
Press Release, 1st Preparatory Committee on Establishment of International Criminal 
Court, Preparatory Committee on Establishment of International Criminal Court Begins 
First Session (Mar. 25, 1996) U.N. Press Release L/27614 (1996), at 
http://www .iccnow .orglromearchi ve/documentsreportsprepcmt l.html [hereinafter 
Preparatory Committee First Session]. 
Preparatory Committee on Establishment of International Criminal Court Begins First 
Session, Mar. 25, 1996, U.N. Press Release L/27614 (1996). 
ICTY Press Release JJJ/PIS/709-e, 3-4 (Oct. 30, 2002) 
ICTY Press Release JDH/PIS/708-e 1, 2 (Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Jorda, Oct. 2002 
Speech]. 
ICTY Press Release CC/PIS/735-e (Feb. 27, 2003). 
UN Doc. S/PV.4838, at 3-7, 9-13 (2003) [hereinafter Meron Speech and Del Ponte], 
ICTY Press Release JL/P.I.S./788-e (Oct. 9, 2003) 
ICTY Press Release FH/PIS/791-e (Oct. 10, 2003). ICTYpress releases are available at 
the ICTY Website, <http://www.un.org/icty>. 
ICTY Press Release JDH/PIS/690-e, at 1 (July 23, 2002). 
Press Release, African Union, The Protocol on the African Court on Human Rights and 
Peoples' Rights to Come Into Force Soon (Dec. 30, 2003), at http://www.pict-
pcti.org/pd£' APHRC%20coming%20into%20force.pdf (last visited March 10, 2006). 
Press Release, Milan Babic Found Dead in Detention Unit, The Hague, 
AM/MOW/1046e, March 6, 2006, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/p1046-e.htm (visited March 12, 2006). 
413 
1 .! 
Press Release, Slobodan Milosevic Found Dead in His Cell at the Detention Unit The 
Hague, CC/MOW/1050ef, March 11,2006, available at: 
http://www. un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/p 1 050-e.htm 
Press Release, Amnesty International, Rwanda: Amnesty International Welcomes 
Historic Rulings of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Sept. 4, 1998, available at: 
www.amnestyusa.org/news/1998/14703098.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004) 
Fourth ICTR Courtroom Inaugurated, available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHIPRESSREL/2005/421.htm, (visited March 11, 2005). 
ICTR Completion Strategy dated 19 November, 2004, available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/completionstrat/191104.pdf, (visited March 11, 2005). 
ICTR Completion Strategy dated 19 November, 2004, available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/completionstrat/191104.pdf, (visited March 11, 2005). 
Press Release, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Court of Appeal Decision Raises 
National and International Concern (July 17, 2003), at 
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/News/17nb-7 03nb.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2004) · 
Press Release, Election of the Prosecutor- Statement by the President of the Assembly of 
States Parties Prince Zeid Raad AI Hussein (Mar. 25, 2003), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/news/details.php?id=2. 
International Criminal Court: Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief 
Prosecutor (June 16, 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp ceremony.html 
(visited October 7, 2005). 
ICC Press Release, Election of the Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
(Sept. 10, 2003), at http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/aspfra.htm 
ICC Press Release, States Parties to International Criminal Court elect Ms. Fatou 
Bensouda of the Gambia Deputy Prosecutor (Prosecutions) [Sept. 10, 2003], at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/statesparties/third session.html (visited October 7, 2005). 
ICC Press Release, Solemn Undertaking ofDeputy Prosecutor (Prosecutions) (Nov. 1, 
2004), at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease details&id=83.html. 
Press Release, interim Headquarters Agreement Exchange of Notes between the 
Netherlands and the ICC, The Hague, November 19,2002, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/4.html (visited October 4, 2005). 
Amnesty International, Security Council Inaction on Justice for Timor-Leste Leaves 
Fight Against Impunity in Limbo, August 19,2005, available at: 
414 
http://www. globalpolicy.org/intlj ustice/tribunals/timor/2005/0819 Altimor.htm 
[hereinafter Fight Against Impunity in Limbo]. 
East Timor National Alliance for International Tribunal Dili, Timor Leste, Press Release, 
August 7, 2005, and Victims and Militia Demand Justice but Not Commission of Truth 
and Friendship at http://www.etan.org/news/2005/08all.htm; 
International Federation for East Timor urges UN Security Council to create International 
Tribunal for East Timor, Media Release, 05/20/2003, at 
http://home.snafu.de/watchin/IFET Release4.htm; 
Amnesty International, Indonesia/Timor-Leste: International Responsibility For Justice, 
Press Release, 14 April2003, AI Index: ASA 21/013/2003, at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA21 0 132003?open&of=ENG-IDN 
OTHER SOURCES 
NEWSPAPERS ARTICLES 
''Khmer Rouge Trial Stalled Over Language", Reuters, Phnom Penh, 26 November 
2001(on file with the author). 
"Sierra Leone: UN Government Sign Historic Accord to Set up Special War Crimes 
Court", UN NewsCenter, 16 January 2002, available at: 
http://www.un.org./apps/news/story.asp?NewsiD2639&CrSierra&Crlcourt (last visited 
March 16, 2005). 
Agence France Presse, Sudan Hands UN Darfur Suspects List, February 26, 2006, 
available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id article=14276 (visited 
February 28, 2006). 
Agence France Presse, Sudan Hands UN Darfur Suspects List, February 26, 2006, 
available at: 
Agence France Presse, Sudan Hands UN Darfur Suspects List, February 26, 2006, 
available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id article=l4276 (visited 
February 28, 2006). 
Alan Sipress, For Torture Camp Survivor, Time is Scarce: Chance to Bear Witness 
Against Khmer Rouge Hinges on Stalled Tribunal, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 2003, at A20 
Amnesty Int'l, Kingdom of Cambodia: Amnesty International's Position and Concerns 
Regarding the Proposed "Khmer Rouge" Tribunal, AI Index: ASA 23/005/2003, 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/lndex/ENGASA23 0052003; 
415 
Barbara Crossette, World Criminal Court Having a Painful Birth, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 
1997, at A10 
BBC News, Taylor meets Obasanjo in Nigeria, February 27,2006, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4754982.stm (visited February 28, 2006); 
BBC NEWS, Taylor off Agenda at Ahuja Talks, March 4, 2006, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hilafrica/4775012.stm 
Chris Seper, Cambodia Captures Last Khmer Rouge Leader: Government Vows to Put 
Ta Mok on Trial, Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 1999, at A22. 
Christopher S. Wren, U.N. Says Leone Rebels Now Hold 92 Peacekeepers, N.Y. Times, 
May 5, 2000, at Croatia Defies Tribunal, Independent (London), Feb. 20, 1997, available 
in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File 
Christopher Marquis, U.S. Seeking Pacts in a Bid to Shield its Peacekeepers, New York 
Times, August 6, 2002 . 
CNN World Edition, Senate Urges Bush to Take Action on Darfur, Friday, March 3, 
2006, available at: 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/03/03/sudan.congress.reut/index.html 
Colum Lynch, "UN Warns Cambodia on War Crimes Tribunal", The Washington Post, 3 
February 2001, p. A22; 
Corinne Dutka, Irish Leader Expresses Concern at Rwanda Justice, Reuters, Mar. 3, 
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model 
for the Future?, 63 ASIA PACIFIC ISSUES, Aug. 2002, at 3-4, available at 
http://www .eastwestcenter.org/storedlpdfs/api061.pdf 
David Rider, Canadian Judge Pans New International Court: Arbour Says Rules Shield 
World's Worst Criminals, The Ottawa Citizen, Jan. 21, 2002, at A7 
Despite UN Tribunal, Rwanda Plans to Try Suspects for War Crimes, Chicago Tribune, 
Nov. 10, 1994, at A6. 
Diane F. Orentlicher, Putting Limits on Lawlessness: From Nuremberg to Pinochet, 
Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1998, at Cl. 
416 
East Timor, Asia-Pacific Daily Rep. (Ctr. of Excellence in Disaster Mgmt. and 
Humanitarian Assistance, Tripier AMC, Hawaii), Sept. 30, 2003, at 2, at 
http://www. who.int/disasters/repo/1 0959 .pdf [hereinafter Asia-Pacific Rep.]. 
Edith M. Lederer, Bolton Launches Talks on Replacing Annan, AP News, February 17, 
2006, available at 
http://www.townhall.com/news/ap/online/headlines/D8FQOOF02.html (visited February 
18, 2006); 
Edward Rwema, Rwanda Launches New Phase of Genocide Trials at Traditional Courts, 
available at: http :1/www .rwanda.net/english/N ews/2005/032005/news031 02005c.htm, 
(visited March 11, 2005). 
From President to Prison, BBC News World Edition, Monday, 7 June, 2004, at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3728807.stm., (visited March 14, 2005). 
Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers' Immunity, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
10,2002, at Al. 
Govt Meets ICC Over Kony Arrest, The Monitor (Kampala), February 3, 2006, at: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/20060202078l.html (last visited February 9, 2006) · 
http:/lnews.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-02/19/content 4200443.htm (visited February 
28, 2006) 
IWPR, Fred Bridgland, Darfur Sanctions Deadlock as ICC Considers Prosecutions, 
February 28, 2006, available at: 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=259927&apc state=henh (visited February 28, 
2006) 
James Rupert and Douglas Farah, Liberian Leader Urges Sierra Leone Rebels to Free 
Hostages, Wash. Post, May 20,2000, at A20. 
James Seitua, Why Obasanjo Has Not Turned Taylor Over?, The Perspective, Atlanta, 
Georgia, May 31,2005, available at: 
http://www.theperspective.org/articles/0531200502.html (visited February 28, 2006); 
JeffSallot, Canadian First to Lead War-Crimes Court, Globe and Mail, March 12, 2003, 
at http://www .globalpolicy.orglintljustice/icc/2003/0312canuck.htm 
Jess Bravin, International Criminal Court Picks US Lawyer to Lead First Case, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 30,2004. 
Jim Leach, Don't Help Pol Pot. Try Him., N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1989, at A29. 
Judicial Tribunal Made up of Three Cambodians and Two Foreign Members, Portland 
Oregonian, Oct. 20, 1999, at A12 
417 
Judy Dempsey, Accords with US 'will violate' ICC treaty, Financial Times, 27 August 
2002. 
Julian Bedford, Judges to Set Rules for Rwanda Genocide Tribunal, Reuters, Jun. 26, 
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
Kenyan Appointed to Top Job on War Crimes Tribunal, Reuters, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, CURNWS File. 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal Approved, BBC News World Edition, Monday 4 October, 2004, 
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3712482.stm (last visited August 11, 
2005). 
Lippman, T.W., America Avoids the Stand: Why the U.S. Objects to a World Criminal 
Court, Wash. Post, July 26, 1998, at COl 
Nathaniel Myers, Khmer Rouge Tribunal Needs More Than Money, Bangkok Post, July 
19,2005. 
NATO: Statement by Justice Louise Arbour on Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, M2 Presswire, Dec. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, 
Currnws File. 
Norimitsu Onishi, Gunmen Fire on Protesters in Sierra Leone, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2000, 
at A6. The Sierra Leone Web cited Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) 
Patrick Goodenough, Security Council Discord Expected Over Annan's Successor, 
Cybercast News Services, February 13, 2006, available at: 
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/viewstory.asp?Page=\ForeignBureaus\archive\200602\FO 
R20060213b.html (visited February 18, 2006). 
Paul Lewis, UN Votes 13-0 for Embargo on Trade with Yugoslavia; Air Travel and Oil 
Curbed, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1992, at 1. 
Philippe Naughton, Rwandan Minister Defends ''No" Vote on Tribunal, Reuters World 
Service, Nov. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
Raymond Bonner, Rwandan Leader, Calling U.S. Envoy "A Disaster,' Hopes for a 
Replacement, Int'l Herald Trib., Nov. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
PAPERS File 
Raymond Bonner, Rwandans Divided on War-Crimes Plan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1994, at 
AlO 
418 
I : 
,·I 
Raymond Bonner, Shattered Nation: A Special Report; Rwanda Now Faces Painful 
Ordeal ofRebirth, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29 1994, at Al. 
Richard D. Lyons, U.N. Approves Tribunal on Rwandan Atrocities, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 
1994, at A12 
Roger Cohen, For Cambodia's Dead, Farce Heaped on Insult, International Herald 
Tribune, April 2, 2005, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/cambodia/2005/0402farce.htm.; 
Roger Thurow, Tito's Legacy: Political Drifting, An Economy in Chaos Prevail in 
Yugoslavia; Question is 
Rory Carroll, Genocide Tribunal 'Ignoring Tutsi Crimes', The Guardian, January 13, 
2005, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/rwandalstory/0,14451,1389194,00.html, 
(last visited March 15, 2005). 
Roy Gutman, Prisoners of Serbia's War: Tales of Hunger, Torture at Camp in North 
Bosnia, Newsday (N.Y.), July 19, 1992, at 7. 
Rwandan President Claims Landslide, BBC News World Edition, 26 August, 2003, 
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3178611.stm., (visited March 14, 2005). 
Saddam Walks Out in Trial Uproar, BBC News, January 29,2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilmiddle east/4659274.stm 
See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers' Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 10, 2002, at A 1. 
See Human Rights Watch, The ICC Jurisdictional Regime; Addressing U.S. Arguments, 
available at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-regime.htm (last modified 
Apr. 4, 2002). 
See Jon Silverman, Worst Outcome for Milosevic Tribunal, 11 March 2006, BBC News, 
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4797696.stm (visited March 12, 2006) 
Seth Mydans, Cambodia Purge Said to Claim 40 Victims, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1997, at 
A8. 
Seth Mydans, East Timor Atrocities will go Unpunished, International Herald Tribune 
WEDNESDAY, MAY 11,2005, at 
http://www .iht.com/articles/2005/05/ 1 0/news/timor.php; 
Steve Coli, The Other War: The Gratuitous Cruelties Against Civilians in Sierra Leone 
Last Year Rivaled Those Committed in Kosovo at the Same Time, Washington Post 
419 
Magazine, January 9, 2000, at W8, available at 
http://www. washingtonpost.com/wpsrv /photo/ galleries/sierraleone; 
Steven Edwards, Del Ponte Says UN Caved to Rwandan Pressure National Post, 
September 17, 2003, at 
http :1/www .globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/rwanda/2003/0918ponte.htm 
Sudan Tribune, ICC Delegation to Visit Sudan's Darfur, February 27,2006, available at: 
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id article=14271 (visited February 28, 2006) 
Sudan Tribune, Only Sudanese Judiciary Can Try Darfur War Crimes -al-Bashir, 
February 19, 2006, available at: 
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id article=14151 (visited February 28, 2006). 
Truth and Friendship Commission: More Friendship, Less Truth, Impunity from the Law, 
JSMP Press Release, January 14,2005, at http://www.asia-pacific-
action.org/statements/jsmp truthandfriendshipcommission 140105 .htm 
UN Panel Opens Inquiry on Rwanda, N.Y. Times, Jun. 28, 1995, at AS. 
UN War Crimes Court Hands over 15 Cases to Rwanda, available at 
http://www.rwanda.net/english!News/2005/022005/news02232005d.htm, (visited March 
11, 2005). 
War Crimes Court Loses Steam, The Analyst (Monrovia) March 2, 2005, available at: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200503020699.html 
War Criminals to Become International Pariahs, Agence France Presse, May 26, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
Whether Nation Will Turn More to Soviets Out of Economic Need; Sharpening Ethnic 
Rivalries, Wall St. J., May 8, 1986, available in 1986 WL-WSJ 258991. 
Wim van Cappellen, Sudan: Judiciary Challenge ICC Over Darfur Cases, Integrated 
Regional Info. Networks, June 24, 2005 
Xanana and SBY Sign Truth Commission Agreement, Timor Post, Thursday March 10, 
2005, at http://www.unmiset.org/. 
Xinhua News Agency, "Sudan Vows Not to Extradite Suspects ofDarfur War Crimes, 
February 19, 2006, available at: 
INTERNERT SOURCES 
420 
Amnesty International, Burundi - Urge the President to Ratify the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, available at htto:/ /web.arnnesty.orglpages/icc-290 1 04-action-eng 
Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: The Need for the 
European Union to Take More Effective Steps to Prevent Members From Signing US 
Impunity Agreements, AI Index: lOR 40/030/2002, October 1, 2002, 
htto://web.arnnesty.org/librarvlindex/engior400302002?open&of=eng-385 (visited 
February 10, 2006); 
Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: The Unlawful Attempt by the 
Security Council to Give US Citizens Permanent Impunity From International Justice, AI 
Index, lOR 40/006/2003 (Legal analysis of S.C. Resolutions 1422 & 1487 by Amnesty 
International concluding that the resolution is contrary to the Rome Statute, and also to 
the United Nations Charter) available at: 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engl0R400082003?0pen&of=eng-393 (visited 
February 10, 2006). 
Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: US Efforts to Obtain 
Impunity for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, AI Index: lOR 
40/025/2002, September 2, 2002, available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engiOR400252002?0pen&of=eng-385 (visited 
February 10, 2006); 
Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CHECKLIST 
FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 3, AI Index: lOR 40/011/2000, August 1, 2000, 
available at: http:/ /web.amnesty.orgllibrary/index/engior400 112000?open&of=eng-3 85 
(visited February 20, 2006); 
Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: Fundamental 
Principles Concerning the Elements of Genocide, AI Index: lOR 40/00111999, February 
17, 1999 available at: 
htto://web.amnesty.org/librarvllndex/ENGIOR4000 11999?open&of=ENG-385 
Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: Making the 
Right Choices- Part I, 5 (Amnesty International Index: lOR 40/001/1997) at 
http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/ engior400011997, (visited September 28, 2005) 
Amnesty International, US Threats to the International Criminal Court, [hereinafter US 
Threats to the ICC] available at: http://web.amnesty.org/pages/icc-US threats-eng 
(visited February 10, 2006). 
Benjamin A. Ferencz, The Evolution of International Criminal Law, at 
http://www .benferencz.orglhamburg.htm 
Beth K. Lamont, The International Criminal Court, available at: www.corliss-
lamont.org/hsmnv!icc.htm 
421 
I i 
CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at 
http://www .cia. gov/cialpublications/factbook/ geos/rw .html 
Coalition for the ICC, Chronology of the Adoption and Withdrawal of Security Council 
Resolutions 1422/1487, 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/declarationsresolutions!UNl422 2004.html. 
Curriculum vitae Luis Moreno Ocampo, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ otp/moreno 
ocampo eve revised. pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). 
David J. Scheffer, Developments at Rome Treaty Conference, p. 3 (July 23, 1998) 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy remarks/1998/981021/scheffer icc.html 
Edoardo Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under 
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, No. 835, pp. 
531-553 (1999) available at: 
http://www .icrc.org!W eb/Eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpListl 06/911763EAA63170COC 1256B660 
05D85DO 
Election of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (last modified Apr. 21, 
2003), at http://www. un.orgllaw/icc/ elections/results/prosecutor<uscore>results.htm. 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court- Overview, available at: 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/generaVoverview.htm (visited on March 6, 2006) 
Human Rights Watch Press Release, "Core Issues in the Khmer Rouge Tribunal 
Unresolved", 21 January 2001, available at: http://www. 
hrw .org/press/2000/0 1 /cam boO 12l.htm, 
Human Rights Watch Report, Entrenching Impunity Government Responsibility for 
International Crimes in Darfur December 12,2005, Volume 17, No. 17A available at: 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/; (visited March 14, 2006) 
Human Rights Watch, Rwanda - Human Rights Developments 
Human Rights Watch, Serious Flaws: Why the U.N. General Assembly Should Require 
Changes to the Draft Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, Human Rights Watch Briefing 
Paper April 2003, http:/ lhrw .orglbackgrounder/asialcambodia040303-
bck.htm#P91 17633 
Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Getting Away With Murder, Mutilation, Rape-New 
testimony from Sierra Leone, in WORLD REPORT 1999 (July 1999), at 
http://www .hrw .orglhrw/reports/1999/sierra; 
Human Rights Watch, Text Analysis International Criminal Court Treaty, July 17, 1998 
available at http://www.hrw.org/press98/july/icc-anly.htm (last modified Apr. 4, 2002) 
422 I i
Human Rights Watch, The ICC Jurisdictional Regime; Addressing U.S. Arguments 1, 
available at: http://www .hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-regime.htm. 
Human Rights Watch, U.N.: Put Sudan's Top Leaders on Sanctions List: ICC Should 
Investigate Darfur Officials, available at: 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/09/sudan12186.htm (visited March 14, 2006) 
Human Rights Watch, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: JUSTICE FOR EAST TIMOR 5 
(August 2000), at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/timor/etimor-back0829.htm. 
Human Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal 
Court: Article 98 (2) Agreements, July 9, 2002, available at 
www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/icc article98.pdf(visited February 10, 2006) 
Human Rights Watch/Africa, GENOCIDE INRWANDAAPRIL-MAY 1994, vol. 6, no 
4, at 2 (May 1994), available at http://hrw.org/reports/world/rwanda-pubs.php 
Humanitarian Law, Geneva (Jan. 19-23, 1998), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList74/02CED570ABFDD384C1256B6600 
5C91C6. 
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights News, Progress on War Crimes Accountability, 
The Rule of Law, and Minority Rights in Serbia And Montenegro, HRW Statement to the 
U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation In Europe (June 4, 2003), at 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/ecalserbiatestimony060403.htm. 
Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm (visited March 3, 2005) 
Human Rights Watch, The Sierra Leone Amnesty Under International Law (August 3 
1999), available at: http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sierralint-law2.htm. 
Human Rights Watch, WORLD REPORT 1995,41 (1994). 
Human Rights Watch/Africa, Genocide in Rwanda April-May 1994, vol. 6, no 4, at 2 
(May 1994), available at http://hrw.org/reportslworld/rwanda-pubs.php. 
ICRC, Armed Conflicts Linked to the Disintegration of State Structures: Preparatory 
Document Drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross for the First 
Periodical Meeting on International Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE FAILURE OF STATES TO ENACT EFFECTNE 
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 29, AI Index: lOR 40/019/2004 1 September 2004, 
available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR400 192004 ?open&of=ENG-
385 (visited February 20, 2006) 
423 
ICTY at a Glance, Key Figures, available at: http://www.un.org/ictvlglance-e/index.htm. 
(visited March 10, 2006) 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Working Paper, June 29, 1999, 
available at http://www.igc.org/icc/html/icrc8 2e 19990629.html 
International Committee of the Red Cross at www.icrc.org. 
International Criminal Court - Office of the Prosecutor: General Organization, at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp.html (visited October 10, 2005). 
International Criminal Court: http://www.icc-cpi.int 
Judicial System Monitoring Programme, THE GENERAL PROSECUTOR v. JONI 
MARQUES AND 9 OTHERS (THE LOS PALOS CASE) 4 (Mar. 2002), available at: 
http:/ /www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources.htm . 
Media Alert, International Criminal Court, Election of the Prosecutor (Apr. 24, 2003), 
available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/php/news/details.php?id=3 (last visited Oct. 6, 2005). 
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, available at 
http:/ /untreatv. un.org/English/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapter XVIII/treaty1l.asp 
(visited March 13, 2006). 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee Against Torture: 
Overview and Procedure, at http://www.unhchr.ch/htmllmenu2/8/overcat.htm (last visited 
May 20, 2004). 
Prendergast, J. & Smock, D., POSTGENOCIDAL RECONSTRUCTION: BUILDING 
PEACE IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI (1999), available at 
http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990915/ sr990915.html 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Declarations and Reservations, 
available at 
http:/ /untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVIWtreaty 11.a 
sp#N7. 
Sierra Leone Special Court available at: http://www.sc-sl.org 
Sierra Leone Web News Archives, May 5, 2000, available at http://sierra-
leone.org/slnews0500.html. 
Status of Detainees, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/factsheets/detainee.htm 
(visited March 11, 2005). 
424 
Stephen Reder & Brian D. Tittemore, Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability 
for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge 5-6 (2001), 
http://www.cij.org/pdf/seven candidates for prosecution Cambodia.pdf 
Thierry Cruvellier and Marieke Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The First 
Eighteen Months, March 2004, 5 available at: 
www.ictj.org/downloads/SC SL Case Study designed.pdf, 
U.N. Dep't ofPublic Information, The Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Background Information (May 1998), at http:/www.un.org/icc/statute.htm. 
U.S. Department of State Press Statement, U.S. Signs tOOth Article 98 Agreement, May 
3, 2005, 2005/463, available at: http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2005/45573.htm 
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor- Mandate, available at: 
http://www .un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/mandate.html (visited September 10, 
2005). 
United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview, available 
at: http://www.un.org/law/icc/general!overview.html (last visited March 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter ICC Overview). 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, SIERRA LEONE- UNAMSIL-
BACKGROUND, available at: 
http://www. un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html ). 
United States Institute for Peace, RWANDA: ACCOUNT ABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES 
AND GENOCIDE (1995), available at http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/rwandal.hmtl 
United States Institute for Peace, Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide 
(1995), available at http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/rwandal.hrntl 
Wilton Park Conference, Towards Global Justice: Accountability and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), Feb. 4-8, 2002, at 
http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/web/welcome.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). 
425 
